"This Little Grammar"

Fawcett (2010: 302):

Clearly, this little grammar leaves out a rather large proportion of the many complex meanings that can be expressed through the nominal group in English. Equally clearly, it ignores various problems, such as the plurals of words like box and the irregular plurals of men and women, etc. All of these matters are covered in the full lexicogrammar from which this simplified one has been taken. The fact that this little lexicogrammar is very limited in its coverage of English nominal groups is unimportant, because our purpose here is simply to illustrate the basic principles of how a grammar that is founded on the concept of 'choice between meanings' actually works. The key concept, then, is that the system network of a language (or any other sign system) defines the meaning potential of that language, and the realisation component defines the form potential. But when such a lexicogrammar is set to work it also specifies the instances that are possible at the levels of both meaning (in the selection expression of semantic features) and form (in the structured strings of word forms that are the output).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this little grammar leaves out almost all of the grammar of English.

[2] To be clear, this has to be taken entirely on trust, because Fawcett has not produced any evidence of "the full lexicogrammar" in a book that is purported to set out his theory.

[3] To be clear, the fact that this little lexicogrammar is very limited is important, because the absence of a full description casts serious doubt on Fawcett's claim that his theory is a viable alternative to SFL Theory.

[4]  To be clear, this is merely a pretext for not supplying a full description, because explaining the formalism does not preclude the possibility of supplying the systems that model the content of this book.

[5] To be clear, here Fawcett once again confuses 'meaning' as a level of symbolic abstraction (vs form) with language as 'meaning potential' (vs instance): the system pole of the cline of instantiation.

[6] As previously explained, selection expressions — like [voiced, bilabial. stop] — constitute potential as well as instance.

[7] As previously explained, Fawcett's model misconstrues syntactic structures as instances of realisation rules.

Problems With Fawcett's Realisation Component

Fawcett (2010: 299):

This selection expression of features becomes the input to the realisation component. This is the bottom left box in Figure 4 (in Chapter 3), and it contains two main types of statement: (1) realisation rules, as given in Figure 2, and (2) potential structures, which simply show the sequence in which those elements that are fixed in sequence must appear (such as those in the nominal group).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] Reminder:

[2] To be clear, in this model, a selection expression is an instance of a system network, and this instance at the level of meaning is in a realisation relation with potential at the level of form (the realisation component).

[3] To be clear, in this model, syntagmatic structures are instances of realisation rules. On the principle of instantiation, an instance of a potential realisation rule is an actual realisation rule.

"A Theory Of The Type Described Here"

Fawcett (2010: 293):

All in all, we can say that a theory of the type described here — together with the theory of system networks and their realisation as illustrated in Appendix A and in Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993) — provides a principled analysis of English syntax that is at every point explicitly functional. It therefore continues the line of development that extends from "Categories" through "Language as choice in social contexts" and, in some measure "Systemic theory". And since the theory of system networks and of the realisation component are clearly quite close in the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars — at least, so long as Halliday continues to regard the networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. as modelling the 'meaning potential' — it is in the theory of syntax that one of the major differences between the two is to be found.

The other great difference, of course, is the answer to the question "What further components does each model have above the system networks for TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc? But that must await another book!

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence. Moreover, there is much evidence that this is not the case, as demonstrated by Fawcett's focus on syntax and form, and his rejection of the three function structures of the clause as proposed in SFL Theory.

[2] To be clear, "the theory of system networks and their realisation as illustrated in Appendix A" will be examined in future posts. But as a foretaste, the only system network that Fawcett provides in this entire publication (p298) construes every noun in English not only as a feature in the network , but also as a feature of either 'mass' or 'count':

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The Cardiff Grammar diverges from this line of development at its very beginning, Scale & Category Grammar (1961). By 1977 (Text as Semantic Choice in Social Contexts), Halliday had already devised the SFL model of stratification that Fawcett does not use, and the metafunctional clause structures that Fawcett rejects.

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue, as the system network above, and the previous examinations of Fawcett's realisation operations demonstrate.

[5] This is misleading, because, although it is true that these systems model 'meaning potential' in Halliday's understanding of the term, language as system, they have never modelled it in Fawcett's misunderstanding of the term, as the semantic stratum.

[6] This is not misleading, because it is not untrue.

[7] To be clear, the "component" that SFL Theory "has above" the system of MOOD is the system of SPEECH FUNCTION; e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 136):

By the same token, the "component" that SFL Theory "has above" the system of TRANSITIVITY is the model of the figure; e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 53):

For the the "component" that SFL Theory "has above" the system of THEME, see the discussion of the text base in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398-413).

[8] To be clear, this book is still awaited, 21 years after the first edition of this publication.

