How Huddleston Tackles The Problem

Fawcett (2010: 329, 329n):

Let us now look at how Huddleston tackles the problem (1988:145-6). He presents partially similar arguments for treating (1a) as being functionally like (2b). They are grammatical arguments, though they are not, of course, expressed in explicitly systemic terms. He cites 

(a) the 'thematisability' of the Time Position Adjunct in both (1a) and (2a); 

(b) the parallels as "focus of an interrogative" between Did he leave before they voted? and Did he leave before the vote? and 

(c) the fact that it is possible to co-ordinate a clause and a nominalised event, as in He left before the debate or (at least) before the vote was taken.¹⁷

¹⁷ It is not clear how Huddleston's second pair of examples is relevant. It surely cannot be the case that he believes that anything significant follows from the fact that a 'beta' clause may have a separate information unit (and so intonation unit). An example such as Did he leave, before they voted? is unusual but not unacceptable. But if Huddleston's example of the 'polarity seeker' type of "interrogative" was a slip and he actually intended to draw attention to the fact that When did he leave? is the "wh-interrogative" equivalent of both (1a) and (2a), then his point would clearly be relevant.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

(1a, i-iii) He left the room before / after / while they voted.

(2a, i-iii) He left the room before / after / during the vote.

(1b, i-iii) Before / after / while they voted, he left the room.

(2b, i-iii) Before / after / during the vote he left the room.

[1] To be clear, Huddleston's claim here is that the fact that a dependent clause can be thematised is evidence that it is embedded as a clause constituent. However, such thematisation is not universally available, but crucially dependent on the logico-semantic relation obtaining between the clauses. For example, thematisation of a dependent clause is not possible in the case of elaboration:

||| He doesn't always tell the truth || which undermines his credibility.|||

nor always possible in the case of enhancement:

||| These theories include the solar theory || whereby periodically the amount of nitrogen compounds is enhanced. |||

nor always possible in the case of projection:

||| Brutus thought || that Cæsar was ambitious |||

and, contrariwise, "thematisation" of a clause is possible for parataxis, in the case of projection:

||| "Well, I'm back" || he said. |||

[2] To be clear, as presented by Fawcett, Huddleston's point appears to be that the clause before they voted and the phrase before the vote both serve the same function in the clause because they both function as the "focus of an interrogative". 

However, though the term 'focus' is used in SFL Theory, this is not consistent with the SFL usage, since the information focus need not fall within the dependent clause or the prepositional phrase. So here Huddleston has merely used the interrogative agnate to repeat the same point he made for the declarative clause.

[3] To be clear, Huddleston's point here is irrelevant, because it is about parataxis, not about the question of hypotaxis vs embedding in (1a), (2a), (1b) and (2b).

[4] To be clear, the WH- interrogative When did he leave? is not criterial in deciding the question of hypotaxis vs embedding. Both (1a) and (2a) answer the question, the former with a dependent clause, the latter with a prepositional phrase. How the function of each is analysed depends on the theory being used.

Explaining The Discontinuous Nominal Group

Fawcett (2010: 261):

Typically, the elements of a unit occur in an uninterrupted sequence. Such a unit can be said to be a continuous unit, and its elements are in the simple 'segmental' relationship of adjacency to each other. This conforms to the general principle that, once a performer has begun on the production of a semantic unit — and so on the production of the syntactic unit in which it is realised — it is helpful to the addressee to finish it before starting on another unit.

But sometimes this principle of "Finish the current unit" is in conflict with one or more other principles. Two of these are what we may call the "Get the pivotal element in soon" principle and the "End weight" principle. For a fuller presentation of these principles, which can be compared with those in Leech (1983), see Fawcett (in press).

In an example such as The time has come when you must leave, the nominal group filling the Subject is the time [...] when you must leave. But it is a discontinuous nominal group, with the qualifier when you must leave following the Main Verb leave come. In such examples the combined influence of the "Get the pivotal element in soon" principle and the "End weight" principle is more powerful than the everyday "Finish the current unit" principle, and the clause moves to the pivotal element of the Main Verb come as quickly as it can, letting the semantically 'heavy' qualifier from the nominal group when you must leave follow, probably with its own information unit, i.e., in its spoken form:

|| the time has come | when you must leave ||

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, a functional grammar explains this type of variation in terms of function, rather than formal principles. In SFL Theory, the variation is explained as motivated by the textual metafunction. The nominal group in Fawcett's example is discontinuous in order achieve the desired texture in terms of Theme-Rheme and Given-New.

