Fawcett's Difficulty In Understanding The Absence Of 'Insert Unit' In Halliday's Theory

 Fawcett (2010: 183):

It is hard to understand why the Sydney Grammar lists of realisation operations should not give Operation 1 at least the status of being a separate operation from 'preselection'. For a start, this operation will only generate units for the lower layers of a structure, so their realisation operations appear not to have any means of generating the initial unit of the clause. Moreover, even when we limit ourselves to lower units in the structure (such as how a nominal group comes to fill an element such as Subject, we should note that it is perfectly possible for the grammar to need to select a given feature on the next pass through the network without thereby also inserting a new unit, so that preselection must in any case be treated as a separate operation from the insertion of a new unit. 

It is therefore hard to understand why Halliday, Matthiessen and Bateman have no equivalent of Operation 1. The reason may possibly be connected with the fact that the emphasis in the Sydney Grammar is strongly on the generation of clauses. Perhaps this leads those working in that framework to take it for granted that all the choices being made in the system network are for the clause unless the rules state otherwise, so that the insertion of the initial clause does not get stated explicitly. Indeed, one surprising fact about the literature of the Sydney Grammar is that it contains no examples of generations of texts that involve a further layer of structure beyond that of a single clause — even in the fairly full description of the Penman Project given in Matthiessen & Bateman (1991). So there is no account of how the process of re-entry operates in the Sydney Grammar, whether for a clause or even for a simple nominal group. In practice, however, the computer implementation of the Penman model must have some equivalent operation to our Operation 1, or it would be unable to generate structures with more than a single layer (as it does when used in computer implementations). Indeed, the existing realisation operations refer to the generation of lower units (e.g., "Preselect nominal group" in Halliday (1993:4505) — though there are no worked examples.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously noted, Fawcett's Operation 1 is 'Insert unit (to fill an element)'. The reason why SFL Theory has no equivalent is simply because a unit is selected from the rank scale within the system.

Each of these units serves as the entry condition to the systems of that unit. It is the rank scale that anchors the systems of the clause — theme, mood and transitivity — on the stratum of lexicogrammar, rather than semantics. Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar locates these grammatical systems at the level of semantics, and does not include a rank scale.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a nominal group realises the element Subject.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a unit such as a clause or group is instantiated in a single 'pass' through the simultaneous systems of that unit, so there is no need for re-entry in the instantiation of a single unit. In cases where units form complexes, the network is re-entered through a system of RECURSION, as illustrated for the highest unit, clause, by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 438):

On The Absence Of Fawcett's Operations 1 and 6 In The Realisation Statements Of Halliday (1993)

Fawcett (2010: 182-3):

However, the most striking difference between the two sets of realisation operations is the omission from all three of the Sydney Grammar lists of our Operations 1 and 6. Operations 1 and 2 are in a sense the two fundamental operations, in that each adds one of the two major categories to the structure: Operation 1 adds a unit and Operation 2 an element. For example, the choice of the feature [situation] is realised by inserting the unit 'Cl' (for 'Clause'), and the choice of the feature [thing] is realised by inserting 'ngp' (for 'nominal group'). If there is no unit, there can logically be no elements, and so no structure. Thus the computer implementation of the Sydney Grammar must have such an operation, or it could not work. The odd thing is that it is not listed here. Operation 6 equally is crucial, because if the network is not re-entered only one layer of structure can be generated. 

The clue to the answer comes in Matthiessen and Bateman's description of what is covered by their term "preselection". For them, "preselections are instructions to re-enter the grammar to develop the function constituents of the clause as nominal groups, [...] and so on" (1991:108), so that their "Preselect" operation includes all three of (1) 'preselection' (in the strict sense of the term). (2) 're-entry' and (3) the insertion of a new unit. No doubt we can infer from this that Halliday's "preselect" operation includes the same three steps. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett's Operation 1 is 'Insert a unit (to fill an element)' (p180). In SFL Theory, a unit (clause, group, word, morpheme) is selected from the rank scale in a system network. SFL Theory models the phenomena of syntax as a rank scale. Fawcett's model of syntax (allegedly) does not include a rank scale.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett's Operation 6 is 'For an element, re-enter the system network' (p180). In SFL Theory, the selection of a given unit entails the selection of the features and the activation of realisation statements that specify all the elements of that unit. This includes structures that Fawcett regards as involving more than one "layer", such as clauses with textual and/or interpersonal Themes, where each is modelled as a simultaneous system within the network. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue; see [1] above. Halliday's (1995 [1993]: 273) realisation statement is not concerned with inserting a unit, but with preselecting a feature at a lower rank:

