Misrepresenting 'Filling' As An Alternative To The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 336-7, 337n):

Even if we set aside the case for abolishing the 'verbal group' set out in the last section, as well as the more general evidence of the value of a description of English such as that summarised in Appendix B, it is surprising that the evidence produced by Matthews, Huddleston and others summarised above has not persuaded Halliday to reconsider the status of the 'rank scale' concept.  

After all, it is clear that the strongest claim that can be made for it is that it characterises a tendency towards a pattern to which there are in fact a great many exceptions.  

One sometimes gets the impression that support for the 'rank scale' is maintained simply because of a general perception that 'there is no alternative'.²¹ 

But there now is an alternative: a simple unordered set of classes of unit, each of which is capable of filling several elements of one or more higher units, as presented in Section 10.2 of Chapter 10.

²¹ This is the 'TINA' attitude to change that is close to the heart of many a right-wing politician — and so not, one would assume, Halliday's.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the reason why the evidence produced by Matthews, Huddleston and others have not persuaded Halliday to reconsider the rank scale concept is that the evidence is no evidence at all, since it derives from theoretical misunderstandings, as demonstrated in previous posts.

[2] This is misleading. The rank scale is one of two ways of modelling formal constituency — the other being immediate constituent analysis (Halliday 1994: 20-8). In SFL Theory, it is the means of modelling morphology and syntax, which is why it leaves no room for Fawcett's 'functional syntax', which is why Fawcett is motivated to argue against its theoretical value. The theoretical value of the rank scale includes the fact that it identifies the entry conditions for networks at each rank, and, in doing so, identifies the formal units to which meanings are assigned.

[3] To be clear, this is a false impression, since the alternative to ranked constituent analysis (minimal bracketing) is immediate constituent analysis (maximal bracketing), as explained in Halliday (1994: 20-8).

[4] To be clear, as previously explained, Fawcett's notion of 'filling' is no alternative to the rank scale, because it is concerned with form-function relations, not with form-form relations (constituency). On the other hand, Fawcett's notion of 'higher' — and therefore 'lower' — units discloses the fact that his model ranks units on a scale from high to low.

[5] To be clear, Fawcett here invites the reader to associate the attitude he falsely attributes to Halliday, a lifelong communist, with the attitude of right-wing politicians. This is achieved textually by the punctuation, which places tonic prominence on the word 'assume', thereby making it the Focus of New information, and interpersonally through the most likely tone, tone 4, which expresses 'reservation' in declarative MOOD.

"The Generalisations That Halliday Gives Up"

Fawcett (2010: 333):

M&M make many valuable points in their "Response to Huddleston". The main weakness in the case that they present in the sections of their "Response" summarised above is this: they do not show how the generalisations that Halliday gives up in order to foreground the similarities between the 'hypotactic' and 'paratactic' analyses are to be handled in the grammar. If M&M are to 'defend' the position taken in IFG successfully, they need to address this question. But perhaps there should be less 'attacking' and 'defending', and more accepting of genuine 'problem examples', together with more exploring of comprehensive solutions to such problems, in the framework of a multi-component model?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday does not "give up" any generalisations in "foregrounding the similarities" of hypotaxis and parataxis. On the contrary, the distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis provides a generalisation, the system of TAXIS (interdependency), which Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar lacks. Importantly, the distinction between interdependency and embedding provides a more detailed specification of the different types of grammatical environments in which the generalised meanings of expansion and projection are manifested.

[2] To be clear, it is Fawcett who chooses to construe M&M's 'Response To Huddleston" in terms of 'attacking' and 'defending', the former being his own preferred modus operandi.

[3] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, the 'problem examples' that have been presented by Huddleston and Fawcett are not genuine 'problem examples' when examined with a sufficient grasp of SFL Theory.

Fawcett's Contention That The Notion Of A Rank Scale Depends On Hypotaxis

  Fawcett (2010: 333):

In other words, the analyses of dependent clauses that Huddleston advocates in his review of IFG are indeed possible ones within SFL. But the fact that SF linguists agree that we should explore the value of both 'hypotaxis' and alternative concepts within the theory does not absolve us from the obligation to try to decide whether 'hypotaxis' is needed in all or some or none of the cases for which Halliday proposes its use. The key point for the present debate is that, if we replace 'hypotaxis' by embedding in the examples discussed here (as Huddleston and I advocate), the case for retaining the concept of the 'rank scale' is greatly weakened. Thus it is not the case, as M&M suggest (p. 28), that "Huddleston's objections are descriptive, not theoretical".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the theoretical value of hypotaxis is its explanatory potential. For example, with regard to projection, the distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis models the distinction between reports and quotes, and the distinction between hypotaxis and embedding models the distinction between reports and pre-projected facts.

