Fawcett Rests His Case Against The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 338):

Thus the present book, together with Fawcett (2000) and (forthcoming b), contributes to the 'rank scale debate' in two ways: one negative and one positive. 

On the negative side, it provides a fuller set of reasons than is given by any previous presentation of the case for not building into the grammar the concept of the 'rank scale' (and its accompanying concept of 'accountability at all ranks'). 

On the positive side, it states clearly what the nearest equivalent concept is — i.e., that the model is built around the concept of a set of units, each of which is capable of filling several elements of one or more higher units in a tree representation of a text-sentence (including a unit of the same class). But the 'filling probabilities' vary greatly, and these probabilities are as much a part of the grammar as the bare fact that a unit may fill an element.

I rest my case that it is now time to replace the concept of the 'rank scale'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett (forthcoming b) is still unpublished, 21 years after the first edition of this book.

[2] To be clear, as this blog has demonstrated over and over, Fawcett confuses the rank scale of formal constituency with relations between form and function, and misunderstands the notion of 'accountability at all ranks', the principle that everything in the wording has some function at every rank (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 84) as "predictions as to what units will function as elements of what other units".

[3] To be clear, 'filling probabilities' are not the nearest equivalent concept to the rank scale, because 'filling probabilities' are concerned with form-function relations, whereas the rank scale is a way to model formal constituency. The alternative ("nearest equivalent") to ranked constituent analysis is immediate constituent analysis, as explained in Halliday (1994: 20-9).

[4] To be clear, as the term 'higher unit' discloses, in Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar, units are ranked on a scale from higher to lower: from text-sentence to clause to group/cluster to item.

[5]  Case dismissed. Release the prisoner. No conviction recorded.

Why 'Syntagmatic Probabilities' Are No Replacement For The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 338):

These systemic probabilities and the model's ability to vary them play a major role in the computer generation of text in the Cardiff Grammar. But from the viewpoint of the text analyst — whether a human or a computer — what is needed is the 'realisation' of these systemic probabilities as structural probabilities. In other words, probabilities that are ultimately semantic and paradigmatic have to be expressed in terms of probabilities that are formal and syntagmatic. And, within the wide range of syntagmatic probabilities at the level of form, is the particular set which states the relative likelihood that a given unit will fill a given element of another unit (or an element of the same class of unit higher in the structure). It is this aspect of the syntagmatic probabilities that replaces the concept of the 'rank scale'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the notion of systemic probabilities realised as 'structural/syntagmatic probabilities' is inconsistent with Fawcett's model (Figure 4, p36), because probability is the quantification of potential, whereas Fawcett (incongruously) models syntagmatic structure as instance.

[2] To be clear, syntagmatic probabilities can not replace the concept of 'the rank scale' because the rank scale is a model formal constituency, whereas syntagmatic probabilities, as form-function relations, are not.

Misrepresenting SFL Theory On Probabilities

Fawcett (2010: 337-8):

Unlike the predictions made from the 'rank scale' framework, the probabilities that the new model suggests can be changed. Such changed [sic] may be triggered by the context of co-text (which includes the specific point in the structure), or by some aspect of the context of situation.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading on two counts. On the one hand, the rank scale does no make "predictions"; it is merely a way of modelling formal constituency such that higher rank units consist of lower rank units. On the other hand, in SFL Theory, despite deploying a rank scale, all features in all systems have deemed to have probability values, and it is variation in such probabilities that distinguishes registers. Moreover, these probabilities are continually altered by the process of instantiation: the selection of features in logogenesis, the unfolding of text.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett has not located 'context of situation' in his model. Figure 12 (p210) identifies 'situation' at the level of 'meaning', not 'context', and where SFL Theory locates 'context', Fawcett has 'belief system':

"The Relevant Arguments From The Main Part Of The Book"

Fawcett (2010: 337):

We can summarise the relevant arguments from the main part of the book by saying that the essence of the new proposal for modelling syntax is 

(1) that classes of unit are defined in terms of their internal structures (this being quite different from the way in which Halliday defines 'classes of unit'), 

(2) that each of these classes of unit (or simply 'units') has an internal structure that reflects as directly as possible the types of meaning that they are required to realise, and 

(3) that for each such unit there is a set of statements about the general probability that it will fill each of the elements of each of the various units that are recognised in the grammar. In other words, it makes predictions as to what units will function as elements of what other units — rather as the 'rank scale' concept of 'accountability at all ranks' does, but in a far more flexible manner. 

Many of these predictions are absolute (just as the strong version of the 'rank scale' concept is), in the sense that many combinations are ruled out by not being mentioned as possibilities in summary diagrams such as those in Appendix B, but the vast majority of the statements in Appendix B are probabilistic. 

An important feature of this approach is that it allows for very low probabilities as well as for the high ones — so that it shows that a clause, for example, may occur occasionally (though typically in a truncated form) as a pre-head modifier in a nominal group, e.g., the underlined portion of her recently married sister and a very slowly running river.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in classifying units in terms of how they are structured, Fawcett is giving priority to the view 'from below'. This is in contradiction to the fundamental principle of SFL Theory of giving priority to the view 'from above' (system and function rather than structure and form).

[2] This is misleading, as demonstrated by the fact that, in Fawcett's model, the internal structure of the clause is the same regardless of the experiential meaning being realised. For example, the clause element Complement, in itself, does not distinguish between a Goal, Behaviour, Existent, Senser, Phenomenon, Verbiage, Target, Attribute, Token or Value.

[3] Again, this seriously misunderstands the concept of 'accountability at all ranks', which is the principle that everything in the wording has some function at every rank (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 84), and therefore is not concerned with "predictions as to what units will function as elements of what other units".

[4] This is misleading. On the one hand, there is no "strong" (or "weak") version of the rank scale; the rank scale is merely a way of modelling formal constituency. On the other hand, the rank scale makes no predictions about "what units will function as elements of what other units" because the rank scale is a model of form (units), not function (elements).

