"A Theory Of The Type Described Here"

Fawcett (2010: 293):

All in all, we can say that a theory of the type described here — together with the theory of system networks and their realisation as illustrated in Appendix A and in Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993) — provides a principled analysis of English syntax that is at every point explicitly functional. It therefore continues the line of development that extends from "Categories" through "Language as choice in social contexts" and, in some measure "Systemic theory". And since the theory of system networks and of the realisation component are clearly quite close in the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars — at least, so long as Halliday continues to regard the networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. as modelling the 'meaning potential' — it is in the theory of syntax that one of the major differences between the two is to be found.

The other great difference, of course, is the answer to the question "What further components does each model have above the system networks for TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc? But that must await another book!

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence. Moreover, there is much evidence that this is not the case, as demonstrated by Fawcett's focus on syntax and form, and his rejection of the three function structures of the clause as proposed in SFL Theory.

[2] To be clear, "the theory of system networks and their realisation as illustrated in Appendix A" will be examined in future posts. But as a foretaste, the only system network that Fawcett provides in this entire publication (p298) construes every noun in English not only as a feature in the network , but also as a feature of either 'mass' or 'count':

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The Cardiff Grammar diverges from this line of development at its very beginning, Scale & Category Grammar (1961). By 1977 (Text as Semantic Choice in Social Contexts), Halliday had already devised the SFL model of stratification that Fawcett does not use, and the metafunctional clause structures that Fawcett rejects.

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue, as the system network above, and the previous examinations of Fawcett's realisation operations demonstrate.

[5] This is misleading, because, although it is true that these systems model 'meaning potential' in Halliday's understanding of the term, language as system, they have never modelled it in Fawcett's misunderstanding of the term, as the semantic stratum.

[6] This is not misleading, because it is not untrue.

[7] To be clear, the "component" that SFL Theory "has above" the system of MOOD is the system of SPEECH FUNCTION; e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 136):

By the same token, the "component" that SFL Theory "has above" the system of TRANSITIVITY is the model of the figure; e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 53):

For the the "component" that SFL Theory "has above" the system of THEME, see the discussion of the text base in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398-413).

[8] To be clear, this book is still awaited, 21 years after the first edition of this publication.

"The First Major Difference Between Fawcett's And Halliday's Nominal Group"

Fawcett (2010: 203-4):

Halliday's nominal group is the only class of group that comes at all close to sharing both the same name and the same coverage of phenomena as it does the Cardiff Grammar — but even here there are important differences.

The first is that Halliday treats the type of quality group that has an adjective as its apex (e.g., more generous than most people) is a type of "nominal group" in IFG. He does this in spite [of] the fact that its internal structure is clearly very similar to that of his "adverbial group". Here, then, he is clearly applying the criterion for assigning an expression to a class of unit that what matters is the unit's ability to function at given elements in the unit above on the 'rank scale' (as discussed in Section 10.2.2). His reason is clearly that an 'adjectival group' such as very bright can function in the clause as an Attribute in the same way as a nominal group can, e.g., She is very bright /a very bright student. 

However, this decision appears to ignore the fact that such expressions also function very frequently as the modifier in a nominal group, e.g., the underlined portion of three very bright students. In both cases the unit realises the meaning of a quality of a thing — and so not the meaning of a 'thing'. 

It is not clear why, since Halliday is willing to allow the internal structure of this morning "to determine its primary syntactic assignment" (as we saw in Section 10.2.2) the internal structure of very bright should not also be allowed to determine its class of unit. The solution to the problem is clear: we should use the internal syntax and semantics of a unit to determine its class.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not misleading, because it is true.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the internal structure of a unit is irrelevant to the classification of a unit, because this takes the view 'from below' (structural realisation), whereas SFL Theory takes the view 'from above' (the function being realised).

[3] To be clear, in all of the provided examples, very bright functions as the (sub-modified) Epithet of a nominal group:

[4] This is true, but misleading. It is true because the Epithet very bright does realise a Quality, rather than a Thing, but it is misleading to imply that, on Halliday's model, it realises a Thing. Fawcett's confusion derives from his misconstruing the Head of the nominal group very bright as Thing, instead of Epithet.

[5] This is very misleading indeed. As we saw in the examination of Section 10.2.2, in the cited example, Halliday was demonstrating the alternative approach that he himself was not taking.

[6] As demonstrated above, the only problem, in this instance, is Fawcett's inability to understand SFL Theory.

