Showing posts with label Mann. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mann. Show all posts

Thursday, 11 November 2021

Fawcett's Higher 'Rhetorical Structure Relations' Component

Fawcett (2010: 331-2, 332n):
However, M&M can still point out that the question remains of where, in the overall model, we should express the similarity between (1a) and (3a). My answer is that the place to handle the choice that is realised by these examples is in a higher component of the generation process than the lexicogrammar. This is the component which plans the rhetorical structure relations of the discourse, and so how best to present the relations between any two events. (For the key proposals for this component see Mann and Thompson 1987, and for a useful introductory discussion see Martin 1992.) Indeed, the choice that is realised in (1a), (2a) or (3a) must also be extended to include a realisation such as (4), so that for this reason too it is appropriate to handle it outside the lexicogrammar.¹⁸
(4) He left the room. Then they voted.

¹⁸ In fact, it is also at this stage in generation that the planner needs to consider choosing other conceptually equivalent choices realised in forms which M&M do not mention but which express the same basic temporal relationship of successivity between events, such as They voted after he left the room and After he left the room they voted.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:
(1a) He left the room before they voted.
(2a) He left the room before the vote.
(3a) He left the room, then they voted.

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the distinction between (1a) and (3a) is the distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis at the rank of clause, and it modelled in the grammar by the system of clause complexing. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 438):

[2] To be clear, Fawcett does not locate this higher component anywhere in the architecture of his model (Figures 4 and 12):

[3] To be clear, Martin (1992: 251-64) misunderstands Rhetorical Structure Theory.  See, for example, the clarifying critiques here, here, and here.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, these are all different grammatical manifestations of the enhancement category 'time: different':
  • in (1a), it is realised logically through clause complexing: hypotaxis;
  • in (2a) it is realised experientially through clause transitivity: circumstantiation;
  • in (3a), it is realised logically through clause complexing: parataxis; and
  • in (4), it is realised textually through cohesive conjunction.
[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the logico-semantic relation between the clauses in both of these hypotactic complexes is analysed as 'time: different: later', with the first complex ordered dominant^dependent (α^β), and the second ordered dependent^dominant (β^α). Note again that Fawcett frames this in terms of a model of text generation by computers, rather than a model of language spoken or written by humans.

Sunday, 22 August 2021

The Fourth Fundamental Category Of The Cardiff Grammar: Place

Fawcett (2010: 279):
A fourth category that is required in the present theory is that of place, in the sense of the numbered position (or 'slot') in a unit at which an element is positioned. Interestingly, Halliday refers in passing to 'place' in "Categories", but it is not presented as a significant category, and nor is it given any role in his later work. Yet this concept has come to play an essential role in the generative versions of SF grammar — especially in providing the conceptual framework, with 'class of unit' and 'element of structure', for explaining the phenomenon known as 'raising' (as noted in Section 11.7 of Chapter 11). The first appearance of the concept of 'place' in the sense defined here was in Fawcett (1973/81) and it was later described formally in Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993). However, the concept was also used, it appears, in Mann and Matthiessen's computer implementation of Halliday's grammar (as explained in Section 10.4.2 of Chapter 10).


Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading, because Halliday (1961) and Fawcett do not mean the same thing by 'place'. For Fawcett (p279) 'place' refers to

…the numbered position (or 'slot') in a unit at which an element is positioned.

For Halliday (2002 [1961]: 46):

A structure is thus an arrangement of elements ordered in places. Places are distinguished by order alone: a structure XXX consists of three places. Different elements, on the other hand, are distinguished by some relation other than that of order: a structure XYZ consists of three elements which are (and must be, to form a structure) place-ordered, though they can be listed (X, Y, Z) as an inventory of elements making up the particular structure.

[2] This is misleading. The only "generative versions of SF Grammar" that feature Fawcett's concept of 'place' are those of Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar.

[4] To be clear, Fawcett has produced no evidence that Mann & Matthiessen used his concept of 'place' in the Penman Project. But, in any case, the functionality of an adaptation of a theory to the limitations of computers is not an argument for its incorporation into a theory of human language.

Friday, 30 April 2021

The SFL Method Of Sequencing Elements In A Unit

Fawcett (2010: 221):
Systemic functional linguists have explored two ways of locating elements in an appropriate sequential relationship to each other in a unit. The first — which may at first sight appear to be the simplest — is to locate each element in its 'place' by relating it to some previously located element. This approach depends crucially on the existence of what we might term an 'anchor' element in each unit, i.e., the existence of a 'pivotal' element that is always present. It was this method that Halliday used in his seminal first description of a generative SF grammar (Halliday 1969/81). Surprisingly, references to this as a method of sequencing elements in a SF grammar are still found in current descriptions by Halliday (1993: 5405) and Matthiessen (1995: 23-4).
I say "surprisingly" because, when Mann and Matthiessen were working on the large-scale computer implementation of Halliday's SF grammar in the Penman Project in the late 1970s, this approach caused problems. When faced with the additional complexities of building an [sic] large, generative grammar, they found that in practice they had to turn to the second method — to which we shall come in a moment (Matthiessen, personal communication).


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the first method of sequencing elements is Halliday's theoretical approach, whereas the second is Fawcett's method for adapting SFL Theory to the limitations of computers for the purpose of text generation.

[2] This is potentially misleading. In terms of the realisation statements that specify the sequencing of elements, what is required is the insertion of the elements that are to be sequenced. The notions of 'pivotal' and 'anchor' are irrelevant, as demonstrated by realisation rules like Finite^Subject, where neither element is 'pivotal' or an 'anchor', even in Fawcett's terms, since the 'anchor' or 'pivotal' element of the clause in the Cardiff Grammar is the 'Main Verb' (p201).)

