Confusing Formal Constituent With Functional Element In Misrepresenting Halliday (1994)

Fawcett (2010: 101):

To summarise; while the evidence of the index is that only one of the "Categories" concepts, i.e., 'element', is referred to throughout the description of English in IFG, the fact is that, if we supplement these references by all of the many other times when terms such as "constituent" and "function" are used to express essentially the same concept, we find that the concept of 'element of structure' occurs frequently throughout the book. And we saw in Section 6.2.1 that 'class of unit' is presupposed throughout the book, even though it is barely mentioned. We can therefore at least say that the two concepts that will be foregrounded in Part 2 as the central categories of syntax also play a central role in IFG. The only caveat — and it is an important one — is that we shall use different criteria for identifying the class of a unit from Halliday's — so that the concept itself is significantly different. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett has used a word count, based on the index of Halliday (1994), to determine the salience of theoretical concepts in Halliday's superseded 1961 theory ("Categories") in Halliday's theory that replaced it, Systemic Functional Grammar.

[2] This is misleading. In SFL theory, constituency is modelled as a rank scale of form, whereas 'element' refers to a function in a structure.  For example, a nominal group is a constituent of a clause, whereas a Sayer is an element of the function structure of a verbal clause.

[3] As previously demonstrated, this is misleading, because it is not true. For example, the notion of 'class of unit' provides the underlying organisation of chapters on both groups and phrases and group and phrase complexes. Moreover it is misleading in another way, since Halliday (1994: 12) explicitly states, with regard to the notion of grammatical form in general:

One of the aims of this initial chapter has been to introduce the notion of constituency, so that it becomes familiar as a general principle of organisation in language and can be taken for granted throughout the subsequent discussion.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On The Notion Of Delicacy

Fawcett (2010: 100):

As for the concept of 'delicacy', it is not mentioned at all in IFG. However, it is illustrated at various points in the book in one of its two main "Categories" senses, i.e., in terms of the 'primary', 'secondary' and even 'tertiary' structures that are shown for the 'thematic' and 'interpersonal' structures that Halliday recognises in the clause. (For a discussion of the relevance of 'delicacy' to a modern theory of SF syntax, see Section 10.3.4 of Chapter 10.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL theory, delicacy is the scale from the most general features in a system network to the most specific features. That is, delicacy is a dimension of paradigmatic systems, not a dimension of syntagmatic structure.

[2] To be clear, "Categories" (Halliday 1961) presents Halliday's early (superseded) theory, known as Scale & Category Grammar. This is a distinct theory from Halliday's later (current) theory known as Systemic Functional Grammar.

[3] To be clear, here — and in Section 10.3.4 — Fawcett mistakes delicacy, which, in SFL theory, is an elaborating relation in paradigmatic systems, with composition, which is an extending relation in syntagmatic structures. The structures that Fawcett discusses are Finite and Subject as components of the Mood element of structure, and textual, interpersonal and topical Themes as components of the Theme element of structure.

As can be seen from the systems of Theme and Mood (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 106, 162), below, these "secondary" structural elements do not feature as more delicate systemic choices:

Misrepresenting The Theoretical Importance Of Realisation In Halliday (1994)

Fawcett (2010: 100):

The term "realisation" (formerly "exponence") is not prominent in IFG either (with half a dozen index entries), but this is not surprising in a book about the outputs from the grammar — i.e., the instances at the level of form — rather than about how they are to be generated from the system networks. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, realisation is the fundamental relation of semiotic systems, namely: the relation between levels of symbolic abstraction, such as between

• signifié and signifiant,
• content and expression,
• function and form,
• meaning and wording,
• paradigmatic system and syntagmatic structure.

[2] To be clear, the discussions of realisation in IFG are significant.  For example, Halliday (1994: 15) identifies realisation as the relation between strata:

The grammar, in this broader sense of lexicogrammar, is the level of 'wording' in a language.  The wording is expressed, or REALISED, in the form of sound or writing; hence the two levels of phonology and graphology serve as alternative modes of expression. We usually the metaphor of vertical space and say that phonology and graphology are the strata 'below' the grammar.  At the same time, the wording REALISES pattern of another level 'higher than' itself — but still within the system of language: the stratum of SEMANTICS.

