On The Diagrammatic Representation Of Systemic Analyses

 Fawcett (2010: 120):

There are in fact three further practical reasons why IFG does not provide the reader with systemic analyses. The first is that if Halliday had included the systemic analyses too — and so also the system networks and realisation statements that would make that possible — the book would have had to be two to three times as long (Halliday 1994:xv). The second reason is that Halliday has never published full sets of his current system networks, and it would have been odd if their first public appearance had been in what was intended as a text book. As we saw in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4, it was only through the publication of Matthiessen (1995) that the system networks which accompany IFG were finally published. And the third reason is that it is not obvious how best to represent, in a readily interpretable diagram, the analysis of a clause in terms of its features. A simple list of all the features that have been chosen is clearly inadequate, because it may include the names of thirty or forty features, not all of which are immediately interpretable. There have in fact been very few published attempts — in any version of the theory — to develop any such method of displaying the systemic features of a text. The diagrams in Fawcett (1980: 195 and 231) are early forerunners of the method of presentation currently used in the Cardiff framework, an example of which is presented in Section 7.8. So far as I know, Fawcett (forthcoming a) will be the first work to introduce a method of analysing texts in terms of their systemic features. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, the first two editions of IFG were not intended as a textbook.  Halliday (1994: xxvi):

This book is not a textbook of English; it is an interpretation of the English code. No attempt is made to 'teach' the categories. But an attempt is made to interpret some of them, especially the difficult and important ones like Subject.

[2] To be clear, the obvious way to present a systemic — not structural — analysis of a clause is to identify the features that were selected in its instantiation.  A list of features is not inadequate because all of the features are immediately interpretable, because the meaning (valeur) of each feature is its relation to other features in the system. Halliday (1994: xxvii):

A systemic grammar is not syntagmatic but paradigmatic; hence there is no difference in describing something and relating it to everything else, because the description of any feature is its relationship to all the others.

[3] To be clear, Fawcett's method of presentation in Section 7.8 — Figure 10 (p148) — confuses systemic features (paradigmatic axis), such as 'repeated past', 'positive' and 'unassessed', with structural elements (syntagmatic axis), such as 'overt agent', 'overt affected', 'subject theme' and unmarked new':

This confusion of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes is inherent in Fawcett's model — Figure 4 (p36 ) — where selected features (paradigmatic axis) are misconstrued as the 'meaning level' counterpart of 'form level' structure (syntagmatic axis):

 

For the internal inconsistencies in Fawcett' model, see:

On 'The Main Components Of A Systemic Functional Grammar'.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Structural Representations

Fawcett (2010: 119-20):

The recognition of this situation leads us to ask a new question. This is: "Since the grammar is is systemic as well as functional, why doesn't Halliday show representations of the features in IFG?' Halliday gives a partial answer to this question when he writes in the "Foreword" to IFG that, because he wrote this book "specially for those who are studying grammar for text analysis purposes, I did not include the systemic part" (1994:x). Later he explains that "structures are less abstract; they are so to speak 'nearer the text'" (1994:xxvii). In other words, the clear implication is that Halliday decided that IFG should present the structural representations of texts rather than the systemic representations, on the grounds that the structural representations are likely to be easier for the reader to understand. Notice, however, that here Halliday is describing a strategy for overcoming the difficulties of communicating the theory's concepts for a particular class of readers, not making a statement about the status in the theory of the structural representations shown in IFG.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the presentation of structural representations in Halliday (1994) was not motivated by any supposed deficiency in the intellectual ability on the part of those who analyse texts ("easier for a particular class of readers to understand").  As Halliday (1994: x, xxvii) points out, structures are more directly related to the analysis of text:

The reason the present work is not called an introduction to systemic grammar is that that is not what it is. Since it was being written specifically for those who are studying grammar for purposes of text analysis, I did not include the systemic part: that is, the system networks and realisation statements, which constitute the main theoretical component (and would be central if the book was an introduction to systemic grammar). What is presented here is the functional part: that is, the interpretation of the grammatical patterns in terms of configurations of functions. These are more directly related to the analysis of text. …

The reason for using structural rather than systemic representations for discourse analysis is that structures are less abstract; they are so to speak 'nearer' the text. The most direct move in the analysis of a text is to give it a structural representation, and this is what is done here. All the structural analyses could be interpreted in terms of the features selected.