To explain, the most probable focus of New information in Fawcett's example is leave, and the discontinuous nominal group positions leave in the unmarked location of New information: 

If this option is not taken, then either the unmarked focus of New information falls on come, which is unlikely to be the focus in this context:

or else leave is presented as marked information focus, which carries the additional semantic feature of contrast (Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 282):

which may have unintended interpersonal implications, depending on tenor.

[2] As previously observed, Fawcett (in press) is still unpublished, 21 years after the first edition of this publication.

[3] To be clear, in the unmarked case, this rendering assigns an additional tonic prominence to come, making it the first focus of information. A more probable rendering would be a single tone group uttered with tone 1:

// 1 ‸ the / time has / come when / you must / leave //

Fawcett's 'Starter' And 'Ender' Elements

 Fawcett (2010: 215-6, 216n):

… the present model also includes punctuation (and intonation, which we shall not discuss further here). Two elements that are expounded by punctuation marks in written text are the starter and the ender. These can occur in any unit. The starter only occurs in an embedded unit, and it is expounded by a comma, a dash or a bracket, while the ender occurs with both embedded and unembedded units, and it is expounded by a wide range of punctuation marks — but most frequently by a full stop at the end of a clause (as shown in Appendix B). And there are equivalent exponents of the starter and ender in spoken text.¹⁹

¹⁹ The meanings of intonation are realised, like the meanings of punctuation, in items (in a broad sense of the term) including those that expound the starter and the ender. For a general account of the model of intonation in the Cardiff Grammar, see Tench (1996), and for a description of the first stage of its implementation in COMMUNAL, see Fawcett (1970).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, punctuation marks are a component of graphology, the systems of the expression plane for written mode. In Fawcett's model, punctuation is incongruously located at the level of syntax, which is a model of the content plane of language.

[2] To be clear, here Fawcett introduces two elements named for their structural position, starter and ender, despite having previously (pp213-4n) criticised the labels 'pre-deictic', and 'pre-numerative' as "purely positional labels". Moreover, neither of these functional syntactic elements is realised by syntactic forms.

[3] To be clear, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence or argument. Moreover, if tone groups were structured with demarcative elements, such elements would only consistently demarcate boundaries of the information unit, a unit which does not feature in Fawcett's model of syntax. 

Further, the distribution of tone groups (realising information units), the system of TONALITY, is only one of three systems of intonation, the others being TONICITY (tonic placement, realising the focus of New information), and TONE (pitch movement realising interpersonal distinctions).

The Main Verb As Pivotal Element Of The Clause

Fawcett (2010: 201):

The most important syntactic fact about the English clause is the great variety in the positions in which its elements occur. However, this is not a matter of so-called 'free word order' (i.e., 'free element order'), since each positional difference realises a different meaning, however fine the distinction.

There is no element of the clause that is obligatorily realised — not even the Main Verb. Moreover it varies in its position, so that there is no element that can be used as an 'anchor-point' from which to start building the structure of the unit in generation — a vital point to which we shall return in Section 10.4.2.

In text analysis, however, it is useful to begin with a working assumption that each unit has a 'pivotal element' that is typically realised, and in the case of the clause in English this 'pivotal element' is the Main Verb.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the different meanings here are textual in terms of metafunction:

• unmarked Theme vs marked Theme,
• unmarked New vs marked New

and variation is motivated by the textual function of relating the clause to its environment, especially the preceding co-text; see, e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 120, 282).

[2] As previously explained, Fawcett's notion of a pivotal element corresponds to the Head of a logical structure, since the Head is the element which is potentially modified by optional elements. However, as previously discussed, Fawcett (p 196) rejects logical structure in his model of syntax, and in SFL Theory, the clause does not include a logical structure.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a verb is a formal constituent (of the verbal group), not an element of function structure.