Halliday (1994: 38) identifies realisation as the relation between function and form:

First position in the clause is not what defines the Theme; it is the means whereby the function of Theme is realised in the grammar of English.

In outlining the model of grammatical metaphor, Halliday (1994: 342) identifies realisation as the relation between semantics and lexicogrammar:

In other words, for any given semantic configuration, there will be some realisation in the lexicogrammar — some wording — that can be considered CONGRUENT; there may be also various others that are in some respect 'transferred', or METAPHORICAL.

And Halliday (1994: 343) identifies realisation as the relation between paradigmatic system and syntagmatic structure:

(i) selection of process type: material, mental, relational, with their various intermediate and secondary types; realised as

(ii) configuration of transitivity functions: Actor, Goal, Senser, Manner, etc. representing the process, its participants, and any circumstantial elements.

[3] As previously explained, in Fawcett's model, 'instance at the level of form' corresponds to grammatical structure.  That is, Fawcett's model confuses the relation between system and instance (instantiation) with the relation between paradigmatic system and syntagmatic structure (realisation).

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On The Concept Of Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 100):

Interestingly, Halliday seems to be sounding a note of caution about the concept of the 'rank scale' when he writes that, while "the guiding principle [when one is describing a text] is that of exhaustiveness at each rank, [...] 

it is an integral feature of this same guiding principle that there is indeterminacy in its application. [...] The issue is whether, in a comprehensive interpretation of the system, it is worth maintaining the global generalisation, because of its explanatory power, even though it imposes local complications at certain places in the description [my emphasis]" (Halliday 1994:12). 

Blogger Comments:

Here Fawcett misleads through strategic omission. This can be demonstrated by restoring the text — in green below — that Fawcett chooses to omit. Halliday (1994: 12):

There is a clearly defined hierarchy in writing, with just a few ranks, or layers of structure, in it: sentence, some sort of sub-sentence, word and letter. The guiding principle is that of exhaustiveness at each rank: a word consists of a whole number of letters, a sub-sentence of a whole number of words, a sentence of a whole number of sub-sentences. At the same time, there is room for manœuvre: in other words, it is an integral feature of this same guiding principle that there is indeterminacy in its application; and we have met this already — for example, is there one layer of sub-sentences or are there two? Such issues will be resolved empirically; but not by single instances of jousting between examples and counter-examples. The issue is whether, in a comprehensive interpretation of the system, it is worth maintaining the global generalisation, because of its explanatory power, even though it imposes local complications at certain places in the description.

[1] As can be seen above, Halliday is not "sounding a note of caution about the concept of a rank scale".  The point he makes is that, even under the constraints imposed by the principle of exhaustiveness at each rank, there is still a degree of indeterminacy (for which, see [3] below).

[2] As can be seen above, Halliday is not concerned with describing a text, but with elaborating on his theoretical approach.

[3] As can be seen above, the complication Halliday refers to is exemplified by the indeterminacy in the number of ranks between word and sub-sentence (clause).  This is the complication of treating phrase and group as the same rank — despite the fact that a phrase includes a group — because both realise functions at clause rank.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Rank And Rank Shift

Fawcett (2010: 100):

Interestingly, the concepts of 'rank' and 'rank shift' (alias 'embedding') have only a relatively small role to play in IFG. This is in large measure because the book focusses so strongly on the clause that groups and their internal structures are not fully explored — and the fact is that all classes of group frequently contain other groups and clauses within them, as Part 2 and the outline description of English in Appendix B both clearly illustrate. However, in IFG the theory itself is also responsible for the reduced role of 'rank shift', because it treats many relationships between units that would in other approaches be analysed as cases of embedding as 'hypotaxis', i.e., as 'dependency without embedding'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, IFG (Halliday 1994) devotes four chapters (196 pages) to the rank of clause and two chapters (52 pages) to the rank of group.  Rank shift is discussed with respect to 

• the Qualifier of nominal groups (pp187-8), 
• the Numerative of nominal groups (pp195-6),
• the Postmodifier of adverbial groups (pp210-1),
• embedded expansions (pp242-50),
• embedded locutions and ideas (pp263-4), and
• facts (pp265-9).