[2] To be clear, here Fawcett misleads through selective omission. On the second of the two cited pages, Halliday does indeed make "a statement about the status in the theory of the structural representations shown in IFG — one that is inconsistent with the Fawcett model (Figure 4) that gives equal weight to system ("meaning potential") and structure ("instances of form"). Halliday (1994: xxvii):

This is not an account of systemic theory, nor does it present the system networks for English grammar (there is a brief foray into network representations at the end of Chapter 10). It presents the structures which are the 'output' of the networks — which collectively realise the sets of features that can be chosen. But it is not a 'structural' grammar (still less a 'structuralist' grammar in the American sense). Such grammars are syntagmatic, having structure as their main organising concept, and bringing in special devices to relate one structure to another. A systemic grammar is not syntagmatic but paradigmatic; hence there is no difference in describing something and relating it to everything else, because the description of any feature is its relationship to all the others. Obviously we have to describe one part of the grammar at a time; but it is important to think of every section as being part of the network as a whole.

Misrepresenting Halliday On "Representations At The Levels Of Meaning And Form"

Fawcett (2010: 119):

It therefore seems that Halliday's answer to Question la above is, in principle, that there should be representations at the levels of both meaning and form. Moreover, this principle should clearly be applied to the analysis of texts as well as to the generation of texts. Indeed, the concept of 'priority to the system' is precisely what is implied by the fact that the name of the theory is "systemic functional grammar" — and not "structural functional grammar". So what, one might reasonably ask, does Halliday consider that the systemic representation of a clause would be like? The answer is that we do not know. 

Perhaps the most surprising fact of all about Systemic Functional Grammar as a theory of language is that that there is no generally agreed way of showing, in the representation of the analysis of a text, the features in the system network that have been chosen in generating it. What makes this fact even stranger is that all of the SF linguists who engage in the 'theoretical-generative' task of building such grammars recognise that it is not merely desirable to have a representation of the features; it is necessary. This is because the 'selection expression' is an integral part of the operation of the grammar, as we saw in Chapter 3 and as is demonstrated in Appendix A.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder of Fawcett's Question 1a (p117):

1a. Is it desirable — or indeed necessary — to have representations of a text at the levels of both form and meaning? 

[1] To be clear, the levels of meaning and form feature only in Fawcett's model; Halliday's model postulates the strata of semantics, lexicogrammar and phonology. So any suggestion of Halliday endorsing Fawcett's model of meaning and form is misleading.

[2] To be clear, one way to provide a systemic representation of a clause is to identify the systemic features that specify its structural realisation.  Halliday and Matthiessen (2004) provide examples for analyses of:

• theme (pp101-3), 
• mood (pp158-9), and
• transitivity (pp304-5).

[3] To be clear, 'selection expression' is "an integral part of the operation of the grammar" in Fawcett's model (p36):

However, as can be seen above, in Fawcett's flowchart, a selection expression is misunderstood as an instance of a system and restricted to only one level: meaning.  In SFL Theory, a selection expression is constituted by all the features that identify a given unit, of a given stratum, whether as potential or instance. This is most clearly demonstrated by the phonological selection expression [voiced, bilabial, stop] which identifies the phoneme /b/ as both potential and instance.

Misrepresenting The Cardiff Flowchart As Consistent With The Architecture Of SFL

Fawcett (2010: 118-9):

However, Halliday's words in "Systemic theory" go even further, clearly implying that it is not only possible to provide this second level of representation, but that it is also desirable. He states that 

in systemic theory the system takes priority [my emphasis]; the most abstract representation [...] is in paradigmatic terms. [...] Syntagmatic organisation is interpreted as the 'realisation' of paradigmatic features, the 'meaning potential'. (Halliday 1993:4505) 

And a few paragraphs later he foregrounds the importance of the representation of the systemic 'meaning potential' more strongly still, writing that 

the selection expression constitutes the grammar's description of the item [e.g., a clause]. (Halliday 1993:4505) 