• 'Preselect' some feature at a lower rank (e.g., preselect actor : human collective);

[4] To be clear, Matthiessen & Bateman (1991) involves the adaptation of SFL Theory to the limitations of computers for the purposes of text generation. As such, it is not equivalent to the SFL model of the human use of language.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On The Realisation Statements 'Preselect' And 'Classify'

Fawcett (2010: 182):

Halliday's Operation (f) is roughly equivalent to our Operation 5, with the important difference that ours is expressed in terms of preferences — and preferences can set the probability of a feature being selected on re-entering the system network to any point on a scale from 0% to 100%. In contrast, the more limited concept of preselection implies an absolute probability (i.e., 100%) that the specified feature will be selected. Interestingly, it appears from Halliday's examples that his "Classify" operation is essentially the same as his "Preselect" operation, and both Matthiessen & Bateman (1991) and Matthiessen (1995) simply omit "Classify" from their lists. The two are therefore treated as equivalent in Figure 11.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday's realisation statement (f) is

• 'Preselect' some feature at a lower rank (e.g., preselect actor : human collective),

whereas Fawcett's Operation 5 is

• Prefer certain features on re-entry to the system network , including preselection (= 100% preference). 

These are not 'roughly equivalent', because Halliday's statement does not involve re-entry, and because Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar does not include a rank scale.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday's realisation statement (d) is

• 'Classify' an element (e.g., classify process as mental : cognition);

As can be seen, 'classify' affects features of a given rank, whereas 'preselect' affects features of the rank below.

[3] It is therefore misleading to treat the two realisation statements as equivalent. In downplaying these differences between Halliday's realisation statements and Fawcett's realisation operations, Fawcett is downplaying the disadvantages of not including a rank scale in his model.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On The Realisation Statement 'Lexify' In A Footnote

Fawcett (2010: 181-2, 182n):

The "Conflate" operation is clearly the same in both models, and Halliday's "Lexify" is equivalent to our "Expound". However, it is important to note that the example of 'lexification' is the exponence of the Subject by the item it (presumably for cases of 'empty Subjects' such as It's raining). In other words, it seems that the "Lexify" operation is not limited, as one might at first suppose, to lexical items, in the usual sense of that term, and that it can also introduce grammatical items to the structure. It therefore covers all types of  'item' — just as the operation "Expound" does in the Cardiff Grammar.⁴

⁴ It is surprising to find Halliday using this example, because it goes against the principle of 'total accountability at all ranks'. This requires, of course, that the Subject should be filled by a nominal group (or some other unit of that 'rank' or above). In the Cardiff Grammar the item it functions as the direct exponent of the Subject only in cases with an "empty Subject", such as It's raining and It's nice to see you, so perhaps this is the case in Halliday's example? But, if this is so, it breeches his 'rank scale' principle.

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because it is untrue. There is no 'breeching' of 'total accountability at all ranks' or the 'rank scale' principle because, in all such examples, the Subject of the clause is realised by nominal group whose Thing/Head is realised by a word:

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On The Realisation Statement 'Order'

Fawcett (2010: 181):

Interestingly, Halliday's original version of his Operation (c) specifies that the task of locating elements in the appropriate sequence in a unit should be achieved by 'ordering' elements in relation to each other — but in "Systemic theory" he adds, after the words "order an element with respect to another", the further words "or to some defined location". This wording seems to suggest that Halliday may wish to extend his original approach to 'ordering' to include the Cardiff Grammar concept of a '(numbered) place in a unit' — and perhaps even to embrace the concept of a 'potential structure' (i.e., an 'ordered list of elements at places in a unit') — as introduced in Fawcett (1973/81). Since this concept has actually been used in the Penman implementation of the Sydney Grammar (as noted in Section 10.4.2 of Chapter 10), it is possible that Halliday's wording here may be intended to reflect the adoption in the Penman implementation of my concept of 'places'.

 Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, since 'operation' is Fawcett's term only, not Halliday's. Where Fawcett's term demonstrates that his model is limited to text generation by computers, Halliday's model is concerned with the system-&-process of human language, whose material substrate is biological, rather than technological.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The concept of a '(numbered) place in a unit' only arises from giving priority to the view 'from below' — structure over system, form over function — in a model that is concerned with adapting theory to the limitations of computers.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, potential is modelled as system, not structure. Halliday explicitly rejected the Chomskyan notion of language as an inventory of structures.

However, the notion of semantic 'structure potential', varying for genre (text type) appears in the work of Hasan (1985: 64ff), though Halliday himself did not adopt his wife's model. It can also be noted here that Martin (1992) misunderstands Hasan's 'Generic Structure Potential' as modelling genre, rather than semantics varying according to genre.

[4] To be clear, the Penman 'implementation of the Sydney Grammar' was an adaptation of SFL Theory to the limitations of computers.

The Cardiff Grammar's Rules For The 'Insertion' Of An Element

Fawcett (2010: 181):

Since this is so, the Cardiff Grammar's rules for the 'insertion' of an element tend to be attached to more delicate features in the system network than in the published versions of the Sydney Grammar. In other words, the realisation rule that inserts an element in a unit is attached to a feature that occurs at the point in the system network by which we know not only that the element will be present in the unit but also the precise place at which it will occur.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Fawcett's realisation rules are not located in system networks (meaning), but at a lower level of symbolic abstraction (form), despite the fact that they apply to network features at the higher level of symbolic abstraction (meaning). This contradiction alone invalidates the theoretical architecture of the Cardiff Grammar (Figure 4).

Fawcett's 'Fetch' Operation

Fawcett (2010: 177-8):

In the Cardiff Grammar, there is a variant of Operation 4, which we shall call Operation 4a. This is the Fetch operation, and it is used to expound items when the item is not an ordinary word in the language that has a 'meaning', but a 'name'. Thus the 'meaning' of Mr White is nothing to do with the colour quality of 'white'. Rather it is something like 'formal', in contrast with Peter, which may be informal'. In order to expound such meanings, e.g., in a computer model of generation, the generation system must consult its 'knowledge' (or, to use a preferable term, its 'beliefs') in order to discover the specific title (realised as Mr, Mrs, Ms, Dr, etc) and family name of the referent, and then 'fetch' the relevant forms for use in the sentence generator. Hence the need to use a different type of operation in the generation of names.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, all wordings realise ("have") meanings.

[2] To be clear, this gives priority to the view 'from below', the expression 'white', rather than the view from 'above', the meaning realised by 'white' (surname vs colour). In SFL Theory, priority is given to to the view 'from above'.

[3] To be clear, 'formal' vs 'informal' does not distinguish the meanings of White vs Peter, but rather the different tenor variables of the situation type (cultural context), enacted by the choice of surname vs forename.

[4] To be clear, this only applies to a computer model of generation, not to the logogenesis of spoken, signed or written texts by flesh-&-blood human beings. Moreover, in SFL Theory, 'knowledge' and 'beliefs' are meanings (the semantic stratum of language).

Fawcett's 'Sentence' Element

 Fawcett (2010: 176-7):

While the system network models choices between meanings, the early choices are between the generalised meanings such as 'situation', 'thing' and 'quality', which are realised as the major syntactic units of the language. …

In generation, the first unit to be generated is always a clause. The 'element' that it fills is an element of an unusual sort, because it is not an element in a unit that is recognised in the model of syntax presented here. The element is the 'Sentence', and this term is interpreted as a placeholder for the 'element' of discourse structure (whichever it is) for which the text-sentence is being generated.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett does not present these system networks in this publication.

[2] To be clear, these 'generalised meanings' are experiential meanings only. Logical, interpersonal and textual meanings do not feature as 'generalised meanings' in Fawcett's unseen system network.