[7] To be clear, as previously explained, classifying units 'from below' ("internal syntax") is inconsistent with the functional principles of SFL Theory. However, classifying units 'from above' (semantics) is entirely consistent with SFL Theory, and it is the method that Halliday adopts. That is, classifying groups according to their function in clause structure is classifying them according to the meaning they realise in the clause. However, contrary to the claim here, this is not the criterion that Fawcett applies, but rather, the criterion he continually rejects.

Some Problems With Fawcett's Treating Hypotaxis As Embedding

 Fawcett (2010: 192n):

³ However, there is still the major difference between the two models in what types of relationship they permit between two (or more) clauses that make up a sentence. While the Sydney Grammar allows for "paratactic" and "hypotactic" relationships between clauses, the Cardiff Grammar recognises only the first of these. The prototypical type of "paratactic" relationship is that of 'co-ordination', as in My brother has arrived but his girlfriend will be a few minutes late, and all grammars recognise this relationship. In contrast, Halliday's "hypotactic" relationship between two units is not recognised in most other grammars. It is said to be one of 'dependency' without 'embedding', an example being He told us that he would be there. In Halliday's model the unit that he would be there is said to be 'projected by' the superordinate clause He told us, rather than being an element of it. In the Cardiff Grammar it would be regarded as a 'Participant' in the Process of 'telling', and it would be treated as an embedded clause that fills a Phenomenon that is conflated with a Complement. Thus the Cardiff Grammar treats virtually all of Halliday's "hypotactic" relationships as types of embedding.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the relation of clause to clause complex ('sentence') is not constituency ('make up'). In each clause nexus, one clause is the expansion or projection of the other.

[2] To be clear, recognising one type of interdependency, parataxis, but not the other, hypotaxis, introduces theoretical inconsistency, and prevents the recognition of agnate clause complexes (and their further agnates), as will be seen in later discussions.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, 'co-ordination' involves two dimensions of choice: interdependency (parataxis) and expansion (extension).

[4] To be clear, here Fawcett implies the logical fallacy known as argumentum ad populum: a proposition is claimed to be true or good solely because a majority or many people believe it to be so.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, dependency (taxis) is distinct from embedding (rankshift).

[6] To be clear, the locution clause (that he would be there) is projected by the main (α) clause, not the superordinate clause. A superordinate clause is a clause that contains another clause. That is, the superordinate clause in this instance is he told us that he would be there, not he told us.

[7] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the Range of a verbal Process is Verbiage, not Phenomenon. Phenomenon is a participant of a mental clause, not a verbal clause.

[8] To be clear, this reduces the explanatory potential of the theory. For example, it fails to distinguish embedded facts, which are clause participants, from projected ideas, which are not.

Syntax Potential

Fawcett (2010: 172):

The main topic of this chapter will be the theory of syntax potential that is required in a modern SF grammar. I first used this term in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3 and it is modelled, as will be clear, on Halliday's characterisation of the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and the rest as meaning potential. In Figure 4 we contrasted the 'meaning potential' of the grammar with its 'form potential', and 'syntax potential' is simply one part of the form potential.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading on several counts. Firstly, it is inconsistent with Halliday's notion of meaning potential, since Halliday models meaning potential as system, whereas Fawcett models syntax potential as realisation rules. Secondly, Halliday's notion of meaning potential refers to language as system, not just to the stratum of semantics (Fawcett's level of meaning). Thirdly, because Fawcett misunderstands 'meaning potential' to mean semantic systems, he gives here the false impression that Halliday characterises his own grammatical systems as semantic.

[2] Reminder:

To be clear, as previously explained, Fawcett's Figure 4 presents 

• form potential as realisation rules that involve meaning features,
• realisation rules (form) as the realisation of a system network (meaning), and
• structure as an instance of realisation rules.

The Purpose Of Fawcett's "Some Proposals" (1974)

Fawcett (2010: 161-2):

The purpose of "Some proposals" was to present the set of revisions to the concepts of "Categories" that I considered at the time (1974) to be required, in order to constitute a 'systemic syntax' that would complement Halliday's revolutionary proposal that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD and THEME should be regarded as choices between meanings (as described in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4). As Butler wrote in 1985:

Halliday's most recent proposals [...] make it clear that the functional component networks are to be regarded as semantic, but we are given very little idea of what the lexicogrammar [i.e., the level of form] might now consist of [my emphasis] (Butler 1985:94).

