Continuing To Attack A Straw Man

Fawcett (2010: 63):

There is a small further problem in adopting the position represented in Figure 5. This is that it is not clear what we should call this supposed 'level' of language. Halliday calls it the "lexicogrammar" and this makes it, in effect, an alternative term to "form".

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

Here again, as before, Fawcett misrepresents his reorganisation (Figure 5) of his model (Figure 4) as Halliday's model, and fallaciously attacks the straw man he has created.

Arguing On The Basis Of Misunderstandings Of Realisation And Instantiation

Fawcett (2010: 63):

Interestingly, the symbol for the meaning of 'is realised by' in informal realisation rules in a SF grammar is a small arrow pointing diagonally from the top left corner of an imaginary rectangle to the bottom right corner. And one could draw just such an arrow with a felt tip pen right across the diagram in Figure 4, so symbolising that the relationship between the meaning potential and the realised instance is the same, both in individual cases and in the case of the model as a whole. Yet this relationship is in fact, as we can see, one that involves not just realisation but both instantiation (twice) and realisation. 

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] As Fawcett's term 'realised instance' discloses, his flowchart confuses the relations of realisation (between system and structure) and instantiation (between potential and instance), as previously demonstrated on this blog.  In SFL terms, the relation between Fawcett's top-left module (paradigmatic system) and his bottom-right module (syntagmatic structure) is realisation.  A structure is not an instance of a system, by definition.

[2] To be clear, this is only true in terms of Fawcett's flowchart.  As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's flowchart is not consistent with the architecture of SFL theory, and not consistent with itself, in terms of realisation or instantiation.  See, for example, the first critique of Figure 4 here.

Deploying Two Logical Fallacies In Misrepresenting Halliday On Realisation

Fawcett (2010: 63):

The reason why the reinterpretations by Halliday of what "realisation" means cited above are so problematical is that it is not logically possible to hold at the same time the two views that

(1) there are two levels of instances (as Figure 4 suggests that there are), and
(2) the two levels of instances are at the same level of language (as Figure 5 suggests). 

It would only be possible to hold both views if one were to claim at the same time that the selection expression of features chosen from the 'meaning potential' and the structure that so clearly manifests it at a lower level are at the same level. Yet the system networks are patently more 'semantic' than the structures that are generated from them. Indeed, when Halliday first introduced the concept of 'realisation', it was in precisely the sense of the relationship between two levels, i.e., between (1) the system networks at the level of meaning potential and — after first generating a selection expression and then applying the realisation statements — (2) the output structures, which are necessarily at the level of form.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, Halliday is consistent on the meaning of realisation; what varies is the dimension along which the realisation relation obtains: strata vs axes. The "reinterpretations" are Fawcett's misunderstandings that arise from his viewing the architecture of SFL theory through his own flowchart (Figure 4).

[2] Here Fawcett continues his use of the Straw Man logical fallacy (identified in the previous post).  As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's flowchart (Figure 4) does not represent the architecture of SFL theory, and his revised flowchart (Figure 5) does not represent Halliday's view.  Fawcett is attempting to refute a position not held by Halliday.

[3] Here Fawcett argues by using the logical fallacy of circular reasoning known as begging the question (petitio principii).  In saying 'the structure that so clearly manifests it at a lower level', Fawcett is assuming the truth of the claim he is trying to prove by argument.

[4] This bare assertion (presented as reasoned argument) clearly demonstrates that Fawcett does not understand the theoretical meaning of 'realisation'.  It is not a matter of systems being more semantic than structures; it is a matter of systems being more symbolically abstract than structures.

[5] This is misleading.  Here Fawcett misrepresents Halliday by inserting two components of his own flowchart (Figure 4), which is temporally ordered, into the realisation relation between system and structure, which is not temporally ordered.  Realisation is an intensive identifying relation, not a circumstantial identifying relation.

[6] This is another bare assertion (presented as reasoned argument) and another use of the circular reasoning logical fallacy known as begging the question (petitio principii), since it assumes the point Fawcett is trying to prove, namely that structures are at the level of form.

To be clear, SFL theorises grammatical form as a rank scale of constituency: clause, group/phrase, word and morpheme.  However, being a functional theory, the structures at each of these ranks are functions, not forms.  For example, the clause structure Token^Process^Value is a structure of functions, not a structure of forms.  Each of these functions is realised by a form of the rank below, and the structures of these forms, such as Classifier^Thing, are likewise functions, not forms.

Attacking A Straw Man

Fawcett (2010: 62-3):

The implications of the position that "the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic phases of representation" [i.e., the system network and the output structure] are "within one stratum" are illustrated in Figure 5.

 

Figure 5 is essentially a re-arrangement of the two components and two outputs in Figure 4 so that they all appear to function within one level of language. Topologically, the two are equivalent, but this does not mean that they are "mere notational variants" of each other. The disadvantage of Figure 5 is that it loses the important insights captured in Figure 4, which shows the places in the model of the central concepts of realisation (relating the levels of form and meaning) and instantiation (relating the potential and the instances).

If the components and outputs shown in Figure 5 really did constitute a single level of language, it would be a level of a very unusual sort. This is because it still contains the same two levels of 'meaning' and 'form' that Halliday's writings in the early 1970s proposed (as we saw in Section 4.3), and which suggest the model of language shown in Figure 4 in Chapter 3.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, the "implications" of lexicogrammatical systems and structures both being on the same stratum, lexicogrammar, are for Fawcett's flowchart (Figure 4) only, and not for SFL theory, which already incorporates this in its architecture.

Moreover, in falsely presenting Figure 5 as representing Halliday's alternative to Fawcett's Figure 4, Fawcett is engaging in the Straw Man logical fallacy:

giving the impression of refuting an opponent's argument, while actually refuting an argument that was not presented by that opponent.

[2] This is misleading because it is untrue.  Figures 4 and 5 are not topologically equivalent, because 5 cannot be formed from 4 without tearing off the form components and attaching them to the right edge of the meaning components.  Topological equivalence involves deforming only, not tearing and re-attachment.

[3] This is misleading.  As previously demonstrated, Halliday's "important insights" of realisation and instantiation are not coherently "captured" in Fawcett's flowchart.  For example,  in terms of realisation, Figure 4 presents a system network being realised in realisation rules; and in term of instantiation, it presents syntagmatic structure as an instance of realisation rules.  It would be dishonest to claim that Figure 4 is the model of someone who understands the theoretical concepts of realisation and instantiation.

[4] This is misleading.  Even Halliday's writings in the early 1970s do not "suggest" Fawcett's theoretically incoherent flowchart model of language.