Fawcett's Understanding Of "The Concepts Underlying IFG"

Fawcett (2010: 285-6):

The core of the IFG framework still appears to be the concept of units on the 'rank scale' — even though it is mentioned only occasionally in IFG and not at all in "Systemic theory". Moreover, the concept of class (which is always 'class of unit') is tied into the 'rank scale' too, in that it is defined in terms of its patterns of operation in the unit next above on the 'rank scale'. The concept of element of structure continues to serve a vital role in the theory, though it receives little overt recognition. The concept of delicacy seems to hover between being a theoretical category and a descriptive convenience. (Systemically the more important concept is dependence, and structurally, as I suggested in Section 10.3.4 of Chapter 10, showing structures with varying degrees of delicacy adds unnecessary complexity to the representation of texts.) And exponence in "Categories" was a concept waiting to be redefined as realisation, and then needing to be split up into specific realisation operations. The original concept of 'exponence' has no role in the theory of syntax that underlies IFG, though 'realisation' is used as the general term for the interstratal relationship. To these concepts from "Categories" Halliday has added three further ones: 'multiple structures' in the clause, and 'parataxis' and 'hypotaxis'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. On the one hand, the rank scale provides the organisation of Halliday (1994), and the entry conditions to grammatical systems. On the other hand, the rank scale is, of course, mentioned in "Systemic Theory". Halliday (1995 [1993]: 273):

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, units (e.g. groups) are classified (e.g. nominal) according to the elements of structure of the higher rank that they prototypically realise (e.g. participant).

[3] This is misleading, though comically so, because all editions of IFG pay far more attention to elements of structure — at clause rank: participants, processes and circumstances — than they do to the systems that specify them.

[4] This is misleading, also comically so, because delicacy is the ordering principle of the system network (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 20), which is the fundamental formalism of Systemic Functional Theory.

[5] This is misleading, because taxis (interdependency) is not more important than delicacy, if only because taxis is confined to the logical metafunction, whereas delicacy is a dimension of every system of all metafunctions.

[6] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue, no matter how many times Fawcett repeats it (the logical fallacy known as the argument from repetition). On the one hand, the organising principle of such structures is composition (extension), not delicacy (elaboration). On the other hand, the bare assertion that they add unnecessary complexity to the description is invalidated by the additional explanatory potential that they provide.

[7] This is misleading. On the one hand, the term 'exponence' (Halliday 1961) was not redefined as realisation. Instead, SFL Theory distinguishes two different types of relation that were conflated in Firth's use of the term: realisation and instantiation. On the other hand, the concept of realisation is not "split up into specific realisation operations". That is, realisation operations are not subtypes of the concept of realisation, but statements that identify circumstances in which the relation obtains. 

[8] This is misleading. On the one hand, the two relations inherent in the original concept of 'exponence', realisation and instantiation, both play very important rôles in SFL Theory. On the other hand, realisation is not merely the relation between strata. Realisation obtains wherever there is a relation of symbolic abstraction, as, for example, between:

• function and form,
• system and structure,
• selection expression and lexical item.

And importantly, SFL Theory reduces syntax (and morphology) to a rank scale of formal units, which is not what Fawcett means by "the theory of syntax that underlies IFG".

[9] This is seriously misleading, because it misrepresents SFL Theory as simply the addition of metafunction structures and taxis to Scale & Category Grammar; see the following post for evidence that invalidates the claim.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1961) On Exponence

Fawcett (2010: 282):

Thus, the highly general concept of 'exponence' from "Categories" was first re-interpreted by Halliday as the second highly general concept of interstratal 'realisation'. Then the researchers at London who were developing generative SF grammars specified the particular types of operation required in realisation. These have been refined over the years, and those set out above can be seen to specify, in their turn, the relationships between categories that are found in the syntax. It is somewhat ironic that the term "exponence" is reintroduced here with roughly the sense that it was originally given by Firth (1957/68:183), before Halliday borrowed it and stretched — indeed overstretched — its meaning in "Categories".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, in Halliday (1961), 'exponence' covered what Halliday later recognised as two distinct theoretical dimensions: realisation (an identifying relation between levels of symbolic abstraction) and instantiation (an ascriptive relation between potential and instance).

[2] To be clear, 'ironic' means happening in a way contrary to what is expected, and typically causing wry amusement because of this. Fawcett's claim, then, is that it is counter-expectant and wryly amusing that he uses the term 'exponence' in a way that he deems consistent with Firth's usage.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Firstly, Halliday (1961) uses 'exponence' in the same sense as Firth, with no "stretching", and thus no "overstretching". Secondly, Halliday's later replacement of the term 'exponence' with the terms 'realisation' and  'instantiation' is not a stretching of the original term, but the more delicate distinction of two theoretical concepts conflated in the term 'exponence'.

[4] To be clear, here Fawcett trivially implies unethical behaviour on the part of Halliday by construing him as having borrowed something of Firth's and stretched it.

Applying Fawcett's Realisation Operations

Fawcett (2010: 281-2):

The specification of the realisation operations that follows is essentially the same as that given in Section 9.2.1 of Chapter 9, the difference being that this list additionally identifies the type of relationship that corresponds to the operation. In their typical order of application, the major realisation operations are:

1 Insert a unit (e.g., "ngp") into the structure to 'fill' (or 'function at') an element or Participant Role (e.g., "cv") — so introducing to the structure the relationship of filling. (The topmost clause in a text-sentence fills the 'Sentence'.)

