"A Theory Of The Type Described Here"

Fawcett (2010: 293):

All in all, we can say that a theory of the type described here — together with the theory of system networks and their realisation as illustrated in Appendix A and in Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993) — provides a principled analysis of English syntax that is at every point explicitly functional. It therefore continues the line of development that extends from "Categories" through "Language as choice in social contexts" and, in some measure "Systemic theory". And since the theory of system networks and of the realisation component are clearly quite close in the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars — at least, so long as Halliday continues to regard the networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. as modelling the 'meaning potential' — it is in the theory of syntax that one of the major differences between the two is to be found.

The other great difference, of course, is the answer to the question "What further components does each model have above the system networks for TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc? But that must await another book!

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence. Moreover, there is much evidence that this is not the case, as demonstrated by Fawcett's focus on syntax and form, and his rejection of the three function structures of the clause as proposed in SFL Theory.

[2] To be clear, "the theory of system networks and their realisation as illustrated in Appendix A" will be examined in future posts. But as a foretaste, the only system network that Fawcett provides in this entire publication (p298) construes every noun in English not only as a feature in the network , but also as a feature of either 'mass' or 'count':

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The Cardiff Grammar diverges from this line of development at its very beginning, Scale & Category Grammar (1961). By 1977 (Text as Semantic Choice in Social Contexts), Halliday had already devised the SFL model of stratification that Fawcett does not use, and the metafunctional clause structures that Fawcett rejects.

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue, as the system network above, and the previous examinations of Fawcett's realisation operations demonstrate.

[5] This is misleading, because, although it is true that these systems model 'meaning potential' in Halliday's understanding of the term, language as system, they have never modelled it in Fawcett's misunderstanding of the term, as the semantic stratum.

[6] This is not misleading, because it is not untrue.

[7] To be clear, the "component" that SFL Theory "has above" the system of MOOD is the system of SPEECH FUNCTION; e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 136):

By the same token, the "component" that SFL Theory "has above" the system of TRANSITIVITY is the model of the figure; e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 53):

For the the "component" that SFL Theory "has above" the system of THEME, see the discussion of the text base in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398-413).

[8] To be clear, this book is still awaited, 21 years after the first edition of this publication.

Confusing Formal Constituency With Function Structure

Fawcett (2010: 247):

The main notation used by Halliday in IFG consists of several lines of analysis, as exemplified in Figure 7 in Chapter 7. If we showed just the line that is the equivalent of what is shown here (the top line of the MOOD analysis), it would be as in Figure 15.

This gives essentially the same amount of information as the previous notation, and it has the same limitation that it does not lend itself to showing in the same diagram the lower layers of the structure. Moreover, it is not clear why it should be thought worth using the extra time and work of drawing boxes around categories in the diagram, rather than simply drawing single lines between categories, as in the first notation, i.e., (a) above.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Fawcett's Figure 7, which misanalyses Mrs Skinner as Goal instead of Scope, is reproduced below:

To be clear, Fawcett's tautological claim is that if everything in this diagram is removed, except that which corresponds to the previous notation, then it "gives essentially the same information as the previous notation". Clearly, if this is not done, it provides considerably more information than Figure 15.

[2] This is misleading, because it confuses formal constituency ('lower layers') with function ('structure'). Though units of higher ranks consist of units of lower ranks, the structure of a lower rank (e.g. group) is not a structure of a higher rank (e.g. clause).

[3] To be clear, one practical advantage of using box diagrams for function structure and tree diagrams for formal constituency is that it provides a visual means of distinguishing the two theoretical principles.

Misrepresenting The SFL Model Of Structure

 Fawcett (2010: 220):

Moreover, the representation of any layers of structure other than the one that reflects directly the choices in the system networks is redundant. (It is not even useful for pedagogical purposes, since it is misleading to suggest that a string of elements of structure that function as the realisations of a set of individually chosen meanings are in some sense "a single element".)

An[d] elements of structure should be defined in terms of the function it serves, i.e., by the aspect of the meaning of the unit that it expresses, rather than by its position in the unit. Since each element in each unit realises a different type of meaning, it should have a different label. The position of an element in its unit is a matter that is handled separately, through the concept of 'place' — the concept that is to be discussed in the next section.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, the Mood element, for example, is specified by the realisation statement 'insert Mood' which is activated by the selection of the feature 'indicative'; see the Mood system in the previous post.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, Mood and Theme are both single elements, each of which can consist of constituent elements.

[3] On the one hand, this confuses formal constituents with functional elements. In SFL Theory, it is formal constituents (e.g. nominal and verbal groups of the clause) that are interpreted in terms of the function they serve (e.g. Senser and Process elements of clause structure). 

On the other hand, it is misleading because it falsely claims that, in SFL Theory, elements are defined in terms of position instead of function; see the previous posts on Fawcett's misunderstandings of nominal group structure.