"Some proposals" was a first attempt to fill this gap, and it probably reached its widest readership through Butler's generally approving summaries of its contents — first in Butler (1979), and then in Butler (1985:94-102). He makes the key point when he states, "[Fawcett's] approach to the recognition of syntactic categories is dictated by his commitment to the centrality of semantics" (Butler 1985:94). In this approach, then, a large part of the description of a text should be in terms of the semantic features that have been chosen in generating it (e.g., in the way described in Section 7.8 of Chapter 7).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the stated purpose of Fawcett's "Some proposals" was to present a set of revisions to Halliday's first theory, Scale and Category Grammar, despite the fact that it had been replaced by a new theory, Systemic Functional Grammar.

[2] As Halliday (1985: xiv) explained, the notion of syntax is inconsistent with the assumptions and mode of inquiry of SFL Theory, for reasons previously cited on this blog.

[3] To be clear, this refers to Halliday's second theory, Systemic Functional Grammar, not his first, Scale and Category Grammar. In the earliest form of Systemic Functional Grammar, the metafunctional systems of the clause were mapped onto the grammatical rank scale of form (see [4] below). This was soon replaced by the relocation of these systems to the stratum of lexicogrammar, largely to provide a systematic account of mismatches between meaning and wording (grammatical metaphor). Because SFG is a functional grammar, the grammar is modelled in terms of its functions, and the function of the grammar is to realise meaning. 

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Even in the earliest version of SFG, where the metafunctional systems were located on the stratum of semantics, Halliday was explicit about what constituted the lexicogrammar. For example, Halliday (1978: 128-9):

Fourth, we shall assume that each component of the semantic system specifies its own structures, as the ‘output, of the options in the network (so each act of choice contributes to the formation of the structure). It is the function of the lexicogrammatical stratum to map the structures one onto another so as to form a single integrated structure that represents all components simultaneously. With negligible exceptions, every operational instance of a lexicogrammatical construct in the adult language — anything that realises text — is structured as the expression of all four components. In other words, any instance of language in use ‘means, in these various ways, and shows that it does so in its grammar.

Fifth, we shall assume that the lexicogrammatical system is organised by rank (as opposed to by immediate constituent structure); each rank is the locus of structural configurations, the place where structures from the different components are mapped on to each other. The ‘rank scale' for the lexicogrammar of English is:

 [5] This misleading, because in all of Halliday's theorising, lexicogrammar is the level of wording, not form; form is a level in Fawcett's model only. For example, in the earliest model of SFG, Halliday (1978: 128) writes:

We shall start with the assumption that the semantic system is one of three strata, chat constitute the linguistic system:

Semantic (the meaning)
Lexicogrammatical (the wording, i.e. syntax, morphology and lexis)
Phonological (the sound)

[6] As demonstrated above, there was no gap to fill. In both of Halliday's theories, grammatical form is modelled as a rank scale. The reason why Fawcett argues against a rank scale, is that it is the most obvious aspect of Halliday's theory that makes his own model redundant.

[7] To be clear, as the critical examinations on this blog demonstrate, contrary to the priorities of Systemic Functional Theory, Fawcett's "commitment to the centrality of semantics" involves prioritising form over function and structure over system.

[8] This is potentially misleading. To be clear, in Systemic Functional Grammar, the metafunctional systems of the clause are located on the lexicogrammatical stratum (rather than semantics), whereas in the Cardiff Grammar they are located at the level of meaning (rather than form). That is, what the Cardiff Grammar describes in terms of semantic features, Systemic Functional Grammar describes in terms of lexicogrammatical features.

The Logical Conclusion Of The Argument For A Theory Of Syntax For SFL [3]

Fawcett (2010: 156):

16. As a final point, we might note that the Cardiff Grammar has a simpler architecture than the Sydney Grammar with respect to the relationship between the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. and their realisations in form. The former is summarised in Figure 4 of Chapter 3 and the latter in Figure 8 of Section 7.4 3. The Cardiff model is also simpler in that its system networks have been semanticised to the point where there is no need to have a higher layer of networks, as there seems to be in the model described in Halliday (1994) and Matthiessen (1995).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, the simpler architecture of the Cardiff Grammar (Figure 4) is riddled with internal inconsistencies that invalidate it as a model. These include positing realisation rules involving semantic features at the level of form, such that realisation rules realise system networks, and positing structure as an instance of realisation rules:

[2] To be clear, the figure in Section 7.4.3, Figure 9*, says nothing about "the relationship between the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. and their realisations in form" in the "Sydney Grammar" since it is merely a metafunctional analysis of clause structure, without reference to the systems that specify each structure:

* Figure 8 presents a modification of Figure 4 to accommodate Fawcett's mistaken notion of structure conflation.