2 Locate an element (e.g., "S") at a given place in a unit — so introducing the relationship of componence.

3 Insert an element or Participant Role to be conflated with an existing element, i.e., to be located immediately after it and to be at the same place (e.g., "S/Ag") — so introducing the relationship of conflation.

4 Expound an element by an item — so introducing the relationship of exponence.

5 Re-set the preferences (i.e., the percentage probabilities on features in certain specified systems), including the preselection of features by the use of 100% and 0% probabilities — these probabilities being reset to their original percentages after the next traversal of the network.

6 Re-enter the system network at a stated feature — so possibly also introducing the recursion of co-ordination, embedding or reiteration.

The result of applying Operation 6 (and so in turn Operation 1) is to introduce to the structure either a single unit or two or more co-ordinated units. In either case the resulting structure may additionally involve the addition of more layers of unit, including the embedding of a unit inside another unit of the same class — depending on what choices have been made in the system network.

Blogger Comments:

These realisation operations can be tested for the clause Blessed are the meek.

1. Insert nominal group into clause structure to fill Subject
2. Locate Subject in final location of clause
3. Insert Affected (Medium) to be conflated with Subject
4. Expound the Head by an item: meek
5. Reset percentage probabilities (not provided by Fawcett)
6. Re-enter system network at stated feature (neither provided by Fawcett).

By this description, the nominal group is already structured before it is inserted into a clause that is already structured and includes a Subject. After one pass through an imaginary system network, all that is generated is the one item meek expounding the Head of a nominal group that fills Subject/Affected. In SFL Theory, in contrast, one pass through the system network of a clause specifies all the elements of a clause, not just one element.

Realisation Operations

Fawcett (2010: 281):

The general concept of 'realisation' is made specific through five major types of realisation operation. As we saw in Section 9.2 of Chapter 9, it is they, together with the potential structures, that specify the 'form potential' of a language.

Notice, however, that when they are applied (i.e., to a selection expression of features generated on a traversal of a system network, as described in Appendix A), they generate syntactic structures. The first four operations directly generate four of the relationships in syntax to be described below. And the last two provide the framework for generating structures with the recursion of co-ordination, embedding or re-iteration. Thus the realisation operations in the grammar are directly related to the relationships in the syntax of an output from the grammar — while not, as I emphasised in Chapter 9, being the same as them. In other words, we need both a theory of 'syntax potential' and a theory of syntactic instances'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is the operations that are specific, not realisation. Realisation is the same in each case: the relation between two levels of symbolic abstraction.

[2] To be clear, potential structures do not feature in the representation of Fawcett's model (Figure 4):

[3] To be clear, in Fawcett's text-generation algorithm, realisation operations are misconstrued as:

(i) the form that realises the meanings of system networks and

(ii) the potential that is instantiated as syntactic structure.

[4] To be clear, Fawcett's argument for the distinction between 'syntax potential' and 'syntactic instances' is simply that the two are related, but not the same. That is, he does not provide any argument as to why, or how, syntactic structures can be understood as instances of realisation operations.

The Problem With 'Exponence' In Its "Categories" Sense

Fawcett (2010: 280-1):

Since this is a comparison as well as a summary, we shall take as our starting point one of the 'scales' of "Categories": the highly generalised concept of 'exponence'. The problem with 'exponence' in its "Categories" sense is that it covers a very larger [sic] number of different concepts — i.e., every relationship between "the categories of the highest degree of abstraction" (by which Halliday means the features in the system networks) and "the data" (Halliday 1961/76:71). 

However, when in the 1960s Halliday introduced the concept that systems are choices between meanings, he also introduced the term realisation as a replacement for "exponence", and it quickly came to be used as the standard general term for referring to the relationship between different levels (or strata) of language. In the context of the present discussion it refers to the relationship between meaning and form (as described in Chapter 3 and as summarised in Figure 4 in Section 3.2 of that chapter).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true that, in Scale & Category Grammar, 'exponence' covered "a very larger number of different concepts". What is true is that it covered both realisation and instantiation, the latter being what Fawcett glosses as "a very larger number of different concepts". By this, Fawcett again demonstrates — as he does in Figure 4 — that he does not understand the SFL notion of instantiation. Halliday (1995: 273):

… 'realisation' (formerly 'exponence') is the relation between the 'strata,' or levels, of a multistratal semiotic system-and, by analogy, between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic phases of representation within one stratum. But in systemic theory, realisation is held distinct from 'instantiation,' which is the relation between the semiotic system (the 'meaning potential') and the observable events, or 'acts of meaning,' by which the system is constituted.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, 'exponence' is replaced by both 'realisation' and 'instantiation'.

[3] This is not misleading, because it is true. However, Fawcett's model (Figure 4) violates this relation between meaning and form by falsely positing that:

• system networks are realised by realisation rules, and
• selection expressions are realised by structures.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Recognising Elements Of Structure

 Fawcett (2010: 278):

A modern theory of SF syntax is — or should be — an explicitly functional theory of language, so that the criteria for recognising an element of structure are — or should be — functional and semantic rather than formal and positional. 

