Fawcett's Functional Semantics Handbook

Fawcett (2010: 294):

This 'syntax handbook' will be complemented in due course by a 'semantics handbook', i.e., my Functional Semantics Handbook: Analysing English at the level of meaning. (Fawcett forthcoming a). This 'semantics handbook' will build on the syntactic analyses provided in the 'syntax handbook', to provide an equivalent framework for the analysis of texts in terms of eight 'strands of meaning'. In the past, users of systemic functional grammars have often found it hard to locate and interpret system networks, so it may be useful to add that those in the Functional Semantic Handbook are designed to be easy to consult and to inte[r]pret — both as an introduction to the systemic-semantic level of language (here English), and for use when analysing a text in systemic-semantic terms. This approach to text analysis solves the difficulty of how to show the multifunctional nature of language in a representation of a text without using the theoretically problematical 'multiple structures' used in IFG.

We have seen an example of an analysis that draws on the two handbooks in Figure 10 in Chapter 7. In such a representation, the multifunctional nature of language is shown in terms of the features that have been chosen at the level of meaning (rather than as 'multiple structures' that lie somewhere between meaning and form, as in IFG). The major feature of the Functional Semantics Handbook will be a full set of system networks that define the meaning potential of English, presented in such a way that they can be used for text analysis.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this promised work is still unpublished, 21 years after the first edition of this book.

[2] To be clear, as previously demonstrated over and over, it is not the 'multiple structures' that are problematic, but Fawcett's understanding of them.

[3] To be clear, as previously demonstrated over and over, Fawcett's representation (Figure 10) confuses paradigmatic features with syntagmatic elements, and provides no metafunctional structures for a theory claimed to be functional.

[4] This is misleading. To be clear, the 'multiple structures' are functions of clause constituents interpreted in terms of the meanings they realise.

Fawcett's Understanding Of "The Concepts Underlying IFG"

Fawcett (2010: 285-6):

The core of the IFG framework still appears to be the concept of units on the 'rank scale' — even though it is mentioned only occasionally in IFG and not at all in "Systemic theory". Moreover, the concept of class (which is always 'class of unit') is tied into the 'rank scale' too, in that it is defined in terms of its patterns of operation in the unit next above on the 'rank scale'. The concept of element of structure continues to serve a vital role in the theory, though it receives little overt recognition. The concept of delicacy seems to hover between being a theoretical category and a descriptive convenience. (Systemically the more important concept is dependence, and structurally, as I suggested in Section 10.3.4 of Chapter 10, showing structures with varying degrees of delicacy adds unnecessary complexity to the representation of texts.) And exponence in "Categories" was a concept waiting to be redefined as realisation, and then needing to be split up into specific realisation operations. The original concept of 'exponence' has no role in the theory of syntax that underlies IFG, though 'realisation' is used as the general term for the interstratal relationship. To these concepts from "Categories" Halliday has added three further ones: 'multiple structures' in the clause, and 'parataxis' and 'hypotaxis'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. On the one hand, the rank scale provides the organisation of Halliday (1994), and the entry conditions to grammatical systems. On the other hand, the rank scale is, of course, mentioned in "Systemic Theory". Halliday (1995 [1993]: 273):

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, units (e.g. groups) are classified (e.g. nominal) according to the elements of structure of the higher rank that they prototypically realise (e.g. participant).

[3] This is misleading, though comically so, because all editions of IFG pay far more attention to elements of structure — at clause rank: participants, processes and circumstances — than they do to the systems that specify them.

[4] This is misleading, also comically so, because delicacy is the ordering principle of the system network (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 20), which is the fundamental formalism of Systemic Functional Theory.

[5] This is misleading, because taxis (interdependency) is not more important than delicacy, if only because taxis is confined to the logical metafunction, whereas delicacy is a dimension of every system of all metafunctions.

[6] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue, no matter how many times Fawcett repeats it (the logical fallacy known as the argument from repetition). On the one hand, the organising principle of such structures is composition (extension), not delicacy (elaboration). On the other hand, the bare assertion that they add unnecessary complexity to the description is invalidated by the additional explanatory potential that they provide.

[7] This is misleading. On the one hand, the term 'exponence' (Halliday 1961) was not redefined as realisation. Instead, SFL Theory distinguishes two different types of relation that were conflated in Firth's use of the term: realisation and instantiation. On the other hand, the concept of realisation is not "split up into specific realisation operations". That is, realisation operations are not subtypes of the concept of realisation, but statements that identify circumstances in which the relation obtains. 

[8] This is misleading. On the one hand, the two relations inherent in the original concept of 'exponence', realisation and instantiation, both play very important rôles in SFL Theory. On the other hand, realisation is not merely the relation between strata. Realisation obtains wherever there is a relation of symbolic abstraction, as, for example, between:

• function and form,
• system and structure,
• selection expression and lexical item.

And importantly, SFL Theory reduces syntax (and morphology) to a rank scale of formal units, which is not what Fawcett means by "the theory of syntax that underlies IFG".

[9] This is seriously misleading, because it misrepresents SFL Theory as simply the addition of metafunction structures and taxis to Scale & Category Grammar; see the following post for evidence that invalidates the claim.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Delicacy And Structure

Fawcett (2010: 284):

Finally, Halliday's term delicacy is, in the present theory, restricted solely to relationships within the system networks. However, Halliday continues to use the concept in his structural descriptions of clauses in IFG (as pointed out in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2 and Section 7.2 of Chapter 7). The disadvantage of this is that it adds one or more extra lines of structure to a clause, so introducing unnecessary complexity to the analysis.