[3] To be clear, Fawcett's "semanticisation" of Halliday's grammatical grammatical systems is merely his relocation of them from Halliday's stratum of lexicogrammar to his level of meaning. Fawcett does not present any of his "semanticised" versions of these networks in the entire publication.

More importantly, as previously noted, the distinction between semantic networks (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999) and lexicogrammatical networks (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004, 2014) is warranted by the explanatory power it provides in modelling grammatical metaphor.

The Need For A Theory Of Syntax For SFL: The Argument Summarised [4]

Fawcett (2010: 154):

7. Thus Halliday now presents the structure of a clause (and in principle other units) as multiple structures. In any such representation of a clause there is, in principle, a line of structure that corresponds to each 'metafunction' (but in practice several more, with seven for many text-sentences as analysed in IFG). Each line consists of a string of 'functional elements', or 'functions'. The problem is that the elements of these 'structures' are not necessarily coterminous (and nor are the structures themselves coterminous). In other words, if two or more elements in two or more strands of meaning are coterminous, they can be conflated with each other to form a compound element, but when they are not coterminous it is not logically possible to conflate them (as described in Section 7.4 of this chapter). Despite these serious theoretical-generative problems, it appears that Halliday may regard the notion that there are many different structures (and so many non-coterminous elements) in a single clause as one of the riches of language — at least from the text-descriptive viewpoint, as exemplified in the analyses in IFG.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In IFG, what Fawcett refers to as "text-sentences" — his model, not SFL Theory — are the three metafunctional clause structures. The reason why Fawcett thinks there are "several more" is that he mistakes information structure as a clause structure, and counts mood and thematic structures twice because of their structural components (e.g. Subject of the Mood element, and topical Theme of the Theme element).

[2] To be clear, as previously explained, in SFL Theory, there is no need to conflate any elements. It is simply the case that, under certain circumstances, some elements do happen to conflate, as when Subject conflates with Behaver in behavioural clauses. The three metafunctional structures of the clause are integrated in the syntagm of units at the rank below, as when Subject and Behaver are realised by the same nominal group.

[3] To be clear, the conflation of two elements, such as Subject and Behaver, does not result in a "compound element", since each element is an element of a different structure, and, in SFL Theory, a structure is the relation between elements (e.g the relation of Subject to Finite, or the relation of Behaver to Process).

The Need For A Theory Of Syntax For SFL: The Argument Summarised [2]

Fawcett (2010: 153):

4. However, Halliday's writings in the 1970s and 1980s have explored two approaches to modelling meaning in language. One of these involves treating the system networks for TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on as the level of semantics. In the second model these networks are considered to be, in some sense, at the level of form — though it is a 'form' that has been 'pushed in the direction of the semantics' (Halliday 1994:xix) — and there is (in principle) a higher stratum of even more 'semantic' system networks that correspond to each of the networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME, etc. I prefer the first (and simpler) of these two positions, and I consider that the phenomena for which Halliday sets up the second level of 'meaning' can be more appropriately accounted for in other ways (as argued in Sections 4.6 to 4.8 of Chapter 4).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in Halliday's superseded model, written between 1972 and 1976, structures produced by semantic systems were mapped onto units of the grammatical rank scale. By the 1980s, these semantic systems were reconstrued as lexicogrammatical systems, so as to account for grammatical metaphor.

[2] This is misleading on two counts. Firstly, in the second model — the current model — these systems are located on the stratum of lexicogrammar, not form; 'form' is a level in Fawcett's model only. In Systemic Functional Grammar, form is modelled as a rank scale of units, each of which serves as the entry condition to functional systems. Secondly, the quote from Halliday (1994: xix) is explicitly concerned with a functional grammar, not form:

[3] To be clear, 'I prefer' and 'I consider that…' are not reasoned argumentation based on evidence.

[4] This very misleading indeed. Fawcett provides no argument whatsoever in Sections 4.6 to 4.8 (pp53-70) for the "other ways" that grammatical metaphor can be "more appropriately accounted for". The only statement in this regard, in the entire three sections, is yet another bare assertion, and the promise of a still unpublished work, in footnote 7 on page 57:

I consider that the phenomena that have led Halliday to adopt his latest position are to be explained in other ways (one being to further semanticise some of Halliday's networks, e.g., that for MOOD). See Fawcett (forthcoming a) for a set of such semantic system networks.

