Fawcett's Argument Against The Mood Element

Fawcett (2010: 133):

However, there is a third point of interest in Matthiessen and Bateman's diagram. It is the fact that they have felt obliged to make some show of generating what for Halliday is the 'primary structure' in the analysis of MOOD. This is the 'function' 'Mood', which in an IFG-style description must be represented in addition to the 'Subject' and the 'Finite', which are shown as its two 'subcomponents". But the fact is that it is only the 'Subject' and the 'Finite' that are needed for (1) conflation with other 'functions' from other lines of the analysis, and (2) the next stage of the process of generation. In other words, the 'function' of 'Mood' plays no part in the generation of the clause. Clearly, it would be far simpler to generate the Finite and the Subject as direct 'functions' of the clause, so that they can be directly conflated with the appropriate other 'functions'. 

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] This wording seems to insinuate an accusation of insincerity on the part of Matthiessen and Bateman, especially when considered in the light of the earlier judgement of the diagram as 'remarkably honest' (p131).

[2] To be clear, here Fawcett argues against the theoretical value of the Mood element of the clause, in modelling language, on the basis of degrees of expediency in the generation of texts by computers. The theoretical value of the Mood element is in its explanatory power in understanding language, not in whether or not it conflates with the element of another structure in the process of computerised text generation.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 150) identify both the semantic function of the Mood element:

Hence the Mood element has a clearly defined semantic function: it carries the burden of the clause as an interactive event. So it remains constant, as the nub of the proposition, unless some positive step is taken to change it…

and (op. cit.: 170) its rôle in realising systemic distinctions:

In the grammar of MOOD in English, the general principle is that less delicate distinctions in mood are realised through the Mood element – its presence and the nature and relative sequence of its element, Subject and Finite, plus the presence of the WH- element…

[3] To be clear, Subject and Finite are "direct" functions of the clause, as components of the Mood element, and the Subject, more usually, is "directly" conflated with other functions, with this typically depending on systemic selections such as those of THEME, VOICE and MOOD.

The Integration Of Different Function Structures (And The Analysis Of Moodtags)

Fawcett (2010: 132-3, 133n):

The importance of establishing these facts is as follows. Despite the  similarity in appeararance [sic] of the representation in Figure 9 to those in IFG, it is clear from both the verbal description in Matthiessen & Bateman (1991) and from the diagram showing "successive states of the blackboard" (their Figure 9.15 on their page 108) that in their account of the generation of a clause (or any other unit) there is no stage at which there are co-existing sets of different functional structures which must later be integrated. And this is the case with all SF generators. 13  

13. For our present purposes, we shall ignore the "Moodtag" in the Matthiessen and Bateman analysis, because it raises additional theoretical and descriptive problems. These arise because their analysis suggests that the elements labelled "Moodfinite" and "Moodsubject" function directly as elements of the clause, rather than being elements of a clause that is embedded within the 'Tag', as it would be in the Cardiff Grammar analysis. See Fawcett (1999) and (in press) for the Cardiff Grammar's analysis of such 'tags', and for the evidence that they should be modelled as embedded clause of a 'truncated' type. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett is here arguing against a theory of language on the basis of how the theory is adjusted to fit the limitations of computers in generating texts. More importantly, he misunderstands the model, since clause structures are integrated in the syntagm of group rank units that realise them. (Strategically, Fawcett again switches terminology from the 'conflation' of structures, the misunderstanding that invalidates his argument, to the 'integration' of structures, a genuine principle of the theory.)

[2] To be clear, this is how Moodtags are analysed in SFL Theory: as functional elements of the clause whose Subject and Finite they reprise, and whose presence and polarity depend on the mood features of that clause.

[3] To be clear, the question here is whether the 'Tag' itself is an element of the clause whose Mood element it reprises. If it is, then the 'Tag' functions "directly" as an element of the clause, whether or not it is said to be realised as an embedded clause. If it is not, then Fawcett's nonsensical suggestion is that a 'Tag' is a clause realised by an embedded clause.