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, neither recently married nor very slowly running is a (rankshifted) clause:

Misrepresenting 'Filling Probabilities' As An Alternative To The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 337):

Interestingly, the concept of the 'rank scale' plays no role in a generative SF grammar. Its main practical value has always been as a model (if a problematical one) that makes predictions that guide the text analyst in how the units in a text-sentence relate to each other. And for this purpose we can now use the set of units supplemented by the concept of filling probabilities that is described in Section 11.2 of Chapter 11 and exemplified in Appendix B. From one viewpoint they are simply a drastic re-interpretation of the 'rank scale' concept, but in essence they are a replacement for it, as a guide for use in text analysis.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. It is only in Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar that the rank scale plays no acknowledged role.

[2] This is misleading, because the rank scale model of formal constituency is fundamental to SFL Theory since it is the means of modelling syntax and morphology. The rank scale provides the various entry conditions to grammatical systems and identifies the formal units that serve grammatical functions.

[3] This is misleading, because filling probabilities are concerned with form-function relations, not with form-form relations ("how units relate to each other"), they are neither a re-interpretation of the rank scale nor a replacement for it as a model of formal constituency.

Misrepresenting 'Filling' As An Alternative To The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 336-7, 337n):

Even if we set aside the case for abolishing the 'verbal group' set out in the last section, as well as the more general evidence of the value of a description of English such as that summarised in Appendix B, it is surprising that the evidence produced by Matthews, Huddleston and others summarised above has not persuaded Halliday to reconsider the status of the 'rank scale' concept.  

After all, it is clear that the strongest claim that can be made for it is that it characterises a tendency towards a pattern to which there are in fact a great many exceptions.  

One sometimes gets the impression that support for the 'rank scale' is maintained simply because of a general perception that 'there is no alternative'.²¹ 

But there now is an alternative: a simple unordered set of classes of unit, each of which is capable of filling several elements of one or more higher units, as presented in Section 10.2 of Chapter 10.

²¹ This is the 'TINA' attitude to change that is close to the heart of many a right-wing politician — and so not, one would assume, Halliday's.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the reason why the evidence produced by Matthews, Huddleston and others have not persuaded Halliday to reconsider the rank scale concept is that the evidence is no evidence at all, since it derives from theoretical misunderstandings, as demonstrated in previous posts.

[2] This is misleading. The rank scale is one of two ways of modelling formal constituency — the other being immediate constituent analysis (Halliday 1994: 20-8). In SFL Theory, it is the means of modelling morphology and syntax, which is why it leaves no room for Fawcett's 'functional syntax', which is why Fawcett is motivated to argue against its theoretical value. The theoretical value of the rank scale includes the fact that it identifies the entry conditions for networks at each rank, and, in doing so, identifies the formal units to which meanings are assigned.

[3] To be clear, this is a false impression, since the alternative to ranked constituent analysis (minimal bracketing) is immediate constituent analysis (maximal bracketing), as explained in Halliday (1994: 20-8).

[4] To be clear, as previously explained, Fawcett's notion of 'filling' is no alternative to the rank scale, because it is concerned with form-function relations, not with form-form relations (constituency). On the other hand, Fawcett's notion of 'higher' — and therefore 'lower' — units discloses the fact that his model ranks units on a scale from high to low.

[5] To be clear, Fawcett here invites the reader to associate the attitude he falsely attributes to Halliday, a lifelong communist, with the attitude of right-wing politicians. This is achieved textually by the punctuation, which places tonic prominence on the word 'assume', thereby making it the Focus of New information, and interpersonally through the most likely tone, tone 4, which expresses 'reservation' in declarative MOOD.

Misunderstanding 'Accountability At All Ranks' And The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 336):

Clearly, the abolition of the 'verbal group' seriously affects the standard claim of the concept of the 'rank scale' that there should be 'accountability at all ranks'. While it might just possibly be arguable that we should treat Linkers such as and, Binders such as because and even perhaps Adjuncts such as therefore as 'minor' exceptions (leaving aside for the moment the various other problems for the 'rank scale' concept that we have noted) it is simply not possible to claim that the elements of the clause are always (or even typically) filled by groups, once the Operator, the Auxiliaries and the Main Verb are all recognised as clause elements, because these are clearly not filled by groups. The abolition of the 'verbal group' therefore leaves a considerable hole in any description of a language that is expected to illustrate the 'rank scale' concept.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this misunderstands the notion of 'accountability at all ranks'. In Scale-&-Category Grammar, Halliday (2002 [1966]: 120) defined this as 'chain-exhaustive assignment to constituents', and in SFL Theory (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 84), this is know as the principle of exhaustiveness:

The general principle of exhaustiveness means that everything in the wording has some function at every rank (cf. Halliday, 1961, 1966c).

That is, 'accountability at all ranks' does not refer to the units on the rank scale of formal constituency, such as the verbal group, but to the assignment of functions to the constituents of a rank unit.

[2] To be clear, the limiting case of a group is a single word: a one-word group is still a group, as demonstrated by nominal groups consisting of only one pronoun.

[3] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, these "problems" can indeed be left aside.

[4] To be clear, this repeats Fawcett's serious misunderstanding of the rank scale. The rank scale is a model of formal constituency: clauses consist of groups, which consist of words, which consist of morphemes. This is distinct from function-form relations in which a functional element at a higher rank is realised by a formal unit of the rank below. For example, the claim that a clause consists of groups ± phrases does not entail that a functional element of a clause, such as Theme, is realised by a single group or phrase.

[5] This would indeed be true, since the hole would be where the verbal group had been removed.

Fawcett's Case For Abolishing The Verbal Group

Fawcett (2010: 336):

Thus the paper presents four major, mutually supportive types of evidence, such that each provides an independent set of reasons why the elements of the supposed 'verbal group' should be treated as elements of the clause. Moreover, each set of reasons applies not merely to one element, but to many of the relevant elements — and in some cases to all of them. In other words, the paper makes the case for abolishing the 'verbal group' four times over, so that even if only one of the four types of evidence were to be deemed to be admissible the case still stands.

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because, as the four previous posts demonstrate, not one of these "four major, mutually supportive types of evidence" withstands close scrutiny.

