Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On Semantics

Fawcett (2010: 89):

We have already noted several surprising omissions of "Categories" concepts from the basic concepts of "Systemic theory". I shall now identify another omission — though it is one of a different sort. You will recall, from Section 4.6 of Chapter 4, that in recent years Halliday has shown an increasing commitment the view that we should recognise an additional layer of 'meaning potential' — i.e., a 'semantics' above the level of 'meaning potential' that is represented in the system networks for TRANSITIVITY, MOOD and so on. We called this the 'two-level' model of meaning. Interestingly, Halliday does not include this concept in "Systemic theory". If it is as central to his view of language as some of his recent writings suggest (e.g., 1996:29), why, one wonders, has it been left out?

Blogger Comments:

[1] See the preceding posts for the invalidity of this claim.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  As previously demonstrated, the stratification of the content plane into semantics and lexicogrammar has been a feature of SFL theory at least since Halliday & Hasan (1976), if not before.

[3] As previously demonstrated, Fawcett confuses 'meaning potential' (language as system) with the stratum of meaning (semantics).  Here he compounds the misunderstanding by confusing it with the stratum of wording (lexicogrammar).

[4] To be clear, it is the content plane that is stratified, with one level of meaning and one level of wording.

[5] This is misleading.  Halliday (1995 [1993]: 273) writes:

The shift to a paradigmatic orientation led to the finding that the content plane of a language is organised in a small number of functionally defined components which Halliday labelled 'metafunctions.' … The stratal role of the lexicogrammar lies in mapping these semantic components into a unitary construct, one that is capable of being linearised.

On The Strange Omission Of The Vital Operation 'Insert Unit'

Fawcett (2010: 88):

Strangely, one vital operation appears to be missing from Halliday's list in "Systemic theory" — and it is also missing from the closely related lists given in Matthiessen & Bateman (1991) and Matthiessen (1995). This missing operation is 'Insert unit', and I shall comment on the possible reasons for its absence in Section 9.2 of Chapter 9.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Fawcett's operation 'Insert unit' corresponds to Halliday's features of the rank scale — clause, group/phrase, word, morpheme — as the entry conditions for more delicate systems at each rank, as will be seen in the examination of Section 9.2 of Chapter 9.  Fawcett's model lacks a rank scale, and so requires this extra 'operation' in his inventory of realisation rules. It will also be seen in that future discussion that Fawcett continues his previously identified confusion of structure with constituency.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) By Confusing Rank With Structure

Fawcett (2010: 88n):

You may have noticed that the term "rank" is used in (f) above, but this is not significant. This is because, strictly speaking, Halliday should have used here a term such as "layer of structure" or "unit", since the unit that is 'lower' in the structure is not necessarily of a lower 'rank' (e.g., a clause or a prepositional group/phrase frequently functions as a qualifier in a nominal group).

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

(f) 'Preselect' some feature at a lower rank (e.g., preselect nominal group);

This is misleading, because it is untrue. Here Fawcett's wording "lower in the structure" confuses the rank scale of forms ("lower") with the syntagmatic axis ("structure").  The form that realises a function is not lower in structure, but lower in constituency.  In the case of a clause realising the Qualifier of a nominal group, the (higher rank) clause is a constituent of a (lower rank) nominal group, which is why the phenomenon is called 'rankshift'.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1961, 1993) And Matthiessen (1995) On Element

Fawcett (2010: 88):

In the Sydney Grammar, it is the word "function" that should, strictly speaking, be used to refer to concepts such as 'Subject' and 'Theme', e.g., in (a), (b) and (c) of Halliday's realisation statements. The term "element" is typically used for the component of the clause into which such "functions" combine. Interestingly, Matthiessen makes no use at all of the term "element", using instead the informal term "bundle of functions". Thus in "Systemic theory" Halliday uses "element" in Matthiessen's sense of "function" — such that the "conflation" (or 'fusion') of two or more such "functions" combines to constitute a single element of the clause, in the way to be described in Section 7.2 of Chapter 7. It is this unified sense of "element" that corresponds most closely to the meaning of the term "element" in "Categories". It may be thought that this is not a major difference, but it is nonetheless a significant one, because it reflects the addition to the theory of the concept that an element may carry several meanings at the same time — this being the third of the major developments in the theory that we noted in Chapter 4.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  Subject and Theme are each elements of function structure.  In theoretical terms, this specifies them as located on the syntagmatic axis, whereas the unqualified term 'function' does not.  For example, as Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 83) point out: 'Theme functions in the structure of the clause as message'.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  Elements of function structure, such as Subject and Location, map onto clause constituents, such as nominal groups and prepositional phrases.  That is to say, here Fawcett has merely confused the term 'element' (of function structure) with the term 'constituent' (as modelled by the rank scale of form).  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 9):

Grammatically, however, the constituent of a clause is not, in fact, a word; it is either a phrase or a word group…

[3] To be clear, the terms 'element' and 'bundle of functions' are not synonymous.  While an element is a structural function such as Theme or Subject or Senser, a bundle of functions are all the structural functions that map onto a clause constituent, such as Theme and Subject and Senser all mapping onto a nominal group.