Thus the elements of a unit are those that are required to realise the meanings that have been selected in the system networks for realisation in this unit — ultimately, of course, as items (see below).

Halliday has surprisingly little to say in "Categories" (or indeed in any later writings) about the criteria for recognising elements of structure (especially the elements of groups).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, given that this is Fawcett's belief, it is surprising that he has, nowhere in this publication, provided "functional and semantic" criteria for recognising his elements of structure, and has, instead, foregrounded form (classes of unit) and position (place).

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, functional elements of grammatical structure (syntagmatic axis) are specified by realisation rules (such as 'insert Subject') in the grammatical system networks (paradigmatic axis) that the grammatical structures realise. In the absence of grammatical metaphor, grammar (wording) and semantics (meaning) are in agreement (congruent).

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday ± Matthiessen (1985, 1994, 2004, 2014) devote three chapters to providing criteria for recognising elements of clause structure, one chapter for each metafunction, and one chapter to providing criteria for recognising elements of group and phrase structure. For example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 240, 249) provide the recognition criteria for Scope and Senser as follows:

…the Scope of a ‘material’ clause is not in any way affected by the performance of the process. Rather it either (i) construes the domain over which the process takes place … or (ii) construes the process itself, either in general or specific terms…

In a clause of ‘mental’ process, there is always one participant who is human; this is the Senser: the one that ‘senses’ – feels, thinks, wants or perceives… . More accurately, we should say human-like; the significant feature of the Senser is that of being ‘endowed with consciousness’. Expressed in grammatical terms, the participant that is engaged in the mental process is one that is referred to pronominally as he or she, not as it.

It is the fact that, in a functional theory, such criteria are 'from above' — rather than 'from below' — that may explain why Fawcett is unable to recognise them as criteria.

A Common Framework For Comparing SFL Theory And The Cardiff Grammar

Fawcett (2010: 274-5):

The starting point for the summaries that follow must be the framework for a modern SF grammar that we established in Chapter 3. As Figure 4 in Section 3.2 of that chapter showed, its two principle characteristics are (1) that it consists essentially of the two levels of meaning and form, and (2) that there is at each level (a) a component that specified the potential, and (b) an Output' from the grammar, i.e., the instance at that level.

As we have seen, an additional advantage of this formulation of the model is that it is at a sufficiently high level of generalisation to provide a common framework in which we may compare the Sydney the Cardiff Grammars. Moreover, its ability to provide this common framework is not affected by Halliday and Matthiessen's increasing commitment, culminating in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), to the idea of having a 'two-level' model of 'semantics' (as we saw in Section 4.6 of Chapter 4). In that model, you will recall, there is both the level of 'meaning potential' that Halliday recognised in the early 1970s as the semantics (e.g., Halliday 1971/73a:41-2), and a level of 'semantics' that is higher than this, roughly equivalent to Martin's (1992) 'discourse semantics'. The proposal that this common ground exists follows directly from statements of Halliday's from the late sixties to the present, such as:

In a functional grammar, [...] a language is interpreted as a system of meanings, accompanied by forms through which the meanings can be expressed" (Halliday 1994:xix).

Indeed, it can be argued that all of the concepts that are required in a modern SF grammar follow from accepting the need to recognise the appropriate 'division of labour' between the two levels of semantics and form in such a model.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, it is the theoretical architecture of the Cardiff Grammar, as represented in Figure 4, that both invalidates the theory and illustrates the extent to which Fawcett does not understand the dimensions of SFL Theory. For example, Figure 4

• misrepresents the axial relation of realisation (paradigmatic system-syntagmatic structure) as the instantiation relation between potential and instance;
• misrepresents a selection expression as an instance of a system network; an instance of a potential system network is an actual system network; a selection expression can be both potential and instance, as demonstrated by the selection expression for the phoneme /b/: [voiced, bilabial, stop] which characterises both the phoneme as potential and the phoneme in a text;
• misrepresents structure as an instance of realisation rules, despite the structure being specified as the realisation of the realisation rules;
• misrepresents a system network and realisation rules as different levels of symbolic abstraction (meaning and form), despite the fact that both the network and the realisation rules include the features of the same level of abstraction (meaning); and
• conflates content (syntax) and expression (phonology/graphology) as the same level of symbolic abstraction (form).

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Even ignoring all the theoretical inconsistencies embodied in Figure 4, it cannot provide a common framework for comparing SFL Theory with the Cardiff Grammar, if only because the two models assume different principles of stratification: meaning/wording/sounding (SFL Theory) vs meaning/form (Cardiff Grammar).

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As pointed out in the examination of Section 4.6, SFL Theory has a 'one-level' model of semantics (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999) and a 'one-level' model of lexicogrammar (Halliday 1985, 1994, Halliday & Matthiessen 2004, 2014). The motivation for this misrepresentation is Fawcett's desire for his model to replace the SFL model of grammatical structure.