[4] To be clear, as previously noted, Fawcett's principle is violated by Fawcett's own model, where there are multiple elements with the same label, such as the Modifier element of the nominal group (p306):

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the position of an element in a structure is specified systemically.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Structural Layers In SFL Theory

Fawcett (2010: 218):

Thus Halliday continues to use the "Categories" concept of having a 'primary', 'secondary' and if necessary a 'tertiary' structure within each strand of text analysis. However, it is not clear how far this concept still has its former central role in Halliday's current theory. While it is not mentioned in the summary of "Systemic theory" given in Halliday (1993), it is there by implication in his realisation operation "Split" (for a discussion of which see Section 9.2.3 of Chapter 9). And the concept that there is a 'primary' and a 'secondary' structure plays a fairly prominent role in the examples of clause analysis in IFG, often appearing twice in the analysis of a single clause (once for MOOD and once for THEME, whenever there is a case of 'multiple Theme'). Its main justification seems to be that it is thought to add insight to the description. (The theory does not require it, as I have shown in Section 9.2.3 of Chapter 9).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true. The notion of primary and secondary structures, conceived of in terms of delicacy (elaboration) of structure, was a feature of Halliday's superseded theory, Scale & Category Grammar (1961) only. In SFL Theory, there are no primary and secondary structures, and the principle behind the layered structures of Mood and Theme is composition (extension), not delicacy (elaboration).

[2] To be clear, adding insight to a description is a positive quality of a theory. See previous posts on Mood and Theme for the theoretical motivations for layered structuring that are unknown to Fawcett.

[3] This is misleading, because it is not true. See, for example, two of the previous clarifying critiques of Section 9.2.3, 'A comparison of the realisation operations in the two frameworks':

• Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On The Realisation Statement 'Expand'
• Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Maximally Extended Theme

Fawcett's Argument Against Mood And Residue

Fawcett (2010: 217-8):

Let us now address the question of how far we need, in a modern SF grammar, the "more delicate differentiations" in "structure" that Halliday introduces in "Categories" (1961/76:63). There the 'primary' structure of the nominal group was said to be "M H Q", i.e., "modifier + head + qualifier", and the distinctions within the "modifier' between "deictic", "numerative" and "epithet", etc., were said to be a matter of 'secondary' structure.

The first point to make is that these "secondary structures" do not — in principle at least — constitute another layer of structure in the representation. Halliday emphasises that they are "still structures of the same unit, not of the unit next below" — the key point being that "they take account of finer distinctions recognisable at the same rank" (by which he means "in the same unit"). However, the fact is that when he introduces such "secondary structures" to the representation of a text-sentence alongside the "primary structures", he adds another line to the analysis — as the presence of two lines of analysis for MOOD in Figure 7 in Chapter 7 clearly illustrates. Indeed, every finite clause in IFG is analysed terms of (1) its "Mood" and "Residue", and then within the "Mood" (2) its "Subject" and "Finite".

If the line showing the "Mood" and "Residue" is removed from such diagrams, the display of the analysis becomes simpler to read, while still preserving the essential insight that it is the relationship of the Subject and the Finite that is the primary expression of the meaning of MOOD. In other words, I am suggesting here that the additional layer of analysis into "Mood" and "Residue" detracts from the insightfulness of the diagram rather than adding to it. Figure 10 illustrates the way in which the semantic information can be extracted directly from the relationship of the Subject and Operator (or Finite). 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett has stopped outlining his own model, and has returned to one of his previous critiques of Halliday's model. However, despite claiming to be concerned with "a modern SF grammar", he focusses here on Halliday's superseded theory, Scale and Category Grammar (1961), which featured neither metafunctions nor system networks.

In SFL Theory, 'delicacy' does not apply to structure, there are no secondary structures, and the structures of the nominal group are differentiated in terms of metafunction: logical (Modifier ^ Head) vs experiential (Deictic ^ Numerative ^ Epithet etc.).

[2] This is misleading. Without acknowledging the fact, here Fawcett switches attention from Scale and Category Grammar to SFL Theory. In Scale & Category Grammar, the elements of clause structure are simply Subject, Predicator, Complement, Adjunct (Halliday 2002 [1961]: 47). The Mood and Residue blocks were not theorised in Scale & Category Grammar. 

[3] This is not misleading, because it is true for indicative clauses.

[4] To be clear, Fawcett's argument against the theoretical categories of Mood and Residue is that their representation in structural analyses makes them harder for him to read.

[5] To be clear, the structural element Mood is functionally motivated. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 142, 143):

The Mood is the element that realises the selection of mood in the clause; and it is also the domain of agreement between Subject and Finite. …

(1) The presence of the Mood element, consisting of Subject plus Finite, realises the feature ‘indicative’. 

(2) Within the indicative, what is significant is the order of Subject and Finite:

(a) The order Subject before Finite realises ‘declarative’;

(b) The order Finite before Subject realises ‘yes-no interrogative’;

(c) In a ‘WH- interrogative’ the order is: 

(i) Subject before Finite if the WH-element is the Subject;

(ii) Finite before Subject otherwise.

[6] This misleading, because Figure 10 (below) does not show how "the semantic information can be extracted directly from the relationship of the Subject and Operator (or Finite)". It merely juxtaposes Fawcett's semantic and syntactic categories for one instance. Moreover, the semantic networks from which these features are derived are not provided anywhere in this publication.