This is heady stuff. However, the ambitious view of the essential nature of a semiotic system expressed in the above quotations is shared by all of those who work in the framework of the Cardiff Grammar, and by many other systemic functional linguists. There are two important consequences that follow directly from accepting this position for our present concerns. Firstly, Halliday's words suggest that the diagram of language shown in Figure 4 in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 can indeed stand as a summary of the framework that is common to both the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars. Secondly, they show that Halliday believes that, if we are to make a full analysis of a clause, we must give equality — and indeed "priority" — to the features that have been selected in generating it — i.e., to the features that specify its 'meaning potential'. All this is, we should note, is what should happen "in principle"; we shall come shortly to what is currently done in practice. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the notion that the system takes priority is not a "view of the essential nature of a semiotic system".  It is a statement of an underlying principle on which Systemic Functional Linguistics is theorised.

[2] This is very misleading.  On the one hand, it is simply a non-sequitur, since giving priority to the system does not logically entail that Figure 4 "can indeed stand as a summary of the framework that is common to both the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars".  On the other hand, Figure 4 cannot "stand as a summary of the framework that is common to both the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars" because it is inconsistent with the architecture of SFL Theory and invalidated by its own internal inconsistencies, as previously explained (e.g. here).  Reminder:

[3] As previously explained, Fawcett misunderstands Halliday's 'meaning potential' (language as system) to be networks at the level of semantics.

Confusing Systemic Features With Structural Elements

Fawcett (2010: 118):

Let us begin with Halliday's own description of the status of the analyses offered in IFG. He writes: 

This book [...] presents the structures which are the 'output' of the networks — which collectively realise the sets of features that can be chosen. (Halliday 1994:xxvii) 

So far so good; this is indeed what the analyses of texts in IFG does, in Halliday's terms. But a few lines below that he adds that 

all the structural analyses [given in IFG] could be reinterpreted in terms of the features selected [my emphasis]. (Halliday 1994:xxvii) 

The significant thing about these passages is that they show that Halliday recognises that there are, in principle, two types of representation for each clause. The first type corresponds to those in IFG, and these are presented to us as instances at the level of form. However, since these "realise the sets of features than can be chosen" (in the 'meaning potential'), it is clear that there is also, in principle, a second type of representation — one that is expressed in terms of the systemic features from which the structure is generated. It is a pity that Halliday does not give an example of what he thinks such representations might be like, but I shall give an example of one possible way of such showing such representations in Section 7.8.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the two types of representation of a clause differ in terms of axis: paradigmatic system vs syntagmatic structure.   That is, one type represents the clause as features of systems, whereas the other represents the clause as structures.

[2] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Fawcett's model ("instances at the level of form") as Halliday's model.  Halliday (1994) presents structures at the stratum of lexicogrammar.

[3] As previously noted, Fawcett misunderstands Halliday's 'meaning potential' — language as system — as just the semantic system, or, in terms of his own model (Figure 4): potential at the level of meaning.  In Halliday's model, SFL Theory, the systems that specify grammatical structures are grammatical systems.

[4] Examples of what "such representations might be like" were given in Halliday & Matthiessen (2004) for clause rank textual feature selections (pp101-3), interpersonal feature selections (p169) and experiential feature selections (pp304-5).

[5] To be clear, the example representation that Fawcett provides in Section 7.8, Figure 10, presents his clause features as if they were (features of) structural elements of the clause. Fawcett (2010: 148):

Fawcett's Three Sub-Questions On The Status Of Representations In Halliday (1994)

Fawcett (2010: 117):

Now that we have examined the nature of representations such as that in Figure 7, we are ready to consider their theoretical status. We shall do this by breaking down the first question that we asked in Section 7.1 into three sub-questions: 

1a. Is it desirable — or indeed necessary — to have representations of a text at the levels of both form and meaning? 

1b. In a model with representations at the level of both form and meaning, is it desirable — or indeed necessary — to show explicitly the multifunctional nature of language at both levels? 

