(Accusing Halliday Of) Confusing Axial Realisation With Instantiation

Fawcett (2010: 61-2):

Passages in Halliday's recent writings such as the following two seem to be attempts to reconcile the two senses in which he now finds himself using the term "realisation" — senses which in the new model have in fact become incompatible. Is the concept of 'realisation' interstratal or intrastratal — or is it really possible that it can be stretched far enough to be used for both, without losing its integrity? In the first of the two passages Halliday writes:

realisation" is both "the relation between the 'strata', or levels [i.e .the original sense of "realisation"] of a [...] semiotic system — and, by analogy, between the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic phases of representation within one stratum [my emphasis]. (Halliday 1993:4505) 

And in a slightly later work Halliday describes the use of the term "realisation" in the 'intrastratal' sense as an "extension" of the concept of 'realisation', saying: 

Realisation is [...] extended to refer to the intrastratal relation between a systemic feature and its structural (or other) manifestation [my emphasis]. (Halliday 1996:29) 

If Halliday had not used the words "within one stratum" and "intrastratal" in these two passages, they could have been interpreted perfectly satisfactorily as describing the relationship of realisation that holds between the two levels of instances in the model represented in Figure 4 of Chapter 3, i.e., (1) the selection expression of features and (2) the structure at the level of form. And in this case the use of the term "realisation" would not be an "analogy" or an "extension". But Halliday did use those words, and under a strict interpretation of their meaning, the relationship must, in his current framework, be surely be said to be one of 'instantiation' rather than 'realisation'. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  Halliday has only ever used the theoretical term 'realisation' in one sense; as an identifying relation between two levels of symbolic abstraction.  What varies is the dimension along which the relation obtains; e.g.

• globally between strata,
• locally within strata, between function (Process) and form (verbal group), and
• locally within strata between paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes.

[2] This is misleading on two counts.  Firstly, there is no "new" model, as previously explained.  Secondly, the 'interstratal' and 'intrastratal' senses of realisation are not incompatible.  Both involve an identity relation between two levels of symbolic abstraction.

[3] This makes it clear that Fawcett does not understand the meaning of 'realisation'; he merely takes it as a label for the relation between strata.  It thus also suggests he does not understand that strata represent levels of symbolic abstraction, as the inconsistencies in his flowchart (Figure 4) also suggest.

[4] To be clear, both of the Halliday quotes are concerned with the realisation relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes on the stratum of lexicogrammar.  As such, they do not describe the relation the two "levels of instances" in Fawcett's flowchart:

As previously demonstrated, a selection expression of features is an instance of systemic potential, whereas structure is the realisation of system, not an instance of it. That is, the flowchart confuses instantiation with (axial) realisation.

[5] To be clear, here Fawcett confuses axial realisation (the subject of the Halliday quotes) with instantiation, and does so on the basis of the confusion in his own model.

In short, Fawcett projects his own misunderstanding onto Halliday.

Confusing Axial Realisation With Stratal Realisation

Fawcett (2010: 61):

The specific problem is that, in the earlier stage of the development of the theory (when the system networks were regarded as being at a higher level than the structures that manifest them), Halliday had identified the set of operations that change the selection expression into the structures as 'realisation statements'. So are the outputs from the system networks of TRANSTIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on really at the level of form, or are they are the same level as the system networks, i.e., at a level that has been "pushed [...] fairly far [...] in the direction of the semantics" (Halliday 1994:xix)?

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  As previously explained, system networks are at a higher level of symbolic abstraction than the structures that realise them, and, contrary to Fawcett's misrepresentation, this is as true now as it was in earlier stages of Halliday's development of his theory. This is the relation between paradigmatic axis and the syntagmatic axis, and it applies to every stratum of language: semantics, lexicogrammar and phonology.  That is, different levels of symbolic abstraction (system and structure) can be construed within a given level of symbolic abstraction (stratum).  This is why the term 'realisation' applies to both axial and stratal relations.

[2] This is correct.  In SFL theory, a realisation statement specifies how a systemic feature is realised structurally.

[3] Again, Fawcett's term 'outputs' blurs the distinction between the theoretical dimensions of axis (structure as the "output" of system) and instantiation (instance as the "output" of potential).

[4] To be clear, on the one hand, 'form' is not a level in the SFL hierarchy of stratification.  On the other hand, grammatical systems and structures are at different levels (axes) of symbolic abstraction, within the same level (stratum) of language (lexicogrammar).

[5] To be clear, the level that has been "pushed fairly far in the direction of semantics" is the stratum lexicogrammar (Halliday 1994: xix).

Misunderstanding And Confusing Realisation And Instantiation

Fawcett (2010: 61):

Taking this position brings with it a serious problem. We shall address it now, because it is a problem which, like the introduction of the higher level of meaning, has the potential to make it impossible to compare the representations at the level of form of the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars. 

