Misrepresenting Halliday (1977/78) And Halliday (1973)

Fawcett (2010: 55):

For very many years the major new component of the second possible model of language was represented in Halliday's writings solely by the use of the term "semantics" as a placeholder in his summaries of what a language is like (e.g., in Halliday 1977/78:128). His nearest related work in this period was on the development, with Bernstein and Turner, of the concept of "socio-semantic" system networks (e.g., Halliday 1973:48-102) — but these only applied in very specific contexts of situation and consequently did not constitute a generalised semantics, as I pointed out in Fawcett (1975).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  What Fawcett dismisses as a mere "placeholder" is elaborated by Halliday (1978: 128) as follows:

[2] This is very misleading, because the wording 'as I pointed out in Fawcett (1975)' gives the false impression that Fawcett uncovered something unacknowledged in Halliday (1973). The initial context of language use under consideration in Halliday (1973) was announced at the beginning of the article and clarified as such with regard to his first semantic network (Figure 1), and its later developments (Figures 2 & 3). Halliday (1973/2003: 324-5, 328-9):

Let us take as an example the use of language by a mother for the purpose of controlling the behaviour of a child. …
Figure 1 is a first attempt at a semantic network for this context. …
Figure 2 More generalised version of earlier network …
Figure 3 Revised version of Figure 1 …

Subsequent semantic networks for other specific contexts are similarly qualified (op. cit.: 332-3, 335, 337-41):

Figure 4 Network for move in pontoon …
Figure 5 Pontoon move network showing recursive option …
Figure 6 Revised version of Figure 5 …
Figure 7 System network for greeting …
Figure 8 Network for agency in physical threat …
Figure 9 Network for physical threat …
Figure 10 Non-physical threat …
Figure 11 Network for warning …
Figure 12 Revised network for threats and warnings …

Misrepresenting Halliday On Lexicogrammatical Systems

Fawcett (2010: 55):

In the first approach, then, the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on are held to be choices in meaning, and so "the semantics" — very much as in the model proposed here. 

In the second approach, which we shall call the 'two-level model of meaning', the existing networks are held to be choices within the grammar (or the 'lexicogrammar') — albeit in a grammar that is described as having been "pushed [...] fairly far" towards the semantics, and whose networks Halliday still describes as modelling "meaning potential" (Halliday 1994:xix). These lower level choices in 'meaning' are said to be "preselected" by choices in a higher system network, which is itself the level of semantics.

Blogger Comment:

[1] As previously explained, the 'first approach' is Fawcett's misrepresentation of Halliday's grammatical networks as semantic networks.

[2] As previously explained, the 'second approach' is Halliday's actual model, wherein the said networks are grammatical systems.

[3] As previously explained, the wording 'two levels of meaning' misunderstands the principle of stratification.  To be clear, in SFL theory, the upper level of the content plane of language is meaning (semantics), and the lower level of the content plane of language is wording (lexicogrammar).  Lower level choices are choices in wording, not meaning.

[4] As previously explained, by the wording 'meaning potential', Halliday refers to language as system, not the stratum of semantics.  Halliday (1994) is titled An Introduction To Functional Grammar, and its introduction includes a discussion headed Grammar and Semantics (xix-xx), and the stratal distinctions of semantics, lexicogrammar and phonology (xiv).

(Trivially, the wording 'meaning potential' does not appear on the page cited by Fawcett: Halliday (1994: xix).)

∞

The reader is invited to consider why Fawcett repeats these misrepresentations of Halliday's model over and over and over and over, instead of just getting on with setting out his own theorising.

Misrepresenting Halliday's Writing As Indecisive And Lacking Specificity

Fawcett (2010: 54-5): 

In evaluating the lack of specificity that is sometimes found in Halliday's writings — which at times risks being interpreted as indecisiveness — it is important to understand the spirit in which he 'does his linguistics'. Essentially, he is an explorer. His typical practice is to suggest some new idea, and then to explore its possibilities in text-descriptive terms to see how far it fits in with other concepts in the theory, rather than to present the world with new 'truths'.