[4] This is doubly misleading, because it is doubly untrue. On the one hand, in Halliday's Scale and Category Grammar (1961), before the theorising of metafunctions, there are no functions to be conflated on a constituent, and on the other hand, Halliday (1961) uses the term in precisely the same way as in Systemic Theory (1993).  Halliday (2002 [1961]: 47):

In the statement of English clause structure, for example, four elements are needed, for which the widely accepted terms subject, predicator, complement and adjunct are appropriate.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1985, 1993, 1994) And Matthiessen (1995) On Element

Fawcett (2010: 87-8):

Halliday's seven types of 'realisation statement' are, in his words:

(a) 'Insert' an element (e.g., insert subject); 

(b) 'Conflate' one element with another (e.g., conflate subject with theme); 

(c) Order' an element with respect to another, or to some defined location (e.g., order finite auxiliary before subject); 

(d) 'Classify' an element (e.g., classify process as mental: cognition); 

(e) "Split' an element into a further configuration (e.g., split mood into subject + finite); 

(f) 'Preselect' some feature at a lower rank (e.g., preselect nominal group); 

(g) 'Lexify' an element (e.g., lexify subject : it). 

(Halliday 1993:4505) 

… Earlier, we were considering the fact that the concept of 'element' was not presented as a "basic concept" in "Systemic theory". However, as you can see from the number of instances of the word "element" in boldface in Halliday's realisation statements, this term certainly plays a central role in the process of building 'structure' in his theory. Notice, however, that the term "element" is being used here in a different sense from that in "Categories" — and also from that in which it is typically used in IFG and in Matthiessen (1995:23-5).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  Despite the fact that the two publications outline different theories,  the use of the term 'element' in Halliday (1993) is the same as its use in Halliday (1961), as the following quote from "Categories" (Halliday 2002 [1961]: 46-7) makes plain:

A structure is made up of elements which are graphically represented as being in linear progression; but the theoretical relation among them is one of order. … A structure is thus an arrangement of elements ordered in places. Places are distinguished by order alone: a structure XXX consists of three places. … In the statement of English clause structure, for example, four elements are needed, for which the widely accepted terms subject, predicator, complement and adjunct are appropriate. These yield four distinct symbols, so that S, P, C, A would be the inventory of elements of English clause structure.

What differs in the two theories is that "Categories" (Halliday 1961) does not yet differentiate between metafunctions, and so the elements of structure are restricted to what later became those of the interpersonal metafunction in Systemic Theory.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  The meaning of 'element' in both IFG and Matthiessen (1995) is 'structural function'.  For example, Halliday (1985: 32; 1994: 30) writes:

…each clause contains one element which can be identified as its Subject…

It will be seen in the following post that Fawcett confuses (functional) 'element' with (formal) 'constituent'.

On There Being No Important Difference Between The Terms 'Realisation Statements' And 'Realisation Rules'

Fawcett (2010: 86n-7n):

Halliday prefers the term 'statements' to rules', but there is no difference of substance here. Following Hudson's pioneering work on realisation in Hudson (1971), I use the term "realisation rules". Strictly speaking, what Halliday refers to here as "realisation statements" are 'realisation operations', because it is possible for the realisation statement for a given feature to include two or more such 'operations'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  On the one hand, Halliday's term 'realisation statement' is consistent with the notion of systems as probabilistic, since probability is a modality of statements. 

On the other hand, Fawcett's term 'realisation rules' construes commands, the agnate modality of which is obligation. This is inconsistent with both modelling systems as probabilistic and with the fundamental view of language taken by SFL theory: meaning as choice.

[2] To be clear, this is a non-sequitur.  Fawcett's argument is as follows:

Premiss: a realisation statement for a feature can include two or more operations,
Conclusion: realisation statements should be called realisation operations.

On the one hand, the Premiss is false, because, in Halliday's model, each individual realisation statement constitutes only one 'operation', not two or more.  On the other hand, the reasoning of the argument is invalid because it deploys the type of circular reasoning known as 'begging the question' (petitio principii), wherein the truth of the conclusion is assumed in the premiss, namely: that realisation statements are operations.

On The Location Of Halliday's Realisation Statements In Fawcett's Model

Fawcett (2010: 86-7):

The selection expression is the input to the realisation statements. The function of each of these is to specify, for a given feature in the system network, the operation through which that feature contributes to "the structural configuration" that is being generated. In "Systemic theory" Halliday specifies seven types of realisation statement, his claim being that every such statement conforms to one of the seven types. As we saw in Chapter 3, a theory of syntax must be concerned with how the grammar specifies both (1) the syntax potential and (2) the instances of syntax, i.e., the outputs from the grammar. In terms of Figure 4 in Chapter 3, then, Halliday's 'realisation statements' belong in the box labelled "realisation rules / statements".