[2] This bare assertion, unsupported by argument, is misleading, because it is untrue. Whether clauses are analysed as ranking (dependent) or rankshifted (embedded) can have no bearing whatsoever on the theoretical status of the rank scale. If hypotaxis were excised from the theory, and all dependent clauses were interpreted as embedded, such clauses can still be interpreted as rank units, shifted to the rank of another unit on a rank scale.

[3] To be clear, the sense in which this is true is that SFL Theory provides both hypotaxis and embedding as potential descriptions of language, and the linguist chooses which of these to deploy in the description.

Projection As A Hypotactic Relationship, Locution As Phenomenon

Fawcett (2010: 332):

M&M then go on to consider, much more briefly, examples such as the clause he'd go in He said he'd go. For Halliday (and so M&M) this is a case of the 'hypotactic' relationship of 'projection', with he'd go being a 'beta' clause to the supposed 'alpha' clause he said. As we saw at the start of this section, for both Huddleston and me this example has an embedded clause that fills a Complement of the higher clause He said he 'd go. (Strictly speaking, for me it fills the Participant Role of Phenomenon, this being conflated with the Complement.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is not misleading, because it is true.

[2] This is misleading, because it is not true. To be clear, in SFL Theory, projection is not a hypotactic relationship. Projection is a logico-semantic relation, whereas hypotaxis is a type of interdependency.

[3] Strictly speaking, in SFL Theory, if he'd go were an embedded clause, it would serve as Verbiage (the Range of a verbal Process), not as Phenomenon (the Range of a mental Process). However, in SFL Theory, this is a dependent clause, and so a verbal projection, and so a reported locution.

Misrepresenting An Argument Against Parataxis As An Argument Against Hypotaxis

Fawcett (2010: 331):

In the second part of their case, M&M suggest a second analysis of Huddleston's example, i.e., as two co-ordinated clauses with ellipsis in the second, thus: He left before the debate or (he left) (at least) before the vote was taken. But again, I am afraid, I have to point out a problem. While their analysis appears at first to be another possible one, we need to take account of the fact that one can insert either to the left of before the debate, so that it becomes He left either before the debate or (at least) before the vote was taken. And this fact demonstrates clearly that the grammar must allow for the possibility of generating the prepositional group and the clause as jointly filling an Adjunct.

Thus M&M suggest that two possible analyses should be allowed (the first being Huddleston's and mine). They therefore do not address the question of which of the two is systemically preferable, and why. Moreover, Huddleston's criticism of IFG stands. In other words, he is right that Halliday's decision to treat all clauses embedded directly in clauses as 'hypotaxis' means that the Sydney Grammar cannot handle examples such as Huddleston's.

Finally, to demonstrate that Huddleston's example is not a 'special case', consider the following example with a simple 'additive' Linker: On average, people died earlier in those days, both from diseases such as diphtheria and because they worked such dreadfully long hours. Notice that here (as in Huddleston's example) the item both prevents the M&M analysis in terms of two co-ordinated clauses with ellipsis. The conclusion, then, must be that we should treat all such 'beta' clauses as embedded clauses. … Withe respect to the areas of the grammar described here, then, M&M fail to rebut Huddleston's critical comments. 

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is an argument about parataxis, and as such, not relevant to the question of hypotaxis. Moreover, this being the case, it could be equally directed against Fawcett's model of co-ordination.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, Huddleston's criticism does not stand, with regard to hypotaxis, because it is an argument about parataxis. On the other hand, SFL Theory (IFG, Halliday) does not treat all such "embedded" clauses as hypotaxis. By distinguishing between embedding (rankshift) and hypotaxis, SFL Theory provides such explanatory advantages as distinguishing between

• defining relative clauses (embedded) and non-defining relative clauses (dependent), and
• pre-projected facts (embedded) and reported projections (dependent).

The conclusion, then, is the distinction between rankshifted and dependent clauses has explanatory advantages over the lack of distinction.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Rankshift

Fawcett (2010: 330-1):

Here we shall consider M&M's response to Huddleston's "co-ordination" argument. This begins, perhaps surprisingly, with M&M's agreement that his analysis is indeed a possible one (i.e., the analysis in which before the vote was taken is treated as a clause embedded as an Adjunct). However, they move quickly on from this apparent olive branch to a robust defence of what they take to be the IFG position on this matter — claiming that Huddleston is wrong to criticise IFG for ruling out his analysis, because "there is nothing in Halliday's system to block this analysis" (p. 27). 

But on this matter Huddleston is right and M&M are wrong, as is shown by Halliday's own specification of the types of rankshift that his model permits. Thus he states (IFG p. 242) that "the relationship of an embedded clause to the 'outer' clause is an indirect one" — i.e., the embedded clause must fill an element of a group, not a clause. (See Section 11.8.5 of Chapter 11 for a summary of Halliday 's statement on this matter.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, if a clause is shifted to the rank of group, then it functions as a group and so serves as ("fills") an element of a clause. For example:

On the other hand, it is when a clause is shifted to the rank of word, that it serves as ("fills") an element of a group. For example:

[2] See the post on Section 11.8.5: Seriously Misrepresenting Halliday On Embedding.