Fawcett's Fourth Major Type Of Evidence For Abolishing The Verbal Group

Fawcett (2010: 335-6):

The fourth type of evidence is that the 'full' version of the 'verbal group' (i.e., the version that includes the Finite) is so liable to interruption by other clause elements (the Subject, Complements and Adjuncts) that its status as a grammatical unit should be questioned on these grounds alone. Alternatively, if we interpret the 'verbal group' as consisting of what remains when the Finite and the Main Verb Extension are treated as elements of the clause, there is so little left that we might as well promote these elements to the clause as well (and so avoid the various problems with the 'verbal group' that the paper describes).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is no evidence against the verbal group. On the one hand, contrary to SFL Theory, it gives priority to the view 'from below': structural realisation instead of the meaning that is expressed. On the other hand, discontinuity of structure is textually motivated, and applies equally to nominal groups serving participant roles, as demonstrated by:

discontinuous Phenomenon

discontinuous Carrier

discontinuous Attribute

[2] To be clear, this is merely another restatement of Fawcett's first type of evidence (p335):

The first reason is that, if the Finite is to be promoted to function as an element of the clause, the other 'major' elements of the 'verbal group' must be promoted too.

Fawcett's Third Major Type Of Evidence For Abolishing The Verbal Group

Fawcett (2010: 335):

The third major type of evidence is the fact that virtually every element of the supposed 'verbal group' needs to be generated in close conjunction with an established element of the clause — very much as the Operator needs to be generated as an element of the same unit as the Subject, as the co-realisation of meanings of MOOD. This was, of course, Halliday's reason for promoting the Finite (or Operator) in the first place. A well-constructed systemic functional grammar should provide for the interdependencies between, let us say, the 'tense' of the Operator or Main Verb and a Time Position Adjunct, preferably by (1) generating them on the same traversal of the system network and (2) realising them in the same unit. There are seven other similar types of inter-dependency between elements of the supposed 'verbal group' and well-established elements of the clause.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this third type of evidence is just a restatement of Fawcett's first type (p335):

The first reason is that, if the Finite is to be promoted to function as an element of the clause, the other 'major' elements of the 'verbal group' must be promoted too.

[2] This is not misleading, because it is essentially true, except of course that, in SFL Theory, the Finite is not "promoted", but is a functional element of the structure of both the clause and the verbal group.

[3] To be clear, here Fawcett is describing his own model (Operator, Main Verb, Time Position Adjunct), not SFL Theory. In SFL Theory, the system of TENSE is realised by the logical structure of the verbal group, not by an 'Operator' or 'Main Verb'. 

[4] To be clear, one insight of SFL Theory is that enhancement categories like 'time' can be realised in multiple grammatical domains, not just in the same rank unit. 

On the other hand, for the validity of Fawcett's claim that one traversal through one of his networks generates a whole unit, see the previous application of his realisation operations  here.

[5] To be clear, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence.

Fawcett's Second Major Type Of Evidence For Abolishing The Verbal Group

Fawcett (2010: 335):

Part 2 of the paper begins by presenting a set of reasons for dispensing with the 'verbal group' that are all based on the generation of the internal morphology of the elements concerned (e.g., be + en) and the portmanteau forms of some of the elements (e.g., is can function simultaneously as both Operator and Auxiliary, or as Operator and Main Verb). So this evidence too shows that the Operator, Auxiliaries and Main Verb should be in the same unit. In principle this could be either the 'verbal group' or the clause, but after the decision to promote the Finite to the clause it must clearly be the clause.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here again, contrary to SFL Theory, Fawcett is arguing 'from below' — from form instead of function.

[2] To be clear, there has been no decision to "promote" the Finite. In SFL Theory, the Finite is an element of both clause and verbal group structure, as previously explained.

Fawcett's First Major Type Of Evidence For Abolishing The Verbal Group

Fawcett (2010: 334-5):

The paper then sets out four major types of reason why this approach in both more workable (e.g., in a generative version of the grammar) and more insightful (e.g., for purposes of text-analysis). The first reason is that, if the Finite is to be promoted to function as an element of the clause, the other 'major' elements of the 'verbal group' must be promoted too. This is because, under the appropriate circumstances, each of the Auxiliaries or the Main Verb can be conflated with the Finite. And it would be a highly illogical grammar that treated an Auxiliary, let us say, as an element of the clause when it is conflated with the Finite and as an element of the 'verbal group' when it is not. Part 1 of the paper then introduces three other elements which must clearly also be promoted to the clause if the Auxiliaries and the Main Verb are, i.e., the Auxiliary Extension, the Infinitive (to) and the Negator (not). All of these are introduced in Appendix B.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because the Finite is not to be "promoted" to clause rank. The Finite is a function in the structures of both the verbal group and clause. The other elements of multivariate verbal group structure, however, only function at group rank, as explained in the previous post.

[2] On the one hand, this is misleading, because, in SFL Theory, the Finite can only conflate with the Event, not with an Auxiliary. On the other hand, and more importantly, inconsistent with SFL Theory, Fawcett here again takes the view 'from below', giving priority to how the meaning is expressed structurally — Finite conflated with Event — rather than to the meaning — finiteness — that is expressed.

[3] To be clear, even ignoring the invalidity of Fawcett's argument, on purely logical grounds, elements that are not elements of the verbal group — Main Verb, Auxiliary Extension, Infinitive — cannot be promoted to the clause.

Problems With Treating Verbal Group Elements As Clause Elements

 Fawcett (2010: 334):

The paper demonstrates that the solution to these problems is to treat all of the elements of the supposed 'verbal group' as direct elements of the clause, as is done in the Cardiff Grammar. Indeed, to do so is simply to carry through to its logical conclusion the change already initiated by Halliday in promoting the Finite to function as an element of the clause (a change that in fact dates back to Halliday 1967:218), and echoed in his treatment of off as an Adjunct in They called the meeting off.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is a very problematic non-solution to (previously demonstrated) non-problems. In SFL Theory, the verbal group is the entry condition for the recursive system of TENSE, which is realised by a univariate structure. Fawcett's proposal would insert a univariate structure into part of the multivariate structure of a clause — the clause itself having no univariate structure. Moreover, such a proposal would transfer all the systems of the verbal group to the clause, even though they do not apply to the clause as a whole. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 410):

[2] This is misleading. The Finite operator was not "promoted" to clause structure; it is theorised as a functional element of both the clause and verbal group. The remaining multivariate structure elements of the verbal group, Polarity, Auxiliary and Event, on the other hand, operate only at group rank, with the Event, and any others present, corresponding to the Predicator at clause rank':

Accordingly, "promoting" these other verbal group elements to clause rank would not be a "logical conclusion".