However, each of the two current theories has added new structural concepts of its own. The Sydney Grammar has added the concept that a clause (and, potentially, each of the other units) has a multiple structure, i.e., it has several structures, each of which corresponds to a different broad type of meaning (roughly, to each 'metafunction', but with two for the 'textual' 'metafunction').

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is also true in SFL Theory.

[2] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. The notion of 'structural delicacy' features solely in Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961). In SFL Theory ("IFG"), the structures that Fawcett refers to, such as Subject and Finite constituting Mood, the structural relation is recognised as one of composition (extension), not delicacy (elaboration), as previously explained in the examination of Sections 2.4 and 7.2.

[3] This is misleading, because providing a more detailed analysis of structure is not, of itself, a disadvantage, especially if it increases the explanatory potential of the model, as it does in this case.

[4]  This is misleading. To be clear, this concept was foundational — not added — to SFL Theory ("the Sydney Grammar").

[5] This is misleading. To be clear, in SFL Theory, units have multiple structures, which is not synonymous with "a multiple structure", this misunderstanding being one source of Fawcett's false notion of "structure conflation".

[6] This is misleading. To be clear, there is only one textual structure of the clause, though this single structure may include textual, interpersonal and experiential components.

Misrepresenting SFL Theory On Structure And Conflation

  Fawcett (2010: 279):

At this point we might remind ourselves that, in the new framework that is proposed here, the multifunctional nature of language is displayed in the analysis of a text at the level of meaning — so avoiding the problems that arise from the challenge of (1) generating and (2) integrating five or more different structures (as described in Chapter 7). This is achieved by arranging the features that have been chosen in generating it in separate lines, as in Figure 10 in Chapter 7. And we should also remind ourselves that the the application of the realisation operations attached to the semantic features generates a single, integrated output structure, so making it both undesirable and unnecessary to generate 'intermediate' structures such as those found in IFG.

The conclusion, therefore, is that single, coterminous elements are the only categories that can be conflated with each other — and this brings out yet more strongly the centrality in the theory of the concept of 'element of structure'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, 'in the new framework that is proposed here', the systemic meanings of all metafunctions are incongruously realised structurally by elements of the interpersonal metafunction: Subject, Complement, Adjunct, Finite ("Operator") and Predicator ("Main Verb"), though, as Figure 10 shows, the experiential elements of Agent and Medium ("Affected") are incongruously presented as both syntactic elements and semantic features.

[2] This is misleading. On the one hand, as previously demonstrated, these problems are imaginary, since they arise from Fawcett's misunderstandings of SFL Theory. On the other hand, because Fawcett has exported most of what is lexicogrammar in SFL Theory to semantic systems, and not provided those semantic systems (or realisation rules), he has hidden any the potential problems that arise in such a model.

[3] To be clear, as acknowledged by Fawcett, and illustrated in Figure 10, the Cardiff Grammar incongruously presents paradigmatic features as syntagmatic elements of structure. This is inconsistent in terms of axis. Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 10, the Cardiff Grammar incongruously conflates categories of different levels of symbolic abstraction: Subject (syntax) with Agent (semantics), and Complement (syntax) with Affected (semantics). This is inconsistent in terms of stratification.

[4] To be clear, on the one hand, Fawcett does not provide these realisation operations. On the other hand, in Fawcett's model (Figure 4), realisation operations are located at the level of form, not meaning (semantics).

[5] This is misleading, because the metafunctional structures in IFG are not intermediate structures, but construals of the different metafunctional meanings realised in the clause. Fawcett's misrepresentation in this regard arises from his inability to understand that these structures are integrated in a syntagm of clause constituents, as previously explained.

[6] This is misleading, because it falsely implies that this is not the case in SFL Theory. Fawcett has falsely claimed that SFL conflates structures rather than elements. Moreover, Fawcett's model incongruously conflates his semantic features (Agent, Affected) with his syntactic elements (Subject, Complement).

[7] To be clear, this is a non-sequitur, because the conflation of elements says nothing at all about the centrality of the notion of 'element of structure' in a theory, since conflation can be posited in any theory that features the notion of 'element of structure' — whether as central or peripheral in the theory.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Conflation

 Fawcett (2010: 278-9):

Moreover, in his writings from the late 1960s onwards the emphasis is always placed on the concept that an element of a clause such as 'Subject' is not a single element but a conflation of three "functions" — and so the expression in structure of the concept that language simultaneously realises several different types of meaning.

However, as we saw in Chapter 7, Halliday immediately extended the concept of the conflation of single coterminous elements to the much more ambitious concept that a whole unit such as the clause can be represented as a series of simultaneous but different structures. This implied in turn that the various structures, each roughly the length of a clause and each with 'elements' that were not coterminous with the elements in the other structures of the same clause, were to be unified, by the application of a final 'structure conflation' rule of an unspecified type, into a single, integrated structure. But the concept that five or more different clause-length structures can be 'integrated' is, as we have seen, theoretically untenable (except in the trivial sense that involves dismembering the structures into their 'lowest common denominators').

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Firstly, 'Subject' is not an element of a clause, but of the interpersonal structure of a clause. Secondly, 'Subject' is a single element of the interpersonal structure of a clause. Thirdly, 'Subject' is not a conflation of three functions; 'Subject' is one of the three functions that are conflated (e.g. Subject/Theme/Behaver).