[3] As this wording demonstrates, this is a model of text generation, not of language itself.

[4] To be clear, in Fawcett's model of syntax, the clause fills an element in a unit that is not recognised in Fawcett's model of syntax.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the sentence is a unit of graphology, the expression plane system of written mode.

[6] To be clear, in Fawcett's model, a sentence is an element that is a placeholder for an element of discourse structure, though no such discourse structures are identified, and 'discourse structure' does not feature in his model (Figure 4).

Misunderstanding Axial Realisation As Instantiation

Fawcett (2010: 174):

Thus most of this chapter will be wholly oriented to the theoretical-generative strand of work in SFL. It might at first appear that Chapters 10 and 11 are oriented to the text-descriptive strand. However, they are only 'text-descriptive' in the sense that the emphasis is on the text-sentences that are the output from the operation of the grammar, and it is these that constitute the texts that are analysed in 'text-descriptive' work. These two chapters are also in fact primarily theoretical, in that the concepts covered there are the theoretical concepts that are required in the description of the structure of English that is needed by a computer for parsing a text — and, indeed, by a human text analyst. The concepts that characterise instances are therefore as much a part of the overall theory as the concepts required in the grammar itself to generate those outputs.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett's theory of language is actually concerned with what computers and linguists require for parsing a text.

[2] As previously explained, Fawcett equates 'instance' with 'output', and consequently misunderstands structures (syntagmatic axis) as instances of realisation rules (paradigmatic axis).

Fawcett's Theories Of Syntax Potential & Instances Of Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 174):

In the rest of the present chapter I shall specify the theory of syntax potential that is required in a modern, large-scale systemic functional grammar — i.e., the concepts that are required in the grammar itself. Then Chapters 10 and 11 will provide an account of the theory of instances of syntax — i.e., the part of the theory that underlies the description of text-sentences. Finally, Chapter 12 will summarise the current theory in relation to its antecedents, including "Categories", offering an evaluation of its importance today.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, for Halliday (1985 & 1994: xiv), the term 'syntax' suggests an approach to theorising that is inconsistent with the approach to SFL Theory, 'such that a language is interpreted as a system of forms, to which meanings are then attached'. In SFL Theory, 'syntax' is modelled as a rank scale. Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar does not include a rank scale.

[2] As previously explained, Fawcett's 'instances of syntax' are not instances of potential, but syntagmatic structures that realise realisation rules. That is, Fawcett's model (Figure 4) confuses the realisation relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes with the instantiation relation between potential and instance.

[3] To be clear, the term 'text sentences', like the architecture of Fawcett's model (Figure 4), confuses instance (text) with structure (sentence). In SFL Theory, 'sentence' is theorised as a rank unit of graphology.

[4] Fawcett's evaluation of the importance of his own model will be evaluated in the examination of his final chapter.

Fawcett's "Surprising Discoveries"

Fawcett (2010: 174):

In Part 1 we considered a number of different approaches to syntax in SFL, and we made some surprising discoveries about the status of the 'multiple structure' representations in IFG. That prolegomenon to the new theory will, I hope, have changed your perspective on the two original questions that were asked in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1. Most importantly, we are now aware that the theory of syntax must contain both a theory of 'syntax potential' and a theory of 'instances of syntax'. The main question was:

(1) What theoretical concepts are required for the description of syntax in a modern, large-scale systemic functional grammar? 

And, as a supplementary question of historical interest, we asked:

(2) How far are the founding concepts introduced by Halliday in "Categories" (1961/76) still valid in such a model?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL the approach to syntax is to model it as a rank scale. Fawcett's model has no rank scale.

[2] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, the "surprising discoveries" with regard to 'multiple structure' representations in IFG were Fawcett's misrepresentations of them, deriving from his misunderstandings, most notably his confusion of formal constituency with function structure.

[3] This is misleading, because it falsely presents a statement of Fawcett's model (Figure 4) as if it had been supported by reasoned argument in Part 1. More importantly, the relation between syntax potential (realisation rules) and instances of syntax (structure) is not instantiation, but realisation: the relation between the paradigmatic (realisation rules) and syntagmatic (structure) axes. This confusion alone invalidates Fawcett's model.