[3] To be clear, the adverb off is irrelevant to matters concerning the verbal group because it serves as the Head element of an adverbial group, not as an element of a verbal group.

Fawcett's Claim That Phrasal Verbs Undermine The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 334):

In a rather similar manner, Halliday analyses the word off in They will call the meeting off as an Adjunct in IFG, i.e., as an element of the clause rather than as an element of the 'verbal group'. Yet we might have expected him to have analysed it as an element of the 'verbal group' since it is the co-realisation, with call, of the meaning of the single Process of 'calling off', and called is unequivocally an element of the 'verbal group' in IFG.

Blogger Comments:

 [1] This is not misleading, because it is true. See IFG (Halliday 1994: 208) on the phrasal verb as Process rather than Process + circumstance.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the reason why the word  off is not analysed as realising an element of the verbal group is that it serves no function in the verbal group. Instead, the word off is analysed as an adverb that serves as the Head element of an adverbial group.

Fawcett's Claim That The Finite Operator Undermines The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 333-4):

Interestingly, none of the previous critics of the concept of the 'rank scale' (except Hudson 1971, implicitly) have discussed the role of the 'verbal group' as either supporting or undermining the concept of the 'rank scale'. Yet the reasons for abolishing the 'verbal group' and promoting its elements to function as elements of the clause are so persuasive that this set of reasons alone is sufficient to cause one to re-think the viability of the concept of 'accountability at all ranks', and so the 'rank scale' itself. In the present section, therefore, I shall provide an outline of the argument set out in my two-part paper "In place of Halliday's 'verbal group'" (Fawcett 2000 and forthcoming b).

Part 1 begins by pointing out a number of inconsistencies, from the functional viewpoint, in the way in which Halliday labels the elements of his 'verbal group' in IFG. It then demonstrates the way in which these problems are resolved in the alternative approach taken in the Cardiff Grammar.

The most obvious of these inconsistencies is the way in which IFG presents the Finite (which is very roughly equivalent to the Cardiff Grammar's Operator). At one point (p. 72) Halliday describes the Finite as "part of the verbal group [my emphasis]", while at another (p. 79) he says that "the predicator ... is realised by a verbal group minus the Finite [my emphasis]". And the Finite is in fact shown in the analyses of clauses throughout IFG as part of the more delicate of the two analyses of 'interpersonal' meaning in the clause, i.e., as an element of the clause. (However, if it really is to be modelled an element of the clause as well as an element of the 'verbal group', this would bring horrendous problems in its train for a generative SF grammar.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the reason why critics of the rank scale have not cited the verbal group in their arguments is that it neither supports nor undermines the rank scale. The verbal group is merely the outcome of modelling formal constituency as a rank scale wherein clauses consist of groups.

[2] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, Fawcett's argument against the verbal group with regard to the rank scale confuses form with function. In SFL Theory, the value of the verbal group includes the fact that it is the entry condition for the recursive system of TENSE.

[3] To be clear, the Finite operator is a functional element, not a formal constituent, and is thus irrelevant to the rank scale as a way of modelling formal constituency.

[4] This is not misleading, because it is true.

[5] To be clear, this is yet another bare assertion, unsupported by argument.

"The Generalisations That Halliday Gives Up"

Fawcett (2010: 333):

M&M make many valuable points in their "Response to Huddleston". The main weakness in the case that they present in the sections of their "Response" summarised above is this: they do not show how the generalisations that Halliday gives up in order to foreground the similarities between the 'hypotactic' and 'paratactic' analyses are to be handled in the grammar. If M&M are to 'defend' the position taken in IFG successfully, they need to address this question. But perhaps there should be less 'attacking' and 'defending', and more accepting of genuine 'problem examples', together with more exploring of comprehensive solutions to such problems, in the framework of a multi-component model?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday does not "give up" any generalisations in "foregrounding the similarities" of hypotaxis and parataxis. On the contrary, the distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis provides a generalisation, the system of TAXIS (interdependency), which Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar lacks. Importantly, the distinction between interdependency and embedding provides a more detailed specification of the different types of grammatical environments in which the generalised meanings of expansion and projection are manifested.

[2] To be clear, it is Fawcett who chooses to construe M&M's 'Response To Huddleston" in terms of 'attacking' and 'defending', the former being his own preferred modus operandi.

[3] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, the 'problem examples' that have been presented by Huddleston and Fawcett are not genuine 'problem examples' when examined with a sufficient grasp of SFL Theory.

Fawcett's Contention That The Notion Of A Rank Scale Depends On Hypotaxis

  Fawcett (2010: 333):

In other words, the analyses of dependent clauses that Huddleston advocates in his review of IFG are indeed possible ones within SFL. But the fact that SF linguists agree that we should explore the value of both 'hypotaxis' and alternative concepts within the theory does not absolve us from the obligation to try to decide whether 'hypotaxis' is needed in all or some or none of the cases for which Halliday proposes its use. The key point for the present debate is that, if we replace 'hypotaxis' by embedding in the examples discussed here (as Huddleston and I advocate), the case for retaining the concept of the 'rank scale' is greatly weakened. Thus it is not the case, as M&M suggest (p. 28), that "Huddleston's objections are descriptive, not theoretical".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the theoretical value of hypotaxis is its explanatory potential. For example, with regard to projection, the distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis models the distinction between reports and quotes, and the distinction between hypotaxis and embedding models the distinction between reports and pre-projected facts.

[2] This bare assertion, unsupported by argument, is misleading, because it is untrue. Whether clauses are analysed as ranking (dependent) or rankshifted (embedded) can have no bearing whatsoever on the theoretical status of the rank scale. If hypotaxis were excised from the theory, and all dependent clauses were interpreted as embedded, such clauses can still be interpreted as rank units, shifted to the rank of another unit on a rank scale.

[3] To be clear, the sense in which this is true is that SFL Theory provides both hypotaxis and embedding as potential descriptions of language, and the linguist chooses which of these to deploy in the description.