Note also that Fawcett incongruously relabels Halliday's Mood element we would as 'information-giver'.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On The Realisation Statement 'Conflate'

Fawcett (2010: 184-5):

Matthiessen & Bateman (1991) and Matthiessen (1995) call Halliday's "Split" operation "Expand", but otherwise there is, in principle, no difference between them and Halliday. In practice, however, they do not fully implement Halliday's concept that the MOOD structure consists primarily of "Mood + Residue" and only secondarily of "Subject + Finite + Complement" (or whatever it happens to be). See the examination of their account of generation in Section 7.4.2 of Chapter 7, which showed that their model is not a 'structure conflation' model, as the IFG model is, but an 'element conflation' model. As I argued there, this fact demonstrates that in the theoretical-generative strand of work in the Sydney Grammar the concept of 'structure conflation' is unnecessary, undesirable, and ultimately unworkable.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, Halliday (1995 [1993]: 272) specifies an 'Expand' realisation statement, not a "Split" operation:

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. It is only Fawcett, not Halliday, who regards these structures as 'primary' and 'secondary'.

[3] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Halliday's model. As previously demonstrated in the examination of Fawcett's Section 7.4.2, and shown above in Halliday's realisation statement (b), in SFL Theory, it is only elements that are conflated, not structures.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On The Realisation Statement 'Expand'

Fawcett (2010: 184):

The last realisation operation that requires a comment is Halliday's Operation (e) of "Split". This has no equivalent in the Cardiff Grammar. A "Split" operation is only needed in a grammar which represents both 'primary' and 'secondary' structures (as introduced in "Categories" and still used regularly for some aspects of structure in IFG). Halliday introduces it to enable the grammar first to generate what he would term a 'primary structure' (such as "Mood + Residue" in Figure 7 in Chapter 7), and then to 'split' the 'Mood' element into the two elements of its supposedly 'secondary' structure, i.e., into "Subject + Finite". Halliday does not explain why he thinks it desirable to generate the "Mood" element first and then to split it into two, but we can presume that the intention is to give expression to the idea that the "Mood + Residue" structure is 'primary' and the "Subject + Finite" structure is 'secondary'. Nor does Halliday explain what would actually happen in practice when a "Split" operation is carried out.

The reason why the Cardiff Grammar has no such realisation operation is, of course, that we recognise only one degree of 'delicacy' in the structures of the clause, so that there is no need for an operation whose function is to add another line of analysis to the representation. Instead, we treat the Subject and the Operator (Halliday's "Finite") as direct elements of the clause.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, Halliday (1995 [1993]: 272) does not propose an Operation of "Split", but a realisation statement of 'expand':

(e) 'Expand' an element into a further configuration (e.g., expand mood into subject+ finite);

[2] Non-trivially, the grammar does not first "generate" a Mood element and then expand it into Subject and Finite elements. This is to mistake a system network of relations for an algorithmic procedure. The identity relation between system and structure is intensive (elaboration), not circumstantial (enhancement: temporal).

[3] This is misleading. It is only Fawcett who regards these structures as 'primary' and 'secondary'.

[4] This is misleading. On the one hand, Halliday does explain why a Mood element is necessary. For example, the presence of the Mood element realises the feature 'indicative' (Halliday 1994: 74). On the other hand, the realisation statement 'expand' is not used in the system network of MOOD; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

[5] To be clear, Halliday's explains that this realisation statement expands an element into a further configuration. 

[6] To be clear, in SFL Theory, delicacy (hyponymy) is a sub-type of elaboration (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 145) and a dimension of systems, not structures. In contrast, the relation of Subject and Finite to the Mood element is composition (meronymy), a subtype of extension (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 146).

[7] This is misleading, since Subject and Finite are "direct" elements of the clause in SFL Theory also. Or more precisely, the notion of 'direct' is irrelevant here, deriving, as it does, from Fawcett's misunderstanding of a system network as a sequenced algorithm; see [2] above.

Syntax Potential

Fawcett (2010: 172):

The main topic of this chapter will be the theory of syntax potential that is required in a modern SF grammar. I first used this term in Section 3.3 of Chapter 3 and it is modelled, as will be clear, on Halliday's characterisation of the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and the rest as meaning potential. In Figure 4 we contrasted the 'meaning potential' of the grammar with its 'form potential', and 'syntax potential' is simply one part of the form potential.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading on several counts. Firstly, it is inconsistent with Halliday's notion of meaning potential, since Halliday models meaning potential as system, whereas Fawcett models syntax potential as realisation rules. Secondly, Halliday's notion of meaning potential refers to language as system, not just to the stratum of semantics (Fawcett's level of meaning). Thirdly, because Fawcett misunderstands 'meaning potential' to mean semantic systems, he gives here the false impression that Halliday characterises his own grammatical systems as semantic.

[2] Reminder:

To be clear, as previously explained, Fawcett's Figure 4 presents 

• form potential as realisation rules that involve meaning features,
• realisation rules (form) as the realisation of a system network (meaning), and
• structure as an instance of realisation rules.