I shall now list the set of types of 'realisation operation' given in "Systemic theory". However, I shall leave the full explanation and evaluation of each to Chapter 9 of Part 2, because they are relatively close to the set that is required for this component of a modern theory of syntax for a SF grammar — though the set to be introduced in Chapter 9 set is slightly fuller. They will therefore be explained and evaluated at that point, i.e., in Section 9.2.1 of Chapter 9.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett has momentarily switched from his red herring argument, of assessing Halliday (1993) in terms of Halliday (1961), to merely restating where Halliday's realisation statements are located in his own model (Figure 4), which, as previously explained over and over (e.g here), is riddled with internal inconsistencies that result from his theoretical misunderstandings.

[2] Here, once again, Fawcett primes the uncritical reader by promising a critique ('evaluation') elsewhere.

Misconstruing Selection Expressions As Instances Of Meaning

Fawcett (2010: 86):

Let us begin with instantiation. In Halliday's words: 

'Instantiation' is the relation between the semiotic system and the observable events, or 'acts of meaning'. (Halliday 1993:4505)

Even a selection expression, which is strictly speaking not "observable", is an 'instance', i.e., an 'instance of meaning', in that it is the set of features that have been chosen on one traversal of the system network. Thus the instance of meaning' chosen in Section 3 of the worked example in Appendix A is: 

[thing, count, plural, student, nearness to performer, un-near]

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true.  A selection expression is the systemic classification of a given unit.  Halliday (1993: 273):

The selection expression constitutes the grammar's description of the item (e.g., the particular clause so specified); it is also, by reference to the network, the representation of its systemic relationship to other items in the language — since the grammar is paradigmatic, describing something 'consists in' locating it with respect to the rest (showing its total lineage of agnate forms).

Importantly, this may be the unit as potential, unit as instance, or unit as somewhere between (as sub-potential or instance type).  For example, the selection expression of a phoneme, such as [voiced, velar, stop], may describe it as phonological potential or as an actual instance when spoken.

To be clear, this misunderstanding is fundamental to Fawcett's model (Figure 4), and, as a misunderstanding, constitutes one of the lines of evidence that invalidates it.

[2] To be clear, here Fawcett confuses language ("observable") with the linguistic description of it (selection expression).  That is, he confuses the data with the model.

[3] To be clear, selection expressions are relevant in Systemic theory wherever there are systems, and thus are not limited to the level of meaning, semantics.  This is only the case in Fawcett's model, where they are misunderstood as instances.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On Realisation

Fawcett (2010: 85-6):

Finally, let us look at what has happened to the term realisation (Halliday's 1966 replacement for the original "Categories" term "exponence"). Halliday originally brought the concept of 'realisation' into use as a result of the elevation of 'system' to model 'meaning potential', as we saw in Figure 4 (in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3). However, the original "Categories" concept of 'exponence / realisation' has now become the concept that denotes the relationship between two levels of language. In Halliday's words:

'Realisation' is the relationship between the 'strata' (or levels) of a [...] semiotic system" (Halliday (1993:4505).

Thus the term has significantly changed its meaning as a result of the elevation of 'system' to model 'meaning potential', just as 'system' itself and 'delicacy' have — but in this case the change of meaning has been marked by a change of name.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett claims the meaning (Value) of a term 'realisation' has changed despite the fact that it is actually the term (Token) that has changed (from 'exponence'), not the meaning.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  Halliday adopted the term 'realisation' as the name for the relation between levels of symbolic abstraction, in the first instance, between strata.  As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's notion of 'the elevation of system to model meaning potential' confuses language as potential (system) with the semantic stratum (meaning).  Moreover, the fact that this is irrelevant to the notion of 'realisation' demonstrates that Fawcett does not understand the meaning of this theoretical term.

As the grammar makes plain, 'realisation' is a nominalisation of the intensive identifying Process 'realise' which relates a less abstract (lower level) Token to a more abstract (higher level) Value.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  Fawcett's own model (Figure 4) says nothing about changes to Halliday's model, actual or imaginary, even when the latter is understood.

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  As demonstrated in previous posts, the terms 'system' (evidence here) and 'delicacy' (evidence here) have not changed their meaning.

More importantly, the meanings of terms in one theory, Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961), are irrelevant to an examination of another theory, Systemic Theory (Halliday 1993).  Fawcett's entire enterprise in comparing terms across theories is an instance of the Red Herring logical fallacy.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On Rank

Fawcett (2010: 85):

Notice that while Halliday introduces the word "rank" in "Systemic theory", the idea that it means a 'rank scale' of units with the associated concept of 'accountability at all ranks' is simply omitted from what is presented as a summary of the "basic concepts" of the theory. One reason why this is particularly surprising is that the concept of the 'rank scale' is still reflected quite strongly in IFG, as we shall see in the next chapter. Nor is there any help on this matter in Halliday (1996). On the other hand, Matthiessen uses the concepts of the 'rank scale' and 'rank shift' quite freely in his Lexico-grammatical Cartography, and he defines 'rank' in the standard "Categories" manner in the book's useful Glossary section (Matthiessen 1995:790). Thus it would be premature to interpret Halliday's failure to foreground the concept of the 'rank scale' in "Systemic theory" as a weakening of his commitment to the 'rank scale'. It is nonetheless a curious omission.