[4] It will be seen when Fawcett eventually comes to presenting his own theory, that his "modern" theory of syntax has more in common with Halliday's first theory, Scale & Category Grammar (1961), than the theory that replaced it, Systemic Functional Grammar.

Fawcett's Relevant Sources For A Modern Theory Of Systemic Functional Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 173):

Clearly, Halliday's important summary of current SFL in "Systemic theory" must be given due weight — especially because so many of the concepts that are new since "Categories" are present in the equivalent Cardiff Grammar work of Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993), as we noted in Section 5.5 of Chapter 5. Yet we must also take into account the evidence from Halliday's actual descriptive practice in IFG, even though it is harder to establish what the concepts are in this work. As we have noted, the concepts behind the representations of structure in IFG have more in common with the concepts of "Categories" than they have with "Systemic theory" — despite the great differences between the 'single structure' representation used in "Categories"-style analyses (as exemplified in Figure 1 in Chapter 2) and in the IFG-style analyses (as in Figure 7 in Chapter 7).

In addition, we must also draw on the evidence from work in the framework of the Cardiff Grammar, both from the 'text-descriptive' work that is roughly equivalent to IFG from Fawcett (in press) and from the 'theoretical-generative' work such as that in Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993) that is the equivalent to Halliday's "Systemic theory".

Finally, we have noted at various points that work on the formalisation of systemic functional grammars in computers has had an important influence on the theory, and in both the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars this has led to the further refinement of the categories and relationships that need to be recognised in the theory.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As previously explained, "Systemic theory" (Halliday 1993) and IFG (Halliday 1994) outline the same theory, but to different readerships, whereas "Categories" (Halliday 1961) outlines a different theory, Scale & Category Grammar, that was superseded by Systemic Functional Grammar. To be clear, Fawcett is here preparing the reader to view positively the fact that his modern theory of syntax has more in common with Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961) than Systemic Functional Grammar.

[2] The strategic use of the term 'equivalent' here — for 'analogous' — is misleading, because it gives the false impression that work in Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar is, in some sense, equivalent in terms of its theoretical assumptions and architecture to Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar.

[3] To be clear, adapting a theory of human language to the limitations of computers is not the same as modelling the language of humans. As demonstrated previously, Fawcett's model (Figure 4) has more in common with algorithms for text generation, than with models of human language.

Misrepresenting The Accounts Of Theories In Fawcett's Part 1

Fawcett (2010: 173):

In Part 1, we have examined four accounts of syntax in SFL. In Chapter 2 we looked at Halliday's "Categories of the theory of grammar" (1961/76), and in Chapters 5 and 6 we noted the considerable changes between the set of concepts presented in "Categories" and the concepts found in his "Systemic theory" (1993) and his An Introduction to Functional Grammar (1994). Then in Chapter 8 of Part 1 I described the framework of concepts set out in my "Some proposals for systemic syntax" (Fawcett 1974-7/81) — this being a revision of the concepts of "Categories" that was made as an explicit response to two factors: the exciting changes which Halliday made to the theory in the 1960s (described in Chapter 4), and very large quantities of work in text analysis. 

We therefore have three 'post-Categories' accounts of SFL syntax. The question now arises as to which of the three should be drawn upon — and to what extent — in the task of establishing a modern theory of SF syntax.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue, not least because, as previously explained, (a) neither of Halliday's theories, Scale and Category Grammar or Systemic Functional Grammar is a theory of syntax and (b) Scale and Category Grammar is not Systemic Functional Linguistics. Moreover, the accounts in Halliday (1993) and (1994) are accounts of the same theory, written for different audiences, as previously explained. That is, the only account of "systemic syntax" that has been introduced — not examined — is Fawcett (1974-7/81).

[2] To be clear, Fawcett's "Some proposals" was addressed to Halliday's first theory, Scale and Category Grammar, after Halliday had devised his second theory, Systemic Functional Grammar.

[3] To be clear, if it were consistent with SFL Theory to establish a "modern theory of SF syntax", then the modern version of SFL (e.g. Halliday 1993, 1994) "should be drawn upon". The reader is invited to guess whether this will be the case.