How Huddleston Tackles The Problem

Fawcett (2010: 329, 329n):

Let us now look at how Huddleston tackles the problem (1988:145-6). He presents partially similar arguments for treating (1a) as being functionally like (2b). They are grammatical arguments, though they are not, of course, expressed in explicitly systemic terms. He cites 

(a) the 'thematisability' of the Time Position Adjunct in both (1a) and (2a); 

(b) the parallels as "focus of an interrogative" between Did he leave before they voted? and Did he leave before the vote? and 

(c) the fact that it is possible to co-ordinate a clause and a nominalised event, as in He left before the debate or (at least) before the vote was taken.¹⁷

¹⁷ It is not clear how Huddleston's second pair of examples is relevant. It surely cannot be the case that he believes that anything significant follows from the fact that a 'beta' clause may have a separate information unit (and so intonation unit). An example such as Did he leave, before they voted? is unusual but not unacceptable. But if Huddleston's example of the 'polarity seeker' type of "interrogative" was a slip and he actually intended to draw attention to the fact that When did he leave? is the "wh-interrogative" equivalent of both (1a) and (2a), then his point would clearly be relevant.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

(1a, i-iii) He left the room before / after / while they voted.

(2a, i-iii) He left the room before / after / during the vote.

(1b, i-iii) Before / after / while they voted, he left the room.

(2b, i-iii) Before / after / during the vote he left the room.

[1] To be clear, Huddleston's claim here is that the fact that a dependent clause can be thematised is evidence that it is embedded as a clause constituent. However, such thematisation is not universally available, but crucially dependent on the logico-semantic relation obtaining between the clauses. For example, thematisation of a dependent clause is not possible in the case of elaboration:

||| He doesn't always tell the truth || which undermines his credibility.|||

nor always possible in the case of enhancement:

||| These theories include the solar theory || whereby periodically the amount of nitrogen compounds is enhanced. |||

nor always possible in the case of projection:

||| Brutus thought || that Cæsar was ambitious |||

and, contrariwise, "thematisation" of a clause is possible for parataxis, in the case of projection:

||| "Well, I'm back" || he said. |||

[2] To be clear, as presented by Fawcett, Huddleston's point appears to be that the clause before they voted and the phrase before the vote both serve the same function in the clause because they both function as the "focus of an interrogative". 

However, though the term 'focus' is used in SFL Theory, this is not consistent with the SFL usage, since the information focus need not fall within the dependent clause or the prepositional phrase. So here Huddleston has merely used the interrogative agnate to repeat the same point he made for the declarative clause.

[3] To be clear, Huddleston's point here is irrelevant, because it is about parataxis, not about the question of hypotaxis vs embedding in (1a), (2a), (1b) and (2b).

[4] To be clear, the WH- interrogative When did he leave? is not criterial in deciding the question of hypotaxis vs embedding. Both (1a) and (2a) answer the question, the former with a dependent clause, the latter with a prepositional phrase. How the function of each is analysed depends on the theory being used.

Fudging The Data

 Fawcett (2010: 326):

(I have slightly altered the wording of Huddleston's examples to create 'minimal pairs' that make the relevant contrasts fully explicit.)

(1a) He left the room before they voted. 

(2a) He left the room before the vote. 

(3a) He left the room, then they voted.

Huddleston's grammatical analysis of (la) — which is broadly similar to mine — is to treat it as a single clause in which the embedded clause before they voted functions as an Adjunct that identifies the 'time position' of the event of 'leaving' by relating it to an event that is already known to the addressee (the 'voting' event), in the same way that before the vote does in (2a). Indeed, Halliday and M&M would agree with Huddleston and me that, when the event of 'voting' is nominalised as in (2a), it serves this function and is therefore an Adjunct. So why, we might ask, do they not also treat before they voted in (la) as an Adjunct? Essentially, their approach is to interpret (la) as a relating of two events (rather than as a 'main' event that is located in time by relating it to another event) — and to claim that this 'relating' can be achieved either 'paratactically', as in (3a), or 'hypotactically' as in the second interpretation of (la).

Blogger Comments:

In SFL Theory, the three instances are analysed as follows:

[1] This is misleading, on two counts. On the one hand, Fawcett's slight alteration of the data does not create 'minimal pairs', and on the other hand, it does not make the relevant contrasts fully explicit. Instead, the contrast it makes explicit is one of time: 'earlier' ((1a) and (1b)) vs 'later' (1c), which is the irrelevant to the distinction between hypotaxis and embedding.

[2] To be clear, this is bare assertion unsupported by reasoned argument.

[3] This is not misleading, because it is essentially true.