[2] This is misleading, because it is the direct opposite of what is true.  The two chapters (52 pages) devoted to groups (and phrases) outline

• the experiential and logical structure of nominal groups (pp180-91 and pp191-6),
• the experiential and logical structure of verbal groups (pp196-8 and pp198-207),
• the logical structure of adverbial groups (pp210-1),
• the logical structure of conjunction groups (p211),
• the logical structure of preposition groups (p212),
• the experiential and interpersonal structure of prepositional phrases (pp212-3),
• the logical structure of nominal group complexes (pp275-6),
• the logical structure of adverbial group / prepositional phrase complexes (pp277-8),
• the logical structure of verbal group complexes (pp278-91).

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  Only nominal and adverbial groups include embedded elements (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 329, 424, 492); see also [4].

[4] It will be seen in later discussions that Fawcett mistakes nesting for embedding.

[5] This is true, and, moreover, as will be seen, it arises from grammatical reasoning, and results in increased explanatory power of the model.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On 'Classes Of Group'

Fawcett (2010: 99):

So far we have looked for the "basic concepts" in the opening chapters of IFG — and without much success. … However, there are two alternative approaches to locating the "basic concepts' of a book which turn out to yield more interesting results. These are to count the entries for each major concept in the book's index, and to read the text with a constant eye to the concepts that underlie it. 

Let us take as out starting point the index entries for the four 'categories'. The concept of 'unit' has just six entries, all being in the first twenty-five pages of this 434-page book. As for the concept of 'class', the word-form "class" also occurs frequently in the early pages (pp. 25-30). However, it is usually being used in the context of the highly generalised discussion of the differences between 'class-oriented' and 'function-oriented' grammars that we noted above. The word "class" in fact only occurs once with the technical meaning of 'class of unit' (on p. 214), and even then the reference is to 'word classes', rather than to the more controversial issue of 'classes of group'. Indeed, the concept of 'class of group' does not appear explicitly at all. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To remind the reader, Fawcett is here looking for the basic concepts of Halliday's previous theory, Scale & Category Grammar (1961), in a book (IFG ) that exemplifies the deployment of Halliday's later theory, Systemic Functional Grammar (1994), and that explicitly states (1994: xxvii) it is not an account of the theory.

[2] This is misleading, because it is the direct opposite of what is true.  For example, Halliday (1994: 180; 274):

In this chapter we shall examine the structure of the three main classes of group: nominal group, verbal group and adverbial group; along with a brief reference to preposition and conjunction groups. …

Groups and phrases form complexes the same way that clauses do, by parataxis or hypotaxis. Only elements having the same function can be linked in this way. Typically this will mean members of the same class: verbal group with verbal group, nominal group with nominal group and so on.

To be clear, as Halliday (1994: 27-8; 24) explains in Chapter 2:

With minimal bracketing (ranked constituent analysis) … the notion of constituency is being made to carry less of the burden of interpretation. …

… if we are using minimal bracketing some other concept is being brought in in order to explain the grammatical structure. This is where the concept of FUNCTION is introduced.

Accordingly, in SFL theory, formal constituency is modelled as a rank scale, and each unit — clause, group/phrase etc. — serves as the entry condition to a system of functions.  This is why Halliday (1994) takes the units of clause and group/phrase as the point of entry in his demonstration of grammatical functions.

On The Absence Of A Summary Statement Of Theoretical Concepts In IFG

Fawcett (2010: 98-9):

Thus, the twenty-two-page "Introduction" and the further two introductory chapters of IFG introduce many important and interesting ideas. And yet, even though much of the discussion is about 'constituency', there is no summary statement of the concepts that are required for the description of English in IFG that is in any way comparable to the earlier statement in "Categories".

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, as Halliday (1994: xxvii, xxvi) explicitly states in the Introduction:

This is not an account of systemic theory… No attempt is made to 'teach' the categories.

On the other hand, "Categories" (Halliday 1961) is an outline of a theory, though a different one: Scale & Category Grammar.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Formal Constituency And Function Structures

Fawcett (2010: 98):