1c. In the representation at the level of form, is the conflation that occurs between the realisations of the various strands of meaning a conflation of whole structures or a conflation of individual elements? 

In answering these questions, we shall make two discoveries about the status of the representations of texts in IFG which are likely to surprise most readers. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] Reminder: Fawcett (2010: 117):

Let me begin by expressing our first question in relatively general terms (though we shall later divide it into three sub-questions): 

1. What is the status in systemic functional theory of the representations of the functional structure of text-sentences given throughout both IFG and the various associated texts?

[2] This is misleading, because it misrepresents levels of Fawcett's model, form and meaning, as levels in Halliday's SFL Theory, on which IFG (Halliday 1994) is based.  The linguistic levels (strata) in SFL Theory are semantics, lexicogrammar and phonology/graphology. Grammatical form is modelled as a rank scale of units, each of which provides the entry condition to systems of functional features.

[3] This is misleading.  What Fawcett terms the "conflation of whole structures" is the integration of the three metafunctional structures of the clause in a syntagm of clause constituents, such as nominal group ^ verbal group ^ prepositional phrase.

[4] In examining Fawcett's answers to these questions, we shall discover that Fawcett misleads by misrepresenting Halliday's theory, which is unlikely to surprise readers of this blog.

Misrepresenting The Integration Of Meanings Into A Single Syntagm As The Conflation Of Structures

Fawcett (2010: 116):

For our present purposes, however, the main point to notice is that a diagram such as that in Figure 7 embodies a very significant extension of the concept that a single element such as we in Figure 7 is the 'conflation' of three 'functions'. In such diagrams the whole clause is presented as the 'conflation' of five or more functional structures (as well as also involving 'more delicate' layers of analysis). In Sections 7.4 and 7.5, I shall challenge Halliday's concept that it is whole structures that are conflated with each other, rather than individual elements. Moreover, this central proposal of Halliday's is also challenged, as I shall show, by the actual practice in the theoretical-generative strand of work in the Sydney Grammar, i.e., in the computer implementations of Halliday's model by Mann, Matthiessen and Bateman — and even, surprisingly, by Halliday's own writings on generation.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, we is not an element of function structure.  As a clause constituent, the nominal group we realises the conflation of three clause functions: Theme, Subject and Actor.

[2] This is misleading. On the one hand, a clause involves only three types of function structure — theme, mood and transitivity — and the relation between the Mood and Residue blocks and their elements in one of composition, not delicacy; e.g. Subject and Finite are parts of the Mood element, not subtypes of it.

On the other hand, it confuses (functional) structure with (formal) syntagm. To be clear, the 'simultaneous structures' of the clause are integrated into a single syntagm — a syntagm being a string of clause constituents (different classes of group ± prepositional phrase). Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 74):

The clause, as we said, is the mainspring of grammatical energy; it is the unit where meanings of different kinds, experiential, interpersonal and textual, are integrated into a single syntagm.

[3] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Fawcett's concept as Halliday's. That is, the concept that whole structures are conflated is Fawcett's, not Halliday's, which means that Fawcett's challenge will be to his own misunderstanding of Halliday's model, rather than to Halliday's model itself.  In terms of logical fallacies, this can be seen as a variant of the Straw Man argument.

Deploying Two Logical Fallacies In Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Thematic Structure

Fawcett (2010: 116): 

The two examples on pages 375-6 of IFG provide a final example of how complex Halliday's representations can become: each has ten lines of analysis. The reason is that Halliday shows three lines of analysis within the THEME line, on the grounds that there are three degrees of structural delicacy in them. However, it should be said that Halliday's analysis of 'multiple theme' in this way is one with which many other systemic functional grammarians disagree — as also do other grammarians (e.g., Huddleston 1988).

Blogger Comments:

[1] On the one hand, this is misleading, because the lines of analysis are not restricted to clause rank analysis. On the other hand, it deploys the red herring logical fallacy, since the number of represented analyses is irrelevant to the value of the analyses themselves.

[2] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Halliday's analysis. The theme analyses represent one line of meaning realised in clause structure, textual meaning, and present the Theme element as consisting of textual, interpersonal and topical (experiential) elements.