The Second Stage In Text Analysis Using The Cardiff Grammar

Fawcett (2010: 147-8):

Then, at a second stage of analysis, the text is described in terms of its key semantic features, i.e., the most significant of the many features that have been chosen in generating it. An example of this type of analysis is shown in the lower half of Figure 10.

 

This displays the key semantic features, arranged in a number of strands of meaning. But note that there is no expectation that all or even most of a 'strand' will be used. Each feature is placed below the element (or elements) of the clause to whose generation it has contributed. There is no space here, of course, to show the system networks from which these features are derived, nor to comment on each feature. Notice, though, that the Subject contributes to two types of meaning: that of 'information giver' and that of 'subject theme'— as well as being conflated with the Agent. I hope that the labels used for the features are sufficiently transparent to give a flavour of this type of multi-strand analysis, and so of its value in analysing texts. 

Perhaps the most important characteristic of the diagram is that it shows how an analyst can first determine the functional syntax of a one-clause text such as this example, and then go on to derive from it, in a relatively direct and natural manner, the semantic analysis, showing these features in terms of the major strands of meaning.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously observed, Figure 10 misrepresents systemic features (paradigmatic axis) as structural elements (syntagmatic axis).

[2] As previously observed, Figure 10 mistakenly assigns features of the clause to individual elements of clause structure.

[3] This is misleading, because it is the opposite of what is true. In a book of 360 pages, there is ample space 'to show the system networks from which these features are derived' and to 'comment on each feature'. Moreover, without the networks, the valeur of each feature — its relation to other features — is not even provided, let alone supported by reasoned argument.

[4] Notice, though, that Fawcett does not specify the valeur of either 'information giver' or 'subject theme', and that the "Agent" is actually the Medium through which the Process unfolds.

[5] To be clear, Figure 10 does not show either how an analyst determines "the functional syntax of a one-clause text" or how to derive a semantic analysis from it, it merely presents each as a fait accompli.

[6] Again, this demonstrates that the Cardiff Grammar's theoretical orientation is the opposite of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, since it proceeds from form to meaning, rather than from meaning to form. Halliday (1985, 1994: xiv):

The Structure Of The Clause In The Cardiff Grammar

Fawcett (2010: 147):

For the reader who is familiar with Halliday's work, it may be helpful to think of the structure of a clause as being represented in the present approach rather as a group is represented in IFG. In other words, the 'metafunctions' "are not represented in the form of separate whole structures, but rather as partial contributions to a single structural line" (Halliday (1994:179). This does not deny the fact that many elements of the clause constitute the simultaneous realisation of several different types of meaning. In Figure 10, for example, the word We simultaneously realises the Subject and the Agent — and, as we shall see in a moment, the Subject itself is the realisation of two meanings.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this flatly contradicts Fawcett's previous insistence (p146) that the metafunctional nature of language should only be represented at the level of meaning:

In the framework of the Cardiff Grammar, where the representation at the level of form is the final, integrated output, it is clear that the level of representation at which the multifunctional nature of language should be displayed is in the representation of the meanings — because at the lower level the various strands of meaning have already been integrated into a single structure.

[2] To be clear, this again confuses constituents of the clause (groups and phrases), which can realise "several different types of meaning", with elements of clause structure, such as Theme or Subject, which cannot. A Theme realises textual meaning only; a Subject realises interpersonal meaning only.

[3] As previously observed, in the clause We would visit Mrs S every Sunday, we serves as the Medium through which the Process unfolds, with Mrs S serving as the Range or domain of the Process. There is no external cause of the Process construed as a participant (Agent). Reminder:

[4] This claim will be examined in situ. (The two meanings said to be realised by 'Subject' are 'subject theme' and 'information giver', the last of which is represented as not coterminous with the other two.)

Fawcett's Third Difficult Question For The Cardiff Grammar

Fawcett (2010: 146-7):

The third question was "In the representation at the level of form, is the conflation that occurs between the realisations of the various strands of meaning a conflation of whole structures or of individual elements?" Here the answer will be clear from the previous sections, and it is that the conflations occur between specific coterminous elements, as complex nodes in the single integrated syntactic representation.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder of the Cardiff Grammar representation (Figure 10, p148):

[1] To be clear, Fawcett's third "difficult" question for the Cardiff Grammar is merely an invitation for him to describe one aspect of it. It is not a question that seeks a justification of the theorising itself.