But what happens in practice, as we read on through IFG? Do "other, more abstract types of relationship" take over from 'constituency'? The fact is that they do not. The different structures that Halliday proposes for each strand of meaning are all represented in the same way, i.e., by the use of 'box diagrams'. It is true that in some cases the significant elements (such as Theme' and 'New') tend to be found at the beginning and end of their structures, but there are too many exceptions to the generalisations that he proposes for it to be worth setting up different types of structure for different types of meaning. Halliday's solution to the problem of finding an adequate notation is to use box diagrams for representing all of the various types of structure that he claims to find in the clause. But box diagrams, as Halliday himself makes clear (IFG p. 36), are just one of several ways of representing the concept of 'constituency'. (For a critical examination of the role of the concept of 'constituency' in a theory of syntax, see Section 11.1 of Chapter 11.) The picture twith which these chapters of IFG leave the reader with is one of a reluctant recognition that, after all, the 'flat tree' type of constituency provides the best way of representing structure. And, as we shall see in Chapter 7, there is a compelling reason for Halliday to represent each of the different lines of structure in the same way.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is the exact opposite of what is true.  The metafunctional structures that Halliday proposes are more abstract than formal constituency because function is more abstract than form — form (Token) realises function (Value).

[2] To be clear, here Fawcett confuses the notion of structure (Value) with the diagrammatic representation of structure (Token), and presents the confusion as evidence that metafunctional structures are not more abstract than formal constituency.  See [1] above.

[3] Here Fawcett (bizarrely!) presents the sequencing of functions in structures as Halliday's theoretical motivation for proposing different types of metafunctional structure, rather than the nature of metafunctions themselves.  This is another instance of the red herring fallacy, a fallacy of relevance.

[4] This is misleading.  What Halliday (1994: 36) actually writes is:

[5] To be clear, Systemic Functional Grammar is not a theory of syntax. It is Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar that is a theory of syntax.

[6] To be clear, the wording 'reluctant recognition' is deeply misleading here, because it falsely implies that Halliday does not deploy a 'flat' model of constituency. As Halliday (1995 [1993]: 273) makes clear:

'Rank' is constituency based on function, and hence 'flat,' with minimal layering;

On the other hand, Fawcett here again confuses formal constituency with functional structure, and further confounds this by confusing such theoretical dimensions with their diagrammatic representation.

[7] To be clear, the review of Chapter 7 will identify the knot of confusions on which Fawcett's claim is based.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Constituency, Metafunction And Structure

Fawcett (2010: 98):

From the viewpoint of our purposes in this book, it is a matter of regret that Halliday did not use a greater proportion of the "Introduction" and the two introductory chapters to provide a guide to the theoretical framework that underlies the description of English in the rest of the book. Indeed, a number of readers of the book — and indeed reviewers of the book — have expressed the view that the general discussions of 'constituency' are not what the reader needs at that stage of the book (if at all).

Surprisingly, Halliday himself drastically downgrades the importance of 'constituency' at the end of Chapter 1 when he suggests that, "as one explores language more deeply, constituency gradually slips into the background, and explanations come more and more to involve other, more abstract kinds of relationship" (IFG p. 16). (Readers will only understand what Halliday is hinting at here if they are familiar with his idea that the meanings of the different metafunctions' are realised in different types of structure — a view that we shall explore in Section 7.1.1 of the next chapter.) 

Blogger Comments:

[1] As Halliday (1994: xxvii, xxvi) explicitly states in the Introduction:

This is not an account of systemic theory… No attempt is made to 'teach' the categories.

[2] To be clear, mere opinion — even if sourced — is not reasoned argument based on evidence.  More importantly, the reason Halliday begins with the notion of constituency is in order to to guide the reader gently from the more familiar and less abstract to the less familiar and more abstract.

[3] This is misleading. To be clear, this is not at all surprising to any reader who understands what Halliday has written in the chapter (which is Chapter 2, not Chapter 1).  As Halliday (1994: 27-8) explains:

With minimal bracketing (ranked constituency analysis), only those items are identified that have some recognisable function in the structure of the larger unit. This means that the notion of constituency is being made to carry less of the burden of interpretation. The concept of constituent structure is much weaker in a functional grammar than a formal one.

[4] The wordings 'only understand' and 'hinting at' here are very misleading indeed, and pettily so. To be clear, Halliday introduces the notion of metafunction and the different types of structure immediately after the discussion of grammatical constituency — in the very same chapter.