Agreeing With Huddleston's Conclusion

Fawcett (2010: 324):

There is much in Huddleston's review, therefore, with which I disagree. However, it will be clear that I share his conclusion that most of the uses to which 'hypotaxis' has been put by Halliday are better handled by a simple embedding relationship (but one by co-ordination; see Section 11.9 of Chapter 11). And I also share his view (though for a set of reasons that only partly overlap with his) that "the constraints this [i.e., the requirement of 'accountability at all ranks'] imposes on the grammar have numerous unsatisfactory consequences" (Huddleston 1988:141). Indeed, I would also agree with his statement (though again for reasons that only partly overlap with his) that

the unsatisfactory nature of the constituent structures given in [IFG] derives in very large measure from their foundation in rank theory. (Huddleston 1988:155)

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, agreeing with someone's conclusion is not reasoned argument. Fawcett has still not provided Huddleston's actual argument, and it is clear from previous posts that Fawcett does not understand hypotaxis, especially with regard to how unit complexes relate to the rank scale.

The rhetorical purpose of providing Huddleston's conclusion before providing his argument is to prime the reader to prejudge the argument through prior alignment with the conclusion.

Misunderstanding Huddleston On Halliday's Group

Fawcett (2010: 322-3):

But Huddleston goes even further, apparently dismissing the concept of the 'group' (or 'phrase') altogether. So it is yet more surprising that he states:

Clause, word and morpheme are commonplace categories in syntactic theory; it is the group, among Halliday's basic ranks, that has no significantly close analogue in non-rank grammars, and it is difficult to see that this innovation has anything to recommend it" (Huddleston 1988:155).

Here Huddleston seems to be denying the value of the concept of the group (or 'phrase'). Presumably he would replace them with various types of 'word complex', each built up of simple 'modifier-head' relationships.¹⁵ Yet he himself uses the concept of 'phrase' throughout Huddleston & Pullum (forthcoming). It is therefore hard to understand what prompted him to make the statement cited above, unless he has moved from that position to a more conventional one in the period since 1988. But if the above remarks stand, he would not only do away with the 'rank scale', but also with any units other than the clause, the word and the morpheme. This would indeed be radical.

¹⁵ This passage reads as if Huddleston is suggesting that the concept of the 'group' (or 'phrase') is an "innovation" by Halliday, whereas it is in fact a commonplace of descriptive grammars — including Huddleston's own current grammar of English. Perhaps the "innovation" is intended to be the placing the group on the 'rank scale'? In any case, the syntax in Huddleston & Pullum (forthcoming) makes full use of familiar concepts such as 'noun phrase', 'adjectival phrase' and 'prepositional phrase' (Huddleston, personal communication 2000).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Huddleston uses the logical fallacy of relevance known as argumentum ad populum: a proposition is claimed to be false solely because a majority or many people believe it to be so.

And from another angle, the absence of a component from Newton's Universal Gravitation in Einstein's General Relativity is clearly no argument against Einstein's theory.

[2] To be clear, here Huddleston uses the logical fallacy of relevance known as the argument from incredulity: 'I cannot imagine how it could be true; therefore it must be false'.

[3] This is misleading. To be clear, it is only the group that Huddleston identifies as Halliday's innovation — not the phrase.

[4] To be clear, the innovation is simply Halliday's concept of the 'group'. As demonstrated above and previously, Fawcett does not understand the distinction between group and phrase.

Huddleston's Third Problem For The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 321-2):

The third problem for the 'rank scale' that Huddleston's review brings out is the fact that the completive of a 'prepositional group/phrase' is practically always filled by one or more nominal groups. The problem is that 'phrase' and 'group' are at the same 'rank' on the 'rank scale'. As Huddleston says (1988:154), "for the prepositional phrase always to involve rankshift is contrary to the spirit of rankshift, since rankshift represents a departure from the normal or unmarked state of affairs".

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, if this were really a problem, it would also be a problem for nominal and adverbial groups since the Postmodifier of both groups is almost always realised by a rankshifted unit — "contrary to the spirit of rankshift". Clearly, whether or not rankshift "represents a departure from the normal or unmarked state of affairs" depends on the grammatical environment in which it occurs.