Criticising Martin For The Wrong Reasons

 Fawcett (2010: 332-3, 333n):

As M&M very fairly point out, "Fawcett (1980), [...] working within a theoretical framework closely related to Halliday's, treats all of Halliday's hypotactic clauses through embedding, the very position which Huddleston espouses." After also indicating that Martin (1988) suggests an analysis of such examples in which the experiential analysis at clause rank is in these terms, they go on: "The theory can thus be seen to accommodate a range of approaches to the question of subordination" (M&M 1991:29). ¹⁹ 

¹⁹ However, I am surprised to find Martin advocating this idea, because it involves an insuperable problem. This is that the second part of his proposal is that there should be a "simultaneous analysis" (showing the 'logical' structure) at the 'rank' of the "clause complex". This is, as we have seen, a different 'unit' on the 'rank scale' from the clause, so that if Martin's idea were to be adopted there would even more serious problems for the concept of conflating these two structures than those already specified in Section 7.4 of Chapter 7. It may be that Martin would now wish to reconsider this proposal.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from Fawcett's description, Martin's problematic analysis of he said he'd go would be something like:

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue, as previously demonstrated. As the term 'clause complex' suggests, the rank at which this unit complex is located is 'clause'.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As previously explained in the examination of Fawcett's Section 7.4, in SFL Theory, it is only elements of structure that can be conflated, not entire structures. The notion of structure conflation is nonsensical because a structure is the relation between elements. 

Throughout Section 7.4, Fawcett confused the false notion of 'structure conflation' with the notion of the integration of the three metafunction structures through their realisation in a syntagm of clause constituents: groups and phrases.

[4] To be clear, even if Martin were the type to reconsider his own proposals, and capable of doing so, at 71 years, he does not have enough years left him to reconsider all the proposals he needs to reconsider. See, for example, the clarifying critiques of Martin (1992) and Martin & Rose (2007).

Projection As A Hypotactic Relationship, Locution As Phenomenon

Fawcett (2010: 332):

M&M then go on to consider, much more briefly, examples such as the clause he'd go in He said he'd go. For Halliday (and so M&M) this is a case of the 'hypotactic' relationship of 'projection', with he'd go being a 'beta' clause to the supposed 'alpha' clause he said. As we saw at the start of this section, for both Huddleston and me this example has an embedded clause that fills a Complement of the higher clause He said he 'd go. (Strictly speaking, for me it fills the Participant Role of Phenomenon, this being conflated with the Complement.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is not misleading, because it is true.

[2] This is misleading, because it is not true. To be clear, in SFL Theory, projection is not a hypotactic relationship. Projection is a logico-semantic relation, whereas hypotaxis is a type of interdependency.

[3] Strictly speaking, in SFL Theory, if he'd go were an embedded clause, it would serve as Verbiage (the Range of a verbal Process), not as Phenomenon (the Range of a mental Process). However, in SFL Theory, this is a dependent clause, and so a verbal projection, and so a reported locution.

Fawcett's Important Principle

Fawcett (2010: 332):

An important principle is involved here. It is that, when one is deciding which patterns of similarity and contrast to assign to the system network of meaning potential within the grammar, one should give priority to those choices which are realised directly at the level of form. And one should recognise that other similarities and contrasts may first need to be modelled at a higher level in the process of generation, and then at a later point be mapped, often incongruently, onto the choices in the grammar itself. Thus, when a text-sentence such as (1a) is used to express a relationship between two events in a narrative, that decision should be modelled as part of the rhetorical structure, and predetermination rules should then ensure that the relationship gets mapped onto the choices in the grammar that present one event as locating the position in time of another.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Fawcett's 'important principle' is the direct opposite of the SFL approach to modelling grammar. Halliday (2002 [1984]: 307-8):

To understand [grammatical] categories, it is no use asking what they mean. The question is not ‘what is the meaning of this or that function or feature in the grammar?’; but rather ‘what is encoded in this language, or in this register (functional variety) of the language?’ This reverses the perspective derived from the history of linguistics, in which a language is a system of forms, with meanings attached to make sense of them. Instead, a language is treated as a system of meanings, with forms attached to express them.

That is, where SFL Theory adopts the view 'from above', giving priority to the meanings that are expressed by form, Fawcett adopts the view 'from below', giving priority to the forms that realise meaning. It is this fundamental difference in theoretical approach that is the driving force making the Cardiff Grammar inconsistent with SFL Theory, and it is Fawcett's ignorance of this fundamental difference that prevents him from understanding SFL Theory in its own terms, as this blog has demonstrated over and over and over.

Fawcett's Higher 'Rhetorical Structure Relations' Component

Fawcett (2010: 331-2, 332n):

However, M&M can still point out that the question remains of where, in the overall model, we should express the similarity between (1a) and (3a). My answer is that the place to handle the choice that is realised by these examples is in a higher component of the generation process than the lexicogrammar. This is the component which plans the rhetorical structure relations of the discourse, and so how best to present the relations between any two events. (For the key proposals for this component see Mann and Thompson 1987, and for a useful introductory discussion see Martin 1992.) Indeed, the choice that is realised in (1a), (2a) or (3a) must also be extended to include a realisation such as (4), so that for this reason too it is appropriate to handle it outside the lexicogrammar.¹⁸

(4) He left the room. Then they voted.

¹⁸ In fact, it is also at this stage in generation that the planner needs to consider choosing other conceptually equivalent choices realised in forms which M&M do not mention but which express the same basic temporal relationship of successivity between events, such as They voted after he left the room and After he left the room they voted.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

(1a) He left the room before they voted.

(2a) He left the room before the vote.

(3a) He left the room, then they voted.

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the distinction between (1a) and (3a) is the distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis at the rank of clause, and it modelled in the grammar by the system of clause complexing. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 438):

[2] To be clear, Fawcett does not locate this higher component anywhere in the architecture of his model (Figures 4 and 12):

[3] To be clear, Martin (1992: 251-64) misunderstands Rhetorical Structure Theory.  See, for example, the clarifying critiques here, here, and here.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, these are all different grammatical manifestations of the enhancement category 'time: different':

• in (1a), it is realised logically through clause complexing: hypotaxis;
• in (2a) it is realised experientially through clause transitivity: circumstantiation;
• in (3a), it is realised logically through clause complexing: parataxis; and
• in (4), it is realised textually through cohesive conjunction.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the logico-semantic relation between the clauses in both of these hypotactic complexes is analysed as 'time: different: later', with the first complex ordered dominant^dependent (α^β), and the second ordered dependent^dominant (β^α). Note again that Fawcett frames this in terms of a model of text generation by computers, rather than a model of language spoken or written by humans.