The Purpose Of Fawcett's "Some Proposals" (1974)

Fawcett (2010: 161-2):

The purpose of "Some proposals" was to present the set of revisions to the concepts of "Categories" that I considered at the time (1974) to be required, in order to constitute a 'systemic syntax' that would complement Halliday's revolutionary proposal that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD and THEME should be regarded as choices between meanings (as described in Section 4.3 of Chapter 4). As Butler wrote in 1985:

Halliday's most recent proposals [...] make it clear that the functional component networks are to be regarded as semantic, but we are given very little idea of what the lexicogrammar [i.e., the level of form] might now consist of [my emphasis] (Butler 1985:94).

"Some proposals" was a first attempt to fill this gap, and it probably reached its widest readership through Butler's generally approving summaries of its contents — first in Butler (1979), and then in Butler (1985:94-102). He makes the key point when he states, "[Fawcett's] approach to the recognition of syntactic categories is dictated by his commitment to the centrality of semantics" (Butler 1985:94). In this approach, then, a large part of the description of a text should be in terms of the semantic features that have been chosen in generating it (e.g., in the way described in Section 7.8 of Chapter 7).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the stated purpose of Fawcett's "Some proposals" was to present a set of revisions to Halliday's first theory, Scale and Category Grammar, despite the fact that it had been replaced by a new theory, Systemic Functional Grammar.

[2] As Halliday (1985: xiv) explained, the notion of syntax is inconsistent with the assumptions and mode of inquiry of SFL Theory, for reasons previously cited on this blog.

[3] To be clear, this refers to Halliday's second theory, Systemic Functional Grammar, not his first, Scale and Category Grammar. In the earliest form of Systemic Functional Grammar, the metafunctional systems of the clause were mapped onto the grammatical rank scale of form (see [4] below). This was soon replaced by the relocation of these systems to the stratum of lexicogrammar, largely to provide a systematic account of mismatches between meaning and wording (grammatical metaphor). Because SFG is a functional grammar, the grammar is modelled in terms of its functions, and the function of the grammar is to realise meaning. 

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Even in the earliest version of SFG, where the metafunctional systems were located on the stratum of semantics, Halliday was explicit about what constituted the lexicogrammar. For example, Halliday (1978: 128-9):

Fourth, we shall assume that each component of the semantic system specifies its own structures, as the ‘output, of the options in the network (so each act of choice contributes to the formation of the structure). It is the function of the lexicogrammatical stratum to map the structures one onto another so as to form a single integrated structure that represents all components simultaneously. With negligible exceptions, every operational instance of a lexicogrammatical construct in the adult language — anything that realises text — is structured as the expression of all four components. In other words, any instance of language in use ‘means, in these various ways, and shows that it does so in its grammar.

Fifth, we shall assume that the lexicogrammatical system is organised by rank (as opposed to by immediate constituent structure); each rank is the locus of structural configurations, the place where structures from the different components are mapped on to each other. The ‘rank scale' for the lexicogrammar of English is:

 [5] This misleading, because in all of Halliday's theorising, lexicogrammar is the level of wording, not form; form is a level in Fawcett's model only. For example, in the earliest model of SFG, Halliday (1978: 128) writes:

We shall start with the assumption that the semantic system is one of three strata, chat constitute the linguistic system:

Semantic (the meaning)
Lexicogrammatical (the wording, i.e. syntax, morphology and lexis)
Phonological (the sound)

[6] As demonstrated above, there was no gap to fill. In both of Halliday's theories, grammatical form is modelled as a rank scale. The reason why Fawcett argues against a rank scale, is that it is the most obvious aspect of Halliday's theory that makes his own model redundant.

[7] To be clear, as the critical examinations on this blog demonstrate, contrary to the priorities of Systemic Functional Theory, Fawcett's "commitment to the centrality of semantics" involves prioritising form over function and structure over system.

[8] This is potentially misleading. To be clear, in Systemic Functional Grammar, the metafunctional systems of the clause are located on the lexicogrammatical stratum (rather than semantics), whereas in the Cardiff Grammar they are located at the level of meaning (rather than form). That is, what the Cardiff Grammar describes in terms of semantic features, Systemic Functional Grammar describes in terms of lexicogrammatical features.

Misrepresenting Critical Reactions To Fawcett (1974)

Fawcett (2010: 161):

It is ironic, therefore, that I should have been admonished in the mid-1970s by two senior systemic linguists at the time (though not by Halliday himself) for the changes that I suggested in "Some proposals" . The irony lies in the fact that my proposals were for a syntax whose representations were far more like those of the Scale and Category model than the proposals for representing structure that Halliday himself developed during the very late 1960s and the early 1970s. As we saw in Chapter 7, it was during this period that he shifted his representations of structure away from the model presented in "Categories" (in which the major clause elements were 'Subject', 'Predicator', 'Complement' and 'Adjunct') to the multiple structures used in IFG and widely elsewhere, in which an analysis in terms of such elements plays little or no role. The changes made by Halliday were far greater than the changes that I was suggesting in "Some proposals", and yet the position of my critics at the time seemed to be that I should not be suggesting any changes to "Categories" at all! The fact is that, even though Halliday's changes were already well under way by the mid-1970s, the key role of "Categories" as the founding document of the new theory seems to have placed it beyond criticism for many. On the whole, then, I think that my critics' response shows that the admittedly provocative use of the term "iconoclastic" in the subtitle of "Some proposals" was justified. 