[3] To be clear, the cited instances are as follows. Halliday (1995 [1993]: 272):

(c) 'Order' an element with respect to another, or to some defined location (e.g., order finite auxiliary before subject);

Matthiessen (1995: 23-4):

Structuring statements determine the organisation within one layer of a function structure:

(1) the presence of a grammatical function (insertion; e.g., "insert Subject," symbolised +Subject), 
(2) the relative sequence of two grammatical functions (ordering; e.g., "order Subject Finite," symbolised Subject^Finite), and  
(3) the constituency relationship between two functions (expansion; e.g., "expand Mood Subject", symbolised Mood(Subject)).

[4] The word "surprisingly" here is misleading, because it is the opposite of what is true. The need to adapt a theory of human language to the limitations of computers for text generation would not be surprising to anyone engaged in such a project, unless they were unable to distinguish between theory and its context-specific application.

Tuesday, 17 December 2019

Misrepresenting The Integration Of Meanings Into A Single Syntagm As The Conflation Of Structures

Fawcett (2010: 116):
For our present purposes, however, the main point to notice is that a diagram such as that in Figure 7 embodies a very significant extension of the concept that a single element such as we in Figure 7 is the 'conflation' of three 'functions'. In such diagrams the whole clause is presented as the 'conflation' of five or more functional structures (as well as also involving 'more delicate' layers of analysis). In Sections 7.4 and 7.5, I shall challenge Halliday's concept that it is whole structures that are conflated with each other, rather than individual elements. Moreover, this central proposal of Halliday's is also challenged, as I shall show, by the actual practice in the theoretical-generative strand of work in the Sydney Grammar, i.e., in the computer implementations of Halliday's model by Mann, Matthiessen and Bateman — and even, surprisingly, by Halliday's own writings on generation.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, we is not an element of function structure.  As a clause constituent, the nominal group we realises the conflation of three clause functions: Theme, Subject and Actor.

[2] This is misleading. On the one hand, a clause involves only three types of function structure — theme, mood and transitivity — and the relation between the Mood and Residue blocks and their elements in one of composition, not delicacy; e.g. Subject and Finite are parts of the Mood element, not subtypes of it.

On the other hand, it confuses (functional) structure with (formal) syntagm. To be clear, the 'simultaneous structures' of the clause are integrated into a single syntagm — a syntagm being a string of clause constituents (different classes of group ± prepositional phrase). Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 74):
The clause, as we said, is the mainspring of grammatical energy; it is the unit where meanings of different kinds, experiential, interpersonal and textual, are integrated into a single syntagm.
[3] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Fawcett's concept as Halliday's. That is, the concept that whole structures are conflated is Fawcett's, not Halliday's, which means that Fawcett's challenge will be to his own misunderstanding of Halliday's model, rather than to Halliday's model itself.  In terms of logical fallacies, this can be seen as a variant of the Straw Man argument.

Sunday, 7 April 2019

Rewiring Fawcett's Network To Include Realisation Rules

Fawcett (2010: 67-8):
There is an alternative solution, and we shall explore it here briefly in order to demonstrate that it is not a desirable answer to the question of how best to model conditions on realisations. It is to model the conditions by the use of the conventions of a system network. Continuing with the example from Appendix B, we would need to extend the existing relatively simple network in Figure 1 in the following ways. We would need to add (1) a right-opening 'and' bracket after each of [mass], [singular] and [plural], and (2) a right-opening 'or' bracket after [near]. Then (3) a line would need to be drawn from each of the three 'and' brackets associated with [mass] and [singular] to a new left-opening 'or' bracket, with (4) a further line running from the latter to a new left opening 'and' bracket. This would also be entered by a line from the right-opening 'or' bracket by [near] (5). Then (6) a dummy feature (standing for the meaning 'near-and-singular-or-mass') would need to be inserted to the right of the left-opening 'and' bracket. This would be a case of what is termed a 'gate', i.e., a feature that is in the system network but which is not part of a system.* Next, we would need to draw a line from the right-opening 'and' bracket by [plural] to a second new left-facing 'and' bracket (7), and (8) this would also be entered by a line from the second branch of the right-opening 'or' bracket' by the feature [near]. Then (9) a second 'dummy' feature would be placed to the right of this left-opening 'and' bracket, standing for the meaning 'near-and-plural'. As a result of the addition of all this new 'wiring' it would be possible to insert two realisation rules which would not have conditions attached to them, i.e., one that stated that the feature 'near-and-singular-or-mass' would be realised by the item this, and one that said that ' near-and-plural' is realised by these.
* Clearly, this concept is an anomaly in a systemic grammar; see Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993:126) for a discussion of the concept of 'gate', which is widely used in the computer implementation of Halliday's version of SFG in the Penman Project to minimise the use of conditions on realisation rules (e.g., Mann & Matthiessen 1983/85). However, its theoretical status requires further clarification, discussion and justification before it is given the status in the theory that is accorded to the concept of a system.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here again Fawcett uses his own network, which, as previously demonstrated, violates the principles of the system network, in order to argue against the inclusion of realisation statements in genuine system networks.  However, what Fawcett actually demonstrates is that it is even possible to include realisation rules in such a network — at least, for those that specify grammatical items rather than structural realisations.

[2] To be clear, in rewiring Fawcett's network, there is no need for "a right-opening 'and' bracket" after the features [singular] or [plural], in this example, because only one wire extends from each of these features.