On There Typically Being Several More Than Three Strands Of Meaning In The Clause

Fawcett (2010: 97-8):

We shall now return to our search for a summary of the underlying concepts of IFG. The last two sections of IFG's Chapter 2 are directly useful to the reader, as they introduce the second major concept — after the concept of 'class of unit' — that underlies the structure of the book: the 'multiple structure' that Halliday's model claims that each clause has. Here he introduces the concept that there are three structures that show "three strands of meaning" in the clause (IFG p. 34) — though in fact there are typically several more than three, as we shall see in Section 7.2 of the next chapter.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it misrepresents IFG. Halliday (1994: xxvii, xxvi) explicitly states in the Introduction:

This is not an account of systemic theory… No attempt is made to 'teach' the categories.

[2] This is misleading, because it misrepresents a major concept Fawcett's model, 'class of unit', as a major concept of Halliday's model.  To be clear, Systemic Functional Grammar prioritises function over form.

[3] To be clear, the three functional configurations of the clause are metafunctional: textual, interpersonal and experiential.  It will be seen in the review of Chapter 7 that Fawcett (p114):

• misrepresents INFORMATION as a system of the clause,
• misrepresents logico-semantic relations as a system of the clause, and
• misrepresents the interpersonal structure of the clause as two distinct structures, with the difference between them misunderstood as a difference in delicacy.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On 'Class Of Unit'

Fawcett (2010: 96-7):

However, Halliday makes a claim in this section that runs counter to the view of syntax to be taken here, and we shall address it at this point. The claim is that grammars which use "maximal bracketing" (e.g., most grammars in the tradition that uses 're-write rules' such as "S -> NP VP") tend also to use 'class' labels (such as "noun phrase") in their tree diagrams, while grammars that use 'minimal bracketing' (i.e., most grammars in the functional tradition) tend to use 'functional' labels (such as "Subject"). At first this may seem to be a neat matching of two pairs of concepts, but in fact it does not correspond to the way in which descriptions of structure are made in a modern SF grammar — even in Halliday's own version. The reason is that in all SF grammars — including IFG — the concept of 'class of unit' is as central as the concept of 'element of structure'.

Indeed, the way in which the book itself is structured demonstrates this point — even though the concept of 'class of unit' is hardly mentioned outside the discussion in Chapter 2. Thus all of Part I of IFG is about the clause (a 'class of unit'), and each of the various chapters of Part II is defined in relation to the clause ("above", "below", "beside", "around" and even "beyond" the clause). And the sections of Chapter 6, which is about groups and phrases, are all identified in terms of the 'class of unit' that is being described. Thus, even though the concept of 'class of unit' is itself barely mentioned, the whole book is, in a sense, structured around it. As we shall see in Part 2, 'class of unit' is one of the two core categories, with 'element of structure', that are required in a modern theory of SF syntax.

Thus, while Halliday is right in pointing out that the formal, 're-write rule' tradition in linguistics typically ignores the concept of 'element' in favour of 'class', he goes too far in suggesting that 'functional grammars' necessarily foreground 'element' (or "function" in the sense of 'functional element') over 'class of unit'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, what Halliday (1994: 27) actually writes is:

Maximal bracketing is associated with class labelling
Minimal bracketing is associated with functional labelling

[2] This is misleading, because it is the opposite of what is true.  Halliday's version of Halliday's theory uses functional labelling (e.g Actor, Process, Goal) for the structures at each rank (e.g clause).

[3] This is misleading, because it is the opposite of what is true.  Because Systemic Functional Grammar is a functional theory, elements of function structure are more "central" to the theory than classes of form.

[4] To be clear, IFG is organised in terms of the rank scale because each rank provides the entry condition to the paradigmatic system of functions that are realised syntagmatically as function structures.

[5] To be clear, 'clause' is a unit, as distinct from a class of unit, such as 'adverbial clause'.

[6] As we shall see in the examination of Part 2, Fawcett confuses constituency (e.g nominal group) with element of function structure (e.g. Subject).

[7] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Chapter 2 of IFG (Halliday 1994: 17-36) says nothing whatsoever about the "formal 're-write rule' tradition in linguistics".

[8] This is misleading.  What Halliday (1994: 27-8) actually writes is:

In using maximal bracketing (immediate constituency analysis), the grammarian is trying to explain as much as possible by reference to the notion of constituency; this means putting a bracket where each successive construction can be shown to occur, whether or not that item is functional in the context of the larger structure. With minimal bracketing (ranked constituency analysis), only those items are identified that have some recognisable function in the structure of the larger unit. This means that the notion of constituency is being made to carry less of the burden of interpretation. The concept of constituent structure is much weaker in a functional grammar than a formal one.