[4] To be clear, while it is true that Martin presents his discourse semantics as a stratum above lexicogrammar, the truth, nevertheless, lies elsewhere. As demonstrated here, Martin's (1992) discourse semantics is largely Halliday & Hasan's (1976) lexicogrammatical cohesion, misunderstood and rebranded as his own invention.

[5] This is misleading because it is untrue. The Halliday quote — which does not appear on the cited page — does not suggest that Fawcett's Figure 4 offers a common ground for comparing his model with SFL Theory. It merely acknowledges that in SFL Theory, lexicogrammatical forms are interpreted in terms of the meanings they realise. Cf Halliday (1994: xvii):

[6] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the 'division of labour' is not between meaning and form, but between meaning, wording and sounding, with wording being the interpretation of lexicogrammatical form (e.g. nominal group) in terms of its function in realising meaning (e.g. Senser).

Confusing Layers Of Structure With Layers Of The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 268-9):

He then goes on to list the very small number of types of embedding that he does still allow (p. 242). These are (expressed here in both Cardiff Grammar and Sydney Grammar terms):

the occurrence of either a clause or a prepositional group/phrase (but no other class of unit, so not a nominal group) as:

1. the head in a nominal group or

2. a qualifier in a nominal group (also referred to as a "postmodifier" in some sections of IFG), or

3. the finisher in a quality group (in IFG a "postmodifier" in an "adverbial group" (but note that in IFG there is no provision for a similarly structured quality group with an adjective as its apex).

Halliday then goes on to state categorically that "there are no further types". The above specification of what types of 'rank shift' are permitted is therefore extremely narrow. It provides for cases such as what Jack built and for Jack to build a house as embedded clauses that fill the Subject, but only by filling the head of a nominal group that in turn fills the Subject. And it even provides for rare cases such as by the bridge as the Subject — but again only as the head of a nominal group that fills a Subject. Why, one wonders, should the clause or prepositional group not fill the Subject directly? Halliday simply states his position and gives no reason. Yet this approach introduces an additional layer of structure, which runs against his general approach of reducing the number of layers of structure in the representation to the minimum.²²

²² In a footnote (p. 242) Halliday re-affirms that the embedded clause or prepositional phrase does indeed function as the head of a nominal group — while at the same time stating that in such cases "we may leave out the intermediate (nominal group) step in the analysis and represent the embedded clause or phrase as functioning directly in the structure of the outer clause, as Subject or whatever." I welcome this small concession, and I suggest that there is, in fact, no reason why a clause should not be permitted to fill an element of another clause.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the Qualifier of a nominal group is an element of experiential structure, whereas the Postmodifier is an element of logical structure. The two do not always conflate, as Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 392) illustrate:

[2] This is misleading. While SFL Theory does not feature Fawcett's quality group, it does provide this type of structure as a nominal group, as Halliday (1994: 242) makes clear on the very page being cited by Fawcett:

[3] To be clear, in Fawcett's terms, a clause that is embedded in a clause does "fill" an element of clause structure; a phrase embedded in a nominal group does "fill" an element of group structure. The crucial thing that Fawcett does not understand is the basic principle that elements of structure at one rank are realised by units of the rank below. This means that if a clause is embedded in a clause, it is shifted to the rank of group where, like groups, it realises an element of clause structure.

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, here Fawcett misrepresents the rank scale — clause, group/phrase, word, morpheme — as layers of structure. In SFL Theory, structures are differentiated according to rank, so that 'layers of structure' are those of just one rank.

On the other hand, this "approach" is merely consistent with the SFL principle of exhaustiveness, which means that 'everything in the wording has some function at every rank' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 84). 

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue, since "reducing the number of layers of structure in the representation" is not Halliday's general approach. In fact, as previously demonstrated, Fawcett has spent considerable effort unsuccessfully arguing that Halliday's model has too many layers of structure.

Here again, Fawcett has confused layers of structure with the rank scale. It is the rank scale that has a fixed number of layers.  Halliday (2002 [1966]: 119):

By a rank grammar I mean one which specifies and labels a fixed number of layers in the hierarchy of constituents, such that any constituent, and any constitute, can be assigned to one or other of the specified layers, or ranks.

A Complete Representation Of A Text-Sentence At The Level Of Form

Fawcett (2010: 259-61):

Let us now take the example analysed in Figure 18, and add to it the one relationship of exponence that would be generated on the first traversal of the system network, i.e., the exponent of the Main Verb. This is the representation shown in Figure 21.

Let us now imagine that the system network has been re-entered three times more, to generate the three nominal groups shown in Figure 21, i.e. Ike, his shirt and the co-ordinated nominal group and his jeans. In Figure 22 I have also added the symbol for 'filling' to show the relationship between the clause and the topmost element in the structure, i.e., 'sentence' (Σ), and also the clause element Ender. … The result of these additions to Figure 21 is a complete representation of a text-sentence at the level of form.

Figure 22 can be taken as a summary of the four 'core' relationships in syntax, i.e., the relationships between syntactic categories that are the direct result of the application of realisation operations.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this system network can only be imagined, since it is not provided anywhere in this publication.