Halliday (1994: 375):

Halliday (1994: 376):

[3] This is misleading. The mere fact that people disagree with an analysis does not, in itself, constitute an argument against the analysis.  This constitutes a version of the logical fallacy known as argumentum ad populum.  Huddleston's arguments will be examined for validity when Fawcett presents them later in his publication.

The Reason Why Fawcett Has Been Repeatedly Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Clause Structure

Fawcett (2010: 115-6, 116n):

It may come as a surprise to some readers that an IFG-style analysis in fact requires seven separate lines of representation (six of these being structural). This is because the writings of the Sydney grammarians regularly present the view that there are either three or at most four strands of meaning, each corresponding to one of the metafunctions. In Chapter 2 of IFG, for example, Halliday introduces the concept that a clause has multiple structures under the beguilingly simple section heading of 'Three lines of meaning in the clause" (p. 33). Yet, the fact is — as I have just demonstrated — that a analysis of a sentence in IFG terms regularly requires seven lines of analysis (and sometimes even more, as we shall see shortly).  

In IFG, therefore, the task of analysing a text — and so the model of language that underlies it — is rather more complex than we are at first led to expect. Indeed, in the analyses of 'The 'silver' text" on pages 368-85 of IFG there are often eight or more lines of analysis, because Halliday adds an extra line for the analysis of the 'unpacked' interpretation of examples that contain cases of what he terms "grammatical metaphor".…⁶

⁶ I should point out that the seven or eight lines of structure found in an IFG-style analysis do not correspond to the eight major types of meaning that I consider to be present (if only by their non-realisation) in a typical clause. See Section 7.8 for a brief introduction to the eight strands of meaning that are recognised in the Cardiff Grammar.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  As previously demonstrated, in arguing about clause structure, Fawcett switches between clause, 'text-sentence' and text in order to deceive the reader.  In erroneously arriving at seven lines of representation for the clause, Fawcett counts interpersonal structure twice, includes both information and logical structure, despite the fact they are not clause structures, and includes cohesion despite the fact that it is not a structure of any grammatical unit.

[2] This is correct.  There are three lines of meaning realised in clause structure: textual, interpersonal and experiential.

[3] This is misleading.  A statement about the number of lines of meaning realised in the structure of one one rank unit, the clause, is not a statement about the complexity of carrying out a complete text analysis using all the dimensions of the theory.

[4] This is correct.  In the analysis of the 'silver' text, Halliday demonstrates how to deploy the theoretical resources outlined in the body of the book, including the three metafunctional structures of the clause, logical relations between clauses in complexes, information unit structure, and the unpacking of grammatical metaphor.

[5] To be clear, it is Fawcett's model of the clause — not Halliday's — that proposes eight lines of meaning.  This suggests that Fawcett's motivation for misrepresenting Halliday's model is to disguise the fact that his own model is less elegant.

Fawcett's Claim That Halliday's Analysis Of A Clause Typically Involves At Least Seven Lines Of Analysis

Fawcett (2010: 115):

We come finally to the seventh line of analysis shown in the standard analyses of texts in IFG . This shows textual 'cohesion', but as Halliday does not propose it as a type of structure we shall pay no further attention to it here. 

Halliday's analysis of a clause therefore typically involves at least seven lines of analysis. It is as if the variation in the structures of the various lines of analysis is seen as a phenomenon of language that is to be celebrated. But we must ask: "Is it a linguistic phenomenon rather than a metaphenomenon, i.e., a product of Halliday's version of the theory?". I shall argue in Section 7.4 (1) that it is indeed a metaphenomenon; (2) that this approach to representing the multi-functional nature of language brings with it enormous problems; and (3) that there is a preferable approach that achieves the same goals. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This raises the question as to how, or if, the Cardiff Grammar integrates cohesion into its model.

[2] This is misleading.  Here Fawcett has switched back from his own terminology, 'text-sentence', on which his argument has been constructed, to the SFL notion of 'clause' and repeated his false claim that a clause "typically involves at least seven lines of analysis", instead of three.