Whatever the reason for this omission …

Blogger Comments:

This is yet another attempt to mislead.  What Halliday (1993: 273) actually says is:

3. Other Basic Concepts

Systemic theory retains the concepts of 'rank,' 'realisation,' and 'delicacy' from scale and category grammar. 'Rank' is constituency based on function, and hence 'flat,' with minimal layering;

Here Fawcett is attempting to cast doubt on the notion of rank, on the basis of the brevity of an entry in an encyclopædia entry.  The reason Fawcett wishes to do so is that his own model does not include a rank scale, and so, by casting doubt, Fawcett primes the uncritical reader for his later dismissal of the theoretical value of a rank scale.

Not Understanding Halliday (1993) On Rank

Fawcett (2010: 84):

We turn now to the concept of 'rank' — the 'scale' which, with 'unit', provides the major organising principle of the grammar in "Categories". The definition that Halliday gives of it in "Systemic theory" is one of the more puzzling sections of the paper. Here he defines 'rank' in a somewhat opaque manner, writing: 

'Rank' is constituency based on function, and hence 'flat', with minimal layering. (Halliday 1993:4505) 

The meaning of "and hence flat" can be clarified by expanding the last part of Halliday's definition to "and hence represented by diagrams that resemble 'flat trees' rather than 'trees with multiple branching'". And such trees naturally have "minimal layering".

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Fawcett provides no evidence that he understands Halliday here.  By 'constituency based on function, and hence 'flat', with minimal layering' Halliday means constituency based on minimal bracketing (ranked constituents) rather than maximal bracketing (immediate constituents).  Halliday (1985: 23):

 

 

Minimal bracketing at three ranks yields (Halliday 1985: 21):

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On Delicacy

Fawcett (2010: 84):

Let us begin with delicacy. I suggested in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2 that this concept belongs essentially with that of 'system' (and so with 'system network'), such that one system is more "delicate" than another if its entry condition is a feature in that other system — and so on, across a chain of such dependencies (as illustrated on a small scale in Figure 1 of Appendix A). It follows, then, that the elevation of the 'system' to model contrasts in 'meaning potential' rather than contrasts between forms brings with it a similar change in the meaning of 'delicacy' — so that 'delicacy' has similarly become a partly different concept. It is therefore not simply "retained", as Halliday says (p. 4505); it has been adapted, just as the concept of 'system' has been adapted. However, there is what we might term a "second order" manifestation of the concept, i.e., its use to describe the relationship between 'primary' and 'secondary structures'. (See Figure 7 in Section 7.2 of Chapter 7 for the presentation of MOOD as having both a 'primary' and a 'secondary' structure, and see Section 10.3.4 of Chapter 10 for a critical discussion of this concept.) With these substantial provisos, then, we may say that the term "delicacy" is used in "Systemic theory" in a roughly similar sense to that which it had in "Categories". 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, the theoretical meaning of systemic 'delicacy' is Halliday's formulation, not Fawcett's suggestion.

[2] This is misleading because it seriously misunderstands the notion of delicacy.  Because the scale of delicacy is a dimension of systems — semantic, lexicogrammatical, phonological — the stratal location of systems does not change the meaning of systemic delicacy.

[3] Here again Fawcett confuses language as system (meaning potential) with semantics as stratum (meaning).

[4] This is misleading.  To be clear, delicacy is a dimension of system, not structure.  To anticipate the examination of Chapter 7, compare Fawcett's Figure 7 with the delicacy of the MOOD system of Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

 

Using Halliday (1961) As The Benchmark Of Halliday (1993)

Fawcett (2010: 83-4):

Thus, only one of the four "fundamental" categories of "Categories" appears in the list of "basic concepts" in "Systemic theory" (i.e., 'system') — and even then it has a significantly modified sense. Two are either used informally or presupposed (i.e.,  'element' and 'class (of unit)'), but it is really surprising to find that they are not presented as "basic concepts". And one of the four original "fundamental concepts" ('unit') is completely missing.

How far, then, are the 'scales' of "Categories" still treated as "basic concepts" in "Systemic theory"? In the section headed "Other basic concepts" Halliday makes the claim that "systemic theory retains [from "Categories"] the concepts of 'rank', 'realisation' [his 1966 replacement for 'exponence'] and 'delicacy'" (Halliday 1993:4505-6). But are these the same concepts that we met in the summary of "Categories" in Chapter 2? 

Blogger Comments:

[1] See the preceding 6 posts for the validity of these claims.

[2] See the next 4 posts for the validity of these claims.