Seriously Misrepresenting Huddleston On Univariate Structure

Fawcett (2010: 320-1):

The above argument goes rather further in exploring the implications for the concept of the 'rank scale' of Halliday's proposals than does Huddleston's review, perhaps in part because he concentrates on different matters (relations between words and groups, and issues of left and right branching). While I shall not attempt to summarise these here, I shall cite his interesting concluding words. These deserve attention because he was, as we noted in Section 5.1 of Chapter 5, one of the small team (with Halliday, Hudson and Henrici) who worked on these problems in the 1960s. Indeed, it was Huddleston who wrote one of the key S&C papers on this topic (Huddleston 1965/81). Since he was so closely involved, we should give due weight to his statement that

historically, the layered univariate structure was introduced in the context of an attempt to solve certain problems stemming from the total accountability requirement of the rank model. [...] "The problems we have been discussing [layering in 'paratactic' and 'hypotactic' structures] are created by the [rank scale] model". (Huddleston 1988:151)

The clear implication of this revealing statement is that the purpose of introducing the concepts of 'paratactic' and 'hypotactic' relations in structure to the theory was less their inherent insightfulness than to shore up the ailing concept of the 'rank scale'. This is therefore secondary evidence for the position taken here, i.e., that the concept of the 'rank scale' is ultimately not a useful one. Moreover we now have a replacement for it, i.e., the concept of a set of units, each of which is capable of filling several elements of one or more higher units in a tree representation, supplemented for text analysis by filling probabilities.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's exploration of the implications on the rank scale proceeds from misunderstandings of unit complexes with regard to the rank scale.

[2] Again, to cite a conclusion without the argument on which it is based is a fallacious use of the argument from authority (argumentum ad verecundiam).

[3] This is very misleading indeed. Huddleston's point is that if a rank scale is assumed, then total accountability at all ranks entails layered univariate structures in the model.  Fawcett misrepresents this as meaning univariate structures were devised primarily as an attempt "to shore up the ailing concept of the rank scale".

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Fawcett has merely misrepresented Huddleston — see [3] — in a way that agrees with his desires.

[5] To be clear, Fawcett ranks his units on a scale from higher to lower, but denies that his model includes a rank scale.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Unit Complexes

 Fawcett (2010: 318):

Firstly, then, we need to note that in Halliday's current model any such "unit complex" is located above the equivalent "basic unit" on the 'rank scale'. (These terms were introduced by Huddleston himself, in his important contribution in Huddleston 1965/81:46.) In other words, Halliday's model states 

(1) that above the clause there is the 'clause complex' (the term "sentence" being permitted as an equivalent when referring to written rather than spoken text); 

(2) that between the clause and the group/phrase there is the 'group/phrase complex'; 

(3) that between the group/phrase and the word there is the 'word complex'; and 

(4) that between the word and the morpheme there is the 'morpheme complex'. 

In principle, then, the introduction of 'unit complexes' to the theory doubles the number of 'units' on the 'rank scale'. Moreover, there is no doubt that a unit complex is a type of 'unit' in Halliday's theory, because he refers to it as a 'unit' — writing, for example, that "the clause complex is the only grammatical unit that we shall recognise above the clause" (IFG p. 216).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true. A unit complex is the structural relation of units at the rank of the unit:

• a clause complex is the structural relation of units at clause rank;
• a group/phrase complex is the structural relation of units at group/phrase rank;
• a word complex is the structural relation of units at word rank; and
• a morpheme complex is the structural relation of units at morpheme rank.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, sentence is a unit on the stratum of graphology, not lexicogrammar. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 436):

… the clause complex is realised graphologically as a ‘sentence’, in the way that this has evolved, over the centuries, as a unit in the written language. The sentence is the highest unit of punctuation on the graphological rank scale and has evolved in the writing system to represent the clause complex as the most extensive domain of grammatical structure. We will use the term sentence to refer only to this highest-ranking graphological unit of punctuation.

[3] This is misleading, because it is not true. As explained above, unit complexes are located at the rank of the units in the complex.

[4] To be clear, a unit complex is a unit in the sense of unit with univariate structure.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a clause complex is not 'above' the clause in terms of the rank scale, as demonstrated, for example, by the location of the clause complexing system at clause rank; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 438):

Misrepresenting Halliday On Layers Of Structure

Fawcett (2010: 317, 317n):

Secondly, Huddleston discusses in considerable detail certain problems that result from the concept of 'layered univariate structures' within 'parataxis' and 'hypotaxis'. We first met these concepts in Section 2.6.1 of Chapter 2. Figure 2 in that section (which is taken directly from Halliday 1965/81) illustrates in a simplified form the concept that 'hypotactic' structures add new layers to the overall structure. Moreover, the top halves of the diagrams in Figures 7-2 and 7-3 on p.217 of IFG similarly suggest that each 'hypotactic' relationship adds a further layer of structure. And the 'paratactic' structures of Halliday's model, with their elements of "1 2 3", necessarily also add more layers to the overall structure.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett does not identify any of the"problems" resulting from layered univariate structures that Huddleston raises. He does, however, provide his own arguments, but as will be seen, these do not withstand close scrutiny.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, Figure 2 only displays one level of structure: α β γ. Fawcett here simply misinterprets clauses displayed on three different lines as three levels of structure.

[3] This is misleading. To be clear, Fawcett here simply misinterprets clauses displayed on different lines in the top halves of Figures 7-2 and 7-3 as multiple levels of structure. On the other hand, the layers of structure are explicitly represented — not suggested — in the bottom halves of Figures 7-2 and 7-3.