The Need For A Theory Of Syntax For SFL: The Argument Summarised [4]

Fawcett (2010: 154):

7. Thus Halliday now presents the structure of a clause (and in principle other units) as multiple structures. In any such representation of a clause there is, in principle, a line of structure that corresponds to each 'metafunction' (but in practice several more, with seven for many text-sentences as analysed in IFG). Each line consists of a string of 'functional elements', or 'functions'. The problem is that the elements of these 'structures' are not necessarily coterminous (and nor are the structures themselves coterminous). In other words, if two or more elements in two or more strands of meaning are coterminous, they can be conflated with each other to form a compound element, but when they are not coterminous it is not logically possible to conflate them (as described in Section 7.4 of this chapter). Despite these serious theoretical-generative problems, it appears that Halliday may regard the notion that there are many different structures (and so many non-coterminous elements) in a single clause as one of the riches of language — at least from the text-descriptive viewpoint, as exemplified in the analyses in IFG.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In IFG, what Fawcett refers to as "text-sentences" — his model, not SFL Theory — are the three metafunctional clause structures. The reason why Fawcett thinks there are "several more" is that he mistakes information structure as a clause structure, and counts mood and thematic structures twice because of their structural components (e.g. Subject of the Mood element, and topical Theme of the Theme element).

[2] To be clear, as previously explained, in SFL Theory, there is no need to conflate any elements. It is simply the case that, under certain circumstances, some elements do happen to conflate, as when Subject conflates with Behaver in behavioural clauses. The three metafunctional structures of the clause are integrated in the syntagm of units at the rank below, as when Subject and Behaver are realised by the same nominal group.

[3] To be clear, the conflation of two elements, such as Subject and Behaver, does not result in a "compound element", since each element is an element of a different structure, and, in SFL Theory, a structure is the relation between elements (e.g the relation of Subject to Finite, or the relation of Behaver to Process).

Fawcett's Claim That All Of The Representations Throughout IFG Have No Status In The Theory

Fawcett (2010: 138):

Can it really be the case, you may be asking, that all of the representations throughout IFG and all the representations in all of the derived works have no status in the theory? Perhaps, you might think, the cumulative effect of the conflation of several individual elements would be to provide a conflation of structures? The answer is that while this is theoretically possible, in practice it does not do so. This is because the supposed 'functions' of 'Rheme', 'Given', 'Residue' and others do not correspond to single 'functions' and they do not play any role in generative systemic functional grammar, for the reasons given in recent sections of this chapter. And nor, as I have suggested above, has anyone yet made any viable proposal as to how such a model could be made to work. Conflation is, by all current SF definitions, an operation that applies only to individual, coterminous elements.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously demonstrated, the notion of 'structure conflation' does not figure in SFL Theory. It arises only as Fawcett's misunderstanding of SFL Theory, particularly his confusion of formal constituency (the rank scale that his model omits) — with function structure (clause rank).

[2] This is misleading, since each of these is a functional element:

• Rheme is the clause element that realises textual meaning that is not Theme;
• Given is the information unit element that realises textual meaning that is not New; and
• Residue is the clause element that realises interpersonal meaning that is not Mood.

[3] To be clear, here Fawcett means that these elements are not coterminous with elements of other metafunctional structures. As previously explained, there is no theoretical requirement that they should be coterminous, since this assumption only arises from Fawcett's notion and interpretation of 'structure conflation'.

[4] This is true.

Fawcett's Claim That 'The Representations In IFG Do Not Have A Solid Basis In The Theory'

Fawcett (2010: 137-8, 138n):

Where, then, does this leave the representations in IFG? 

The clear implication of these facts is that the representations in IFG do not have the solid basis in the theory that they surely should, if they are to be used as the standard method of describing texts in systemic functional terms. In other words, if generative systemic functional grammars do not build structures like this, IFG-style representations give a misleading picture of the systemic functional view of the structure of language.

As a specific example, we may say that it is positively misleading to label the portion of the clause that is not a Theme as the "Rheme", because the label "Rheme" simply means 'that which is not Theme' — or, more fully, 'the elements corresponding to this block are not one of the Themes'. Similarly, "Residue" simply means 'those elements that are not the Subject or the Finite' (or any other marker of interpersonal meaning). And essentially the same position holds for "Given".

To place the names of such supposed 'functions' in the long boxes in diagrams such as Figure 7 that would otherwise be empty is to sustain — on what we now see to be theoretically inadequate grounds — the initially attractive metaphor that each clause has several different structures, and so several different strands of meaning that run (virtually) all the way through (virtually) all of them.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett's argument is that the lack of 'structure conflation' in SFL Theory undermines the theoretical validity of there being three lines of structure in the clause. As explained in previous posts, 'structure conflation' is neither a feature of the theory, nor a requirement of it, since all three clause structures are integrated in their realisation as a syntagm of units at group/phrase rank. This theoretical option is not available in Fawcett's model, however, since he also argues against the theoretical value of a rank scale.