However,"Some proposals" was really not as revolutionary as its critics felt it to be. With the benefit of a further twenty-five years of hindsight, I see now that, far from being too critical of "Categories", "Some proposals" did not go as far as it should in proposing changes, as we shall see in due course.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. By the mid-1970s, Halliday had replaced his Scale and Category Grammar with a new theory: Systemic Functional Grammar. In proposing a syntax at that time, Fawcett was inconsistent with both theories. In proposing changes to the first theory, Fawcett was ignoring the fact that that theory had been superseded.

[2] This is very misleading indeed. In the new theory, Systemic Functional Grammar, the elements Subject, Predicator, Complement and Adjunct (± Finite) constitute the interpersonal structure of the clause.

[3] To be clear, the changes made by Halliday were so great that they resulted in a new theory. Fawcett's suggestions for changes to "Categories" were suggestions for changes to the superseded theory.

[4] This is misleading. Scale and Category Grammar was the earlier theory from which Halliday developed his new theory. An old theory (e.g. Newton's Universal Gravitation) is not the founding document of the theory that replaces it (e.g. Einstein's General Relativity).

[5] To be clear, Fawcett's use of 'iconoclastic' couches support for a theory in terms of belief, rather than, say, in terms of explanatory potential, self-consistency, reasoned argumentation and evidence.

[6] This is misleading, because it is the opposite of what is true. Here Fawcett misrepresents his critics as deeming his proposals as revolutionary, despite the fact that, in advocating the old theory, his proposals were reactionary.

The Logical Conclusion Of The Argument For A Theory Of Syntax For SFL [3]

Fawcett (2010: 156):

16. As a final point, we might note that the Cardiff Grammar has a simpler architecture than the Sydney Grammar with respect to the relationship between the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. and their realisations in form. The former is summarised in Figure 4 of Chapter 3 and the latter in Figure 8 of Section 7.4 3. The Cardiff model is also simpler in that its system networks have been semanticised to the point where there is no need to have a higher layer of networks, as there seems to be in the model described in Halliday (1994) and Matthiessen (1995).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, the simpler architecture of the Cardiff Grammar (Figure 4) is riddled with internal inconsistencies that invalidate it as a model. These include positing realisation rules involving semantic features at the level of form, such that realisation rules realise system networks, and positing structure as an instance of realisation rules:

[2] To be clear, the figure in Section 7.4.3, Figure 9*, says nothing about "the relationship between the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. and their realisations in form" in the "Sydney Grammar" since it is merely a metafunctional analysis of clause structure, without reference to the systems that specify each structure:

* Figure 8 presents a modification of Figure 4 to accommodate Fawcett's mistaken notion of structure conflation.

[3] To be clear, Fawcett's "semanticisation" of Halliday's grammatical grammatical systems is merely his relocation of them from Halliday's stratum of lexicogrammar to his level of meaning. Fawcett does not present any of his "semanticised" versions of these networks in the entire publication.

More importantly, as previously noted, the distinction between semantic networks (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999) and lexicogrammatical networks (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004, 2014) is warranted by the explanatory power it provides in modelling grammatical metaphor.

The Need For A Theory Of Syntax For SFL: The Argument Summarised [4]

Fawcett (2010: 154):

7. Thus Halliday now presents the structure of a clause (and in principle other units) as multiple structures. In any such representation of a clause there is, in principle, a line of structure that corresponds to each 'metafunction' (but in practice several more, with seven for many text-sentences as analysed in IFG). Each line consists of a string of 'functional elements', or 'functions'. The problem is that the elements of these 'structures' are not necessarily coterminous (and nor are the structures themselves coterminous). In other words, if two or more elements in two or more strands of meaning are coterminous, they can be conflated with each other to form a compound element, but when they are not coterminous it is not logically possible to conflate them (as described in Section 7.4 of this chapter). Despite these serious theoretical-generative problems, it appears that Halliday may regard the notion that there are many different structures (and so many non-coterminous elements) in a single clause as one of the riches of language — at least from the text-descriptive viewpoint, as exemplified in the analyses in IFG.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In IFG, what Fawcett refers to as "text-sentences" — his model, not SFL Theory — are the three metafunctional clause structures. The reason why Fawcett thinks there are "several more" is that he mistakes information structure as a clause structure, and counts mood and thematic structures twice because of their structural components (e.g. Subject of the Mood element, and topical Theme of the Theme element).

[2] To be clear, as previously explained, in SFL Theory, there is no need to conflate any elements. It is simply the case that, under certain circumstances, some elements do happen to conflate, as when Subject conflates with Behaver in behavioural clauses. The three metafunctional structures of the clause are integrated in the syntagm of units at the rank below, as when Subject and Behaver are realised by the same nominal group.

[3] To be clear, the conflation of two elements, such as Subject and Behaver, does not result in a "compound element", since each element is an element of a different structure, and, in SFL Theory, a structure is the relation between elements (e.g the relation of Subject to Finite, or the relation of Behaver to Process).