[4] This is misleading. Clearly, the paratactic structure 1 2 3 construes only one level of structure.

Huddleston's Suggestion That Halliday Should Treat Hypotactic Clauses As Embedded

Fawcett (2010: 317):

Firstly, Huddleston suggests that in He assumed that she was guilty, the clause that she was guilty functions as a Complement, just as too much is a Complement in He assumed too much. Similarly, he suggests that in He left before the vote was taken, the clause before the vote was taken functions as an Adjunct, just as before the debate does in He left before the debate. Huddleston's point is that Halliday should treat the dependent clause in such examples as functioning as an element of the matrix clause (i.e., as embedded) and not as a clause that is 'hypotactically' related to the rest of the main clause in a 'modifier-head' relationship. The relevance of this for the 'rank scale' is that, if his position is accepted, the amount of 'rank shift' in the grammar is thereby increased enormously, and the predictions made by the 'rank scale' concept are consequently weakened. We shall shortly consider more closely both Huddleston's reasons for taking the position that he does on this matter, and Matthiessen and Martin's reply. As you may have noticed, Huddleston's position is essentially the same as my own, as described in Section 11.9 of Chapter 11.

Blogger Comments:

 [1] To be clear, merely reporting Huddleston's suggestions, without the reasoning on which they are based, is not argument.

But note that the above clause that she was guilty can interpreted as a Complement in SFL Theory, if it is construed as a pre-projected fact: He assumed (the fact) that she was guilty. Importantly, the distinction between embedding and hypotaxis provides the means of distinguishing between pre-projected facts and projected ideas, whereas the approach advocated by Huddleston and Fawcett does not.

[2] This is misleading. The rank scale derives from taking a functional approach to formal constituency: the minimal bracketing of ranked constituent analysis (Halliday 1994: 20-8). Its "predictions" are not weakened by any increase in the amount of rankshift. On the contrary, the rank scale provides the principled means of accounting for rankshift in functional terms.

[3] This is misleading, because it is not possible to look more closely at reasons which have not yet been provided. That is, Fawcett falsely implies that the bare assertions he provides here, from Huddleston, are reasoned arguments.

[4] To be clear, Fawcett's Section 11.9 is titled 'How embedding and co-ordination can replace hypotaxis and parataxis'. Clarifications and critiques of the section can be viewed here:

• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic And Paratactic Projection
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic Extension And Enhancement
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic "Elaboration"
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Paratactic Expansion
• Summary Of How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotaxis And Parataxis

Misrepresenting IFG On Structure Markers

Fawcett (2010: 311, 311n):

In his reply to Matthews' paper, Halliday (1966:110-8) accepts that it is at least worth considering one idea floated by Matthews, i.e., that items such as and and or might be treated as "markers" (as he suggest punctuation might be) rather than as "constituents".¹ 

¹ In his 1988 review of IFG, Huddleston suggests (ironically, presenting the idea as a possible source of support for the 'rank scale' concept) that, Halliday may have taken up Matthews' suggestion, and that he would analyse the genitive element 's in my father's as a "structural signal rather than a constituent" (Huddleston 1988:141), and that "the same probably holds for co-ordinators such as and and or." But there is no indication in Halliday's analyses in IFG that this would be his solution to any of the four types of problem mentioned above. There he classifies both 'linkers' and 'binders' (together with 'continuatives') as types of 'adverbial', and so as 'constituents' rather than as 'structural signals' (p. 214). The problem of how best to handle these four cases in a 'rank scale' grammar therefore remains unresolved.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading. What Halliday (2002 [1966]: 125) actually wrote was:

Given an adequate representation of the underlying grammar, there is no need to insist that every element should be assigned constituent status at all; it is quite usual not to recognise intonation features as constituents, and the same considerations could apply, as Matthews points out, provided limitations were stated, to markers such as and and or. I do not know how to specify in a general formation the conditions under which accountability in constituent terms would not be required. But this problem is no more difficult for a rank grammar, which has at least the concept of total accountability to refer to as a point of departure, than for a rank-free grammar, which has not.

[2] To be clear, in Systemic Functional Grammar, these are analysed as constituents of their respective rank units that function as structure markers. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 425, 611):

The exception is prepositional phrases with of, which normally occur only as Postmodifier; the reason is that they are not typical prepositional phrases, because in most of its contexts of use of is functioning not as minor Process/Predicator but rather as a structure marker in the nominal group (cf. to as a structure marker in the verbal group). …

The logico-semantic relation is marked by a conjunction – either by a non-structural one that is used only in this way, i.e. only cohesively, such as for example, furthermore, consequently; or by a structural one whose prototypical function is to mark the continuing clause in a paratactic clause nexus. The former serve as conjunctive Adjuncts and are very commonly thematic; the latter are simply analysed as structure markers and are obligatorily thematic as structural Theme.