Misrepresenting Bracketing Notation

Fawcett (2010: 96):

The next two sections of Chapter 2 describe the differences between "maximal bracketing" and "minimal bracketing" — i.e., what Hudson earlier (1967/81:103) called the "few-ICs approach" vs. the "many-ICs approach (where "ICs" stands for "Immediate Constituents"). Here, we should understand that the term "bracketing" refers to a concept rather than a notation, but it is derived from the ultimately misleading concept that 'constituency' in syntax can be adequately represented by a linear representation of a bracketed string of words and/or morphemes. (See Section 11.2 of Chapter 11 for a discussion of alternative notations for representing the 'componence' part of 'constituency'.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is Halliday's discussion of maximal and minimal bracketing that provides the argument that explains why a functional approach necessarily entails adopting the ranked constituency approach (minimal bracketing); see previous post.

[2] This is misleading, because it is the exact opposite of what is true.  Bracketing is a notation; it is a means — along with tree structure diagrams — of representing constituency analysis, whether immediate constituency or ranked constituency.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  The linear representation of minimal or maximal bracketing expresses precisely the same constituency analysis as a tree diagram, which is Fawcett's preferred mode of representation.

[4] To be clear, as previously explained, Systemic Functional Grammar is not a theory of syntax.

[5] To be clear, Fawcett also (unwittingly) adopts the ranked constituency approach, but uses tree structures, rather than minimal bracketing, as his means of representation, but confuses formal constituents (clause and nominal group) with functional elements of structure (S/Ag, M, C/Af, h, dd, &). Fawcett (2010: 260):

 

In the above analysis, Fawcett interprets a graphological structure signal (Halliday 1994: 3) as a clause constituent (E).

Misrepresenting Halliday's IFG2 Chapter 2: Towards A Functional Grammar

Fawcett (2010: 96):

It is only in Chapter 2 that we reach the application of the 'constituency' concepts discussed in Chapter 1 to grammar itself, and Halliday simply presents the concept of a 'rank scale' of units from 'sentence' to 'morpheme' as "strengthening this conception of grammatical structure" (IFG p. 23). The concepts are simply presented to the reader, with no attempt to justify them as preferable to alternatives by supportive arguments. This is understandable in a work that is presented as a textbook but it does not help us in our quest to understand the theory that underlies the description. In fact they are open to challenge, as we shall see in Section 11.1 of Chapter 11.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is very misleading indeed, because it is deeply untrue.  Halliday clearly sets out the reasons why a functional approach is based on a rank scale, that is: a ranked constituent analysis (minimal bracketing) rather than immediate constituency analysis (maximal bracketing). For example, Halliday (1994: 22-3):

Literally interpreted, the wording 'minimal bracketing' would presumably mean no bracketing at all.  It does not mean that, of course; what it means is functional bracketing — bracketing together only those sequences that have some function relative to a larger unit. …

If we use maximal bracketing, we are taking the concept of bracketing as a powerful explanatory device; in other words, we are attempting to explain as much of grammar as possible in terms of constituent structure.  The concept of constituency is being made to do a lot of work.  If we use minimal bracketing, we are relegating the concept of bracketing to a less important role, requiring the notion of constituency to take us only a limited way in the explanation of the grammar, and no further. This means, of course, that we have to bring in other concepts to take over the burden of interpretation where constituent structure is no longer relevant.  The concepts in question are, in the first instance, functional ones. …

The rank scale provides the basis for a constituent analysis of the 'minimal bracketing' type. In minimal bracketing, each node corresponds to a unit on the rank scale; this is why we refer to it as a 'ranked' constituent analysis. …

We can see now more clearly the difference between the two ways of bracketing.  Maximal bracketing is a statement of the order of composition of the constituent parts. It expresses the idea that some constructions are more closely bonded than others, to the extent that, given any grammatical structure, it is possible to specify the order in which all the pieces are put together, pair by pair. …

It says nothing about the function that any of the pieces have in any construction; in fact it does not imply that they have any function at all. … This is in marked contrast to minimal bracketing, which means putting together as constituents only those sequences that actually function as structural units in the item in question.