[2] The term 'misleading' is significant here. Fawcett has twice previously primed the reader to expect impropriety by referring to a diagram of Matthiessen & Bateman (1991) as 'remarkably honest' (p131), and congratulating those authors 'for resisting the temptation to make their computer output more like the IFG representations than they really are' (p137).

[3] Here Fawcett correctly defines Rheme, Residue and Given as negatives, but simultaneously claims that it is misleading use them in this way.

[4] Here Fawcett misrepresents the elements of the Residue as not being markers of interpersonal meaning. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 143n) make clear, both the Mood and Residue elements realise the interpersonal meaning of the clause as proposition or proposal:

The combination of Mood plus Residue embody the proposition or proposal of the clause (with the Mood element as the key to the distinction between the two); but, as we shall see below, there are certain interpersonal elements of the clause that do not belong to either the Mood element or the Residue: the Vocative, and comment and conjunctive Adjuncts. These relate to, but are not part of the proposition/ proposal enacted by the clause.

[5] Here again Fawcett confuses a structural element with the method of labelling it. The function 'not Theme', for example, is an element of clause structure whether it is identified by the label 'Rheme' or by the absence of a label.

Fawcett's Argument That Rheme, Residue And Given "Do Not Contribute In Any Way To The Functional Structure Of The Clause"

Fawcett (2010: 135-6):

Let me summarise the stages of the argument that I have presented up to this point. We have established that the theoretical-generative model of a systemic functional grammar is always one of 'element conflation' and never one of 'structure conflation'. In other words, the 'mapping' between lines of analysis is performed on individual pairs and trios of 'functions' or 'elements', which from then on function as a single element of the clause. I would therefore say that those systemic functional grammars which suggest that the representation of a clause should include 'functions' such as 'Residue', 'Rheme' and 'Given' are in fact introducing what we might term 'pseudo-elements', i.e., chunks of text that do not contribute in any way to the functional structure of the clause. Their chief effect is to give the misleading impression that there is a 'structure' of roughly the length of a clause that corresponds to each of the strands of meaning. In other words, the only type of conflation that occurs in such a grammar — as it generates its single, 'flat-tree' structures — is the conflation of single, coterminous elements.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. The fact that conflation involves only elements, and not structures, is not established by Fawcett's argument, because it is a principle of SFL Theory. The notion of 'structure conflation' is merely Fawcett's misunderstanding of SFL Theory, as demonstrated in previous posts.

[2] This is a serious misunderstanding of the conflation of functions. The conflation of functions, such as Theme, Subject and Actor does not entail that all three "function as a single element of the clause". The conflation of functions just means that all three are realised by the same nominal group, as happens in the case of such selections as [unmarked THEME, operative VOICE, declarative MOOD, material PROCESS TYPE]. Each of the three elements is a distinct function, each defined by its relations to other elements in its particular structure.

[3] To be clear, this is an invalid conclusion argued from a false premiss. The false premiss is that conflated elements "function as a single element of the clause"; see [2]. The argument is invalid, because, regardless of the truth of the premisses, the conclusion is not logically entailed by them. That is, the fact that one element is not conflated with another does not mean that such elements serve no function in their structural configuration. Function of an element in one metafunctional structure is not dependent on its being conflated with another element in a different metafunctional structure. As previously noted, a structure is the relation between elements, such as:

• the relation between Theme and Rheme in clause structure;
• the relation between Mood and Residue in clause structure;
• the relation between New and Given in information unit structure.

[4] This continues Fawcett's confusion between function structures and formal constituency. The 'flatness' here refers to formal constituency as modelled by the rank scale: ranked constituents (minimal bracketing), rather than immediate constituents (maximal bracketing). As Halliday (1995 [1993]: 273) makes clear:

'Rank' is constituency based on function, and hence 'flat,' with minimal layering;

It will be seen later that, while Fawcett argues for what he calls a 'flat tree structure', he simultaneously argues against the inclusion of a rank scale in SFL Theory.