[2] To be clear, the rhetorical significance of this question is that Fawcett has previously misrepresented Halliday's model as involving structure conflation, and argued that structure conflation is problematic. Fawcett's model therefore does not suffer from the problems he wrongly attributes to Halliday's model.

[3] To be clear, Fawcett's answer is merely a bare assertion, with no supporting argumentation — either here or in the previous sections. For example, having argued against representing metafunctional meanings at the level of form, he provides no explanation as to why the two conflations in Figure 10 are conflations of interpersonal elements with experiential elements: Subject with Agent, and Complement with Affected (Medium) — leaving aside the fact that, in terms of SFL Theory, Subject actually conflates with Medium, and Complement with Range.

Fawcett's Argument That Rheme, Residue And Given "Do Not Contribute In Any Way To The Functional Structure Of The Clause"

Fawcett (2010: 135-6):

Let me summarise the stages of the argument that I have presented up to this point. We have established that the theoretical-generative model of a systemic functional grammar is always one of 'element conflation' and never one of 'structure conflation'. In other words, the 'mapping' between lines of analysis is performed on individual pairs and trios of 'functions' or 'elements', which from then on function as a single element of the clause. I would therefore say that those systemic functional grammars which suggest that the representation of a clause should include 'functions' such as 'Residue', 'Rheme' and 'Given' are in fact introducing what we might term 'pseudo-elements', i.e., chunks of text that do not contribute in any way to the functional structure of the clause. Their chief effect is to give the misleading impression that there is a 'structure' of roughly the length of a clause that corresponds to each of the strands of meaning. In other words, the only type of conflation that occurs in such a grammar — as it generates its single, 'flat-tree' structures — is the conflation of single, coterminous elements.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. The fact that conflation involves only elements, and not structures, is not established by Fawcett's argument, because it is a principle of SFL Theory. The notion of 'structure conflation' is merely Fawcett's misunderstanding of SFL Theory, as demonstrated in previous posts.

[2] This is a serious misunderstanding of the conflation of functions. The conflation of functions, such as Theme, Subject and Actor does not entail that all three "function as a single element of the clause". The conflation of functions just means that all three are realised by the same nominal group, as happens in the case of such selections as [unmarked THEME, operative VOICE, declarative MOOD, material PROCESS TYPE]. Each of the three elements is a distinct function, each defined by its relations to other elements in its particular structure.

[3] To be clear, this is an invalid conclusion argued from a false premiss. The false premiss is that conflated elements "function as a single element of the clause"; see [2]. The argument is invalid, because, regardless of the truth of the premisses, the conclusion is not logically entailed by them. That is, the fact that one element is not conflated with another does not mean that such elements serve no function in their structural configuration. Function of an element in one metafunctional structure is not dependent on its being conflated with another element in a different metafunctional structure. As previously noted, a structure is the relation between elements, such as:

• the relation between Theme and Rheme in clause structure;
• the relation between Mood and Residue in clause structure;
• the relation between New and Given in information unit structure.

[4] This continues Fawcett's confusion between function structures and formal constituency. The 'flatness' here refers to formal constituency as modelled by the rank scale: ranked constituents (minimal bracketing), rather than immediate constituents (maximal bracketing). As Halliday (1995 [1993]: 273) makes clear:

'Rank' is constituency based on function, and hence 'flat,' with minimal layering;

It will be seen later that, while Fawcett argues for what he calls a 'flat tree structure', he simultaneously argues against the inclusion of a rank scale in SFL Theory.

The Problem Of Limitations On 'Potential For Conflation'

Fawcett (2010: 132):

The second important difference in Figure 9 from the standard IFG-style analysis follows from the first. It is that the potential for 'conflation' among the 'functions' in Matthiessen and Bateman's "output" diagram (and in fact in all other published accounts of SF generation) is very limited indeed. In the generation of their worked example (shown in Figure 9) the only conflations that occur are (1) the conflation of the elements "Theme", "Subject" and "Carrier", and (2) the conflation of the elements "Finite" and "Process". More specifically, notice that the only 'functions' that Figure 9 shows to be conflated are ones that are coterminous with each other.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett is comparing representations of structures, the one in the modelling of human language, the other in the generation of texts by computer — rather than examining the theoretical criteria on which structures are based — as a means of questioning the theoretical validity of structures. Again, this makes Fawcett's argument an instance of the Red Herring fallacy, since how structures are represented (even within the same field) is irrelevant to the the theoretical validity of the structures themselves.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, here Fawcett falsely presents an aspect of SFL Theory, the conflation of coterminous elements, as if it were in contradiction with the theory itself, and as if it supported his own argument; see the preceding and following posts.