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. 'Subject' is the realisation of just one type of meaning, interpersonal, not several types of meaning.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The SFL notion that clause structures vary by metafunction is not an extension of the concept of conflation, if only because conflation requires the prior distinction of metafunctional structures whose elements can be conflated. Importantly, unknown to Fawcett, in SFL Theory, structures can not be conflated, because a structure is the relation between elements. See the posts examining Chapter 7 here.

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The SFL model, which Fawcett demonstrably does not understand, does not imply a structure conflation rule, if only because structures are not conflated in SFL Theory.

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Revealingly, here Fawcett switches terminology from 'conflation' to 'integration', which suggests he is, in fact, aware of the SFL principle that he is choosing not to mention. In SFL Theory, the three metafunctional structures of the clause are integrated in the syntagm of its constituents (groups ± phrases). Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 74):

The clause, as we said, is the mainspring of grammatical energy; it is the unit where meanings of different kinds, experiential, interpersonal and textual, are integrated into a single syntagm.

[6] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, there are three clause structures: textual, interpersonal and experiential. Fawcett's miscalculation arises from misconstruing information structure as clause structure, and from counting the textual and interpersonal structures twice, as previously explained.

Conflation, Filling And Componence In A Modern Systemic Functional Grammar

Fawcett (2010: 253-4):

Up to this point I have been writing as if it was the Subject or the Complement that is filled by a nominal group. But it is, strictly speaking, the Participant Role (PR) that is conflated with the Subject or the Complement that the unit below fills. This is because, in generation, it is typically the PR which predicts what the unit will be, and the likely semantic features of the entity to be generated. (The configuration of PRs in a clause is in turn closely tied to the Process type, which is typically realised in the Main Verb.) However, from the viewpoint of drawing tree diagrams when analysing text-sentences, it makes little difference whether you picture the unit as filling the PR or as filling the element with which it is conflated. …

The introduction of the relationship of 'filling' as a complement to that of 'componence' is probably one of the Cardiff Grammar's main contributions to developing a theory of syntax for a modern systemic functional grammar.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, if two elements are conflated, then the lower rank unit realises ("fills") both of them. For example, the nominal group people realises both the Subject and Carrier in the clause people are strange.

[2] To be clear, as previously observed, Fawcett's model of structure does not present a configuration of process and participants — an experiential structure — since there is no process and the participants are only construed as conflated with interpersonal elements.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the Process of experiential clause structure corresponds to the Finite and Predicator of interpersonal structure (as well as one or more Adjuncts, in the case of phrasal verbs). In Fawcett's model (e.g. p305), the Process can correspond to several elements, including the Operator, Negator, Infinitive Element, Auxiliary Verb, Auxiliary Verb Extension, Main Verb, and up to 3 Main Verb Extensions.

[4] This is true.

[5] This may well be true. However, there are several problems here:

• filling and componence both misconstrue function and form as the same level of symbolic abstraction;
• componence misconstrues functions as parts of forms;
• SFL does not model grammar in terms of syntax (Halliday 1985: xiv);
• the Cardiff Grammar is not a modern systemic functional grammar because
• it is not modern, but developed from Halliday's superseded Scale & Category Grammar;
• it is not systemic, because its priority is structure, not system; and
• it is not functional, because its priority is form, not function.

The Absence Of Experiential Structure In The Cardiff Grammar

Fawcett (2010: 249-50):

… every Participant Role (PR) is introduced to the structure by being conflated with an element such as Subject. A PR is simply a particular type of element that is generated from the experiential component of the system network, and it is not a different order of phenomenon from an 'element'. A PR may appear to be more 'semantic' than an element such as Subject, but it is not. The presence of each in the structure directly expresses a meaning, and the only difference is that the meaning expressed by a PR (such as Agent) is overtly referred to in the name of the features in the system network, e.g., as [overt agent] and [covert agent], as in Figure 10 in Chapter 7. … It is the concept of 'conflation' that expresses the multifunctional nature of language, and the same concept and notation are used in all versions of SFL.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] To be clear, this is a serious shortcoming of Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar, since it is inconsistent with the notion of structure in SFL Theory. Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 60):

The significance of any functional label lies in its relationship to the other functions with which it is structurally associated. It is the structure as a whole, the total configuration of functions, that construes, or realises, the meaning. The function Actor, for example, is interpretable only in its relation to other functions of the same kind — other representational functions such as Process and Goal. So if we interpret the nominal group I as Actor in I caught the first ball, this is meaningful only because at the same time we interpret the verbal group caught as Process and the nominal group the first ball as Goal. It is the relation among all these that constitutes the structure. In similar fashion, the Subject enters into configurations with other functional elements as realisation of the clause as exchange; and similarly the Theme, in realising the clause as message.

That is, Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar provides no experiential structure of the clause, since it does not provide a total configuration of functions in which Agent, Process and Medium, for example, are structurally related. By the same token, Cardiff Grammar provides no textual structure of the clause, since it does not provide a total configuration of functions in which Theme and Rheme are structurally related.

[2] This is not misleading, because it is true.

[3] This is true, but potentially misleading. In SFL Theory, both Subject and Agent (PR) are both semantic and lexicogrammatical. This is because lexicogrammatical forms, such as nominal groups, are analysed in terms of their functions in realising meanings, such as Subject and Agent. In the absence of grammatical metaphor, semantics and lexicogrammar are in agreement (congruent).

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The crucial difference between Subject and a participant role is metafunctional: Subject is an interpersonal function, whereas a participant role is an experiential function.

[5] To be clear, this is seriously inconsistent with SFL Theory, in which all elements of syntagmatic structure — including both Subject and participant roles — are specified in paradigmatic systems.