The Problem Of Limitations On 'Potential For Conflation'

Fawcett (2010: 132):

The second important difference in Figure 9 from the standard IFG-style analysis follows from the first. It is that the potential for 'conflation' among the 'functions' in Matthiessen and Bateman's "output" diagram (and in fact in all other published accounts of SF generation) is very limited indeed. In the generation of their worked example (shown in Figure 9) the only conflations that occur are (1) the conflation of the elements "Theme", "Subject" and "Carrier", and (2) the conflation of the elements "Finite" and "Process". More specifically, notice that the only 'functions' that Figure 9 shows to be conflated are ones that are coterminous with each other.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett is comparing representations of structures, the one in the modelling of human language, the other in the generation of texts by computer — rather than examining the theoretical criteria on which structures are based — as a means of questioning the theoretical validity of structures. Again, this makes Fawcett's argument an instance of the Red Herring fallacy, since how structures are represented (even within the same field) is irrelevant to the the theoretical validity of the structures themselves.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, here Fawcett falsely presents an aspect of SFL Theory, the conflation of coterminous elements, as if it were in contradiction with the theory itself, and as if it supported his own argument; see the preceding and following posts.

Misconstruing An Absence Of Label For An Absence Of Function

Fawcett (2010: 132, 132n):

From our present perspective, the first important difference about Figure 9 is the blank boxes in the THEME and MOOD lines of the representation. Most of the THEME line of analysis is a long blank box, covering several elements, in which the label "Rheme" would be written if this was an IFG analysis. And there is similar blank box in the MOOD line of Figure 9, where "Residue" would be written in an IFG analysis (between "Mood" and "Moodtag"). This is not the trivial difference that it might at first appear, because when the blank boxes are labelled this suggests that there are 'functions' in these lines of analysis that correspond to them — and it is this fact that in turn allows one to read into such diagrams the idea that they represent a 'structure'. In other words, I suggest that there is not in fact a single 'functional element' called a "Rheme" that corresponds to several other clause elements; that there is no 'functional element' of 'Residue' that similarly covers one or more elements; and, in cases where there is an INFORMATION line of analysis, that there is no 'functional element' of 'Given' that covers one or more elements.¹²

¹² As you may have noticed, the right hand box in the TRANSITIVITY line of analysis is also blank, but in this case an IFG-style analysis would not label it. This is because this element only has 'interpersonal' meaning. Since the tag isn't it is automatically derived from the main clause it has no 'experiential' meaning, so that there is nothing to say about it in terms of the TRANSITIVITY line of analysis. 

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] This is misleading, because the difference is indeed trivial. The difference here is between labelling a negative — Rheme or Residue — and not labelling it. 'Rheme' labels the portion of a clause as message that is not Theme: the point of departure of the message. 'Residue' labels the portion of a clause as exchange that is not Mood: the carrier of 'the burden of the clause as an interactive event' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 150).  The unlabelled box after 'Theme' signifies 'not Theme', which is equivalent to 'Rheme'; the absence of a label after 'Mood' signifies 'not Mood', which is equivalent to 'Residue'.

[2] To be clear, a structure is the relation between elements, and the relations obtain if both elements are labelled or if one of them is iconically represented as a negative.

[3] To be clear, this is a non-sequitur. Here Fawcett has invalidly concluded that the absence of a label necessarily entails the absence of a function. Moreover, this conclusion leads to an absurdity, since, without at least the possibility of an element that is not Theme (Rheme), not Mood (Residue), not New (Given), there can be no contrasting element that is Theme, Mood, New, respectively.

[4] To be clear, the reason why a Moodtag 'has no experiential meaning' is because it is not a representation of experience.

The "Remarkably Honest" Diagram Of Matthiessen and Bateman

Fawcett (2010: 131-2):

It is highly illuminating to compare a recent description of the version of Halliday's Nigel grammmar [sic] that was implemented in the computer with the original account of a generative systemic functional grammar in Halliday (1969/81). … Consider the diagram shown in Figure 9, which is taken directly from Matthiessen & Bateman (1991:109). 