The Need For A Theory Of Syntax For SFL: The Argument Summarised [3]

Fawcett (2010: 153-4):

5. In two of the papers in which Halliday takes the position that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD and THEME are at the level of semantics (1970/76b and 1977/78) he includes diagrams that show (1) several lines of analysis, each of which clearly corresponds to a major strand of meaning, and (2), below these, a single line of analysis that shows the 'Scale and Category' elements of the clause, such that this line represents the integration of the metafunctional representations above it. It is from this stage of Halliday's thinking that the Cardiff Grammar version of SFL has developed (as shown in Section 4.9 of Chapter 4).

6. However, these two papers represent just a brief period in the development of Halliday's concept of how structure should be represented, and almost immediately he dropped the integrative representation in his diagrams in favour of the type of representation shown throughout IFG and his subsequent descriptive works to date. Here the original S&C elements of Subject, Predicator, Complement and Adjunct are no longer shown as elements of the structure that integrates the various strands of meaning, but instead they are introduced as a structure within the representation of 'interpersonal' meaning (with the addition of the Finite). Indeed, Halliday presents them as merely the 'secondary' structure of 'interpersonal' meaning, the 'primary' structure being that of "Mood + Residue" (also called "Modal + Propositional", in earlier works). Halliday's reasons for including the elements of 'Predicator', 'Complement' and 'Adjunct' in the 'interpersonal' line of analysis (which were summarised in Section 7.2) are considered here to be unpersuasive — especially in comparison with the much more persuasive reason for assigning them the role described in Point 5 above, namely their role as elements of the structure that integrates the various strands of meaning (with others, as illustrated in Appendix B).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Halliday's final theory, Systemic Functional Grammar, in terms of his earliest theory, Scale and Category Grammar (1961). The terms 'primary and 'secondary' — but not 'merely' — derive from Halliday originally applying the principle of delicacy to structure (Halliday 2002 [1961]: 48). This old view is inconsistent with SFL Theory, where delicacy is a type of elaboration, whereas structural composition — e.g. Mood composed of Subject and Finite — is a type of extension; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 145-6).

[2] See Fawcett's previous misunderstandings and bare assertions on this matter here. To be clear, labelling Halliday's reasons 'unpersuasive' and Fawcett's reason 'persuasive' is not reasoned argumentation based on evidence. Importantly, in SFL Theory, the integration of 'the various strands  of meaning' of the clause occurs in the form that realises the elements of clause structure: the syntagm of units on the rank below the clause.

Fawcett, on the other hand, argues against the value of a rank scale, and uses a blending of Halliday's interpersonal and experiential functions as his means of integrating 'the various strands of meaning' at his level of form, as his Figure 10 (p148) demonstrates:

The Need For A Theory Of Syntax For SFL: The Argument Summarised [2]

Fawcett (2010: 153):

4. However, Halliday's writings in the 1970s and 1980s have explored two approaches to modelling meaning in language. One of these involves treating the system networks for TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on as the level of semantics. In the second model these networks are considered to be, in some sense, at the level of form — though it is a 'form' that has been 'pushed in the direction of the semantics' (Halliday 1994:xix) — and there is (in principle) a higher stratum of even more 'semantic' system networks that correspond to each of the networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME, etc. I prefer the first (and simpler) of these two positions, and I consider that the phenomena for which Halliday sets up the second level of 'meaning' can be more appropriately accounted for in other ways (as argued in Sections 4.6 to 4.8 of Chapter 4).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in Halliday's superseded model, written between 1972 and 1976, structures produced by semantic systems were mapped onto units of the grammatical rank scale. By the 1980s, these semantic systems were reconstrued as lexicogrammatical systems, so as to account for grammatical metaphor.

[2] This is misleading on two counts. Firstly, in the second model — the current model — these systems are located on the stratum of lexicogrammar, not form; 'form' is a level in Fawcett's model only. In Systemic Functional Grammar, form is modelled as a rank scale of units, each of which serves as the entry condition to functional systems. Secondly, the quote from Halliday (1994: xix) is explicitly concerned with a functional grammar, not form:

[3] To be clear, 'I prefer' and 'I consider that…' are not reasoned argumentation based on evidence.

[4] This very misleading indeed. Fawcett provides no argument whatsoever in Sections 4.6 to 4.8 (pp53-70) for the "other ways" that grammatical metaphor can be "more appropriately accounted for". The only statement in this regard, in the entire three sections, is yet another bare assertion, and the promise of a still unpublished work, in footnote 7 on page 57:

I consider that the phenomena that have led Halliday to adopt his latest position are to be explained in other ways (one being to further semanticise some of Halliday's networks, e.g., that for MOOD). See Fawcett (forthcoming a) for a set of such semantic system networks.

Fawcett's Claim That All Of The Representations Throughout IFG Have No Status In The Theory

Fawcett (2010: 138):

Can it really be the case, you may be asking, that all of the representations throughout IFG and all the representations in all of the derived works have no status in the theory? Perhaps, you might think, the cumulative effect of the conflation of several individual elements would be to provide a conflation of structures? The answer is that while this is theoretically possible, in practice it does not do so. This is because the supposed 'functions' of 'Rheme', 'Given', 'Residue' and others do not correspond to single 'functions' and they do not play any role in generative systemic functional grammar, for the reasons given in recent sections of this chapter. And nor, as I have suggested above, has anyone yet made any viable proposal as to how such a model could be made to work. Conflation is, by all current SF definitions, an operation that applies only to individual, coterminous elements.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously demonstrated, the notion of 'structure conflation' does not figure in SFL Theory. It arises only as Fawcett's misunderstanding of SFL Theory, particularly his confusion of formal constituency (the rank scale that his model omits) — with function structure (clause rank).