[6] To be clear, Fawcett does not supply the system network from which Figure 10 is derived.

[7] This is misleading, because Fawcett's use of the concept of conflation is significantly different from its use in SFL Theory. In SFL Theory, conflation correlates elements of different metafunctional structures, whereas in Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar, conflation fuses different metafunctional elements into a single structure, thereby creating metafunctional inconsistency in that structure.

Why Dependency Relations Are Undesirable In Fawcett's Model Of Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 249):

However, it can be shown that it is not in fact necessary — nor even desirable — to model sister dependency relations in syntax. As I pointed out in Section 10.3.3 of Chapter 10, the supposed 'dependency' of a "modifier' on the "head' on a unit (e.g., in a nominal group) is a 'second order' concept, and ultimately an uninsightful one. In a SF grammar the relationship between the two elements is more appropriately seen as an indirect one, because each element realises its own aspect of the meaning of a referent, and the relationship is therefore at the level of meaning rather than form. In other words, in a SF grammar, any relationship of apparent 'syntactic sister dependency' is already expressed, in a natural manner, in the dependency relations by which one system is dependent on another in the system network of the language's meaning potential. For the systemic grammarian this is the true location of dependence (or 'dependency').

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. On the one hand, Fawcett's argument is invalid because it relies on his own misunderstandings of theory; see further below. On the other hand, interdependency is valuable for its explanatory potential across all grammatical ranks. This is demonstrated at group rank, for example, where the logical structure of the verbal group realises the system of TENSE in English. Halliday (1994: 198-9):

[2] See the examination of Section 10.3.3 — Confusing Structure With (Transcendent) Ideational Denotation — for a dissection of Fawcett's first-stated misunderstandings on this matter.

[3] Here Fawcett repeats his confusion of logical structure (dependency relations) with ideational denotation ("each element realises its own aspect of the meaning of a referent").

[4] To be clear, on the one hand, 'meaning and form' are levels in Fawcett's model (Figure 4), not in SFL Theory. On the other hand, in SFL Theory, dependency relations obtain at both levels of content, semantics and lexicogrammar — with mismatches constituting instances of grammatical metaphor — and are modelled in systems that specify their structural realisations.

[5] This is misleading. In SFL Theory, dependency relations are modelled as systems, not by dependency relations between systems. For example, 

Strictly speaking, system networks do not construe dependency relations between systems. However, it could be said that entry to a system "depends on" the selection of its entry condition.

Fawcett's Argument Against Dependency Relations In A Footnote

 Fawcett (2010: 248-9n):

¹¹ … However, in Fawcett & Davies (1992) and Lin & Fawcett (1996), my colleagues and I have demonstrated (in terms of both visual diagrams and a computer implementation) that sister dependency relations can always be interpreted in constituency terms without loss of information. 

… the 'sister-dependency' approach has certain disadvantages. Firstly, it lacks the concept of 'class of unit' (channelling all 'constituency' relations through the 'head'). Secondly, the sister dependency approach raises questions about which element 'depends on' which, when there is frequently not in fact any 'dependency' between them — even between the features in the system network from which the elements are generated.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, dependency is modelled as the univariate iterative structure of the logical metafunction, whereas constituency is the basis of the multivariate segmental structure of the experiential metafunction. Halliday (1994: 36):

Because of this, interpreting dependency in constituency terms "loses" the logical dimension of ideational meaning.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Since interdependency relates formal units — clause, group/phrase, word, morpheme — in complexes, it does not "lack the concept of class of unit", as demonstrated, for example, by nominal group complexes, verbal group complexes, etc. The element Head, on the other hand, identifies the function of one of the formal units in a complex.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. SFL Theory distinguishes two types of interdependency: parataxis and hypotaxis. Parataxis involves units of equal status, whereas hypotaxis involves units of unequal status. The dependency of a unit in a hypotactic complex is demonstrated by its inability to stand alone, as in the case of the dependent clause because they trusted Fawcett without question… .

Componence vs Dependency

Fawcett (2010: 248):

Throughout this book I have assumed, as most linguists do, that the dominant relationship in modelling relationships in syntax is 'constituency'. And in spelling out the concepts that make up 'constituency' I have assumed that it is the concept of 'componence' that expresses the 'part-whole' relationship. However, there is an alternative concept that has at times attracted the support of a number of fine linguists. It is often called 'dependency grammar' — but, strictly speaking, it should instead be called "sister dependency grammar". … The question is: "Is it either necessary or desirable to show 'sister dependency' relations in the syntactic representation of a text-sentence?" If it is either necessary or desirable, this would have a profound effect on the proposals set out here, and in particular on the place of 'componence' in the theory.¹¹

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, SFL Theory distinguishes four types of structure, only one of which is based on constituency. Halliday (1994: 36):

[2] As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's notion of componence confuses formal constituency with the relation between function (element) and form (unit).

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, interdependency is used to relate units in complexes at all ranks.

[4] To be clear, whether or not interdependency is "necessary of desirable", componence has no place in SFL Theory because it is invalidated through its confusion of function with form.

Fawcett's Argument Against Mood And Residue

Fawcett (2010: 217-8):

Let us now address the question of how far we need, in a modern SF grammar, the "more delicate differentiations" in "structure" that Halliday introduces in "Categories" (1961/76:63). There the 'primary' structure of the nominal group was said to be "M H Q", i.e., "modifier + head + qualifier", and the distinctions within the "modifier' between "deictic", "numerative" and "epithet", etc., were said to be a matter of 'secondary' structure.