Misunderstanding Halliday (1993) On Class

Fawcett (2010: 83):

The fourth "fundamental category" in "Categories" is 'class' — and this concept too is missing from the list of "basic concepts" in "Systemic theory". This absence is equally surprising, because the concept of 'class of unit' is essential to any generative SF grammar. The reason is that the way in which such grammars work is that each pass through the system network builds the structure of a given class of unit. For example, the class of unit that the simple system network in Figure 1 of Appendix A generates is the nominal group, and it cannot generate any other class of unit. The class of unit that is generated in all of the illustrative generative grammars that Halliday presents is the clause (e.g., Halliday 1969/81). "Systemic theory" is oriented to the use of the theory in generation so that the concept of 'class (of unit)' is, in a sense, presupposed throughout, yet the fact is that it is not presented as a "basic concept".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the reason why 'class' is not presented as a "basic concept" in Halliday (1993) is because Systemic Theory is "basically" a functional theory, rather than a formal theory, and 'class' is the categorisation of form.

This, of course, does not mean that 'class' is not accounted for by the theory.  SFL models grammatical form as the rank scale, where it distinguishes classes, most explicitly at group and word rank; e.g. nominal vs verbal vs adverbial vs preposition vs conjunction group.

[2] To be clear, as already demonstrated, Fawcett's system network is inconsistent with SFL theory, not least because it construes lexical items as grammatical features of the nominal group.

[3] To be clear, here Fawcett mistakes a rank unit ('clause') for a class of rank unit (e.g. 'adverbial clause').

Deploying A Logical Fallacy In Discussing Halliday (1993) On Unit

 Fawcett (2010: 83):

How, then, have the two other "fundamental" categories from "Categories" fared, i.e., unit and class (of unit)? Amazingly, these two terms are also missing from "Systemic theory". One reason why it is surprising that the concept of 'unit' is not listed as a "basic concept" is that it is a vital part of the 'rank scale' concept — and it is this concept which provides the main organising principle in "Categories" (as we saw in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2). We shall discuss the curious treatment of the related concept of 'rank' shortly, when we ask what status is given in "Systemic theory" to the 'scales' that were introduced in "Categories".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett is amazed because two terms from an earlier theory, Scale and Category Grammar, are missing from a brief summary of a later theory, Systemic Functional Grammar. This is equivalent to being amazed because the term 'epicycle' from the earlier planetary model of Ptolemy is missing from the later planetary model of Copernicus. Clearly, Fawcett's presumption that the terms of an earlier theory should be included in a later theory is an instance of the 'red herring' logical fallacy. But see [2].

[2] This is very misleading indeed.  In this instance, Fawcett switches from 'term' to 'concept'. Contrary to Fawcett's claim, the concept of 'unit' is included in Systemic Theory, because the concept of 'rank', which is included (Halliday 1993: 273), entails the concept of 'unit', since a rank scale is a scale of units. Readers can judge for themselves whether Fawcett is deliberately trying to deceive his readers.

[3] Here again Fawcett uses the rhetorical strategy of implying a critique ("curious") while promising an argument elsewhere.  "We shall discuss" the misunderstandings that Fawcett deploys "shortly".

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On Element

Fawcett (2010: 83):

Perhaps, you might think, the concept of 'structure' in the "Categories" sense would still be reflected in "Systemic theory" through the presence of the term element, with which it is mutually defining? The term "element" does indeed appear in "Systemic theory", but once again it is used in a somewhat different sense (as I shall explain shortly). But the most surprising fact of all about the concept of 'element' in "Systemic theory" is that it is not presented as one of the "basic concepts". It is simply employed in defining other concepts — rather as if it was considered to be a non-theoretical concept whose meaning the reader is expected to interpret without guidance. In "Systemic theory", then, the concepts of both 'structure' and 'element' are used in different senses from those with which they were used in "Categories".

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  Halliday (1993: 272-3) uses 'element' in the same sense: as an element of structure, such as Subject, Finite, Theme, Process etc.

[2] This is misleading in two ways.  On the one hand, Halliday (1993: 272-3) presents 'element' in his discussion of the "basic concept" of Systemic Theory, systems, where it features in realisation statements.  On the other hand, it is not surprising that the concept should be presented this way, especially in a brief encyclopædia article, because what distinguishes Systemic Theory from Scale and Category Grammar (1961) is the 'shift to a paradigmatic orientation' (p273).  (Fawcett's orientation is to structure and form, rather than system and function.)

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue, as demonstrated above for 'element', and in the previous post for 'structure'.  That is, Fawcett has misrepresented Halliday (1993) on both matters.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On Structure

Fawcett (2010: 82-3):

However, Halliday also uses the term system in a more general sense. In this second sense it denotes 'paradigmatic relations' (or 'options in meaning potential'), and it is in contrast with the term structure, which is itself to be understood in a broad sense that embraces all aspects of syntagmatic organisation at the level of form. But we should notice this is not the sense in which the term "structure" was used in "Categories". There it was used in a quite specific sense, i.e., one in which it was mutually defining with the concept of 'element'. In other words, a second "fundamental category" is now being used in a different sense.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is the same construal of system.  In this case, system is being theoretically located in terms of the axial relation between paradigmatic system and syntagmatic structure, rather than in terms of the instantiation relation between system and instance.