Misrepresenting An Argument Against Parataxis As An Argument Against Hypotaxis

Fawcett (2010: 331):

In the second part of their case, M&M suggest a second analysis of Huddleston's example, i.e., as two co-ordinated clauses with ellipsis in the second, thus: He left before the debate or (he left) (at least) before the vote was taken. But again, I am afraid, I have to point out a problem. While their analysis appears at first to be another possible one, we need to take account of the fact that one can insert either to the left of before the debate, so that it becomes He left either before the debate or (at least) before the vote was taken. And this fact demonstrates clearly that the grammar must allow for the possibility of generating the prepositional group and the clause as jointly filling an Adjunct.

Thus M&M suggest that two possible analyses should be allowed (the first being Huddleston's and mine). They therefore do not address the question of which of the two is systemically preferable, and why. Moreover, Huddleston's criticism of IFG stands. In other words, he is right that Halliday's decision to treat all clauses embedded directly in clauses as 'hypotaxis' means that the Sydney Grammar cannot handle examples such as Huddleston's.

Finally, to demonstrate that Huddleston's example is not a 'special case', consider the following example with a simple 'additive' Linker: On average, people died earlier in those days, both from diseases such as diphtheria and because they worked such dreadfully long hours. Notice that here (as in Huddleston's example) the item both prevents the M&M analysis in terms of two co-ordinated clauses with ellipsis. The conclusion, then, must be that we should treat all such 'beta' clauses as embedded clauses. … Withe respect to the areas of the grammar described here, then, M&M fail to rebut Huddleston's critical comments. 

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is an argument about parataxis, and as such, not relevant to the question of hypotaxis. Moreover, this being the case, it could be equally directed against Fawcett's model of co-ordination.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, Huddleston's criticism does not stand, with regard to hypotaxis, because it is an argument about parataxis. On the other hand, SFL Theory (IFG, Halliday) does not treat all such "embedded" clauses as hypotaxis. By distinguishing between embedding (rankshift) and hypotaxis, SFL Theory provides such explanatory advantages as distinguishing between

• defining relative clauses (embedded) and non-defining relative clauses (dependent), and
• pre-projected facts (embedded) and reported projections (dependent).

The conclusion, then, is the distinction between rankshifted and dependent clauses has explanatory advantages over the lack of distinction.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Rankshift

Fawcett (2010: 330-1):

Here we shall consider M&M's response to Huddleston's "co-ordination" argument. This begins, perhaps surprisingly, with M&M's agreement that his analysis is indeed a possible one (i.e., the analysis in which before the vote was taken is treated as a clause embedded as an Adjunct). However, they move quickly on from this apparent olive branch to a robust defence of what they take to be the IFG position on this matter — claiming that Huddleston is wrong to criticise IFG for ruling out his analysis, because "there is nothing in Halliday's system to block this analysis" (p. 27). 

But on this matter Huddleston is right and M&M are wrong, as is shown by Halliday's own specification of the types of rankshift that his model permits. Thus he states (IFG p. 242) that "the relationship of an embedded clause to the 'outer' clause is an indirect one" — i.e., the embedded clause must fill an element of a group, not a clause. (See Section 11.8.5 of Chapter 11 for a summary of Halliday 's statement on this matter.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, if a clause is shifted to the rank of group, then it functions as a group and so serves as ("fills") an element of a clause. For example:

On the other hand, it is when a clause is shifted to the rank of word, that it serves as ("fills") an element of a group. For example:

[2] See the post on Section 11.8.5: Seriously Misrepresenting Halliday On Embedding.

"Two Problems Unaddressed"

Fawcett (2010: 330):

Even though Halliday may be right that language is ultimately "ineffable" (Halliday 1984/88), it seems to me that, as SF linguists, it is our task to carry out the research programme outlined earlier, i.e., to assemble the available evidence; to decide which relationships between examples should be given systemic priority in the model of the lexicogrammar; and to explain our decisions. As we have seen, M&M accept this goal too, recognising that the question is that of "what to treat as the basic agnation" (M&M 1991:25). So how far do they do this? 

On the 'thematisability' evidence for treating (1a) as being like (2a) rather than (3a), M&M simply state that "Halliday points out that the thematic principle is not limited to [elements within] the clause; it is also in operation in the clause complex" (1991:26). But one's inevitable response is that, since they start from a position of commitment the concept of 'hypotaxis', they are bound to take this position, so that this it is not independent evidence in support of their argument. Their reply to Huddleston leaves two problems unaddressed. 

The first is that, if we do not treat both after they voted in (1a) and after the vote in (2a) as Adjuncts, our grammar will require two different rules to model a generalisation that patently invites expression in a single rule. 

And the second is that it is not clear how such a rule can in fact be formalised (unless the 'alpha' and 'beta' clauses are admitted as full elements of an as yet unnamed unit, so that the 'beta' element can be thematised in the same way that an Adjunct is.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

(1a) He left the room before they voted.
(2a) He left the room before the vote.
(3a) He left the room, then they voted.

[1] This is misleading. M&M's reply specifically addressed Huddleston's claim that the thematisability of the dependent clause in (1a) was evidence that it is embedded as an Adjunct, demonstrating why, in theoretical terms, why this was not the case.

[2] To be clear, if this is a problem, it is only a problem for Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar, not for SFL Theory. In SFL Theory, the general meaning of 'time' — like all categories of expansion and projection — is realised across several domains of the grammar. In (1a) it is realised through clause complexing, whereas in (2a) it is realised through the transitivity system of the clause.

[3] To be clear, the "as yet unnamed unit" in which a 'beta' clause can be thematised is not so much a unit as a unit complex: the clause complex. Halliday (1994: 57):

Fawcett's Epistemology

Fawcett (2010: 329-30):

The main rhetorical thrust of M&M's "Response to Huddleston" is a forceful rejection of almost all of what he says. Yet often, as we shall see, they do not show why we should reject arguments such as these, even sometimes accepting Huddleston's analysis. 

Instead, their major point is (following Halliday in his 'reply' to Matthews in the first stage of the 'rank scale' debate) that it is a virtue of Halliday's model that it raises questions about grammatical structure, rather than to establish that the IFG approach is 'right' and that the more traditional analysis that Huddleston offers is 'wrong'. This approach is fully justifiable at the exploratory stage, but systemic functional linguists have now had well over a quarter of a century to explore English in the systemic functional framework.