The first point to make is that these "secondary structures" do not — in principle at least — constitute another layer of structure in the representation. Halliday emphasises that they are "still structures of the same unit, not of the unit next below" — the key point being that "they take account of finer distinctions recognisable at the same rank" (by which he means "in the same unit"). However, the fact is that when he introduces such "secondary structures" to the representation of a text-sentence alongside the "primary structures", he adds another line to the analysis — as the presence of two lines of analysis for MOOD in Figure 7 in Chapter 7 clearly illustrates. Indeed, every finite clause in IFG is analysed terms of (1) its "Mood" and "Residue", and then within the "Mood" (2) its "Subject" and "Finite".

If the line showing the "Mood" and "Residue" is removed from such diagrams, the display of the analysis becomes simpler to read, while still preserving the essential insight that it is the relationship of the Subject and the Finite that is the primary expression of the meaning of MOOD. In other words, I am suggesting here that the additional layer of analysis into "Mood" and "Residue" detracts from the insightfulness of the diagram rather than adding to it. Figure 10 illustrates the way in which the semantic information can be extracted directly from the relationship of the Subject and Operator (or Finite). 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett has stopped outlining his own model, and has returned to one of his previous critiques of Halliday's model. However, despite claiming to be concerned with "a modern SF grammar", he focusses here on Halliday's superseded theory, Scale and Category Grammar (1961), which featured neither metafunctions nor system networks.

In SFL Theory, 'delicacy' does not apply to structure, there are no secondary structures, and the structures of the nominal group are differentiated in terms of metafunction: logical (Modifier ^ Head) vs experiential (Deictic ^ Numerative ^ Epithet etc.).

[2] This is misleading. Without acknowledging the fact, here Fawcett switches attention from Scale and Category Grammar to SFL Theory. In Scale & Category Grammar, the elements of clause structure are simply Subject, Predicator, Complement, Adjunct (Halliday 2002 [1961]: 47). The Mood and Residue blocks were not theorised in Scale & Category Grammar. 

[3] This is not misleading, because it is true for indicative clauses.

[4] To be clear, Fawcett's argument against the theoretical categories of Mood and Residue is that their representation in structural analyses makes them harder for him to read.

[5] To be clear, the structural element Mood is functionally motivated. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 142, 143):

The Mood is the element that realises the selection of mood in the clause; and it is also the domain of agreement between Subject and Finite. …

(1) The presence of the Mood element, consisting of Subject plus Finite, realises the feature ‘indicative’. 

(2) Within the indicative, what is significant is the order of Subject and Finite:

(a) The order Subject before Finite realises ‘declarative’;

(b) The order Finite before Subject realises ‘yes-no interrogative’;

(c) In a ‘WH- interrogative’ the order is: 

(i) Subject before Finite if the WH-element is the Subject;

(ii) Finite before Subject otherwise.

[6] This misleading, because Figure 10 (below) does not show how "the semantic information can be extracted directly from the relationship of the Subject and Operator (or Finite)". It merely juxtaposes Fawcett's semantic and syntactic categories for one instance. Moreover, the semantic networks from which these features are derived are not provided anywhere in this publication.

Note also that Fawcett incongruously relabels Halliday's Mood element we would as 'information-giver'.

Misunderstanding Interpersonal Metaphor As The Experientialisation Of Non-Experiential Meaning

 Fawcett (2010: 210-1):

While the nominalisation of events is both the most frequent type of incongruence and the type with the most subtle variations, there are many others, such as the expression of a quality as a thing, e.g., his great happiness.

Halliday discusses such phenomena under the general heading of "grammatical metaphor" (e.g., Halliday 1994:340f.). However, the scope of the term has become very broad, and I find it more helpful to think in terms of specific types of phenomena. Thus, nominalisation occurs within experiential meaning, so that it is a different matter from the experientialisation of non-experiential meaning — e.g., saying It's possible that he'll be there rather than He may be there. See Fawcett (in press) for a rather fuller picture of these relationships.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands nominalisation. To be clear, in SFL Theory, nominalisation is the reconstrual of processes and qualities as things (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 314). That is, Fawcett's "other" type of incongruence is actually just another example of nominalisation.

[2] This is misleading. Halliday's grammatical metaphor is an incongruent relation between semantics and grammar, not between an extra-linguistic belief system and linguistic meaning (semantics).

[3] To be clear, the theoretical notion of grammatical metaphor is clearly defined and systematically described. For ideational metaphor, see Chapter 6 in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 227-296).

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, this is an instance of an interpersonal metaphor of modality, not "the experientialisation of non-experiential meaning". The non-metaphorical use of may is an instance of implicit subjective modality, whereas the metaphorical use of it's possible that is an instance of explicit objective modality. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 186):

[5] To be clear, Fawcett (in press) is still unpublished, 21 years after the first edition of this publication.

Fawcett's Grammatical Metaphor As An Incongruent Relation Between Ideational Meaning And Non-Language

Fawcett (2010: 209-10):

I have referred in previous sections to correspondences between 'syntactic', 'semantic' and 'conceptual' units. Let us now consider the relationship between the syntactic units and their 'higher' equivalents. We shall focus upon the two main classes of syntactic unit: the clause and the nominal group.