[2] This is misleading, because 'form' is a level in Fawcett's model of syntax, not in Halliday's functional linguistics.  Halliday models form as a rank scale at the level (stratum) of lexicogrammar.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  In Categories, Halliday  (2002 [1961]: 46) writes

A structure is made up of elements which are graphically represented as being in linear progression; but the theoretical relation among them is one of order.

This is the same sense of 'structure' in Systemic Theory; e.g. the experiential structure of a clause is a configuration of elements, such as Senser ^ Process ^ Phenomenon.  What is true is that the notion of structure is backgrounded in Halliday (1993), since the priority of Systemic Functional Theory is system, not structure (and function, not form).

[4] This is misleading, because it misrepresents a fundamental category in a superseded theory (Scale & Category Grammar) as a fundamental category in the theory that replaced it (Systemic Linguistics).

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On System

Fawcett (2010: 82):

Let us begin by looking for the four concepts from "Categories" of 'unit','class', 'structure' and 'system'. We shall find, as we would expect in a theory that has been re-named "systemic (functional) theory", that system is strongly fore-grounded, so let us begin with this concept. In Halliday's words (1993:4505): "the system takes priority," and he defines a system as a set of "options in meaning potential [my emphasis]". He then goes on to show how, because an option in one system can serve as an entry condition to another, large numbers of such systems combine to form a system network. … Thus the first two "basic concepts" of "Systemic Theory' are 'system' and 'system network', where they model the "meaning potential" of a language.

One might be tempted to say that the concept of 'system' has been expanded from what it was in "Categories" rather than changed — if it were not for the vital fact that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on now model choices between meanings, as Halliday's use of the term "meaning potential" indicates.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading in a way that serves Fawcett's argument.  Systemic Theory is not a renaming of another theory.  It is a different theory.

[2] Here Fawcett continues his confusion of language as meaning potential with meaning as the semantic stratum of language.  To be clear, systems on the stratum of phonology represent the meaning potential of language, but they do not represent "choices between meanings" (semantics).  That is, Fawcett confuses instantiation (potential–instance) with the stratification of content (meaning–wording).

[3] This is very misleading. By 1993, the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, and THEME modelled choices between wordings (lexicogrammar); see [2].

Examining Systemic Theory (Halliday 1993) By Comparing It With Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961)

Fawcett (2010: 81-2):

With these issues in mind, we shall turn now to an examination of the concepts presented in "Systemic theory". Then in Chapters 6 and 7 we shall examine those in IFG. …

Halliday begins "Systemic theory" by reminding us that "systemic theory" is short for "systemic-functional theory", and this establishes from the start that the "systemic" approach to explaining language is one that is inherently oriented to 'function' and 'meaning'. The fact that SFG is a different theory of language from S&C is underlined when Halliday describes it (1993:4505) as "a development of Scale and Category Grammar"; indeed, the encyclopaedia in which "Systemic theory" appears contains a separate article on S&C grammar (Butler 1993a).

The question that we need to ask is: "How far do the seven 'fundamental' concepts of "Categories" (as described in Chapter 2 of this book) coincide with the 'basic concepts' presented in "Systemic theory", thirty-two years later?" 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Fawcett intends to examine one theory, Systemic Theory (Halliday 1993), not in its own terms, but by comparing it with a different theory, Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961).  It will be seen that Fawcett frames the differences between the two theories as shortcomings of the later theory.

Promising A Critique Of An Imaginary Theoretical Inconsistency

Fawcett (2010: 81):

However, as we shall see in Chapter 7, it seems that two different positions on how a grammar works have been allowed to develop alongside each other in the Sydney version of SFL — and that in this case the two positions are not compatible with each other. This then raises the difficult question of which one is the 'correct' version of the theory — and, in relation to the other version, why it is different and what status it has in the theory.

Blogger Comments:

[1] It is worth mentioning, given how frequently Fawcett uses it as a rhetorical strategy, that Fawcett  primes the uncritical reader by repeatedly making substantial claims for which the evidence is said to lie elsewhere (in an upcoming chapter, in a past or forthcoming publication, etc.).

[2] To be clear, Fawcett's Chapter 7 is concerned with the 'box diagram' representations of metafunctional structures at the rank of clause in IFG. "As we shall see in the examination of Chapter 7", Fawcett's misunderstandings in this regard are multi-dimensional and, as such, very instructive.

Misrepresenting Halliday's Presentations Of Theory

Fawcett (2010: 80-1):

Thus, when Halliday was asked to write an account of 'systemic theory' for the Encyclopaedia of Languages and Linguistics, it was natural that he should draw primarily on the theoretical-generative strand of the theory. However, this leaves unanswered the question of why the aspects of the theory that are relevant to the 'text-descriptive' work that is presented in IFG are so different from the aspects presented in "Systemic theory".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, what Fawcett previously (p79) described as "most striking" is now described as 'natural'.

[2] This is misleading. On the one hand, all "aspects of the theory" are potentially "relevant to the 'text-descriptive' work", whether theory is being used to describe a language or to analyse text.