Even though Halliday may be right that language is ultimately "ineffable" (Halliday 1984/88), it seems to me that, as SF linguists, it is our task to carry out the research programme outlined earlier, i.e., to assemble the available evidence; to decide which relationships between examples should be given systemic priority in the model of the lexicogrammar; and to explain our decisions.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here again Fawcett makes a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence, about an argument to presented later in order to prime the reader to prejudge the argument when it is finally presented.

[2] To be clear, this is a serious epistemological misunderstanding that pervades Fawcett's work. The notion that theories are right or wrong presumes that 

• there is one true model of phenomena, if only we could find it, and so that
• there are criteria for assessing theories that are themselves independent of theory.

Clearly, theories are contingent on the initial assumptions on which they are developed. Theories can be compared on the basis of explanatory potential, but this too is contingent on the assumptions on which each theory was developed, which include the functions the theory was designed to serve.

On the other hand, what can be assessed as "right" (consistent) or "wrong" (inconsistent) are interpretations of theory.

[3] To be clear, this is a serious misunderstanding. Halliday argues that it is grammatical categories that are ineffable, and in a specific sense. Halliday (2002 [1984]: 303, 306-7):

The meaning of a typical grammatical category thus has no counterpart in our conscious representation of things. There can be no exact paraphrase of Subject or Actor or Theme – because there is no language-independent clustering of phenomena in our experience to which they correspond. If there was, we should not need the linguistic category to create one. If language was a purely passive partner, ‘expressing’ a ‘reality’ that was already there, its categories would be eminently glossable. But it is not. Language is an active participant in the semogenic process. Language creates reality – and therefore its categories of content cannot be defined, since we could define them only by relating them to some pre-existing model of experience, and there is no model of experience until the linguistic categories are there to model it. The only meaning of Subject is the meaning that has evolved along with the category itself. … 

But a language is an evolved system; and evolved systems rest on principles that are ineffable – because they do not correspond to any consciously accessible categorisation of our experience. Only the relatively trivial meanings of a natural language are likely to be reducible to (meta-)words. Fundamental semantic concepts, like those underlying Subject, or Theme, Actor, New, definite, present, finite, mass, habitual, locative, are, in an entirely positive way, ineffable. 

How Huddleston Tackles The Problem

Fawcett (2010: 329, 329n):

Let us now look at how Huddleston tackles the problem (1988:145-6). He presents partially similar arguments for treating (1a) as being functionally like (2b). They are grammatical arguments, though they are not, of course, expressed in explicitly systemic terms. He cites 

(a) the 'thematisability' of the Time Position Adjunct in both (1a) and (2a); 

(b) the parallels as "focus of an interrogative" between Did he leave before they voted? and Did he leave before the vote? and 

(c) the fact that it is possible to co-ordinate a clause and a nominalised event, as in He left before the debate or (at least) before the vote was taken.¹⁷

¹⁷ It is not clear how Huddleston's second pair of examples is relevant. It surely cannot be the case that he believes that anything significant follows from the fact that a 'beta' clause may have a separate information unit (and so intonation unit). An example such as Did he leave, before they voted? is unusual but not unacceptable. But if Huddleston's example of the 'polarity seeker' type of "interrogative" was a slip and he actually intended to draw attention to the fact that When did he leave? is the "wh-interrogative" equivalent of both (1a) and (2a), then his point would clearly be relevant.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

(1a, i-iii) He left the room before / after / while they voted.

(2a, i-iii) He left the room before / after / during the vote.

(1b, i-iii) Before / after / while they voted, he left the room.

(2b, i-iii) Before / after / during the vote he left the room.

[1] To be clear, Huddleston's claim here is that the fact that a dependent clause can be thematised is evidence that it is embedded as a clause constituent. However, such thematisation is not universally available, but crucially dependent on the logico-semantic relation obtaining between the clauses. For example, thematisation of a dependent clause is not possible in the case of elaboration:

||| He doesn't always tell the truth || which undermines his credibility.|||

nor always possible in the case of enhancement:

||| These theories include the solar theory || whereby periodically the amount of nitrogen compounds is enhanced. |||

nor always possible in the case of projection:

||| Brutus thought || that Cæsar was ambitious |||

and, contrariwise, "thematisation" of a clause is possible for parataxis, in the case of projection:

||| "Well, I'm back" || he said. |||

[2] To be clear, as presented by Fawcett, Huddleston's point appears to be that the clause before they voted and the phrase before the vote both serve the same function in the clause because they both function as the "focus of an interrogative". 

However, though the term 'focus' is used in SFL Theory, this is not consistent with the SFL usage, since the information focus need not fall within the dependent clause or the prepositional phrase. So here Huddleston has merely used the interrogative agnate to repeat the same point he made for the declarative clause.

[3] To be clear, Huddleston's point here is irrelevant, because it is about parataxis, not about the question of hypotaxis vs embedding in (1a), (2a), (1b) and (2b).

[4] To be clear, the WH- interrogative When did he leave? is not criterial in deciding the question of hypotaxis vs embedding. Both (1a) and (2a) answer the question, the former with a dependent clause, the latter with a prepositional phrase. How the function of each is analysed depends on the theory being used.

Fawcett's Argument On Hypotaxis vs Embedding [6]

 Fawcett (2010: 328-9):

If we put this evidence together with that of my alternative analyses of the examples of Halliday's ten major categories for 'paratactic' and 'hypotactic' relations between clauses (as set out in Section 11.9 of Chapter 11), we have two separate pieces of evidence that the grammar should not in fact foreground the contrast between 'parataxis' vs. 'hypotaxis' as a system that is to be entered simultaneously with one for 'expansion' vs. 'projection', etc. 