Misconstruing An Absence Of Label For An Absence Of Function

Fawcett (2010: 132, 132n):

From our present perspective, the first important difference about Figure 9 is the blank boxes in the THEME and MOOD lines of the representation. Most of the THEME line of analysis is a long blank box, covering several elements, in which the label "Rheme" would be written if this was an IFG analysis. And there is similar blank box in the MOOD line of Figure 9, where "Residue" would be written in an IFG analysis (between "Mood" and "Moodtag"). This is not the trivial difference that it might at first appear, because when the blank boxes are labelled this suggests that there are 'functions' in these lines of analysis that correspond to them — and it is this fact that in turn allows one to read into such diagrams the idea that they represent a 'structure'. In other words, I suggest that there is not in fact a single 'functional element' called a "Rheme" that corresponds to several other clause elements; that there is no 'functional element' of 'Residue' that similarly covers one or more elements; and, in cases where there is an INFORMATION line of analysis, that there is no 'functional element' of 'Given' that covers one or more elements.¹²

¹² As you may have noticed, the right hand box in the TRANSITIVITY line of analysis is also blank, but in this case an IFG-style analysis would not label it. This is because this element only has 'interpersonal' meaning. Since the tag isn't it is automatically derived from the main clause it has no 'experiential' meaning, so that there is nothing to say about it in terms of the TRANSITIVITY line of analysis. 

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] This is misleading, because the difference is indeed trivial. The difference here is between labelling a negative — Rheme or Residue — and not labelling it. 'Rheme' labels the portion of a clause as message that is not Theme: the point of departure of the message. 'Residue' labels the portion of a clause as exchange that is not Mood: the carrier of 'the burden of the clause as an interactive event' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 150).  The unlabelled box after 'Theme' signifies 'not Theme', which is equivalent to 'Rheme'; the absence of a label after 'Mood' signifies 'not Mood', which is equivalent to 'Residue'.

[2] To be clear, a structure is the relation between elements, and the relations obtain if both elements are labelled or if one of them is iconically represented as a negative.

[3] To be clear, this is a non-sequitur. Here Fawcett has invalidly concluded that the absence of a label necessarily entails the absence of a function. Moreover, this conclusion leads to an absurdity, since, without at least the possibility of an element that is not Theme (Rheme), not Mood (Residue), not New (Given), there can be no contrasting element that is Theme, Mood, New, respectively.

[4] To be clear, the reason why a Moodtag 'has no experiential meaning' is because it is not a representation of experience.

The "Remarkably Honest" Diagram Of Matthiessen and Bateman

Fawcett (2010: 131-2):

It is highly illuminating to compare a recent description of the version of Halliday's Nigel grammmar [sic] that was implemented in the computer with the original account of a generative systemic functional grammar in Halliday (1969/81). … Consider the diagram shown in Figure 9, which is taken directly from Matthiessen & Bateman (1991:109). 

Here Matthiessen and Bateman provide a visual representation of the output from their generator, following as far as they can the IFG layout. It looks, at first sight, very like Figure 7 in Section 7.2, and so also like one of the many representations of clauses given in IFG.

It is also a remarkably honest diagram, in the sense that it has not been adapted to make it more like the standard IFG analysis than the output from the computer really is (with one vital proviso, which we shall come to shortly). Yet the fact is, as we shall now see, that it is unlike the IFG diagrams in one vital respect. So let us compare Figure 9 with the IFG-style analysis of a clause in Figure 7.

Two differences that are not important for our present purposes are (1) that Figure 9 includes the 'tag' isn't it, and (2) that it contains no line for the INFORMATION structure shown in Figure 7 as "Given" and "New". (The reason for this omission is probably that their version of the Penman generator does not generate intonation.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here Fawcett begins a comparison of a very early statement of SFL Theory (Halliday 1969) with a later application of SFL Theory to the programming of computers to generate texts (Matthiessen & Bateman 1991). As a form of argumentation, it is an instance of the red herring logical fallacy, a fallacy of relevance, because the adaptation of a linguistic theory to the domain of computer capabilities is irrelevant to the validity of a linguistic theory as a model of human language.

[2] Here Fawcett introduces the possibility that Matthiessen & Bateman are otherwise dishonest, since their diagram (Figure 9) is not only "honest", but "remarkably" so.