Misconstruing An Absence Of Label For An Absence Of Function

Fawcett (2010: 132, 132n):

From our present perspective, the first important difference about Figure 9 is the blank boxes in the THEME and MOOD lines of the representation. Most of the THEME line of analysis is a long blank box, covering several elements, in which the label "Rheme" would be written if this was an IFG analysis. And there is similar blank box in the MOOD line of Figure 9, where "Residue" would be written in an IFG analysis (between "Mood" and "Moodtag"). This is not the trivial difference that it might at first appear, because when the blank boxes are labelled this suggests that there are 'functions' in these lines of analysis that correspond to them — and it is this fact that in turn allows one to read into such diagrams the idea that they represent a 'structure'. In other words, I suggest that there is not in fact a single 'functional element' called a "Rheme" that corresponds to several other clause elements; that there is no 'functional element' of 'Residue' that similarly covers one or more elements; and, in cases where there is an INFORMATION line of analysis, that there is no 'functional element' of 'Given' that covers one or more elements.¹²

¹² As you may have noticed, the right hand box in the TRANSITIVITY line of analysis is also blank, but in this case an IFG-style analysis would not label it. This is because this element only has 'interpersonal' meaning. Since the tag isn't it is automatically derived from the main clause it has no 'experiential' meaning, so that there is nothing to say about it in terms of the TRANSITIVITY line of analysis. 

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] This is misleading, because the difference is indeed trivial. The difference here is between labelling a negative — Rheme or Residue — and not labelling it. 'Rheme' labels the portion of a clause as message that is not Theme: the point of departure of the message. 'Residue' labels the portion of a clause as exchange that is not Mood: the carrier of 'the burden of the clause as an interactive event' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 150).  The unlabelled box after 'Theme' signifies 'not Theme', which is equivalent to 'Rheme'; the absence of a label after 'Mood' signifies 'not Mood', which is equivalent to 'Residue'.

[2] To be clear, a structure is the relation between elements, and the relations obtain if both elements are labelled or if one of them is iconically represented as a negative.

[3] To be clear, this is a non-sequitur. Here Fawcett has invalidly concluded that the absence of a label necessarily entails the absence of a function. Moreover, this conclusion leads to an absurdity, since, without at least the possibility of an element that is not Theme (Rheme), not Mood (Residue), not New (Given), there can be no contrasting element that is Theme, Mood, New, respectively.

[4] To be clear, the reason why a Moodtag 'has no experiential meaning' is because it is not a representation of experience.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1969/81) As Adopting An "Anomolous" Position

Fawcett (2010: 130):

There are differences in the sequence in which 'functions' are inserted in various versions of SF grammars, but what is constant across all such grammars — whether they are produced in the Sydney or the Cardiff frameworks — is that the phenomena that gets [sic] conflated are coterminous 'functional elements' (or 'functions' or 'elements') — and not structures. 

Moreover, there is no generative systemic functional grammar in existence that includes a rule which conflates 'chunks' of the clause such as 'Residue', 'Rheme' and 'Given' with the various 'functions' in other 'strands'. 

The fact is that Halliday, in his immensely influential but still exploratory work 'Options and functions in the English clause' (1969/81) appears to adopt an anomolous [sic] position. On page 143 he emphasises the concept that "the clause has a number of different but simultaneous structures" (while pointing out certain caveats, as indicated in the last subsection). But on the facing page he sets out a table of realisation statements that demonstrates clearly that the model is in fact one that simply conflates 'functions' — and not structures. In other words, his rules show how to generate the 'function' of 'Theme', but not the 'function' of 'Rheme'; they show how to give a Participant Role the 'function' of being 'New', but not how to assign the supposed function of 'Given' to whatever experiential element or elements it is relevant to — and similarly for the 'Residue'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously explained, the selection of clause features and the activation of realisation statements, the process of instantiation, is not temporally sequenced in SFL Theory. The application of the theory to computational text generation requires an adaptation of the theory to the limitations of computers, which, at the time of writing, do not learn language through interaction in a speech community.

[2] To be clear, this is true of SFL Theory, but contrary to what Fawcett has thus far been claiming.

