Inconsistencies Caused By The Notion Of Exponence

Fawcett (2010: 259):

How far should this useful principle be extended? For example, should we say that the Subject of a clause that is ultimately expounded by a single pronoun such as he is to be directly expounded by it? Clearly, few linguists would wish to do this, but the criteria for not doing so are rarely stated clearly. 

There are in fact several reasons for not extending the principle to such cases. The first is the sheer centrality of the choices in the nominal group in the grammar as a whole. It is the unit that is used for referring to 'objects', and within it we need to be able to choose between the three major ways of referring to objects that are exemplified by my friend, she and Ivy respectively. The second reason is the sheer frequency of all three types. And the third is the need to be able to co-ordinate different types (as in my friend and I and Ivy and I).

A more problematical case is the treatment of tall in a tall man. Since modifiers are quite frequently filled by quality groups, as in the underlined portion of a very tall man, we treat examples such as a tall man as cases where the modifier is filled by a quality group that has only an apex.

Ultimately, then, the criterion is a matter of economy. In other words, when a further layer of structure unit is required relatively frequently — as in the case of the nominal group that fills the Subject and the quality group that fills the modifier — we always introduce the additional unit. However, when the lower unit occurs only relatively infrequently — as in the case of the quantifying determiner cited above, we introduce a system to handle the choice that is manifested ultimately as variation in depth of exponence.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the rank scale makes this principle — and the problems it generates — unnecessary, as demonstrated previously and below.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the pronoun he simply serves as the Thing/Head of a nominal group that serves as the Subject of a clause.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, nominal groups do not "refer" to 'objects'. Instead, congruently (and ideationally) they realise participants; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 177). Clearly, the nominal groups rare privilege and insatiable greed do not refer to 'objects'.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, these nominal groups are structured as follows:

The participant that each realises depends on the clause in which each functions.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, these are instances in which the Subject is realised by an extending paratactic nominal group complex:

[6] To be clear, in SFL Theory, Fawcett's quality group corresponds to the (± submodified) Epithet of a nominal group: