"The Generalisations That Halliday Gives Up"

Fawcett (2010: 333):

M&M make many valuable points in their "Response to Huddleston". The main weakness in the case that they present in the sections of their "Response" summarised above is this: they do not show how the generalisations that Halliday gives up in order to foreground the similarities between the 'hypotactic' and 'paratactic' analyses are to be handled in the grammar. If M&M are to 'defend' the position taken in IFG successfully, they need to address this question. But perhaps there should be less 'attacking' and 'defending', and more accepting of genuine 'problem examples', together with more exploring of comprehensive solutions to such problems, in the framework of a multi-component model?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday does not "give up" any generalisations in "foregrounding the similarities" of hypotaxis and parataxis. On the contrary, the distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis provides a generalisation, the system of TAXIS (interdependency), which Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar lacks. Importantly, the distinction between interdependency and embedding provides a more detailed specification of the different types of grammatical environments in which the generalised meanings of expansion and projection are manifested.

[2] To be clear, it is Fawcett who chooses to construe M&M's 'Response To Huddleston" in terms of 'attacking' and 'defending', the former being his own preferred modus operandi.

[3] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, the 'problem examples' that have been presented by Huddleston and Fawcett are not genuine 'problem examples' when examined with a sufficient grasp of SFL Theory.

Fawcett's Contention That The Notion Of A Rank Scale Depends On Hypotaxis

  Fawcett (2010: 333):

In other words, the analyses of dependent clauses that Huddleston advocates in his review of IFG are indeed possible ones within SFL. But the fact that SF linguists agree that we should explore the value of both 'hypotaxis' and alternative concepts within the theory does not absolve us from the obligation to try to decide whether 'hypotaxis' is needed in all or some or none of the cases for which Halliday proposes its use. The key point for the present debate is that, if we replace 'hypotaxis' by embedding in the examples discussed here (as Huddleston and I advocate), the case for retaining the concept of the 'rank scale' is greatly weakened. Thus it is not the case, as M&M suggest (p. 28), that "Huddleston's objections are descriptive, not theoretical".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the theoretical value of hypotaxis is its explanatory potential. For example, with regard to projection, the distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis models the distinction between reports and quotes, and the distinction between hypotaxis and embedding models the distinction between reports and pre-projected facts.

[2] This bare assertion, unsupported by argument, is misleading, because it is untrue. Whether clauses are analysed as ranking (dependent) or rankshifted (embedded) can have no bearing whatsoever on the theoretical status of the rank scale. If hypotaxis were excised from the theory, and all dependent clauses were interpreted as embedded, such clauses can still be interpreted as rank units, shifted to the rank of another unit on a rank scale.

[3] To be clear, the sense in which this is true is that SFL Theory provides both hypotaxis and embedding as potential descriptions of language, and the linguist chooses which of these to deploy in the description.

Criticising Martin For The Wrong Reasons

 Fawcett (2010: 332-3, 333n):

As M&M very fairly point out, "Fawcett (1980), [...] working within a theoretical framework closely related to Halliday's, treats all of Halliday's hypotactic clauses through embedding, the very position which Huddleston espouses." After also indicating that Martin (1988) suggests an analysis of such examples in which the experiential analysis at clause rank is in these terms, they go on: "The theory can thus be seen to accommodate a range of approaches to the question of subordination" (M&M 1991:29). ¹⁹ 

¹⁹ However, I am surprised to find Martin advocating this idea, because it involves an insuperable problem. This is that the second part of his proposal is that there should be a "simultaneous analysis" (showing the 'logical' structure) at the 'rank' of the "clause complex". This is, as we have seen, a different 'unit' on the 'rank scale' from the clause, so that if Martin's idea were to be adopted there would even more serious problems for the concept of conflating these two structures than those already specified in Section 7.4 of Chapter 7. It may be that Martin would now wish to reconsider this proposal.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from Fawcett's description, Martin's problematic analysis of he said he'd go would be something like:

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue, as previously demonstrated. As the term 'clause complex' suggests, the rank at which this unit complex is located is 'clause'.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As previously explained in the examination of Fawcett's Section 7.4, in SFL Theory, it is only elements of structure that can be conflated, not entire structures. The notion of structure conflation is nonsensical because a structure is the relation between elements. 

Throughout Section 7.4, Fawcett confused the false notion of 'structure conflation' with the notion of the integration of the three metafunction structures through their realisation in a syntagm of clause constituents: groups and phrases.

[4] To be clear, even if Martin were the type to reconsider his own proposals, and capable of doing so, at 71 years, he does not have enough years left him to reconsider all the proposals he needs to reconsider. See, for example, the clarifying critiques of Martin (1992) and Martin & Rose (2007).

Projection As A Hypotactic Relationship, Locution As Phenomenon

Fawcett (2010: 332):

M&M then go on to consider, much more briefly, examples such as the clause he'd go in He said he'd go. For Halliday (and so M&M) this is a case of the 'hypotactic' relationship of 'projection', with he'd go being a 'beta' clause to the supposed 'alpha' clause he said. As we saw at the start of this section, for both Huddleston and me this example has an embedded clause that fills a Complement of the higher clause He said he 'd go. (Strictly speaking, for me it fills the Participant Role of Phenomenon, this being conflated with the Complement.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is not misleading, because it is true.

[2] This is misleading, because it is not true. To be clear, in SFL Theory, projection is not a hypotactic relationship. Projection is a logico-semantic relation, whereas hypotaxis is a type of interdependency.

[3] Strictly speaking, in SFL Theory, if he'd go were an embedded clause, it would serve as Verbiage (the Range of a verbal Process), not as Phenomenon (the Range of a mental Process). However, in SFL Theory, this is a dependent clause, and so a verbal projection, and so a reported locution.

Fawcett's Higher 'Rhetorical Structure Relations' Component

Fawcett (2010: 331-2, 332n):

However, M&M can still point out that the question remains of where, in the overall model, we should express the similarity between (1a) and (3a). My answer is that the place to handle the choice that is realised by these examples is in a higher component of the generation process than the lexicogrammar. This is the component which plans the rhetorical structure relations of the discourse, and so how best to present the relations between any two events. (For the key proposals for this component see Mann and Thompson 1987, and for a useful introductory discussion see Martin 1992.) Indeed, the choice that is realised in (1a), (2a) or (3a) must also be extended to include a realisation such as (4), so that for this reason too it is appropriate to handle it outside the lexicogrammar.¹⁸

(4) He left the room. Then they voted.

¹⁸ In fact, it is also at this stage in generation that the planner needs to consider choosing other conceptually equivalent choices realised in forms which M&M do not mention but which express the same basic temporal relationship of successivity between events, such as They voted after he left the room and After he left the room they voted.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

(1a) He left the room before they voted.

(2a) He left the room before the vote.

(3a) He left the room, then they voted.

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the distinction between (1a) and (3a) is the distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis at the rank of clause, and it modelled in the grammar by the system of clause complexing. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 438):

[2] To be clear, Fawcett does not locate this higher component anywhere in the architecture of his model (Figures 4 and 12):

[3] To be clear, Martin (1992: 251-64) misunderstands Rhetorical Structure Theory.  See, for example, the clarifying critiques here, here, and here.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, these are all different grammatical manifestations of the enhancement category 'time: different':

• in (1a), it is realised logically through clause complexing: hypotaxis;
• in (2a) it is realised experientially through clause transitivity: circumstantiation;
• in (3a), it is realised logically through clause complexing: parataxis; and
• in (4), it is realised textually through cohesive conjunction.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the logico-semantic relation between the clauses in both of these hypotactic complexes is analysed as 'time: different: later', with the first complex ordered dominant^dependent (α^β), and the second ordered dependent^dominant (β^α). Note again that Fawcett frames this in terms of a model of text generation by computers, rather than a model of language spoken or written by humans.

Misrepresenting An Argument Against Parataxis As An Argument Against Hypotaxis

Fawcett (2010: 331):

In the second part of their case, M&M suggest a second analysis of Huddleston's example, i.e., as two co-ordinated clauses with ellipsis in the second, thus: He left before the debate or (he left) (at least) before the vote was taken. But again, I am afraid, I have to point out a problem. While their analysis appears at first to be another possible one, we need to take account of the fact that one can insert either to the left of before the debate, so that it becomes He left either before the debate or (at least) before the vote was taken. And this fact demonstrates clearly that the grammar must allow for the possibility of generating the prepositional group and the clause as jointly filling an Adjunct.

Thus M&M suggest that two possible analyses should be allowed (the first being Huddleston's and mine). They therefore do not address the question of which of the two is systemically preferable, and why. Moreover, Huddleston's criticism of IFG stands. In other words, he is right that Halliday's decision to treat all clauses embedded directly in clauses as 'hypotaxis' means that the Sydney Grammar cannot handle examples such as Huddleston's.

Finally, to demonstrate that Huddleston's example is not a 'special case', consider the following example with a simple 'additive' Linker: On average, people died earlier in those days, both from diseases such as diphtheria and because they worked such dreadfully long hours. Notice that here (as in Huddleston's example) the item both prevents the M&M analysis in terms of two co-ordinated clauses with ellipsis. The conclusion, then, must be that we should treat all such 'beta' clauses as embedded clauses. … Withe respect to the areas of the grammar described here, then, M&M fail to rebut Huddleston's critical comments. 

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is an argument about parataxis, and as such, not relevant to the question of hypotaxis. Moreover, this being the case, it could be equally directed against Fawcett's model of co-ordination.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, Huddleston's criticism does not stand, with regard to hypotaxis, because it is an argument about parataxis. On the other hand, SFL Theory (IFG, Halliday) does not treat all such "embedded" clauses as hypotaxis. By distinguishing between embedding (rankshift) and hypotaxis, SFL Theory provides such explanatory advantages as distinguishing between

• defining relative clauses (embedded) and non-defining relative clauses (dependent), and
• pre-projected facts (embedded) and reported projections (dependent).

The conclusion, then, is the distinction between rankshifted and dependent clauses has explanatory advantages over the lack of distinction.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Rankshift

Fawcett (2010: 330-1):

Here we shall consider M&M's response to Huddleston's "co-ordination" argument. This begins, perhaps surprisingly, with M&M's agreement that his analysis is indeed a possible one (i.e., the analysis in which before the vote was taken is treated as a clause embedded as an Adjunct). However, they move quickly on from this apparent olive branch to a robust defence of what they take to be the IFG position on this matter — claiming that Huddleston is wrong to criticise IFG for ruling out his analysis, because "there is nothing in Halliday's system to block this analysis" (p. 27). 

But on this matter Huddleston is right and M&M are wrong, as is shown by Halliday's own specification of the types of rankshift that his model permits. Thus he states (IFG p. 242) that "the relationship of an embedded clause to the 'outer' clause is an indirect one" — i.e., the embedded clause must fill an element of a group, not a clause. (See Section 11.8.5 of Chapter 11 for a summary of Halliday 's statement on this matter.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, if a clause is shifted to the rank of group, then it functions as a group and so serves as ("fills") an element of a clause. For example:

On the other hand, it is when a clause is shifted to the rank of word, that it serves as ("fills") an element of a group. For example:

[2] See the post on Section 11.8.5: Seriously Misrepresenting Halliday On Embedding.

"Two Problems Unaddressed"

Fawcett (2010: 330):

Even though Halliday may be right that language is ultimately "ineffable" (Halliday 1984/88), it seems to me that, as SF linguists, it is our task to carry out the research programme outlined earlier, i.e., to assemble the available evidence; to decide which relationships between examples should be given systemic priority in the model of the lexicogrammar; and to explain our decisions. As we have seen, M&M accept this goal too, recognising that the question is that of "what to treat as the basic agnation" (M&M 1991:25). So how far do they do this? 

On the 'thematisability' evidence for treating (1a) as being like (2a) rather than (3a), M&M simply state that "Halliday points out that the thematic principle is not limited to [elements within] the clause; it is also in operation in the clause complex" (1991:26). But one's inevitable response is that, since they start from a position of commitment the concept of 'hypotaxis', they are bound to take this position, so that this it is not independent evidence in support of their argument. Their reply to Huddleston leaves two problems unaddressed. 

The first is that, if we do not treat both after they voted in (1a) and after the vote in (2a) as Adjuncts, our grammar will require two different rules to model a generalisation that patently invites expression in a single rule. 

And the second is that it is not clear how such a rule can in fact be formalised (unless the 'alpha' and 'beta' clauses are admitted as full elements of an as yet unnamed unit, so that the 'beta' element can be thematised in the same way that an Adjunct is.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

(1a) He left the room before they voted.
(2a) He left the room before the vote.
(3a) He left the room, then they voted.

[1] This is misleading. M&M's reply specifically addressed Huddleston's claim that the thematisability of the dependent clause in (1a) was evidence that it is embedded as an Adjunct, demonstrating why, in theoretical terms, why this was not the case.

[2] To be clear, if this is a problem, it is only a problem for Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar, not for SFL Theory. In SFL Theory, the general meaning of 'time' — like all categories of expansion and projection — is realised across several domains of the grammar. In (1a) it is realised through clause complexing, whereas in (2a) it is realised through the transitivity system of the clause.

[3] To be clear, the "as yet unnamed unit" in which a 'beta' clause can be thematised is not so much a unit as a unit complex: the clause complex. Halliday (1994: 57):

Fawcett's Epistemology

Fawcett (2010: 329-30):

The main rhetorical thrust of M&M's "Response to Huddleston" is a forceful rejection of almost all of what he says. Yet often, as we shall see, they do not show why we should reject arguments such as these, even sometimes accepting Huddleston's analysis. 

Instead, their major point is (following Halliday in his 'reply' to Matthews in the first stage of the 'rank scale' debate) that it is a virtue of Halliday's model that it raises questions about grammatical structure, rather than to establish that the IFG approach is 'right' and that the more traditional analysis that Huddleston offers is 'wrong'. This approach is fully justifiable at the exploratory stage, but systemic functional linguists have now had well over a quarter of a century to explore English in the systemic functional framework.

Even though Halliday may be right that language is ultimately "ineffable" (Halliday 1984/88), it seems to me that, as SF linguists, it is our task to carry out the research programme outlined earlier, i.e., to assemble the available evidence; to decide which relationships between examples should be given systemic priority in the model of the lexicogrammar; and to explain our decisions.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here again Fawcett makes a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence, about an argument to presented later in order to prime the reader to prejudge the argument when it is finally presented.

[2] To be clear, this is a serious epistemological misunderstanding that pervades Fawcett's work. The notion that theories are right or wrong presumes that 

• there is one true model of phenomena, if only we could find it, and so that
• there are criteria for assessing theories that are themselves independent of theory.

Clearly, theories are contingent on the initial assumptions on which they are developed. Theories can be compared on the basis of explanatory potential, but this too is contingent on the assumptions on which each theory was developed, which include the functions the theory was designed to serve.

On the other hand, what can be assessed as "right" (consistent) or "wrong" (inconsistent) are interpretations of theory.

[3] To be clear, this is a serious misunderstanding. Halliday argues that it is grammatical categories that are ineffable, and in a specific sense. Halliday (2002 [1984]: 303, 306-7):

The meaning of a typical grammatical category thus has no counterpart in our conscious representation of things. There can be no exact paraphrase of Subject or Actor or Theme – because there is no language-independent clustering of phenomena in our experience to which they correspond. If there was, we should not need the linguistic category to create one. If language was a purely passive partner, ‘expressing’ a ‘reality’ that was already there, its categories would be eminently glossable. But it is not. Language is an active participant in the semogenic process. Language creates reality – and therefore its categories of content cannot be defined, since we could define them only by relating them to some pre-existing model of experience, and there is no model of experience until the linguistic categories are there to model it. The only meaning of Subject is the meaning that has evolved along with the category itself. … 

But a language is an evolved system; and evolved systems rest on principles that are ineffable – because they do not correspond to any consciously accessible categorisation of our experience. Only the relatively trivial meanings of a natural language are likely to be reducible to (meta-)words. Fundamental semantic concepts, like those underlying Subject, or Theme, Actor, New, definite, present, finite, mass, habitual, locative, are, in an entirely positive way, ineffable. 

Fudging The Data

 Fawcett (2010: 326):

(I have slightly altered the wording of Huddleston's examples to create 'minimal pairs' that make the relevant contrasts fully explicit.)

(1a) He left the room before they voted. 

(2a) He left the room before the vote. 

(3a) He left the room, then they voted.

Huddleston's grammatical analysis of (la) — which is broadly similar to mine — is to treat it as a single clause in which the embedded clause before they voted functions as an Adjunct that identifies the 'time position' of the event of 'leaving' by relating it to an event that is already known to the addressee (the 'voting' event), in the same way that before the vote does in (2a). Indeed, Halliday and M&M would agree with Huddleston and me that, when the event of 'voting' is nominalised as in (2a), it serves this function and is therefore an Adjunct. So why, we might ask, do they not also treat before they voted in (la) as an Adjunct? Essentially, their approach is to interpret (la) as a relating of two events (rather than as a 'main' event that is located in time by relating it to another event) — and to claim that this 'relating' can be achieved either 'paratactically', as in (3a), or 'hypotactically' as in the second interpretation of (la).

Blogger Comments:

In SFL Theory, the three instances are analysed as follows:

[1] This is misleading, on two counts. On the one hand, Fawcett's slight alteration of the data does not create 'minimal pairs', and on the other hand, it does not make the relevant contrasts fully explicit. Instead, the contrast it makes explicit is one of time: 'earlier' ((1a) and (1b)) vs 'later' (1c), which is the irrelevant to the distinction between hypotaxis and embedding.

[2] To be clear, this is bare assertion unsupported by reasoned argument.

[3] This is not misleading, because it is essentially true.

Fawcett's Reasons For The Lack Of Discussion Of Solutions To Problems In SFL

Fawcett (2010: 312-3, 313n):

We need to ask why there has been so little discussion of alternative systemic functional solutions to problems in SFL. The reason is partly the example that is set by Halliday himself. He, like many others, has a strong dislike for the type of supposedly 'hard-nosed' combative argumentation that was so popular in the heyday of Chomskyan linguistics. This may be at least part of the reason why Halliday has only rarely responded to criticisms, and why he hardly ever comments adversely on alternative proposals from within SFL — and so why there is so little 'debate' in SFL. 

On the rare occasions when he does reply to a criticism, his typical response is to concede courteously that the point needs consideration (as he did with respect to Matthews' idea of treating Linkers such as and as "markers"), while at the same time continuing to assert the value of the original concept. The problem is that, with the passage of time and the repeated re-presentation of the original concept (both his own works and, often, in the various introductions to his ideas by others) the criticism gets forgotten and the original concept, despite its weaknesses, survives.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the reason there has been so little discussion of the problem of the rank scale is that the only people who think it a problem are those who cannot understand it. On the other hand, alternative solutions to non-problems have been proposed, not only by Fawcett, but also by others, most notably Martin.

[2] This speculation confuses debate, in general, with one particular type of debate — the type exemplified by Matthews (1966) and Fawcett (2010: 238n, 256n):

… its existence is therefore an embarrassment for the 'rank scale' concept …

We might note that the data that we are about to consider are yet another serious source of embarrassment for the concept of the 'rank scale'.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. When Halliday later formulated Systemic Functional Grammar, he did indeed treat these as structure markers. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 611):

The logico-semantic relation is marked by a conjunction – either by a non-structural one that is used only in this way, i.e. only cohesively, such as for example, furthermore, consequently; or by a structural one whose prototypical function is to mark the continuing clause in a paratactic clause nexus. … the latter are simply analysed as structure markers and are obligatorily thematic as structural Theme.

[4] To be clear, as this blog has demonstrated, this is not true in the case of either the rank scale or structure markers.

∞

It might be mentioned that Fawcett and his fellows are not so keen to have Fawcett's "solutions" discussed. See, for example, here.

A Common Framework For Comparing SFL Theory And The Cardiff Grammar

Fawcett (2010: 274-5):

The starting point for the summaries that follow must be the framework for a modern SF grammar that we established in Chapter 3. As Figure 4 in Section 3.2 of that chapter showed, its two principle characteristics are (1) that it consists essentially of the two levels of meaning and form, and (2) that there is at each level (a) a component that specified the potential, and (b) an Output' from the grammar, i.e., the instance at that level.

As we have seen, an additional advantage of this formulation of the model is that it is at a sufficiently high level of generalisation to provide a common framework in which we may compare the Sydney the Cardiff Grammars. Moreover, its ability to provide this common framework is not affected by Halliday and Matthiessen's increasing commitment, culminating in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), to the idea of having a 'two-level' model of 'semantics' (as we saw in Section 4.6 of Chapter 4). In that model, you will recall, there is both the level of 'meaning potential' that Halliday recognised in the early 1970s as the semantics (e.g., Halliday 1971/73a:41-2), and a level of 'semantics' that is higher than this, roughly equivalent to Martin's (1992) 'discourse semantics'. The proposal that this common ground exists follows directly from statements of Halliday's from the late sixties to the present, such as:

In a functional grammar, [...] a language is interpreted as a system of meanings, accompanied by forms through which the meanings can be expressed" (Halliday 1994:xix).

Indeed, it can be argued that all of the concepts that are required in a modern SF grammar follow from accepting the need to recognise the appropriate 'division of labour' between the two levels of semantics and form in such a model.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, it is the theoretical architecture of the Cardiff Grammar, as represented in Figure 4, that both invalidates the theory and illustrates the extent to which Fawcett does not understand the dimensions of SFL Theory. For example, Figure 4

• misrepresents the axial relation of realisation (paradigmatic system-syntagmatic structure) as the instantiation relation between potential and instance;
• misrepresents a selection expression as an instance of a system network; an instance of a potential system network is an actual system network; a selection expression can be both potential and instance, as demonstrated by the selection expression for the phoneme /b/: [voiced, bilabial, stop] which characterises both the phoneme as potential and the phoneme in a text;
• misrepresents structure as an instance of realisation rules, despite the structure being specified as the realisation of the realisation rules;
• misrepresents a system network and realisation rules as different levels of symbolic abstraction (meaning and form), despite the fact that both the network and the realisation rules include the features of the same level of abstraction (meaning); and
• conflates content (syntax) and expression (phonology/graphology) as the same level of symbolic abstraction (form).

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Even ignoring all the theoretical inconsistencies embodied in Figure 4, it cannot provide a common framework for comparing SFL Theory with the Cardiff Grammar, if only because the two models assume different principles of stratification: meaning/wording/sounding (SFL Theory) vs meaning/form (Cardiff Grammar).

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As pointed out in the examination of Section 4.6, SFL Theory has a 'one-level' model of semantics (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999) and a 'one-level' model of lexicogrammar (Halliday 1985, 1994, Halliday & Matthiessen 2004, 2014). The motivation for this misrepresentation is Fawcett's desire for his model to replace the SFL model of grammatical structure.

[4] To be clear, while it is true that Martin presents his discourse semantics as a stratum above lexicogrammar, the truth, nevertheless, lies elsewhere. As demonstrated here, Martin's (1992) discourse semantics is largely Halliday & Hasan's (1976) lexicogrammatical cohesion, misunderstood and rebranded as his own invention.

[5] This is misleading because it is untrue. The Halliday quote — which does not appear on the cited page — does not suggest that Fawcett's Figure 4 offers a common ground for comparing his model with SFL Theory. It merely acknowledges that in SFL Theory, lexicogrammatical forms are interpreted in terms of the meanings they realise. Cf Halliday (1994: xvii):

[6] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the 'division of labour' is not between meaning and form, but between meaning, wording and sounding, with wording being the interpretation of lexicogrammatical form (e.g. nominal group) in terms of its function in realising meaning (e.g. Senser).

'A Further Problem About Trying To Use IFG For Text Analysis'

Fawcett (2010: 145n):

There is a further problem about trying to use IFG for text analysis. This is that it is not in fact easy to use (even with the addition of an index in the 1994 edition). Analysing language is of course inherently problematical, so it is hard to judge how far the difficulties in using IFG are inherent in the nature of language, and how far they are the result of (1) the theory and description used in IFG and/or (2) how it is presented. Certainly, many students have been helped to understand it better by reading introductory works such as Eggins (1994), Bloor & Bloor (1995) Thompson (1996) and Martin, Matthiessen & Painter (1997).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett cites his own difficulty in using IFG (Halliday 1994) as a problem with the theory and/or its presentation — though he doesn't identify any of the difficulties he faced.

[2] To be clear, these publications were made possible by their authors being able to use IFG (Halliday 1985, 1994) for text analysis.

On The Need To Incorporate Martin's Discourse Semantics Into Semanticised Clause Systems

Fawcett (2010: 56):

As will perhaps be obvious, the position taken here is that the semanticisation of the system networks for TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on that constitute the meaning potential should incorporate many of the types of meaning covered in Martin's 'discourse semantics', so enabling the overall model of language to remain as it is in Figure 4 of Chapter 3, rather than becoming increasingly complex.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, for the semantics of TRANSITIVITY, see Chapter 4 'Figures' in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128-76), and the semantic system realised by MOOD is SPEECH FUNCTION.   This distinction between semantics and lexicogrammar provides the means of modelling grammatical metaphor systematically.  For the semantics of the textual metafunction, see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398-414).

[2] Here Fawcett again misconstrues 'meaning potential' (language as system) as the stratum of meaning (semantics) — a misunderstanding that supports his position.

[3] As demonstrated in great detail here, Martin's discourse semantics is based on misunderstandings of SFL theory at all scales and is wholly inconsistent with it.  Incorporating it into the semantic counterparts of grammatical systems would therefore severely compromise the theory overall.

[4] As previously demonstrated here (and in subsequent posts), Fawcett's Figure 4 ('The main components of a systemic functional grammar') is invalidated by internal inconsistencies arising from misunderstandings of the theoretical dimensions of realisation, instantiation, delicacy and axis.

Misrepresenting Martin (1992) And Halliday & Hasan (1976) In A Footnote

Fawcett (2010: 56n):

The reason why the coverage in Cohesion in English was limited was not, of course, that the authors were unaware that other factors also contribute to the 'cohesion' of a text, but because they explicitly confined their goals in that work to covering those aspects of 'cohesion' that are not realised in structures — and Halliday takes the position that TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on are all meanings that are indeed realised in structures. (But see my discussion of the reasons for disagreeing with this view in Chapter 7.) Yet the fact is that TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. can also contribute to the 'cohesion' of a text, as Martin (1992) clearly demonstrates. Perhaps one of the reasons for the popularity of Cohesion in English is the fact that its ideas can be applied to the analysis of texts without having a full understanding of the SFL approach to understanding language. The re[s]ult is that most studies of cohesion do only part of the job. This has in turn had an unfortunate effect on work in some areas where SFL can usefully be applied, such as psychiatric linguists, where the two major areas of study are cohesion and syntax (the latter being of the 'phrase-structure' type).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading and misrepresents Halliday & Hasan (1976: 7), who explicitly define their term 'cohesion' as only referring to non-structural text-forming resources:

In other words, a text typically extends beyond the range of structural relations, as these are normally conceived of.  But texts cohere; so cohesion within a text — texture — depends on something other than structure.  There are certain specifically text-forming relations which cannot be accounted for in terms of constituent structure; they are properties of the text as such, and not of any structural unit such as a clause or sentence.  Our use of the term COHESION refers specifically to these non-structural text-forming relations.

[2] See the critique of Chapter 7 for the misunderstandings on which  Fawcett's views are based.

[3] On the one hand, this is misleading because it gives the false impression that Fawcett uncovered something unacknowledged in Halliday & Hasan (1976: 6-7):

Structure is, of course, a unifying relation.  The parts of a sentence or a clause obviously 'cohere' with each other by virtue of the structure.  Hence they also display texture; the elements of any structure have, by definition, an internal unity which ensures that they all express part of a text. … In general, any unit which is structured hangs together so as to form text.  All grammatical units — sentences, clauses, groups, words — are internally 'cohesive' simply because they are structured.

On the other hand, it confuses the general notion of 'cohesive' with the technical term 'cohesion' that refers only to non-structural text-forming relations; see [1] above.

To be clear, Halliday (1994: 334) identifies the structural and non-structural resources of the textual metafunction — theme, information and cohesion — as the creators of texture:

 

[4] This is misleading because it misrepresents Martin (1992), in as much as Martin has nothing at all to say about these grammatical systems contributing to the cohesion of a text, as demonstrated here.

[5] These are bare assertions, unsupported by evidence, and based on misunderstandings of cohesion, including those outlined above.

Misrepresenting Martin (1992)

Fawcett (2010: 56):

However, the major effort to provide system networks that could function as the 'higher semantics' in the framework of the Sydney Grammar has been Martin's development of what he calls a "discourse semantics", as described in his valuable English Text (Martin 1992). Martin's theory of language constitutes a separate 'sub-dialect' of the Sydney Grammar that is significantly different from that of Hasan and indeed Halliday — but he too, like Hasan and Cloran, works on the assumption that his 'discourse semantic' system networks will be 'realised' by a grammar such as that of Halliday (1994) and Matthiessen (1995). However, even Martin's 620-page work does not provide a full coverage of the proposed higher level of system networks. This is understandable, both because of the size of the task and because the focus of English Text is not on the grammar as a whole, but on providing a much more complete coverage of the topic of 'cohesion' than the limited coverage in Halliday & Hasan's Cohesion in English (1976).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As demonstrated here in meticulous detail, Martin (1992) is based on fatal misunderstandings of SFL theory across all scales.

[2] To be clear, the commonly used geographical description of Martin's misunderstandings of SFL theory is 'The Sydney School'.

[3] This is true.  Martin (1992) is not only 'significantly different' from Halliday's theory, but also, more importantly, wholly inconsistent with it, as demonstrated here.

[4] This is misleading.  Martin's networks provide no realisation statements that specify how discourse semantic features are realised in lexicogrammatical systems (evidence here).  Moreover, Martin (1992) misunderstands strata as modules (evidence here), and demonstrates that he does not understand the theoretical term 'realisation' (evidence here).

[5] This is an empty claim in the absence of a means of determining what would constitute "full coverage".

[6] This misunderstands both SFL theory and Martin (1992).  In SFL theory, cohesion is a non-structural resource of the textual metafunction at the level of lexicogrammar.  As demonstrated here, Martin (1992) misunderstands these systems, rebrands them, distributes them across different metafunctions, and relocates them to the level of (discourse) semantics.

[7] This is misleading in as much as it falsely implies that Martin (1992) complements the description of Halliday & Hasan (1976) in a theoretically consistent way.