[3] To be clear, one reason why Figure 9 does not include a 'line for the INFORMATION structure' is that INFORMATION is not a system of the clause. The reason why Figure 7 does include a 'line for the INFORMATION structure' is that Figure 7 was devised by Fawcett, and Fawcett does not realise that INFORMATION is not a system of the clause.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1969/81) As Adopting An "Anomolous" Position

Fawcett (2010: 130):

There are differences in the sequence in which 'functions' are inserted in various versions of SF grammars, but what is constant across all such grammars — whether they are produced in the Sydney or the Cardiff frameworks — is that the phenomena that gets [sic] conflated are coterminous 'functional elements' (or 'functions' or 'elements') — and not structures. 

Moreover, there is no generative systemic functional grammar in existence that includes a rule which conflates 'chunks' of the clause such as 'Residue', 'Rheme' and 'Given' with the various 'functions' in other 'strands'. 

The fact is that Halliday, in his immensely influential but still exploratory work 'Options and functions in the English clause' (1969/81) appears to adopt an anomolous [sic] position. On page 143 he emphasises the concept that "the clause has a number of different but simultaneous structures" (while pointing out certain caveats, as indicated in the last subsection). But on the facing page he sets out a table of realisation statements that demonstrates clearly that the model is in fact one that simply conflates 'functions' — and not structures. In other words, his rules show how to generate the 'function' of 'Theme', but not the 'function' of 'Rheme'; they show how to give a Participant Role the 'function' of being 'New', but not how to assign the supposed function of 'Given' to whatever experiential element or elements it is relevant to — and similarly for the 'Residue'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously explained, the selection of clause features and the activation of realisation statements, the process of instantiation, is not temporally sequenced in SFL Theory. The application of the theory to computational text generation requires an adaptation of the theory to the limitations of computers, which, at the time of writing, do not learn language through interaction in a speech community.

[2] To be clear, this is true of SFL Theory, but contrary to what Fawcett has thus far been claiming.

[3] To be clear, this is true of SFL Theory, because no such rule is necessary. This is because all structures are integrated in the syntagm that realises them, and the terms 'Residue' and 'Rheme' are labels for negatives: 'not Mood' and 'not Theme', respectively.

[4] To be clear, 'Given' is not a function of the clause, and labels a negative: the portion of the information unit that is 'not New'.

[5] To be clear, there is no anomaly here. In Halliday's model, the clause does have a number of different but simultaneous structures, but it is only elements of structure that are conflated, not structures.

[6] See [4]. To be clear, it is not only participants, or indeed even experiential elements, that can be highlighted as New, as demonstrated by instances like:

• I say it is true (Process as New)
• I said put it on the table (Location as New)
• Of course it is! (comment Adjunct as New)
• I'm going anyway. (conjunctive Adjunct as New).

The Reason Why Fawcett Has Been Repeatedly Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Clause Structure

Fawcett (2010: 115-6, 116n):

It may come as a surprise to some readers that an IFG-style analysis in fact requires seven separate lines of representation (six of these being structural). This is because the writings of the Sydney grammarians regularly present the view that there are either three or at most four strands of meaning, each corresponding to one of the metafunctions. In Chapter 2 of IFG, for example, Halliday introduces the concept that a clause has multiple structures under the beguilingly simple section heading of 'Three lines of meaning in the clause" (p. 33). Yet, the fact is — as I have just demonstrated — that a analysis of a sentence in IFG terms regularly requires seven lines of analysis (and sometimes even more, as we shall see shortly).  

In IFG, therefore, the task of analysing a text — and so the model of language that underlies it — is rather more complex than we are at first led to expect. Indeed, in the analyses of 'The 'silver' text" on pages 368-85 of IFG there are often eight or more lines of analysis, because Halliday adds an extra line for the analysis of the 'unpacked' interpretation of examples that contain cases of what he terms "grammatical metaphor".…⁶

⁶ I should point out that the seven or eight lines of structure found in an IFG-style analysis do not correspond to the eight major types of meaning that I consider to be present (if only by their non-realisation) in a typical clause. See Section 7.8 for a brief introduction to the eight strands of meaning that are recognised in the Cardiff Grammar.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  As previously demonstrated, in arguing about clause structure, Fawcett switches between clause, 'text-sentence' and text in order to deceive the reader.  In erroneously arriving at seven lines of representation for the clause, Fawcett counts interpersonal structure twice, includes both information and logical structure, despite the fact they are not clause structures, and includes cohesion despite the fact that it is not a structure of any grammatical unit.

[2] This is correct.  There are three lines of meaning realised in clause structure: textual, interpersonal and experiential.