On the other hand, the reason for the different presentation of theory in Halliday (1993) and in IFG (1985, 1994) is that these texts are instances of different registers, each realising a different context.  For example, in terms of tenor, the addressee of Halliday (1993) is the general reader, whereas the addressee of IFG is an undergraduate linguistics student taking a course in Systemic Functional Grammar.

Misrepresenting Halliday's IFG

Fawcett (2010: 79-80):

The second strand of work in SFL is the one that is more widely known: this is the text-descriptive strand of work. Like the term 'theoretical-generative', the term 'text-descriptive' is intended to evoke two types of work in linguistics that do not necessarily occur together, but which in SFL tend to be mutually supportive. The first is the description of languages, where the goal is to achieve a functional description of a language with a broad coverage (rather than, for example, the identification of particular syntactic phenomena as part of a search for syntactic 'universals', as in some other theories). … Works such as Halliday's IFG and Fawcett (in press) are also in the text-descriptive tradition.

It is a descriptive linguistics of this type that is needed by many researchers in many fields of 'applied linguistics' for use in the description of texts. … The term "text-descriptive" is therefore intended to cover both of these aspects of what is perceived here as one general strand of work: the text-based description of languages and the description of texts. …

The two editions of IFG (1985 and 1994) and the many spin-off publications are the main testimony to this strand of work in the Sydney framework.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, Fawcett's notion of a 'text-descriptive aspect of theory' conflates the focus on instances of language ('text') with the practice of describing particular languages ('descriptive').

	theory	description
linguist as grammarian	language as potential	a language as potential
linguist as discourse analyst	language as instance	a language as instance

The failure to distinguish these "strands" leads to misunderstanding and misrepresentation, as demonstrated below.

[2] This is misleading.  Halliday's IFG uses a theoretical description of one language, English, to demonstrate his theory of language, Systemic Functional Grammar.  That is, in terms of Fawcett's dichotomy of 'theoretical-generative' vs 'text-descriptive', it is both 'theoretical' and 'descriptive', but not 'text', since it is concerned with language-as potential, not with language-as-instance.

[3] To be clear, this confuses the theory–description dimension with the potential–instance dimension.  The description of language-as-instance (text) requires a description of language-as-potential.  This is why linguists working on an undescribed language need to describe the language in terms of theory in order to describe (analyse) texts of the language.

What Fawcett Finds Most Striking About Halliday (1993)

Fawcett (2010: 79):

From this viewpoint, what is most striking about "Systemic theory" is that the ideas that Halliday chooses to present as the "basic concepts" of the theory are precisely the ones that are central to the concerns of the theoretical-generative strand of work in SFL (as we shall see in the next section).

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, what Fawcett finds "most striking" here is the fact that, in an Encyclopædia article titled 'Systemic Theory', Halliday outlined the basic concepts that constitute the architecture of Systemic Theory (rather than, say, a description of a language or an analysis of text).

Fawcett's Distinction Of 'Theoretical-Generative' Vs 'Text-Descriptive' Aspects Of A SF Theory Of Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 78):

Interestingly, we shall find that, in what we shall term the 'theoretical-generative' aspect of a SF theory of syntax, there are fewer important differences between the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars than there are in the 'text-descriptive' aspect. By the end of this chapter we shall see how it is that there can be a fairly close similarity between the two models with respect to one aspect of the theory, while there is not in the other.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As will be seen, Fawcett's distinction between the 'theoretical-generative' aspect of theory and the 'text-descriptive' aspect of theory confuses two distinct dimensions:

• the distinction between theory and description, and
• the distinction between potential and instance.

	theory	description
linguist as grammarian	language as potential	a language as potential
linguist as discourse analyst	language as instance	a language as instance

That is, Fawcett's notion of a 'text-descriptive aspect of theory' conflates the focus on instances of language ('text') with the practice of describing particular languages ('descriptive').

On the distinction between theory and description, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 55) write:

While a description is an account of the system of a particular language, a theory is an account of language in general. So we have descriptions of various languages such as English, Akan and Nahuatl; but we have a theory of human language in general. This introduction to (systemic) functional grammar is both an introduction to the general theory of grammar and to the description of the grammar of a particular language, English. The theory includes the ‘architecture’ of grammar – the dimensions that define the overall semiotic space of lexicogrammar, the relationships that inhere in these dimensions – and its relationship to other sub-systems of language – to semantics and to phonology (or graphology). Thus, according to systemic functional theory, lexicogrammar is diversified into a metafunctional spectrum, extended in delicacy from grammar to lexis, and ordered into a series of ranked units.

On the different foci of the linguist as grammarian on potential and the linguist as discourse analyst on instance, Halliday (2008: 84-5, 126) writes:

I shall refer from time to time to "the grammarian" and "the discourse analyst", which makes it sound as though these have to be different people; but it is obvious, I hope, that the same person may take on both rôles, and probably most of us do, unless we adopt a rigidly formalist approach. … the power of the text resides in the system, because it is the system that determines the meaning and the significance of the ongoing choices made by writers and speakers. It is a mistake to restrict our angle of vision to just one perspective or the other, or to treat the discourse analyst and grammarian as if they inhabited two different realms of intellectual being.