[2] For contrast, compare an analysis of this clause using SFL Theory:

with the Goal/Complement realised by an extending paratactic nominal group complex:

[3] To be clear, the precise realisation operations are not provided by Fawcett, and so must be taken on trust.

Inconsistencies Caused By The Notion Of Exponence

Fawcett (2010: 259):

How far should this useful principle be extended? For example, should we say that the Subject of a clause that is ultimately expounded by a single pronoun such as he is to be directly expounded by it? Clearly, few linguists would wish to do this, but the criteria for not doing so are rarely stated clearly. 

There are in fact several reasons for not extending the principle to such cases. The first is the sheer centrality of the choices in the nominal group in the grammar as a whole. It is the unit that is used for referring to 'objects', and within it we need to be able to choose between the three major ways of referring to objects that are exemplified by my friend, she and Ivy respectively. The second reason is the sheer frequency of all three types. And the third is the need to be able to co-ordinate different types (as in my friend and I and Ivy and I).

A more problematical case is the treatment of tall in a tall man. Since modifiers are quite frequently filled by quality groups, as in the underlined portion of a very tall man, we treat examples such as a tall man as cases where the modifier is filled by a quality group that has only an apex.

Ultimately, then, the criterion is a matter of economy. In other words, when a further layer of structure unit is required relatively frequently — as in the case of the nominal group that fills the Subject and the quality group that fills the modifier — we always introduce the additional unit. However, when the lower unit occurs only relatively infrequently — as in the case of the quantifying determiner cited above, we introduce a system to handle the choice that is manifested ultimately as variation in depth of exponence.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the rank scale makes this principle — and the problems it generates — unnecessary, as demonstrated previously and below.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the pronoun he simply serves as the Thing/Head of a nominal group that serves as the Subject of a clause.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, nominal groups do not "refer" to 'objects'. Instead, congruently (and ideationally) they realise participants; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 177). Clearly, the nominal groups rare privilege and insatiable greed do not refer to 'objects'.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, these nominal groups are structured as follows:

The participant that each realises depends on the clause in which each functions.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, these are instances in which the Subject is realised by an extending paratactic nominal group complex:

[6] To be clear, in SFL Theory, Fawcett's quality group corresponds to the (± submodified) Epithet of a nominal group:

'Variation In Depth Of Exponence' Viewed Through The Lens Of SFL Theory

Fawcett (2010: 257-8):

Here we shall consider just the four examples where the quantifying expression is a cardinal number, i.e., sixty books, two hundred books, over sixty books and over two hundred books. Please look at the analyses of the first three examples in Figure 20.

In Example (a) the quantifying determiner (qd) is shown as directly expounded by the item sixty. But Examples (b) and (c), illustrate the fact that there are two frequent ways in which a quantifying determiner may be filled by a quantifying expression which itself has the internal structure of a group. Expressions of 'quantity' are frequently expressed through a nominal group, as in (b) above and in examples such as a very large number and a huge heap. Example (c) above illustrates the fact that the unit that fills a quantifying determiner is also frequently a quantity group, where the two elements are an adjustor and an amount. Moreover, the two constructions exemplified in (b) and (c) can be combined, as in over two hundred books, where the item over 'adjusts' the 'amount' of two hundred — so adding another layer of structure.¹⁷

¹⁷ Indeed, an adjustor can itself contain an embedded quantity group, such that the 'amount of adjustment' that it expresses is in turn adjusted, as in well over two hundred books, a trifle over two hundred books, etc.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, Fawcett's quantifying determiner is termed a Numerative, and in (a) it is realised by the word sixty.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, Fawcett's analysed example (b) the Numerative is realised by a word complex, not by a nominal group:

in contrast to the two unanalysed examples in which the Numerative is realised by an embedded nominal group:

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the quantity group that expounds a quantifying determiner in (c) is a word complex that realises a Numerative:

Fawcett's adjustor and amount of his quantity group correspond to the Modifier (β) and Head (α) of the word complex realising the Numerative.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, this added layer actually involves submodification of the Head of the word complex realising the Numerative:

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, these two unanalysed examples have different function structures. While both involve the submodification of the Modifier and Head of the word complex realising the Numerative, only the second involves an embedded nominal group in the structure: 

Misrepresenting Halliday On The Cardiff Grammar's Exponence Operation

Fawcett (2010: 254):

In the Cardiff Grammar the realisation operation that generates this relationship is "Expound an element by an item". Its notation is simply:

h < mountain.

Surprisingly, the equivalent operation in the Sydney Grammar is termed "Lexify". It is surprising because the traditional distinction between "grammatical" and "lexical" items has always been reflected in Halliday's work (e.g., what he does and does not cover in his system networks) so that it is odd to find the term "lexify" being used as the name of the operation that inserts all types of items, irrespective of where they come on the continuum from the most "lexical" to the most "grammatical". But the example in Halliday 1993:4505) shows that it really is intended to generate grammatical as well as lexical items.

Blogger Comments:

Surprisingly, this is misleading because, surprisingly, it is untrue, since, surprisingly, 'lexify' is not the SFL equivalent of Fawcett's 'expound an element by an item'.