How do these come to be generated? The answer is that they originate (typically) at the level of logical form, in the planner (which draws in turn on the belief system). They are typically represented as events and the objects that occur in events. These are then processed in the semantics, where an event is typically expressed as a situation and an object as a thing — and these in turn are then realised as a clause and a nominal group. However, there is not necessarily a one-to-one relationship between logical form, which is extralinguistic) and the intra-linguistic level of semantics. Figure 12 gives an overview of the two possibilities for incongruent correspondences between these. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] As this makes plain, Fawcett's theory of language is actually a model of text generation by computer.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett nowhere elaborates on the organisation of logical form, but it can be noted that his location of it outside language is inconsistent with its conception in linguistics, philosophy and mathematics. In linguistics, it refers to a syntactic structure that is interpreted semantically:

In generative grammar and related approaches, the logical Form (LF) of a linguistic expression is the variant of its syntactic structure which undergoes semantic interpretation.

whereas in philosophy and mathematics, it is the semantic interpretation of a syntactic expression:

In philosophy and mathematics, logical form of a syntactic expression is a precisely-specified semantic version of that expression in a formal system.

[3] To be clear, Fawcett's events and objects are ideational meanings relocated outside language. Interpersonal and textual meanings are absent, and so are not accounted for here at the level of belief system (or semantics).

[4] To be clear, Figure 12 misrepresents relations between levels, expression and realisation, as levels.

[5] To be clear, here Fawcett is interpreting grammatical metaphor — an incongruent relation between semantics and grammar — as an incongruent relation between ideational semantics and a higher level of meaning outside language. The possibility of interpersonal metaphor is not entertained.

Problems With The Term 'Quality Group'

Fawcett (2010: 206-7, 207n):

The term 'quality' is borrowed directly from the term used in the system network for the meanings that are realised in this unit. But, in a model of language in which the syntax is seen as the reflection of meaning, it is natural to introduce an explicitly functional label in this way. (The reason why this approach is not followed for the 'nominal' and 'prepositional' groups is that the labels that reflect the 'word class' tradition are so well established.) There is, of course, a long tradition in linguistics of using functional labels for categories that are in fact the realisations of meanings (as the term 'nominal" originally was), and there is certainly no reason to avoid using such labels — especially in an explicitly functional grammar such as the present one.¹² This discussion illustrates nicely the important fact — which is often overlooked — that it is not only the elements that are functional, but also the units.

¹² It has been suggested that we might call the group the "adjective-adverb group" to preserve the parallelism with the "nominal group", but it seems more natural, in the framework of an explicitly functional grammar, to use a label that directly expresses the type of meaning that this unit expresses.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett does not provide the system network featuring the term 'quality'. Moreover, in terms of ideational meaning, his Figure 12 (p210) only features 'situation', realised by clause, and 'thing', realised by nominal group. Interpersonal and textual semantics are not featured.

[2] To be clear, in Systemic Functional Theory, syntax is not seen as a "reflection" of meaning, since syntax and meaning are different levels of symbolic abstraction, whereas a phenomenon and its reflection are not. This suggests that Fawcett does not understand the principle of realisation.

[3] To be clear, introducing an explicitly functional label for a unit of form creates a theoretical inconsistency. In SFL Theory, forms are modelled as a constituency hierarchy, a rank scale, with constituents assigned functions in the unit of which they are constituents, as exemplified by an adverbial group serving the functions 'Manner' circumstance or 'comment Adjunct' in clause structure.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, an element is the function served by a unit; e.g. the element Senser is the function served by the unit nominal group.

[5] To be clear, a grammatical unit and its meaning are different levels of symbolic abstraction, and to label a grammatical form in terms of its meaning is to confuse levels of symbolic abstraction in the architecture of the theory. Moreover, units realise not just ideational meanings, but those of the interpersonal and textual metafunctions. But most importantly, this approach "leapfrogs" the more immediate grammatical functions realised by a 'quality unit', such as Attribute (participant), Manner (circumstance), Adjunct, and Theme or Rheme.

Problems With Fawcett's Quality Group

 Fawcett (2010: 206):

The quality group has as its pivotal element (the apex) an adjective or an adverb (typically a manner adverb). The quality group corresponds to the semantic unit of 'quality'. However we should note that the 'quality' may be a quality of either a 'thing' (e.g., clever) or a 'situation' (e.g., cleverly in He cleverly opened it with a paper clip). Thus quality groups that refer to the quality of an object have an adjective as their apex, and quality groups that refer to an event have, typically, a manner adverb at their apex — but sometimes other classes of adverb, such as the 'usuality' adverb often.¹¹

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett applies a functional label to a formal unit, a group, thereby creating a theoretical inconsistency with regard to other groups in his own model, not least because he labels this group 'from above' (function) despite classifying it 'from below' (structure). In SFL Theory, formal units are assigned functions in the structure of the unit above them in the rank scale. For example, 

• the word clever is assigned the function Epithet in the nominal group a clever device,
• the nominal group (very) clever is assigned the function Attribute in the clause he's not (very) clever, and 
• the adverbial group (very) cleverly is assigned the function Manner: quality in the clause He (very) cleverly opened it with a paper clip.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, qualities can be realised as circumstances (Manner), participants (Attribute) or a feature of a Process, as in he sped around the corner, where sped means 'moved speedily'. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 208):

[3] To be clear, in Fawcett's model, 'situation' is the semantic unit — regardless of metafunction — realised in syntax by a clause. Its nearest equivalent in SFL Theory is the ideational unit 'figure' (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999).

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, this variant of Fawcett's quality group is a nominal group with Epithet as Head, as in (she's) quite clever:

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, this variant of Fawcett's quality group is an adverbial group, as in (he does not plan) very cleverly:

[6] To be clear, in Fawcett's model (Figure 12), 'event' is not language, but a 'belief system' unit, that is typically realised in language as a 'situation' in semantics, and as a clause in syntax. As previously explained, this is inconsistent with the the epistemological assumptions on which SFL Theory is founded.