Here Matthiessen and Bateman provide a visual representation of the output from their generator, following as far as they can the IFG layout. It looks, at first sight, very like Figure 7 in Section 7.2, and so also like one of the many representations of clauses given in IFG.

It is also a remarkably honest diagram, in the sense that it has not been adapted to make it more like the standard IFG analysis than the output from the computer really is (with one vital proviso, which we shall come to shortly). Yet the fact is, as we shall now see, that it is unlike the IFG diagrams in one vital respect. So let us compare Figure 9 with the IFG-style analysis of a clause in Figure 7.

Two differences that are not important for our present purposes are (1) that Figure 9 includes the 'tag' isn't it, and (2) that it contains no line for the INFORMATION structure shown in Figure 7 as "Given" and "New". (The reason for this omission is probably that their version of the Penman generator does not generate intonation.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here Fawcett begins a comparison of a very early statement of SFL Theory (Halliday 1969) with a later application of SFL Theory to the programming of computers to generate texts (Matthiessen & Bateman 1991). As a form of argumentation, it is an instance of the red herring logical fallacy, a fallacy of relevance, because the adaptation of a linguistic theory to the domain of computer capabilities is irrelevant to the validity of a linguistic theory as a model of human language.

[2] Here Fawcett introduces the possibility that Matthiessen & Bateman are otherwise dishonest, since their diagram (Figure 9) is not only "honest", but "remarkably" so.

[3] To be clear, one reason why Figure 9 does not include a 'line for the INFORMATION structure' is that INFORMATION is not a system of the clause. The reason why Figure 7 does include a 'line for the INFORMATION structure' is that Figure 7 was devised by Fawcett, and Fawcett does not realise that INFORMATION is not a system of the clause.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1969/81) As Adopting An "Anomolous" Position

Fawcett (2010: 130):

There are differences in the sequence in which 'functions' are inserted in various versions of SF grammars, but what is constant across all such grammars — whether they are produced in the Sydney or the Cardiff frameworks — is that the phenomena that gets [sic] conflated are coterminous 'functional elements' (or 'functions' or 'elements') — and not structures. 

Moreover, there is no generative systemic functional grammar in existence that includes a rule which conflates 'chunks' of the clause such as 'Residue', 'Rheme' and 'Given' with the various 'functions' in other 'strands'. 

The fact is that Halliday, in his immensely influential but still exploratory work 'Options and functions in the English clause' (1969/81) appears to adopt an anomolous [sic] position. On page 143 he emphasises the concept that "the clause has a number of different but simultaneous structures" (while pointing out certain caveats, as indicated in the last subsection). But on the facing page he sets out a table of realisation statements that demonstrates clearly that the model is in fact one that simply conflates 'functions' — and not structures. In other words, his rules show how to generate the 'function' of 'Theme', but not the 'function' of 'Rheme'; they show how to give a Participant Role the 'function' of being 'New', but not how to assign the supposed function of 'Given' to whatever experiential element or elements it is relevant to — and similarly for the 'Residue'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously explained, the selection of clause features and the activation of realisation statements, the process of instantiation, is not temporally sequenced in SFL Theory. The application of the theory to computational text generation requires an adaptation of the theory to the limitations of computers, which, at the time of writing, do not learn language through interaction in a speech community.

[2] To be clear, this is true of SFL Theory, but contrary to what Fawcett has thus far been claiming.

[3] To be clear, this is true of SFL Theory, because no such rule is necessary. This is because all structures are integrated in the syntagm that realises them, and the terms 'Residue' and 'Rheme' are labels for negatives: 'not Mood' and 'not Theme', respectively.

[4] To be clear, 'Given' is not a function of the clause, and labels a negative: the portion of the information unit that is 'not New'.