The idea that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on are choices between meanings — and that they are therefore essentially semantic choices — was initially just one such tentative proposal, as we saw in Section 4.3, but the warmth of its reception by many systemic linguists at the time (though not all; compare Hudson 1971) did not prevent Halliday from exploring, in parallel, an alternative approach to the representation of meaning. It is significant that his 1973 book, in which the two alternative positions on 'meaning' are discussed, was entitled Explorations in the Functions of Language. From the early 1970s onwards, then, Halliday has consistently held open the possibility of exploring two alternative models of the stratification of meaning. But the fact that each makes 'meaning' central to understanding language means that they can easily be confused and the distinctions blurred.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here Fawcett misrepresents his own inability to understand Halliday's writing as deficiencies on Halliday's part, appraising it in terms of negative appreciation, 'lack of specificity', and negative judgement, 'indecisiveness'.

[2] Here yet again Fawcett repeats his own misrepresentation of Halliday's grammatical networks as semantic networks, as if multiple repetitions of the claim have established it as valid (the logical fallacy of proof by assertion).  To be clear, in SFL theory, grammatical networks realise semantics; that is, as networks of wording, they are construed as a lower level of symbolic abstraction than meaning.

[3] This is misleading.  To be clear, the approach that Fawcett labels as "alternative" is Halliday's only view on the matter: that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME are grammatical systems that realise semantics, rather than semantic systems.

[4] The wording 'stratification of meaning' betrays Fawcett's misunderstanding of stratification.  It is language that is stratified, not meaning; meaning is but one stratum in this hierarchy of symbolic abstraction.

[5] As demonstrated over and over here, the confusions and the blurring of distinctions in this regard arise solely from Fawcett's inability to understand Halliday's writing.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Lexicogrammatical Systems

Fawcett (2010: 54):

Whatever the reason, the fact is that Halliday felt justified at the time in presenting the existing networks as at least a first approximation to what was needed for a representation of the meaning potential of English. Thus the existing system networks had an ambivalent status between being at the level of form (for which they had been developed) and being at the level of meaning (which they were now said to represent). 

It may have been the ambivalence of the status of the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on that allowed Halliday both to think of his existing networks as 'semantic' and at the same time to explore the alternative approach to the representation of meaning to which we shall come shortly. But the point to note here is that Halliday himself never embraced fully the revolutionary change described above in Section 4.4 — despite the fact that it was his own proposal. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] See the previous post.

[2] To be clear, 'meaning potential' is Halliday's characterisation of language as system, as opposed to language as text.  It does not refer solely to the semantic stratum as a level of symbolic abstraction.

[3] This is misleading.  To be clear, Halliday's grammatical networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, and THEME did not, and do not, have ambivalent status with regard to stratal location.  This is Fawcett's misunderstanding, deriving from his mistaking 'meaning potential' for the stratum of meaning; see [2] above.

[4] This is misleading.  The claim that these networks are at the level of meaning is Fawcett's, not Halliday's.

[5] This is very misleading.  To be clear, 'Halliday himself never embraced fully the revolutionary change' of relocating his networks to semantics because the fact is that it was not his proposal, merely Fawcett's misunderstanding, as explained above.  The logical fallacy deployed by Fawcett continues to be proof by assertion.

[6] Trivially, this was discussed in Section 4.3; Section 4.4 was concerned with the notion of metafunction.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Lexicogrammatical Systems

Fawcett (2010: 53-4):

So why, we may wonder, did Halliday not carry out such a programme of semanticising his system networks? We may make a number of guesses at the possible reasons. These might have included:

1. The enthusiastic welcome already given to the existing networks by new converts to systemic linguists;
2. the lack of serious criticism of the networks by his immediate colleagues — a lack that is perhaps not surprising, given that Halliday's main collaborators at the time were Hudson and Huddleston, both of whom were more 'form-centred' than Halliday himself (as they have continued to be); 
3. Halliday's preoccupation in that period with various other aspects of the burgeoning work, both in the theory and its applications in many fields, to many of which he contributed personally; 
4. the concern that the features in the new networks would be so much further removed from their realisations at the level of form that the new realisation statements (to use Halliday's term) would be very hard to write; 
5. sheer lack of time to undertake this task, given its size and his other commitments.

Blogger Comments:

As previously explained, the system networks in question were and are grammatical networks, and that is the reason why Halliday didn't "semanticise" them.  This is another instance of the logical fallacy of proof by assertion.