[3] To be clear, this is true of SFL Theory, because no such rule is necessary. This is because all structures are integrated in the syntagm that realises them, and the terms 'Residue' and 'Rheme' are labels for negatives: 'not Mood' and 'not Theme', respectively.

[4] To be clear, 'Given' is not a function of the clause, and labels a negative: the portion of the information unit that is 'not New'.

[5] To be clear, there is no anomaly here. In Halliday's model, the clause does have a number of different but simultaneous structures, but it is only elements of structure that are conflated, not structures.

[6] See [4]. To be clear, it is not only participants, or indeed even experiential elements, that can be highlighted as New, as demonstrated by instances like:

• I say it is true (Process as New)
• I said put it on the table (Location as New)
• Of course it is! (comment Adjunct as New)
• I'm going anyway. (conjunctive Adjunct as New).

The Problem Of "Evaluative Enhanced Theme"

Fawcett (2010: 128-9):

Moreover, similar problems would arise for Halliday's analysis of what are termed in the Cardiff Grammar evaluative enhanced theme constructions (i.e., 'extraposition' in the terms of formal grammar) such as It's marvellous to see you again). 

In my view the component of the grammar that would handle Halliday's analyses of such structures will never be built — if only because there are vastly preferable approaches to the problem of modelling such structures.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Problems do not arise because it is not structures that are conflated, but elements, as previously explained.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, such constructions involve a 'postposed Subject' and are analysed along the following lines:

It	's		marvellous	[[to see you again]]
Theme	Rheme
Sub-	Finite	Predicator	Complement	-ject
Car-	Process		Attribute	-rier
nominal group	verbal group		nominal group	(clause embedded in) nominal group

Here the Theme is simply it, and the Subject and Carrier are realised by an elaborating paratactic nominal group complex (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 199):

It	[[to see you again]]
1	= 2

That is,

• the Theme is not evaluative — the evaluation is given rhematic status, and
• the Theme is not enhanced — the Subject is realised by an elaborating nominal group complex.

The Serious Problem Of Predicated Theme

Fawcett (2010: 128, 128n):

Some of Halliday's analyses in IFG introduce a yet more serious problem. This is the fact that they involve presenting the same clause at two different layers of structure in the THEME and MOOD analyses. This occurs in his analyses of clauses with an experiential enhanced theme (also known as 'predicated theme' and the 'it-cleft construction'), e.g., It was his teacher who persuaded him to continue. Halliday's analyses of the THEME and MOOD structures of such examples have very little in common. His THEME structure (IFG p. 60) presents who persuaded him to continue as a direct element of the thematic structure, while the equivalent clause in his MOOD analysis (p. 98) is two layers lower in the structure. This is because Halliday claims (wrongly in my view) that the Subject in the MOOD structure in the above text-sentence is it [...] who persuaded him to continue (where who persuaded him to continue must function as a qualifier in a nominal group whose head is it)ⁱ⁰ The problem is that the clause who persuaded him to continue is at a different layer of structure in each of these two analyses — so running counter to one of the basic assumptions of theoretical-generative SFL, i.e., that each traversal of the system network generates one layer of structure. I can think of no way in which 'structure conflation statements' could cover such cases.  

10. The elements of the TRANSITIVITY analysis that Halliday would give to such examples would be the same as the MOOD elements, judging by his analyses in Halliday (1967-8:236). 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the structures under discussion are the thematic and mood structures of clauses with predicated Theme. Halliday (1994: 60):

Halliday (1994: 98):

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. These structures do not pose a theoretical problem because the structures are not conflated, as previously explained.  All structures are integrated by the group rank syntagm that realises them.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett neither offers a reason for his grammatical disagreement, nor provides an alternative analysis.  In SFL theory, the Subject is identified by what is picked up by a Mood Tag:

It was his teacher who persuaded him to continue, wasn't it?

The analysis of it [[who persuaded him to continue]] as a single (discontinuous) clause constituent can be seen more clearly through agnate clauses such as:

Who was it [[who persuaded him to continue]]?

and its transitivity structure:

it	was	his teacher	who persuaded him to continue
Ident…	Process: identifying	Identifier	…ified

[3] This is misleading, because it confuses two distinct senses of 'layer':

• 'layer' in the sense of one of three metafunctional structures, and
• 'layer' in the sense of a compositional level within one metafunctional structure (e.g. Mood composed of Subject and Finite).

The structures of each metafunction — composite or otherwise — realise the systemic choices of its metafunctional system.