To recap, in these seven lines of analysis, Fawcett includes:

• information structure, which is not a system of the clause, but of the informations unit,
• logical structure, which is not a system of the clause, but of the clause complex,
• cohesion, which is not a system of the clause, or any other grammatical unit,

and misrepresents the interpersonal structure of the clause as two lines of analysis, instead of one.

[3]  The fatuousness of this remark can be made self-evident by transposing its type to physics:

it is as if the number of different subatomic particles is a physical phenomenon that is to be celebrated.

[4] To be clear, any proposed linguistic structure can be nothing other than a construal ("product") of one theory of language or another.  Such construals are assessed in terms of their validity.

[5] It will be seen in the examination of Section 7.4 that the enormous problems that Fawcett identifies only arise, once again, from his own misunderstandings of Halliday's theory.

[6] To be clear, the approach that Fawcett finds preferable is his own, and whether or not it achieves the same goals will be examined when his approach is finally revealed.

On Predicator, Complement and Adjunct As Labels For Otherwise Empty "Boxes"

Fawcett (2010: 115):

It is interesting to note that the inclusion of the clause elements "Predicator", "Complement" and "Adjunct" as 'secondary' elements in the "Residue" is the last remaining trace in the descriptive framework found in IFG of a set of concepts that were central in the Scale and Category description of English. Indeed they, together with "Subject" were the primary elements of clause structure in "Categories". Interestingly, these elements are not referred to in the explication of "The 'silver' text" (IFG pp. 368-85). So what is their role?

In IFG, their role seems to be little more than a way of labelling another row of boxes that would otherwise remain empty, like the "Residue" (of which they are said to be the corresponding more delicate analysis) and the Rheme. But in Halliday (1970/76b) and (1977/78) they played a far more important role, as we saw in Section 4.9 of Chapter 4. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Predicator, Complement and Adjunct feature in the Mood structures in the analysis of the 'silver' text, and a Predicator is explicitly mentioned in the discussion of clause 7 (p377).  However, the discussion of the text generally takes a systemic perspective — e.g. MOOD selection — rather than a structural one.

[2] On the one hand, this misunderstands the notion of structure in SFL Theory. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451):

A multivariate structure is a configuration of different functional relationships … . Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

That is, the textual structure of the clause is the relation between Theme and Rheme; the interpersonal structure of the clause is the relation between Mood (elements) and Residue (elements).

On the other hand, the "labelling of boxes" is the assignment of clearly defined theoretical functional categories to the data. For example, the label 'Predicator', inter alia, identifies the element that specifies the Process that is predicated of the Subject (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 152-5). The  label 'Complement' specifies any element that was passed over for the choice of Subject (ibid.), and the label 'Adjunct' specifies any element that could not have been selected as Subject (ibid.). (Note that neither conjunctive nor modal Adjuncts are part of the Residue.)

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  See the earlier post: Seriously Misrepresenting Halliday's Early Theorising.

On Complement And Adjunct As Experiential Elements In The Cardiff Grammar

Fawcett (2010: 115n):

5. In contrast, the concepts of 'Complement' and "Adjunct' — but not 'Predicator' — have a central role in the Cardiff Grammar. Here, a Complement is an 'experiential' element of the clause that is 'predicted' by the Process (i.e., a Participant Role), while an Adjunct is one that is not (i.e., a Circumstantial Role) — or an element expressing a different type of meaning. 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the notion of 'Complement' and 'Adjunct' as experiential meanings is inconsistent with the notion of experiential meaning, since neither is a construal of experience as meaning.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 511):

Ideationally, the grammar is a theory of human experience; it is our interpretation of all that goes on around us, and also inside ourselves. There are two parts to this: one the representation of the processes themselves, which we refer to as the "experiential"; the other the representation of the relations between one process and another, and it is this that we refer to as the "logical". The two together constitute the "ideational" metafunction, whereby language construes our experiential world.