[7] To be clear, the 'usuality' adverb often does not realise a quality — not least because 'usuality' is interpersonal in function, whereas 'quality' is ideational. This highlights the general inconsistency here: many groups with an adverb as its apex do not construe qualities; for example (from Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 313, 191):

• adverbs of place: abroad, overseas, home, upstairs, downstairs, inside, outside; out, up, down, behind; left, right, straight; there, here
• adverbs of time: today, yesterday, tomorrow; now, then
• adverbs serving as comment Adjuncts: naturally, inevitably, obviously, clearly, plainly, doubtless, indubitably, unsurprisingly, predictably, surprisingly, unexpectedly, evidently, allegedly, supposedly, arguably, presumably, luckily, fortunately, hopefully, sadly, unfortunately, amusingly, funnily, importantly, significantly, wisely, cleverly, foolishly, stupidly, rightly, correctly, justifiably, wrongly, unjustifiably, characteristically, typically, truly, honestly, seriously, admittedly, certainly, actually, really, generally, broadly, roughly, ordinarily, frankly, candidly, honestly, confidentially, personally, strictly, tentatively

Exponents Of The Elements Of Fawcett's Prepositional Group

 Fawcett (2010: 204-5):

The element 'preposition' is typically expounded by an item from the word class with the same name, i.e., by a preposition. But occasionally it is filled by a quality group, as in the underlined portions of very near the wall and more like his mother than he used to be. (In this last example the quality group is discontinuous; see Section 11.7 of Chapter 11 for 'discontinuity'.) And in other cases the unit of the quantity group is 'borrowed' to express the internal structure within the prepositional element, as in right into the corner. 

The second major element is the completive, and this is practically always filled by one or more nominal groups; see Appendix B and, for a more complete picture of this unit, Fawcett (in press).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously observed, this misconstrues a formal unit (at the rank of word), a preposition, as an element of function structure (at the rank of group) — and in a model that purports not to feature a rank scale. To be clear, in SFL Theory, a preposition serves in a preposition group which realises the functional element minor Process/Predicator in a prepositional phrase.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the underlined portions in these examples — Fawcett's quality and quantity groups — are preposition groups, involving modification, that serve as the minor Process/Predicator in a prepositional phrase. 

[3] Arguably, in SFL Theory, this is a nominal group rather than a prepositional phrase (Fawcett's preposition group), in which like his mother serves the same function as cautious in the agnate wording more cautious than he used to be:

On this analysis, like his mother is an embedded prepositional phrase of comparison, serving as the Head of the Epithet of the nominal group. Cf the near agnate: more mother-like than he used to be.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, Fawcett's 'completive' is the Range of a minor Process, in terms of the experiential metafunction, and the Complement of a minor Predicator, in terms of the interpersonal metafunction. The most obvious disadvantages of Fawcett's model are that 

• (i) it does not distinguish the two different metafunctional rôles, 
• (ii) the term 'completive' interprets the function of the nominal group as merely completing the prepositional group, and 
• (iii) the term 'completive' fails to recognise the fact that the Complement of a prepositional phrase — just like the Complement of a clause — can be made the Subject of a clause, as exemplified by:

[5] To be clear, the "more complete" picture of this unit in Appendix B (p306) is as follows, noting that its structural elements include both a conjunction (and) and a punctuation mark (.):

[6] As previously noted, Fawcett (in press) is still unpublished, 21 years after the first publication of this work.

"The Second Major Difference Between Fawcett's And Halliday's Nominal Group"

Fawcett (2010: 204):

The second major difference between the two models is that the coverage of the nominal group in the Cardiff Grammar is considerably fuller than that in IFG. This is especially true with respect to the many types of determiner that it introduces and the concept of 'selection' that holds between them, e.g., as in five of the ripest of those mangoes. 

It also includes a full treatment of compound nouns — a very important category that is the source of many problems in text analysis and text generation. Halliday simply omits these from IFG (presumably on the grounds that the primary focus in IFG in on the clause, with groups and words receiving a much lighter treatment). For a fuller picture of the nominal group, see Appendix B and Fawcett (in press).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence, or by the provision of a scale by which to objectively measure different degrees of fullness.

[2] To be sure, the Cardiff Grammar does propose many types of determiner (pp304, 306), though few of these are "determiners" from the perspective of SFL Theory:

On the other hand, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the Cardiff Grammar treats Numeratives as determiners, and does not distinguish Deictics from post-Deictics, nor Classifiers from Epithets. More importantly, it mixes word classes (determiner) with experiential elements (qualifier) with logical elements (modifier, head). Most importantly, this confusion of theoretical principles is the incongruous solution to Fawcett's previous argument against viewing the nominal group as a logical structure (194-5):

Once we recognise that each element of a syntactic unit makes a unique contribution to realising the meaning of that unit, we can dispense with the traditional, over-narrow characterisation of the internal structure of groups as a series of 'modification' relationships. In its extreme form, this model presents groups as simply the 'hypotactic expansion' of the word class that functions as the 'head', in a series of 'modifier-head' relationships. …

The nearest that the present grammar comes to a generalised concept of a 'modifier + head' relationship is its recognition of the fact that other elements of a group typically depend on the presence of the 'pivotal element'. Thus when the grammar generates a "common nouns" as the head of a nominal group, other elements realising other types of meaning typically get brought into play as well. Thus it is preferable to characterise the nominal group as a unit for expressing the wide range of types of meaning associated with a 'thing', rather than in terms of an over-simple series of 'modifier + head' relationships.