[3] See the preceding two posts.

[4] To be clear, 'adverbial' is the class of these words as formal constituents, whereas 'structure marker' is the function of these forms.

[5] This is misleading, because it is the opposite of what is true, as demonstrated above and in the preceding two posts.

The First Fundamental Category Of The Cardiff Grammar: Class Of Unit

Fawcett (2010: 277-8):

The first fundamental category in the present theory is the concept of class of unit. However, the criteria used for recognising examples of classes of unit (and at the development stage of the grammar for setting up new units) are significantly different from those used in "Categories" and still used in IFG, so that it is effect a different concept from Halliday's 'class of unit'. In "Categories", the class of a unit is said to be determined by its potential for operation at given elements of the unit next above on the 'rank scale' — and in IFG classes of unit still appear to be assigned on the same principle (even though this leads to various anomalies, as pointed out in Section 10.2 of Chapter 10). 

Halliday has stuck by this criterion in spite of the fact that most of his grammatically-minded colleagues of the 1960s and 1970s (Huddleston, Hudson and Sinclair) seem to have given increasing weight to internal structure and semantics, as we saw in Section 10.2.2 of Chapter 10 — so effectively rejecting Halliday's criterion. 

In the present framework, as in Fawcett (1974-6/81), the class of a unit is identified solely by its internal structure, i.e., by its potential array of elements of structure. (But see below for their close relationship with the meanings that they realise.) For English five major classes of unit are recognised here: clause, nominal group, prepositional group, quality group and quantity group, together with the genitive cluster and a number of other classes of cluster that handle the internal structure of various types of 'name'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar recognises 'class of unit', but does recognise 'unit'. That is, it recognises the Classifier, but not the Thing classified. This is like recognising breeds of dogs without recognising dogs. The motivation for this oxymoron is Fawcett's association of 'unit' with the rank scale, which Fawcett vociferously rejects, because he knows the rank scale makes his theory redundant. In truth, 'unit' only implies constituency, not the rank scale approach to constituency.

[2] To be clear, this is not misleading, because it is true.

[3] To be clear, this is misleading, because it is not true, as demonstrated in the examination of Section 10.2. The "various anomalies" were shown to be (motivated) misunderstandings on Fawcett's part.

[4] To be clear, this criterion is fundamental to a functional theory of grammar, and distinguishes it from formal (syntactic) theories. A functional theory gives priority to the view 'from above': the function (e.g. Process) that is expressed by a form (e.g. verbal group). Fawcett's approach, on the other hand, is contrary to this fundamental principle, in that it gives priority to the view 'from below': how forms are expressed structurally.

[5] To be clear, on the one hand, Huddleston, Hudson and Sinclair do not use SFL Theory, and so take a different approach to language, founded on different assumptions. On the other hand, what matters intellectually is not the rejecting of a criterion, but the validity of the reasons for rejecting a criterion. Here Fawcett has once again indulged in the logical fallacies known as the appeal to popularity, since he suggests that his view must be preferred simply because it is held by others, and the argument from authority, since he presents Huddleston, Hudson and Sinclair as authorities whose opinions matter simply on that basis.

[6] To be clear, as explained above, and previously, Fawcett's approach, the view 'from below', is contrary to a functional approach to language.

[7] See, for example, the earlier post Limiting All Classes Of Semantic Unit To Experiential Meaning.

[8] To be clear, 'clause' is a unit, not a class of unit. An adverbial clause is a class of unit; a clause is the unit of which it is a class.

Presenting Bare Assertions As Supporting Argument: Butler, Huddleston And Hudson

Fawcett (2010: 199-200):

Butler, in his useful discussion of this issue, is quite clear about what the answer should be. He points out that "if we are to account for the variety of structures available in a language, we shall have to elevate structural type to a more central position in the theory than Halliday suggests" (Butler 1985:34). And, referring to two papers by Halliday's two closest colleagues in the 1960s (Huddleston 1966/81 and Hudson 1967/81) he goes on to say that: "although neither [...] actually defines class, their discussion suggests that their criteria for classification are those of internal constituency".

It therefore seems that there is a basic difference here between, on the one hand, Halliday and those whose publications have been written with the goal of expounding and complementing IFG, and on the other hand almost all other grammarians who have worked on the analysis of English using SFL.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the claim by Fawcett's supporter, Butler, is merely a bare assertion, unsupported by any argument as to why accounting for the variety of structures requires elevating structural type to a more central position in Systemic Theory. As the name suggests, Systemic Theory is concerned with modelling language as system, not structure, and structures are specified in the system through realisation statements. Halliday (1995[1993]: 272):

In systemic theory the system takes priority; the most abstract representation at any level is in paradigmatic terms. Syntagmatic organisation is interpreted as the 'realisation' of paradigmatic features.