The alternative is that each type of 'co-ordination' and each type of 'dependence' should be modelled in terms of the systemic choices that are available to it, so avoiding the ever present temptation to the grammarian, i.e., that of modifying the description to conform to the theory.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, neither of these constitute evidence about the system of TAXIS (parataxis vs hypotaxis). The argument Fawcett has just made relies on misrepresenting expressions of systemic features as systemic features (see the preceding five posts), and his alternative analyses in Section 11.9 are merely presented rather than supported by argument; see:

• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic And Paratactic Projection
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic Extension And Enhancement
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic "Elaboration"
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Paratactic Expansion
• Summary Of How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotaxis And Parataxis

[2] To be clear, this is precisely how the two types of interdependency — parataxis ("co-ordination") and hypotaxis ("dependence") — are modelled in SFL Theory, in conjunction with the systems of LOGICO-SEMANTIC TYPE and RECURSION. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 438):

[3] To be clear, it is not the description that is at risk of being modified so as to conform to theory, but the data that is described in terms of a theory. More importantly, Fawcett's insinuation here is that Halliday has succumbed to the temptation of intellectual dishonesty.

Fawcett's Argument On Hypotaxis vs Embedding [5]

 Fawcett (2010: 327, 328):

(1a, i-iii) He left the room before / after / while they voted.

(1b, i-iii) Before / after / while they voted, he left the room.

Thus the lexicogrammatical evidence begins to mount up that, on the one hand, (1a, i) belongs systemically with (1a, ii-iii), and that, on the other, it belongs with (1b, i). 

Moreover, these two pairs of systemic relationships can both be handled in a natural way in the lexicogrammar. (We know this because we have implemented this approach in the generative grammar in COMMUNAL.) 

On the other hand, the lexicogrammatical evidence is that a different range of choices is available for modelling co-ordination between clauses ('parataxis') from the range for modelling 'dependent' relations (whether these are viewed as 'hypotaxis' or embedding). 

The case for foregrounding the parallels between 'parataxis' and 'hypotaxis' in the system networks therefore looks rather less convincing than it may have at the start of this study of the data.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the one hand, Fawcett has provided no evidence that (1a,i) "belongs systemically with" (1a,ii-iii), and on the other hand, this is not in dispute, since these are agnates differing only in the relative time construed by the dependent clause (earlier vs later vs same).

[2] To be clear, on the one hand, Fawcett has provided no evidence that (1a,i) "belongs systemically with" (1b,i), and on the other hand, it is true that, in SFL Theory, it does — though not in the way that Fawcett means. In (1a, i) 'earlier' time is realised through the ideational clause rank system of CLAUSE COMPLEXING, whereas in (1b, i), 'earlier' time is realised through the related ideational clause rank system of CIRCUMSTANTIATION.

[3] This is not misleading, because it is true.

[4] We know this because we understand how "these two pairs of systemic relationships" are modelled by SFL Theory.

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As previously demonstrated, the "range of systemic choices" for temporal enhancement is the same for parataxis and hypotaxis. The difference lies only in how agnate choices are realised.

[6] This is misleading, because it is not true, as demonstrated by this and four preceding posts.

Fawcett's Argument On Hypotaxis vs Embedding [4]

   Fawcett (2010: 327, 328):

(1a, i-iii) He left the room before / after / while they voted.

(2a, i-iii) He left the room before / after / during the vote.

(1b, i-iii) Before / after / while they voted, he left the room.

(2b, i-iii) Before / after / during the vote he left the room.

One the other hand, the grammar should — and can — capture the fact that we can thematise both before they voted and before the vote, as in (1b, i) and (2b, i) — a possibility which suggests that the same element (which we may term a Time Position Adjunct) is involved in both (1a, i-iii) and (2a, i-iii). And equivalent variants can be generated, of course, for (1b, ii-iii) as in (2b, ii-iii), if the option to thematise the Time Position Adjunct is exercised.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, SFL Theory does "capture the fact" that both can be thematised.

Cf. Halliday (1994: 57):

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the suggestion is that 'time' is realised through clause complexing in (1a) and (1b) and through a Location circumstance in (2a) and (2b).

See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 671) for the range of grammatical environments in which 'time' can be realised.

Fawcett's Argument On Hypotaxis vs Embedding [3]

   Fawcett (2010: 327-8):

(3b, i-n) He left the room, but earlier (on) / first/ before that / before his departure / etc. they (had) voted. 

(3c, i-n) He left the room and in that period / during that time / during his absence / etc. they voted. 

(3a, v-n) He left the room, and later (on) / afterwards / after that / after his departure / etc. they voted.

It is always possible, of course, to express a roughly equivalent meaning by a combination of the Linker and and an Adjunct such as afterwards or during that time, etc., these Adjuncts being shown by underlining in (3b,i-n) and (3c, i-n). 

But this is a very different matter, in terms of the systemic choices that are available, as these examples show — because the introduction of the Adjunct opens up a very much larger range of possibilities than is available within the Linker. (Indeed, the use of "n" in the numbering of the examples symbolises the open-endedness of the available options.) 

Moreover, a similar range of options to those shown in (3b, i-n) and (3c, i-n) is also available to express the concept of 'subsequent time', as (3a, i-n) demonstrates. Thus the system of choices within 'paratactic' relations is significantly different from that when the relationship is one of 'dependence' (whether this is interpreted as 'hypotaxis' or as embedding). 

The lists of examples given in each of Tables (7(6) and 7(7) on pages 216 and 217 of IFG in fact illustrate precisely this difference. (These tables cover not just temporal relations but the full range of types of embedded clause that express a Circumstance, and in so doing they provide further evidence for the position taken here.) Halliday must therefore be aware that the parallels are limited.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, it is only the conjunctive Adjuncts in Fawcett's data that mark temporal relations between the clauses in these paratactic complexes. These are:

• earlier (on)
• first
• before that
• later (on)
• afterwards
• after that

The circumstantial Adjuncts in Fawcett's data, on the other hand, do not mark temporal relations between the clauses in these paratactic complexes. Instead, they realise time as a circumstance of the Process of the clause in which they figure. These are:

• before his departure
• in that period
• during that time
• during his absence
• after his departure

[2] This is misleading because, in the case of conjunctive Adjuncts, this is not a "very different matter in terms of the systemic choices that are available", because, in terms of relating two clauses in a paratactic complex, the "introduction of the [conjunctive] Adjunct" does not "open up a very much larger range of possibilities than is available within the Linker [structure marker]". In such cases, the systemic choices are restricted to 'parataxis' and 'expansion: enhancing: temporal', varying for 'same' or 'different: earlier' or 'different: later'. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 438):

Here Fawcett has simply confused expressions of systemic choices ("the lists of examples") with the systemic choices that they express.