The problem is as follows. In his earlier descriptions of the grammar (1969/81) and (1970/76b), Halliday showed the relationship between the system networks and the output structures to be one of realisation. But in his this [sic] second approach to the representation of meaning the relationship must logically be regarded as one of instantiation. This is because system and structure are presented in the new model as being at the same level of language.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  As previously demonstrated, Halliday has only had one view on this matter, and Fawcett's misrepresentations derive from his own misunderstandings of stratification.

[2] This is true.  In Halliday's model, the relation between the paradigmatic axis and the syntagmatic axis, between system and structure, is realisation.

[3] Fawcett's use of the word 'output' is the source of his confusion, since it confuses two distinct dimensions of SFL theory:

• syntagmatic structure as the "output" of paradigmatic system (realisation),
• instance as the "output" of systemic potential (instantiation).

[4] Fawcett's argument is as follows:

Premiss (reason): because system and structure are presented as being at the same level of language

Conclusion (result): the relationship must logically be regarded as one of instantiation

To be clear, the conclusion does not follow from the premiss.  Presenting system and structure as being of the same level of language does not logically entail that the relation between them is necessarily one of instantiation (the relation between system and instance).

This also confirms — along with his flowchart (Figure 4) — that Fawcett does not understand the theoretical dimension of instantiation.

[5] To be clear, in SFL theory, system and structure are modelled as the same level of language, whether at the level of semantics, lexicogrammar or phonology.  However, they are modelled as different levels of symbolic abstraction within that level of language, such that the lower level Token, structure, realises the higher level Value, system.

This also confirms — along with his flowchart (Figure 4) — that Fawcett does not understand the theoretical relation of realisation.

Halliday's Refusal To Add To Fawcett's Flowchart

Fawcett (2010: 60-1):

However, adding to the model in Figure 4 in this way has not been Halliday's response to the situation. Instead, his later works present the view that the system networks of meaning potential and their outputs at the level of form shown in Figure 4 are all at the same level. 

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] This is misleading.  The reasons Halliday has not added to Fawcett's model in Figure 4 are, as previously argued:

• it is not Halliday's model, 
• it is not a model of language consistent with SFL theory, and
• it is not a model consistent with itself.

[2] This is misleading.  To be clear, Halliday's later works do not present "system networks of potential and their outputs at the level of form at the same level", not least because "outputs at the level of form" is not Halliday's model.  One reason for this is that Fawcett's "outputs at the level of form" confuses two distinct dimensions of SFL theory: axis (local) and instantiation (global); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32).

The relation between system and structure is the identifying relation of symbolic abstraction between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes.  For a given stratum, syntagmatic structure (Token) realises paradigmatic system (Value).

On the other hand, the relation between system and instance is the attributive relation of instantiation, such that an instance is a token (Carrier) of the type (Attribute) system.  See Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 145).

In the next post, it will be seen that Fawcett accuses Halliday of confusing realisation and instantiation.

The First Of Two Possible Effects Of Semantic Systems On Fawcett's Flowchart

Fawcett (2010: 60):

It would be reasonable, if this higher level of system networks really is necessary, simply to add the higher level to the model illustrated in Figure 4 of Chapter 3. This would require the addition of the following sub-components: (1) a new higher system network (a second 'meaning potential'), which would generate its own set of features after each traversal of the network), (2) the selection expression of the 'instances' that have been chosen, (3) a 'realisation component' that states what the effect of each choice is (i.e., 'preselection' rules, which would specify that if Feature X is chosen in the higher network, Feature Y must be chosen in the lower network), and (4) the output from the operation of that component, i.e., the list of features to be chosen in the lower network. The result of this change would be to add the components decribed [sic] here above the model shown in Figure 4 of Chapter 3. This is the first of the "two possible effects" referred to in the title of this section.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This higher level of system networks (semantic stratum) really is necessary if grammatical metaphor is to be systematically accounted for, and if knowledge is to be included in the SFL model of language.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

… grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures. Since we [unlike Fawcett] allow for a stratification of content systems into semantics and lexicogrammar, we are in a stronger position to construe knowledge in terms of meaning. That is, the semantics can become more powerful and extensive if the lexicogrammar includes systems.

[2] This is misleading.  It would not be reasonable, because, as previously demonstrated, the flowchart depicted in Fawcett's Figure 4 is inconsistent with the architecture of SFL theory.

[3] This is misleading.  Here Fawcett describes how he would change his flowchart to accommodate the SFL distinction between meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar), as if such changes are relevant to the architecture of SFL theory.  That is to say, Fawcett's presumption is that Halliday's stratified model of language has to conform to Fawcett's self-inconsistent flowchart.