[2] To be clear, what the 1960s work of two non-Systemicists, Huddleston and Hudson, suggests to Butler is not argument as to why classifying units according to their internal structure has more explanatory potential than classifying them according to the function they realise. That is, this is another instance of the logical fallacy known as argumentum ab auctoritate, whereby authorities are cited instead of their arguments.

Moreover, to take the view 'from below' on this matter creates a theoretical inconsistency in a theory that gives priority to the view 'from above': system over structure, function over form.

[3] This is misleading, not least because Butler, Fawcett, Huddleston (1966) and Hudson (1967) come nowhere near constituting "almost all other grammarians who have worked on the analysis of English using SFL". Moreover, this is an attempt to deploy the logical fallacy known as argumentum ad populum.

Why Fawcett Rejects Halliday's Criteria For Classes Of Unit

Fawcett (2010: 197-8):

There is a crucial difference, therefore, between the theoretical positions taken on this matter in the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars. Moreover, there are many other systemic linguists who have differed from Halliday on this key matter, as we shall now see.

Butler (1985:33-5) provides a valuable discussion of several of the problems with Halliday's concept of 'class', referring to some of the key contributions to the literature that it has generated. He points out that "certain other systemicists" — including Huddleston (1966/81), Hudson (1967/81) and myself (Fawcett 1974-6/81) — had by then abandoned Halliday's criterion of the potential for operation in the unit above it on the 'rank scale', in favour of the criterion of "the internal structure of units".

This leads to the question of why I and others should have abandoned this central tenet of Halliday's theory. My own answer — and I cannot speak for Huddleston and Hudson — is that my experience of building models of English syntax (for use in both generating and describing text) has taught me that the model become [sic] far more insightful, when I treat the internal structural patterns of a unit as the defining ones (for the reasons given in Section 10.2.1). One must operate with either internal criteria or external criteria (the latter being operation in the unit next above on the 'rank scale'), because the two are often in conflict. I find that the descriptive facts of natural texts in English and other languages provide just too many clear examples where it distorts the facts to categorise them in terms of their operation in a higher unit, and where it is insightful to categorise them in terms of their internal syntactic-semantic structure.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. On the one hand, the "many" systemic linguists are four in number, namely:

• Fawcett himself,
• Christopher Butler, an advocate of Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar,
• Richard Hudson, who was Halliday's research assistant (1964-70) and is not a systemic linguist (his theory is 'Word Grammar'), and
• Rodney Huddleston, who was Halliday's student (1961-3) and research assistant (1964-7), and is not a systemic linguist.

On the other hand, here Fawcett combines the logical fallacy known as argumentum ad populum ('many other systemic linguists') with the logical fallacy known as argumentum ab auctoritate, whereby authorities are cited instead of their arguments.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett does not provide any reasoned arguments from Butler (1985: 33-5) as to why Hudson and Huddleston see Halliday's concept of 'class' as problematic.

[3] To be clear, this is but bare assertion ("far more insightful") unsupported by reasoned argument.

[4] This is misleading. As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's Section 10.2.1 merely outlines, in general terms, the concept of 'class of unit' in the Cardiff Grammar. It does not provide any reasons as to why classifying units on the basis of structure is "far more insightful".

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, this corresponds to taking the view 'from below' ("internal criteria") or the view 'from above' ("external criteria"). In Systemic Functional Linguistics priority is given to the view 'from above': to system over structure, to function over form. Fawcett's view is inconsistent with the principles of SFL Theory.

[6] To be clear, if the two are often in conflict, then the conflict is between taking Halliday's systemic-functional perspective and taking Fawcett's structural-formal perspective.

[7] To be clear, this is another bare assertion unsupported by reasoned argument.

[8] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In Fawcett's model, Figure 4 (p36), structure is syntactic (formal), but not semantic (meaning):

Misrepresenting Halliday On Lexicogrammatical Systems

Fawcett (2010: 53-4):

So why, we may wonder, did Halliday not carry out such a programme of semanticising his system networks? We may make a number of guesses at the possible reasons. These might have included:

1. The enthusiastic welcome already given to the existing networks by new converts to systemic linguists;
2. the lack of serious criticism of the networks by his immediate colleagues — a lack that is perhaps not surprising, given that Halliday's main collaborators at the time were Hudson and Huddleston, both of whom were more 'form-centred' than Halliday himself (as they have continued to be); 
3. Halliday's preoccupation in that period with various other aspects of the burgeoning work, both in the theory and its applications in many fields, to many of which he contributed personally; 
4. the concern that the features in the new networks would be so much further removed from their realisations at the level of form that the new realisation statements (to use Halliday's term) would be very hard to write; 
5. sheer lack of time to undertake this task, given its size and his other commitments.

Blogger Comments:

As previously explained, the system networks in question were and are grammatical networks, and that is the reason why Halliday didn't "semanticise" them.  This is another instance of the logical fallacy of proof by assertion.