[3] To be clear, this concept will be examined when it is discussed in the text.

[4] To be clear, the "full treatment" of compound nouns in this volume is a single mention in Appendix B (p306):

[5] This is very misleading indeed, because it misrepresents Halliday (1994). A compound noun, as a noun, serves as the Thing of a nominal group, but, as Halliday (1994: 185) explains, there is often indeterminacy between 'compound noun' and 'Classifier + Thing' interpretations:

[6] To be clear, Fawcett (in press) is still unpublished, 21 years after the first edition of this volume.

The Main Verb As Pivotal Element Of The Clause

Fawcett (2010: 201):

The most important syntactic fact about the English clause is the great variety in the positions in which its elements occur. However, this is not a matter of so-called 'free word order' (i.e., 'free element order'), since each positional difference realises a different meaning, however fine the distinction.

There is no element of the clause that is obligatorily realised — not even the Main Verb. Moreover it varies in its position, so that there is no element that can be used as an 'anchor-point' from which to start building the structure of the unit in generation — a vital point to which we shall return in Section 10.4.2.

In text analysis, however, it is useful to begin with a working assumption that each unit has a 'pivotal element' that is typically realised, and in the case of the clause in English this 'pivotal element' is the Main Verb.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the different meanings here are textual in terms of metafunction:

• unmarked Theme vs marked Theme,
• unmarked New vs marked New

and variation is motivated by the textual function of relating the clause to its environment, especially the preceding co-text; see, e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 120, 282).

[2] As previously explained, Fawcett's notion of a pivotal element corresponds to the Head of a logical structure, since the Head is the element which is potentially modified by optional elements. However, as previously discussed, Fawcett (p 196) rejects logical structure in his model of syntax, and in SFL Theory, the clause does not include a logical structure.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a verb is a formal constituent (of the verbal group), not an element of function structure.

Theoretical Problems With Fawcett's Model Of Clause Structure

 Fawcett (2010: 200-1):

The most frequent elements of the English clause are the Subject, Operator and Main Verb, with one or more Complements and potentially many Adjuncts, selected from over forty functionally differentiated types. Typically, a Participant Role (such as Agent, Affected, Carrier or Attribute) is conflated with the Subject or Complement. Auxiliary Verbs and Main Verb Extensions also occur frequently, as do the Binders and Linkers that relate the clause out to another unit. See Appendix B and Fawcett (in press) for a fuller picture, including six other elements.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on Fawcett's model, Figure 4 (p36), structure is located at the level of form:

Inconsistent with this, Fawcett's elements of structure are a confusion of form (Main Verb) and function (Subject, Operator, Complement, Adjunct). In SFL Theory, these functions are interpersonal functions.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett locates Halliday's systems of the clause at his level of meaning. In such a formulation, the participant rôles of Agent, Affected, Carrier, Attribute etc. (meaning) and the structural elements Subject and Complement (form) are located at different levels of symbolic abstraction. On this model, therefore, participant rôles are not conflated with Subject and Complement, but are realised by them, since realisation is the relation between levels of symbolic abstraction. That is, what Fawcett actually proposes is that experiential meanings are realised by elements of syntactic structure that correspond to interpersonal wordings in SFL Theory.

Confusing Experiential With Logical Structure And Misconstruing Form As Function

Fawcett (2010: 196):

In many theories of syntax there is an assumption that each unit has an element that is obligatorily present (often called the 'head'). This reflects the traditional assumption that a unit is essentially the 'expansion' of a word — a concept which is replaced here by recognising the fact that each element realises one aspect of the unit's meaning, as explained in Section 10.2.1. But among formal grammarians — i.e., those who are influenced by formal language theory (i.e., the theory of 'formal' languages) — there is a tendency to transfer the characteristics of formal languages to natural languages, and so to construct theories for parsing natural languages on the basis of such assumptions (e.g., 'head-driven parsers'). However, the data of natural language texts suggest that such concepts express strong tendencies rather than absolute rules.

On the other hand, the concept of an element that is typically present in a given class of unit is useful (e.g., when the theory of syntax is to be used by a parser), and on those occasions when we need to refer to such an element we shall call it, informally, the pivotal element of the unit. Examples of nominal groups that have no heads include the very rich and five in Give me five (see Fawcett in press for the reasons for these analyses). And for a discussion of the Main Verb as the pivotal element of the clause, see Section 10.4.2.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett's claims here are that

• his model replaces logical structure with experiential structure, and
• only experiential structure "recognises the fact that each element realises one aspect of the unit's meaning".

On the first claim, it will be demonstrated that Fawcett confuses logical and experiential structure; see below. On the second claim, logical structure construes meaning in terms of the relation of modification, which thus also "recognises the fact that each element realises one aspect of the unit's meaning".

[2] To be clear, the structural element that is "typically" present is the Head, since this is the element that is optionally modified. That is, on the one hand, Fawcett rejects logical structure, while on the other, he uses one of its elements, the Head, and renames it the Pivot.

[3] To be clear, these nominal groups do have Head elements (logical structure); what they do not have are Thing elements (experiential structure). That is, Fawcett's model confuses logical and experiential structure.

[4] To be clear, 'Fawcett in press' (Functional Syntax Handbook) is still unpublished, 20 years after the first edition of this book.

[5] To be clear, on the one hand, this unwittingly construes the clause as a logical structure, since 'Pivot' is demonstrably Fawcett's term for 'Head'; see above. On the other hand, it misconstrues a class of form (main verb) as an element of function structure.