[5] To be clear, there is no anomaly here. In Halliday's model, the clause does have a number of different but simultaneous structures, but it is only elements of structure that are conflated, not structures.

[6] See [4]. To be clear, it is not only participants, or indeed even experiential elements, that can be highlighted as New, as demonstrated by instances like:

• I say it is true (Process as New)
• I said put it on the table (Location as New)
• Of course it is! (comment Adjunct as New)
• I'm going anyway. (conjunctive Adjunct as New).

Misrepresenting Halliday On Structural Realisation

Fawcett (2010: 129-30):

Surprisingly, perhaps, Halliday's own published fragments of generative grammars all take the same position as that to [be?] described now, as we consider the procedure for generating the element we in We would visit Mrs Skinner every Sunday (i.e., the clause analysed in the IFG-style in Figure 7). Drawing on Halliday (1969/81:142) and 1970/76b), we can say that Halliday would generate this composite element in the following manner: 

1. At some early stage, the 'function' of Theme' is inserted in the structure. 2. At a later stage of generation the 'function' of 'Subject' is inserted, and either then or by a later rule it is conflated with the 'Theme'. 3. Later still, a Participant Role is inserted, e.g., 'Actor,' and this is conflated with the 'Theme/Subject' to create a composite element 'Theme/Subject/Actor'. 

This is also essentially what happens in Matthiessen and Bateman's computer implementation of Halliday's Nigel grammar in Penman, according to their description of the process in Matthiessen & Bateman (1991:88-109). 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it misrepresents a computer implementation of Halliday's theory, for the purposes of text generation, as his theory of human language.

[2] To be clear, technically, we is not an element of structure, but the data (language) to be accounted for by theory (SF grammatics). Elements of clause structure include Theme, Subject and Actor.

[3] This is misleading, because it misrepresents the realisation relation between paradigmatic system and syntagmatic structure as ordered in time. The relation of realisation is one of intensive identity, not circumstantial: temporal, identity.

[4] This is potentially misleading. The conflation is not a "composite element", but rather three distinct elements, each from a distinct structural configuration, that are integrated in the nominal group that realises all three.

The Fact On Which Fawcett's Main Argument Depends

Fawcett (2010: 129):

What, then is the position on this matter of those who have sought to implement Halliday's model? The fact is that all of the theoretical-generative publications in the framework of the Sydney Grammar show that no systemic functional grammarian has even considered building a generative grammar that works on the principle of 'structure conflation' [author's bolding]. The importance of this fact for the main argument that is made in this book cannot be overstated, because it shows that the multiple structure representations used in IFG have no real position in the theory. (It is of course still possible that they may have some other value — a topic to which we shall return shortly.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the reason why "no systemic functional grammarian has even considered building a generative grammar that works on the principle of 'structure conflation' " is that structure conflation is not a principle of the theory, as previously explained.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett rests the main argument of this publication on a misunderstanding he takes to be a fact.

[3] To be clear, this is an invalid conclusion inferred from a false premiss.  The false premiss is the notion that structure conflation is a principle of SFL Theory. The conclusion is invalid because the fact that linguists have not considered building such a generative grammar does not logically entail that metafunctional clause structures have no real position in the theory. What linguists choose to build, or not, does not invalidate any dimension of a theory. In terms of reasoning, this is simply a non sequitur.

"The Only Possible Conclusion"

Fawcett (2010: 129):

At this point in the development of the argument, the only possible conclusion is that it would only be desirable to try to construct a component of the grammar for integrating the various structures that correspond to strands of meaning if it could be shown that it is needed on independent grounds. In other words, we should not go down the road of turning the 'two-component' model of Figure 4 into the 'three-component' model of Figure 8 unless it is really necessary. In the next sub-section we shall see that it is not.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear,  Fawcett's argument has been against the conflation of structures, but here he shifts to the integration of structures. As previously demonstrated, clause structures of the three metafunctions are not conflated, but they are integrated by the syntagm of group rank forms that realise them.