[3] This is misleading.  A statement about the number of lines of meaning realised in the structure of one one rank unit, the clause, is not a statement about the complexity of carrying out a complete text analysis using all the dimensions of the theory.

[4] This is correct.  In the analysis of the 'silver' text, Halliday demonstrates how to deploy the theoretical resources outlined in the body of the book, including the three metafunctional structures of the clause, logical relations between clauses in complexes, information unit structure, and the unpacking of grammatical metaphor.

[5] To be clear, it is Fawcett's model of the clause — not Halliday's — that proposes eight lines of meaning.  This suggests that Fawcett's motivation for misrepresenting Halliday's model is to disguise the fact that his own model is less elegant.

Fawcett's Claim That Halliday's Analysis Of A Clause Typically Involves At Least Seven Lines Of Analysis

Fawcett (2010: 115):

We come finally to the seventh line of analysis shown in the standard analyses of texts in IFG . This shows textual 'cohesion', but as Halliday does not propose it as a type of structure we shall pay no further attention to it here. 

Halliday's analysis of a clause therefore typically involves at least seven lines of analysis. It is as if the variation in the structures of the various lines of analysis is seen as a phenomenon of language that is to be celebrated. But we must ask: "Is it a linguistic phenomenon rather than a metaphenomenon, i.e., a product of Halliday's version of the theory?". I shall argue in Section 7.4 (1) that it is indeed a metaphenomenon; (2) that this approach to representing the multi-functional nature of language brings with it enormous problems; and (3) that there is a preferable approach that achieves the same goals. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This raises the question as to how, or if, the Cardiff Grammar integrates cohesion into its model.

[2] This is misleading.  Here Fawcett has switched back from his own terminology, 'text-sentence', on which his argument has been constructed, to the SFL notion of 'clause' and repeated his false claim that a clause "typically involves at least seven lines of analysis", instead of three.

To recap, in these seven lines of analysis, Fawcett includes:

• information structure, which is not a system of the clause, but of the informations unit,
• logical structure, which is not a system of the clause, but of the clause complex,
• cohesion, which is not a system of the clause, or any other grammatical unit,

and misrepresents the interpersonal structure of the clause as two lines of analysis, instead of one.

[3]  The fatuousness of this remark can be made self-evident by transposing its type to physics:

it is as if the number of different subatomic particles is a physical phenomenon that is to be celebrated.

[4] To be clear, any proposed linguistic structure can be nothing other than a construal ("product") of one theory of language or another.  Such construals are assessed in terms of their validity.

[5] It will be seen in the examination of Section 7.4 that the enormous problems that Fawcett identifies only arise, once again, from his own misunderstandings of Halliday's theory.

[6] To be clear, the approach that Fawcett finds preferable is his own, and whether or not it achieves the same goals will be examined when his approach is finally revealed.

Misrepresenting The Conflation Of Functional Elements

Fawcett (2010: 113):

Let us now examine Figure 7 more closely. It show four clearly separated lines of box diagrams (one containing two lines of structure within it), such that each of the four major lines corresponds to one of four major types of 'meaning'. The two basic assumptions upon which such a diagram rests are (1) that there should be a separate structural representation for each major strand of meaning (including two completely distinct structures within 'textual' meaning), and (2) any one 'element' of the clause is likely to consist of the 'conflation' of two or more 'functions' from two or more different lines of meaning. For example, the description in Halliday (1994:30f.) of the duke in the duke gave my aunt this teapot states that, in his approach, the three 'functions' of 'Subject', 'Actor' and 'Theme' are typically — but not necessarily — mapped onto one another to form a single 'element' of the clause (just as the same three 'functions' are in Figure 7).

Blogger Comments:

[1] Reminder:

A functional analysis (with syntagm) that is consistent with SFL Theory is presented below for contrast:

we	would	visit	Mrs Skinner	every Sunday
Theme	Rheme
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement	Adjunct
Mood		Residue
Actor	Process		Scope	Extent
nominal group	verbal group		nominal group	prepositional phrase

[2] This is misleading. The clause has only one textual structure (Theme^Rheme).  Information is not a system of the clause, but of the information unit — whether or not the information unit happens to be coterminous with the clause.

[3] To be clear, the "element" that is the conflation of different functions is a formal constituent of the clause, represented as a unit of the syntagm.  For example, it is the initial nominal group onto which the three functional elements of Theme, Subject and Actor are mapped.