[2] This is misleading, since each of these is a functional element:

• Rheme is the clause element that realises textual meaning that is not Theme;
• Given is the information unit element that realises textual meaning that is not New; and
• Residue is the clause element that realises interpersonal meaning that is not Mood.

[3] To be clear, here Fawcett means that these elements are not coterminous with elements of other metafunctional structures. As previously explained, there is no theoretical requirement that they should be coterminous, since this assumption only arises from Fawcett's notion and interpretation of 'structure conflation'.

[4] This is true.

Fawcett's Claim That 'The Representations In IFG Do Not Have A Solid Basis In The Theory'

Fawcett (2010: 137-8, 138n):

Where, then, does this leave the representations in IFG? 

The clear implication of these facts is that the representations in IFG do not have the solid basis in the theory that they surely should, if they are to be used as the standard method of describing texts in systemic functional terms. In other words, if generative systemic functional grammars do not build structures like this, IFG-style representations give a misleading picture of the systemic functional view of the structure of language.

As a specific example, we may say that it is positively misleading to label the portion of the clause that is not a Theme as the "Rheme", because the label "Rheme" simply means 'that which is not Theme' — or, more fully, 'the elements corresponding to this block are not one of the Themes'. Similarly, "Residue" simply means 'those elements that are not the Subject or the Finite' (or any other marker of interpersonal meaning). And essentially the same position holds for "Given".

To place the names of such supposed 'functions' in the long boxes in diagrams such as Figure 7 that would otherwise be empty is to sustain — on what we now see to be theoretically inadequate grounds — the initially attractive metaphor that each clause has several different structures, and so several different strands of meaning that run (virtually) all the way through (virtually) all of them.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett's argument is that the lack of 'structure conflation' in SFL Theory undermines the theoretical validity of there being three lines of structure in the clause. As explained in previous posts, 'structure conflation' is neither a feature of the theory, nor a requirement of it, since all three clause structures are integrated in their realisation as a syntagm of units at group/phrase rank. This theoretical option is not available in Fawcett's model, however, since he also argues against the theoretical value of a rank scale.

[2] The term 'misleading' is significant here. Fawcett has twice previously primed the reader to expect impropriety by referring to a diagram of Matthiessen & Bateman (1991) as 'remarkably honest' (p131), and congratulating those authors 'for resisting the temptation to make their computer output more like the IFG representations than they really are' (p137).

[3] Here Fawcett correctly defines Rheme, Residue and Given as negatives, but simultaneously claims that it is misleading use them in this way.

[4] Here Fawcett misrepresents the elements of the Residue as not being markers of interpersonal meaning. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 143n) make clear, both the Mood and Residue elements realise the interpersonal meaning of the clause as proposition or proposal:

The combination of Mood plus Residue embody the proposition or proposal of the clause (with the Mood element as the key to the distinction between the two); but, as we shall see below, there are certain interpersonal elements of the clause that do not belong to either the Mood element or the Residue: the Vocative, and comment and conjunctive Adjuncts. These relate to, but are not part of the proposition/ proposal enacted by the clause.

[5] Here again Fawcett confuses a structural element with the method of labelling it. The function 'not Theme', for example, is an element of clause structure whether it is identified by the label 'Rheme' or by the absence of a label.

Fawcett's Argument That Rheme, Residue And Given "Do Not Contribute In Any Way To The Functional Structure Of The Clause"

Fawcett (2010: 135-6):

Let me summarise the stages of the argument that I have presented up to this point. We have established that the theoretical-generative model of a systemic functional grammar is always one of 'element conflation' and never one of 'structure conflation'. In other words, the 'mapping' between lines of analysis is performed on individual pairs and trios of 'functions' or 'elements', which from then on function as a single element of the clause. I would therefore say that those systemic functional grammars which suggest that the representation of a clause should include 'functions' such as 'Residue', 'Rheme' and 'Given' are in fact introducing what we might term 'pseudo-elements', i.e., chunks of text that do not contribute in any way to the functional structure of the clause. Their chief effect is to give the misleading impression that there is a 'structure' of roughly the length of a clause that corresponds to each of the strands of meaning. In other words, the only type of conflation that occurs in such a grammar — as it generates its single, 'flat-tree' structures — is the conflation of single, coterminous elements.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. The fact that conflation involves only elements, and not structures, is not established by Fawcett's argument, because it is a principle of SFL Theory. The notion of 'structure conflation' is merely Fawcett's misunderstanding of SFL Theory, as demonstrated in previous posts.

[2] This is a serious misunderstanding of the conflation of functions. The conflation of functions, such as Theme, Subject and Actor does not entail that all three "function as a single element of the clause". The conflation of functions just means that all three are realised by the same nominal group, as happens in the case of such selections as [unmarked THEME, operative VOICE, declarative MOOD, material PROCESS TYPE]. Each of the three elements is a distinct function, each defined by its relations to other elements in its particular structure.