[2] This is misleading.  Only Fawcett's model is a theory of syntax.  Halliday (1994: xiv) explains why he rejects the term:

[3] It will be seen, by the end of this chapter, that Fawcett actually uses his confused distinction to make comparisons between Halliday's pre-Systemic theory, Scale and Category Grammar (1961), and Halliday's exposition of Systemic theory (1993).

Misrepresenting The Relation Between Theory And The Work That Contributes To It

Fawcett (2010: 77-8):

We can take the view of language presented in "Systemic theory" as broadly representative of three closely related bodies of work: (1) the work in the mid-1960s by Halliday, Henrici, Huddleston and Hudson that was to develop into the set of concepts presented in "Systemic Theory"; (2) the formalisation and computer implementation of these concepts by Mann, Matthiessen and others, as first described informally in Mann & Matthiessen (1983/85) and later more fully in Matthiessen & Bateman (1991) and (less formally) in Matthiessen (1995); and (3) — with some differences — the set of concepts used in the Cardiff Grammar, as first described in Fawcett (1973/81 and 1980) and defined most clearly in Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993). It is the first two bodies of work that "Systemic theory" reflects most closely. 

Blogger Comments:

Here Fawcett confuses theory ('the view of language') with work carried out in the developmental history of the theory.  Halliday (1993) sets out the theory itself in Sections 2-4, and lists works involved in the development of Systemic theory in Section 5.

More importantly, Fawcett misrepresents the relation between Systemic theory and such work, in as much as his identification construes the theory as decoded by reference to these works, including his own. This can be demonstrated by the following agnate clauses:

systemic theory	broadly	represents	three closely related bodies of work
Identified Token	Manner: degree	Process: relational	Identifier Value

systemic theory	most closely	reflects	the first two bodies of work
Identified Token	Manner: degree	Process: relational	Identifier Value

On the one hand, this is invalid, since it construes the theory as less abstract than the work that expresses it; and on the other hand, it is misleading, because it identifies the theory in terms of work, like Fawcett's, which may or may not be consistent with the theory.

In terms of the theoretical architecture of SFL linguistics, theory (context) is realised by the language that expresses it, with each instance of such language (individual text) realising an instance of theory.

systemic theory	is realised	by language
instances of systemic theory	are realised	by instances of language
Identified Value	Process: relational	Identifier Token

(That is, Systemic theory is encoded by reference to the language that expresses it.)

Moreover, it can be seen that, if different texts realise different instances of theory, the question arises as to whether such instances of theory are valid or not.  And that is the question that this blog asks with regard to the instance of Systemic theory realised in Fawcett (2000, 2010).

∞

It will be seen, in later posts, that this misrepresentation is a strategic necessity for Fawcett's argument in this chapter.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993)

Fawcett (2010: 77):

The picture of the nature of language that one gets from "Systemic theory" [Halliday 1993] is fascinatingly different from that given in "Categories" — and indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter, from the picture of language given in IFG. It is of course to be expected that it should be different from "Categories", since that paper appeared over thirty years earlier, but it is at first sight surprising that "Systemic theory" is so different from IFG (whose second edition was published just a year after it, in 1994). 

Blogger Comments:

Unsurprisingly, given the foregoing, as will be seen in the examination of Fawcett's Chapter 5, the theoretical differences here are not between Halliday's IFG and Halliday (1993), but between Fawcett's understanding of Halliday's IFG and  Fawcett's understanding of Halliday (1993).

On Halliday's 1972-6 Model

Fawcett (2010: 75):

Finally, I showed that there was one temporary phase in the development of Halliday's theory in which he showed the Scale and Category elements of the clause as serving the function of integrating the various strands of meanings that are always shown in any IFG-style analysis — very much as the Cardiff Grammar does, in general terms, and as this book argues that all systemic functional grammars should. Yet it is a model which Halliday quickly abandoned for reasons that are far from clear, inserting the 'integrating' elements in the 'interpersonal' strand of meaning instead, as we shall see in Chapter 7. And, as we shall also see in Chapter 7, this leaves the considerable problem of how these semi-semantic 'multiple structures' are to be integrated into a single structure.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, this hangover from Halliday's pre-Systemic theory, Scale and Category Grammar, had already been re-theorised by the time of the second edition (Halliday 1978) of the paper that Fawcett used (Halliday 1977 — written 1972-6) to exemplify the "temporary phase in the development of Halliday's theory".

[2] To be clear, this "abandonment" was a direct consequence, in Halliday (1978), of identifying units of the rank scale — clause, group, word, morpheme — as the locus onto which the structures of metafunctional systems are mapped.

[3] As will be demonstrated in the examination of Chapter 7, the "problem" here, as elsewhere, is with Fawcett's difficulty in understanding Halliday's theory.