Moreover, as such, neither is structurally related to a Process. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451):

A multivariate structure is a configuration of different functional relationships … . Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

On The Unjustified Inclusion Of Predicator, Complement And Adjunct In Mood Structure

Fawcett (2010: 114-5, 115n):

Halliday's reasons for including this line of analysis as part of the interpersonal component are dependent on the fact that the Subject and Finite are involved in the expression of MOOD meanings. While I agree that these two elements contribute to the clause's interpersonal meaning (Fawcett 1999), I see no reason to include the other elements here. Halliday's stated reason for including Complements and Adjuncts in this line of analysis is that a Complement is an element that (typically) can become a Subject (though not in examples such as clever in Ivy is clever, as Halliday admits) and that an Adjunct is one that cannot. While this is largely true it does not seem a sufficient justification for including them in the analysis of every clause, and nor does it explain why the 'Predicator' is included there. In fact, this line of analysis does not explain anything about the particular text that is currently being analysed, since these elements patently do not carry the meaning associated with the Subject in the clause currently being analysed. (The Complement might, if the concept of the syntactic transformation were to be introduced to the theory, but Halliday would clearly not wish to do that.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the interpersonal structure of the clause, the clause as exchange, realises a proposition or a proposal.  In the case of propositions, the choice of indicative MOOD is realised by the presence of the Mood element, Subject and Finite, which realises the nub of the proposition, with the Residue elements — Predicator, Complement, circumstantial Adjunct — realising the remainder of the proposition.

[2] To be clear, these are not the reasons for including Complements and Adjuncts as elements of the interpersonal structure of the clause, but criteria for differentiating the two.

[3] To be clear, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by reasoned argument.

[4] To be clear, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 151-2) identify four functions of the Predicator, including:

It specifies the process (action, event, mental process, relation) that is predicated of the Subject.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Types Of Clause Structure

Fawcett (2010: 114):

However, there are in fact at least three other lines of representation in the analysis of a typical text-sentence in Halliday (1994:368-5), in addition to the four shown in Figure 7. The fifth is the analysis of the logico-semantic relationships between clauses that Halliday introduces to represent 'paratactic' or 'hypotactic' relations, as in I'll come when I'm ready (see Section 2.6.1 of Chapter 2.)

The sixth line of representation arises from the fact that Halliday always shows two lines of structure for the 'interpersonal' strand of meaning. At the primary degree of delicacy the structure is 'Mood + Residue'. Here I am using the term "primary" that was introduced to the theory for this purpose in Halliday 1961/76), in order to make explicit the nature of the relationship between the two lines. Then at the secondary degree of delicacy the structure within the 'Mood' element is divided into 'Subject + Finite'. This is not a matter of constituency relations, Halliday emphasises, but of a more delicate analysis at the same layer of structure, as we saw in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Halliday' model.  Fawcett's Figure 7 depicts a clause analysis; the notion of a 'text-sentence' is exclusive to Fawcett's model, and so does not feature in Halliday (1994).  As previously demonstrated, on Halliday's model, there are three lines of structure in the clause: textual, interpersonal and experiential.  Fawcett's Figure 4 shows four lines of structure because he misrepresents the structure of an information unit as a structure of the clause.

The "at least three other lines of representation" that Fawcett refers to here are:

• logical structure, which does not apply to clause structure (hence Fawcett's strategic use of "text-sentence" instead of clause);
• interpersonal structure misrepresented as two lines of structure instead of one (see below); and
• cohesive relations, which do not apply to clause structure (hence Fawcett's strategic use of "lines of representation" instead of lines of structure).

[2] This is misleading, because here Fawcett uses Halliday's first theory, Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961) — which featured neither system nor metafunction — to misrepresent Halliday's final theory, Systemic Functional Grammar.

In SFL Theory, delicacy refers to the elaboration of systems, from the most general features to the most particular.  It does not refer to structural relations.

The relation of the Mood element to the Subject and Finite elements, on the other hand, is one one of composition — a subtype of extension, not elaboration. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 143):

The presence of the Mood element, consisting of Subject plus Finite, realises the feature ‘indicative’.

Importantly, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the sense in which this functional relation is "not a matter of constituency relations" is that it is not a matter of formal (rank) constituency; that is, it is not a matter of clauses consisting of groups consisting of words consisting of morpheme.