[2] This is misleading, because it presents Fawcett's model (Figure 4) as Halliday's model, and Fawcett's modification of his own model (Figure 8) as a solution to a problem that only arises through Fawcett misunderstanding Halliday's model to require the conflation of structures.

The Problem Of "Evaluative Enhanced Theme"

Fawcett (2010: 128-9):

Moreover, similar problems would arise for Halliday's analysis of what are termed in the Cardiff Grammar evaluative enhanced theme constructions (i.e., 'extraposition' in the terms of formal grammar) such as It's marvellous to see you again). 

In my view the component of the grammar that would handle Halliday's analyses of such structures will never be built — if only because there are vastly preferable approaches to the problem of modelling such structures.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Problems do not arise because it is not structures that are conflated, but elements, as previously explained.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, such constructions involve a 'postposed Subject' and are analysed along the following lines:

It	's		marvellous	[[to see you again]]
Theme	Rheme
Sub-	Finite	Predicator	Complement	-ject
Car-	Process		Attribute	-rier
nominal group	verbal group		nominal group	(clause embedded in) nominal group

Here the Theme is simply it, and the Subject and Carrier are realised by an elaborating paratactic nominal group complex (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 199):

It	[[to see you again]]
1	= 2

That is,

• the Theme is not evaluative — the evaluation is given rhematic status, and
• the Theme is not enhanced — the Subject is realised by an elaborating nominal group complex.

The Serious Problem Of Predicated Theme

Fawcett (2010: 128, 128n):

Some of Halliday's analyses in IFG introduce a yet more serious problem. This is the fact that they involve presenting the same clause at two different layers of structure in the THEME and MOOD analyses. This occurs in his analyses of clauses with an experiential enhanced theme (also known as 'predicated theme' and the 'it-cleft construction'), e.g., It was his teacher who persuaded him to continue. Halliday's analyses of the THEME and MOOD structures of such examples have very little in common. His THEME structure (IFG p. 60) presents who persuaded him to continue as a direct element of the thematic structure, while the equivalent clause in his MOOD analysis (p. 98) is two layers lower in the structure. This is because Halliday claims (wrongly in my view) that the Subject in the MOOD structure in the above text-sentence is it [...] who persuaded him to continue (where who persuaded him to continue must function as a qualifier in a nominal group whose head is it)ⁱ⁰ The problem is that the clause who persuaded him to continue is at a different layer of structure in each of these two analyses — so running counter to one of the basic assumptions of theoretical-generative SFL, i.e., that each traversal of the system network generates one layer of structure. I can think of no way in which 'structure conflation statements' could cover such cases.  

10. The elements of the TRANSITIVITY analysis that Halliday would give to such examples would be the same as the MOOD elements, judging by his analyses in Halliday (1967-8:236). 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the structures under discussion are the thematic and mood structures of clauses with predicated Theme. Halliday (1994: 60):

Halliday (1994: 98):

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. These structures do not pose a theoretical problem because the structures are not conflated, as previously explained.  All structures are integrated by the group rank syntagm that realises them.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett neither offers a reason for his grammatical disagreement, nor provides an alternative analysis.  In SFL theory, the Subject is identified by what is picked up by a Mood Tag:

It was his teacher who persuaded him to continue, wasn't it?

The analysis of it [[who persuaded him to continue]] as a single (discontinuous) clause constituent can be seen more clearly through agnate clauses such as:

Who was it [[who persuaded him to continue]]?

and its transitivity structure:

it	was	his teacher	who persuaded him to continue
Ident…	Process: identifying	Identifier	…ified

[3] This is misleading, because it confuses two distinct senses of 'layer':

• 'layer' in the sense of one of three metafunctional structures, and
• 'layer' in the sense of a compositional level within one metafunctional structure (e.g. Mood composed of Subject and Finite).

The structures of each metafunction — composite or otherwise — realise the systemic choices of its metafunctional system.