In SFL Theory, unlike the Cardiff Grammar, the elements of a structure at group rank are realised by the units of a syntagm at word rank, and there is no realisation statement for such a relation, since it is the formal constituents of groups, (grammatical) words, that are assigned structural functions at group rank. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 364):

In the Cardiff Grammar, on the other hand, an element of group structure is expounded (realised) by an item, which as previously observed, is a confusion of lexical item, grammatical word, and its graphological/phonological expression, surprisingly.

Fawcett's Use Of 'Exponence'

Fawcett (2010: 254):

The relationship between categories of exponence has a different theoretical status from any other, because it takes us out of the abstract categories of syntax and into the more concrete (but still abstract) phonological or graphological "shape" of items. Thus we may say that the head of a nominal group is expounded by the item mountain. As I pointed out earlier, the present use of the term is essentially a return to the sense in which it was used by Firth (1957/68), from whom Halliday borrowed it before greatly extending its meaning in "Categories". (Later, as we have seen, he re-named it 'realisation').

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, Fawcett's 'item' confuses:

• grammatical word (consisting of morphemes) that realises an element of group structure,
• lexical item that synthetically realises the most delicate lexicogrammatical features, and
• the graphological/phonological configuration that realises a word.

[2] To be clear, the following characterisation by Firth's student, Palmer (1995: 271), would suggest that Firth used 'exponence' for the relation between a level of abstraction within theory and data, which is not the sense used by Fawcett:

Grammatical categories are abstracted from the linguistic material, but 'renewal of connection' via their 'exponents' is essential, though these exponents may be discontinuous or cumulative.

In terms of SFL Theory, this usage combines realisation (level of abstraction within theory) with instantiation (the relation of theory to data). Fawcett's use of 'exponence' is closer to the non-Firthian usage: the relation between a morphosyntactic category and its phonological expression — which is but one example of 'realisation' in SFL Theory.

[3] As previously explained, the meaning of exponence in the superseded theory, Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961), covered both of what became realisation and instantiation in SFL Theory.

Conflation, Filling And Componence In A Modern Systemic Functional Grammar

Fawcett (2010: 253-4):

Up to this point I have been writing as if it was the Subject or the Complement that is filled by a nominal group. But it is, strictly speaking, the Participant Role (PR) that is conflated with the Subject or the Complement that the unit below fills. This is because, in generation, it is typically the PR which predicts what the unit will be, and the likely semantic features of the entity to be generated. (The configuration of PRs in a clause is in turn closely tied to the Process type, which is typically realised in the Main Verb.) However, from the viewpoint of drawing tree diagrams when analysing text-sentences, it makes little difference whether you picture the unit as filling the PR or as filling the element with which it is conflated. …

The introduction of the relationship of 'filling' as a complement to that of 'componence' is probably one of the Cardiff Grammar's main contributions to developing a theory of syntax for a modern systemic functional grammar.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, if two elements are conflated, then the lower rank unit realises ("fills") both of them. For example, the nominal group people realises both the Subject and Carrier in the clause people are strange.

[2] To be clear, as previously observed, Fawcett's model of structure does not present a configuration of process and participants — an experiential structure — since there is no process and the participants are only construed as conflated with interpersonal elements.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the Process of experiential clause structure corresponds to the Finite and Predicator of interpersonal structure (as well as one or more Adjuncts, in the case of phrasal verbs). In Fawcett's model (e.g. p305), the Process can correspond to several elements, including the Operator, Negator, Infinitive Element, Auxiliary Verb, Auxiliary Verb Extension, Main Verb, and up to 3 Main Verb Extensions.

[4] This is true.

[5] This may well be true. However, there are several problems here:

• filling and componence both misconstrue function and form as the same level of symbolic abstraction;
• componence misconstrues functions as parts of forms;
• SFL does not model grammar in terms of syntax (Halliday 1985: xiv);
• the Cardiff Grammar is not a modern systemic functional grammar because
• it is not modern, but developed from Halliday's superseded Scale & Category Grammar;
• it is not systemic, because its priority is structure, not system; and
• it is not functional, because its priority is form, not function.

The Centrality Of 'Filling' To Fawcett's Theory Of Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 252):

However, the concept of 'filling' is not completely absent from the Sydney Grammar. It has been present from the start in the wording by which the relationship of a unit to an element is described, in the use of "operates at" (e.g., Halliday 1961/76:64). An alternative term is "function as". Thus a nominal group would be said to "operate at" (or "function as") the Subject or Complement of a clause. But it is not given a place as a central concept in the theory, as it is here. The term 'filling' seems to be preferable to "operating-at-ness" or "functioning-as-ness".

Its centrality in the theory of syntax is shown by the fact that it functions as the direct complement to 'componence'. In other words, as your eye moves down a full tree diagram representation of a text-sentence (e.g., Figure 25 in Section 12.6 of Chapter 12), you find that the relationships between categories are alternately those of componence and filling, and that these two are repeated until the point at which the analysis moves out of the abstract categories of syntax to the rather more concrete (but still abstract) category of items (via the relationship of exponence, to which we shall come in Section 11.6).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, since Fawcett's notion of filling is not even slightly absent from SFL Theory. As previously explained, it corresponds to the realisation relation between a functional element at a higher rank and a formal unit at the rank below.