[3] To be clear, this is an invalid conclusion argued from a false premiss. The false premiss is that conflated elements "function as a single element of the clause"; see [2]. The argument is invalid, because, regardless of the truth of the premisses, the conclusion is not logically entailed by them. That is, the fact that one element is not conflated with another does not mean that such elements serve no function in their structural configuration. Function of an element in one metafunctional structure is not dependent on its being conflated with another element in a different metafunctional structure. As previously noted, a structure is the relation between elements, such as:

• the relation between Theme and Rheme in clause structure;
• the relation between Mood and Residue in clause structure;
• the relation between New and Given in information unit structure.

[4] This continues Fawcett's confusion between function structures and formal constituency. The 'flatness' here refers to formal constituency as modelled by the rank scale: ranked constituents (minimal bracketing), rather than immediate constituents (maximal bracketing). As Halliday (1995 [1993]: 273) makes clear:

'Rank' is constituency based on function, and hence 'flat,' with minimal layering;

It will be seen later that, while Fawcett argues for what he calls a 'flat tree structure', he simultaneously argues against the inclusion of a rank scale in SFL Theory.

The "Cosmetic Exercise" Of Matthiessen and Bateman

Fawcett (2010: 135):

To summarise: it seems clear that that Matthiessen and Bateman's only purpose in generating the Mood elements is to generate a second line of interpersonal structure, and so to make available a visual representation that looks a little more like an IFG analysis. In other words, the generation of the 'Mood' element is simply a cosmetic exercise. Essentially, then, the Nigel generator that Matthiessen and Bateman describe here is one that generates single structures, just as Halliday's earlier models do (e.g., Halliday (1969/81). In other words, their generator conflates 'functions to generate multiple elements, as shown above, but it does not generate multiple structures. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The reason why Matthiessen and Bateman generated Mood elements is because the Mood element is a structural function of the clause, according to the theory they used.

[2] This is misleading, because, in Fawcett's own terms, it is untrue. The text generator of Matthiessen and Bateman produces Subject and Finite as components of the Mood element, which for Fawcett, constitutes "two lines of structure".

[3] To be clear, the conflation of functions does not generate "multiple elements". For example, the conflation of Theme, Subject and Actor does not generate a "multiple element". Each of these is an element of a different structure, a different configuration of relations, and so the notion of a "multiple element" of structure is nonsensical. What is true, in terms of SFL Theory, is that conflated elements are realised by the same unit at the rank below, such as a nominal group, as previously explained.

[4] This is misleading, because it it is untrue. The text generator of Matthiessen and Bateman produces each of the metafunctional structures of the clause: namely, those of theme, mood and transitivity.

Fawcett's Claim That The Finite (Clause) Should Be Conflated With The Event (Verbal Group)

Fawcett (2010: 134-5, 135n):

The reason why it is important to generate the Subject and Finite as direct elements of the clause (rather than the 'Mood' clement') is that it is the Subject and the Finite on which further work must be done. This further work will  generate (1) the nominal group the new system to fill the Theme/Subject/Actor and (2) the item is to expound the Finite/Process.¹⁶ Interestingly, however, Matthiessen and Bateman do not explain why — or even how — these are generated as "subcomponents' of 'Mood'. (However it is done, the same principle presumably applies to the division of the "Moodtag" into its two elements.) 

16. Strictly speaking, in the Sydney Grammar it is the element 'Event' within the 'verbal group' (the unit that fills the clause element 'Predicator') with which the 'Finite' should be conflated, and not the 'Process', as an example with auxiliary verbs such as the new system may be going to be more reliable than the old one demonstrates. See Fawcett (2000 and forthcoming b) for a full critique of Halliday's approach to the 'verbal group' and Appendix C for a summary. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the one hand, the term 'direct' is a red herring here, since there is no distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' elements of clause structure in SFL theory. The elements Subject and Finite are no less 'direct' for being components of the Mood element.

On the other hand, Fawcett's use of computerised text generation to argue about theoretical issues is also a red herring, since adjustments of the theory in response to the limitations of computers are irrelevant to the theory as a model of human language.

[2] To be clear, the reason why Matthiessen and Bateman generate Subject and Finite as components of the Mood element is because they are applying SFL theory to computerised text generation, and according to the theory, this is a structural realisation of the systemic feature 'indicative'.

[3] To be clear, the Predicator is realised by all elements of the verbal group except the Finite. In Fawcett's example, the Predicator is realised by the elements Auxiliary₁ ^ Auxiliary₂ ^ Event, as shown below.

the new system	may	be	going to	be	more reliable than the old one
Carrier	Process: attributive				Attribute
Subject	Finite	Predicator			Complement
	verbal group
	Finite	Auxiliary₁	Auxiliary₂	Event

[4] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Halliday's theory.  Fawcett's claim is that, on the SFL model, the Finite (clause rank) should be conflated with the Event (group rank), and that his example demonstrates the fact.  That is, Fawcett's claim is that two syntagmatically separated elements, at different ranks, should be conflated. This demonstrates a serious failure to understand the notion of conflation.

As the analysis above makes clear, in Fawcett's example, the Process (transitivity) conflates with Finite ^ Predicator (mood), both of which are integrated in their realisation as a verbal group.