To be clear, in SFL Theory, the mood structure of the clause realises one type of meaning: that of the interpersonal metafunction.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Its Representation Of Clause Structure

Fawcett (2010: 113-4):

Halliday's introductory writings often imply that each line of structure corresponds to one of his three (or four) 'metafunctions', i.e., broad types of  'meaning'. There are four such metafunctions when he splits the 'ideational' metafunction into the 'experiential' and the 'logical', e.g., as described in Halliday (1977/78:128), but in his introductory writings he frequently omits the 'logical' and only illustrates three (as in Figure 7). The interesting point here, then, is that the four 'strands of meaning' shown in Figure 7 — and in all equivalent representations in IFG — do not correspond to Halliday's four 'metafunctions'. Thus the THEME and INFORMATION lines of analysis both belong in his 'textual' metafunction; the MOOD analysis (which itself contains two lines) is the 'interpersonal' metafunction; and the TRANSITIVITY is 'experiential'. The fourth 'metafunction' (i.e., the 'logical') is omitted in Figure 7, because Halliday only introduces it when there is a 'logico-semantic relationship' between two or more clauses.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  Halliday explicitly states — over and over, across many publications — that each line of structure corresponds to the meanings of a separate metafunction.  For example, Halliday (1994: 35):

[2] To be clear, the logical metafunction is concerned with relations between units in complexes all along the rank scale, whether clauses in clause complexes, groups or phrases in group or phrase complexes, words in word complexes, or morphemes in morpheme complexes.

[3] This is misleading. To be clear, Fawcett's Figure 7 illustrates only three metafunctional strands of meaning: textual, interpersonal and experiential, and misrepresents information as a structure of the clause (instead of the information unit). Reminder:

[4] This is misleading. To be clear, there are no representations in IFG that are equivalent to Fawcett's Figure 7; that is, there are no representations showing all three lines of clause structure in one diagram, though there are several that show both MOOD and TRANSITIVITY. The nearest equivalents appear in Appendix 1, an analysis of the 'Silver' text, but these are not confined to clause structure, and additionally demonstrate both cohesion and information analyses, neither of which constitutes clause structure, as well as the analysis of grammatical metaphor.  For example, Halliday (1994: 371):

Clearly, Fawcett confuses this series of composite 'text analysis' diagrams in IFG with diagrams merely illustrating clause structure.

[5] This is misleading.  Mood structure represents only one line of meaning, interpersonal meaning, but the structure itself involves functional constituency.  For example, the Mood block of finite clauses consists of the Subject and Finite elements (± modal Adjuncts), and the Residue can consist of the elements Predicator, Complement(s) and circumstantial Adjunct(s).

Misrepresenting The Conflation Of Functional Elements

Fawcett (2010: 113):

Let us now examine Figure 7 more closely. It show four clearly separated lines of box diagrams (one containing two lines of structure within it), such that each of the four major lines corresponds to one of four major types of 'meaning'. The two basic assumptions upon which such a diagram rests are (1) that there should be a separate structural representation for each major strand of meaning (including two completely distinct structures within 'textual' meaning), and (2) any one 'element' of the clause is likely to consist of the 'conflation' of two or more 'functions' from two or more different lines of meaning. For example, the description in Halliday (1994:30f.) of the duke in the duke gave my aunt this teapot states that, in his approach, the three 'functions' of 'Subject', 'Actor' and 'Theme' are typically — but not necessarily — mapped onto one another to form a single 'element' of the clause (just as the same three 'functions' are in Figure 7).

Blogger Comments:

[1] Reminder:

A functional analysis (with syntagm) that is consistent with SFL Theory is presented below for contrast:

we	would	visit	Mrs Skinner	every Sunday
Theme	Rheme
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement	Adjunct
Mood		Residue
Actor	Process		Scope	Extent
nominal group	verbal group		nominal group	prepositional phrase

[2] This is misleading. The clause has only one textual structure (Theme^Rheme).  Information is not a system of the clause, but of the information unit — whether or not the information unit happens to be coterminous with the clause.

[3] To be clear, the "element" that is the conflation of different functions is a formal constituent of the clause, represented as a unit of the syntagm.  For example, it is the initial nominal group onto which the three functional elements of Theme, Subject and Actor are mapped.