[2] To be clear, the term 'operates at' is from Halliday's superseded theory, Scale & Category Grammar, and misrepresents the relation between function and form in SFL Theory because it construes function and form as one level of symbolic abstraction instead of two (Value and Token).

[3] This is not misleading, because it is true. The term 'function as' is consistent with theory because it construes the higher level of symbolic abstraction, element, as Role: guise, which is the circumstantial counterpart of Value; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 326).

[4] To be clear, the centrality of 'filling' in Fawcett's model arises from his focus on form instead of function and his confusion of formal constituency with function-form relations, as previously demonstrated.

[5] To be clear, on the one hand, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by reasoned argument, and on the other, it is misleading because it is untrue. As previously explained, 'function as' (2 levels of abstraction) is consistent with the architecture of SFL theory, whereas 'filling' (1 level of abstraction) is not.

[6] As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's componence, filling and exponence arise from his confusing formal constituency with form-function relations. Componence misconstrues functions (elements) as constituents of forms (units); filling misconstrues functions (elements of clause structure) and forms (units) as the same level of symbolic abstraction; and exponence is the realisation relation between functions (elements of group structure) and forms ("items").

[7] From the perspective of SFL Theory, Fawcett's Figure 25 (p289) analyses a projection nexus (clause complex) as a single clause:

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On "Filling" Notation

Fawcett (2010: 251-2):

Interestingly, there is an equivalent gap in the Sydney Grammar's notation for representing the outputs from the grammar. This arises from the surprising fact that there is no diagram in IFG — or in the equivalent diagrams in Matthiessen & Bateman (1991) or Matthiessen (1995) — that shows how such a relationship should be represented in the full analysis of a text-sentence. In all of these works each unit is analysed in its own terms, almost as if the way in which they are to be related to the units above and below them in the structure is self-evident and has no complications. Filling is in fact a complex matter, and it very often happens that the possibilities as to what class of unit may fill an element depends, either in absolute or in probabilisitc [sic] terms, on choices in the generation of the unit above. The most obvious example is the restrictions on what may fill the Complements of particular Main Verbs (for which see Fawcett 1996).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is the direct opposite of what is true. Halliday (1994: 109) provides the following diagram illustrating both clause experiential function types and their realisations by classes of forms at the rank of group/phrase:

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 169) further elaborates the model for all three metafunctional structures:

[2] This is not misleading, because it is true. In SFL theory, each rank provides the entry condition to the systems of that rank, in which the structures of each rank are specified.

[3] This is misleading because, in SFL Theory, formal constituents are related to each other by the rank scale, and the relation between function structures at a higher rank and formal syntagms at the lower rank is specified as realisation.

[4] To be clear, in contradiction of SFL Theory, Fawcett here gives priority to the view 'from below', classes of form that realise functions, instead of the view 'from above', the functions that are realised by forms.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, Complement is an element of interpersonal structure at clause rank, which may be conflated with most, if not all, types of participant in experiential structures. Any restrictions on the class of unit that realises a Complement thus depend on the type of participant with which it is conflated.

Misconstruing Hypotaxis As Embedding

 Fawcett (2010: 251):

Filling may introduce a single additional unit to the structure, or it may introduce two or more co-ordinated units. (For co-ordination see Section 11.8.2). For example, an Adjunct that expresses 'Time Position' may be filled by a nominal group such as the day before yesterday, a prepositional group such as on Friday, a quality group such as quite recently, or a clause such as when I was last in London. (In the last case it introduces a clause that is embedded in another clause; see Section 11.8.3 for 'embedding'.) Alternatively, an element may be filled by two co-ordinated units, as in (I lost it) either last Monday or last Tuesday. …

In the Cardiff Grammar, the realisation operation that introduces this relationship of filling to a structure is "Insert a unit to fill Element X". The most surprising fact about the Sydney Grammar's list of realisation operations, as stated in their theoretical-generative publications, is the lack of any equivalent to this crucial operation (as discussed in Section 9.2.3 of Chapter 9).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To translate this into SFL Theory: a functional element of one rank may be realised by either a unit or a complex of units of the rank below. However, only in SFL theory, the complex may be either paratactic ("co-ordinated") or hypotactic.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, quite recently is an adverbial group.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the clause when I was last in London can be either rankshifted (embedded) or ranking:

Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar treats both of the above instance types as embedded, and so can not distinguish between them. Moreover, Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar treats such clauses as embedded (rankshifted) in cases of hypotaxis, but as co-ordinated (ranking) in cases of parataxis. That is, from the perspective of SFL Theory, Fawcett's model involves both reduced explanatory potential and theoretical inconsistency.

[4] This is misleading, because this fact is not surprising. As explained in the examination of Section 9.2.3 (here), Fawcett's realisation operation is unnecessary in SFL Theory, because a unit (clause, group, word, morpheme) is not "inserted" but selected from the rank scale in a system network.