It follows from this that, as we expressed it earlier, maximal bracketing is a way of explaining as much as possible about linguistic structure by means of the notion of constituency. … With minimal bracketing we are merely saying: combine those and two and tall and trees, in a single operation; the result is a group consisting of four words. This tells us very little, and so it suggests that if we are using minimal bracketing some other concept is being brought in in order to explain the grammatical structure. This is where the concept of FUNCTION is introduced. It will be necessary to to say something about the particular function that each part has with respect to the structure as a whole. 

[2] As previously noted, Halliday (1994: xxvii, xxvi) explicitly states in the Introduction:

This is not an account of systemic theory… No attempt is made to 'teach' the categories.

[3] As will be seen, in the challenge in Section 11.1, Fawcett confuses formal constituent (rank unit) with functional element of structure, thereby invalidating his argument.

Fawcett's Problems With Halliday's IFG Chapter On Constituency

Fawcett (2010: 96):

Chapter 1 is entitled "Constituency". It is here, one might think, that we should find a set of statements about the type of theory of syntax that will be used in the descriptive chapters of the book. But what we are given instead is a highly generalised introduction to the concept of 'constituency', this being illustrated from the English and Chinese writing systems and from English intonation. Halliday then uses these to illustrate the concept of a 'rank scale of units'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Systemic Functional Grammar is not a theory of syntax; it is Fawcett's model that is a theory of syntax.  In the introduction, Halliday (1994: xiv) explains:

[2] Here Fawcett complains that Halliday's chapter entitled 'constituency' is concerned with constituency rather than a theory of syntax.  At the end of the chapter, where Halliday (1994: 12-6) explains the significance of constituency, he explains why he chose to begin his account with the notion of constituency, and in doing so, discusses such theoretical concepts as:

• mode of expression (p12)
• realisation (p15)
• strata (p15)
• the stratal distinction between lexicogrammar and semantics (p15)
• the theoretical priority given to paradigmatic systems over syntagmatic structures (p15)
• the notion that functional configurations are assigned to structural units (p16).

[3] To be clear, the reason why a rank scale of units is discussed in a chapter entitled 'constituency' is that the rank scale is the means of modelling constituency in Systemic Functional Grammar.

On The "Introduction" Of IFG Not Setting Out The Theoretical Categories That Underlie The Book

Fawcett (2010: 95-6):

The "Introduction" of IFG provides twenty-two pages of wide-ranging discussion, taking in "natural grammar", "grammar and semantics", "sentence and word", "system and text", "the spoken language", "the unconscious language", "theoretical approach", "applications", "the 'code", and "possible grammars". However, while this "Introduction" includes many interesting passages (e.g., that concerning "grammar and semantics", which I have referred to in Chapters 3 and 4), and while it certainly gives the reader a general sense of Halliday's approach to language, it does not set out for the reader the set of theoretical categories that underlie the main body of the book.

 Blogger Comments:

This is misleading because it misrepresents IFG. On the one hand, as Halliday (1994: xxvii, xxvi) explicitly states in the Introduction:

This is not an account of systemic theory… No attempt is made to 'teach' the categories.

On the other hand, the following theoretical categories are introduced in the introduction:

• metafunction (xiii)
• element (xiv)
• units (xiv, xxi)
• strata (xiv)
• system network (xiv, xxvi)
• stratal realisation (xvii, xx)
• structure (xviii)
• grammatical metaphor (xviii)
• rank (xix)
• paradigmatic vs syntagmatic (xix)
• cohesion (xx)
• system probabilities (xxii)
• instantiation (xxii)
• entry condition (xxvi)
• realisation statement (xxvi)
• axial realisation (xxvii)
• delicacy (xxvii)
• context of situation and context of culture (xxx-i)

On The Surprising Disquieting Difference Between IFG And Systemic Theory

Fawcett (2010: 95):

In this chapter, like the last, the task is to summarise the "basic concepts" presented in a major recent work by Halliday. This time the work is IFG (using the 1994 edition). Surprisingly, perhaps, we shall find it quite difficult to establish the theoretical concepts that underlie the description of English structure given in IFG. And then, when we have identified them, we shall find a disquieting difference between these "basic concepts" and those that we found in "Systemic theory". This in turn raises questions about the relationships between IFG and "Systemic theory" and between IFG and "Categories", and so about how far the Sydney Grammar can be said to have a theory of syntax. 

We saw in the last chapter that "Systemic theory" does not include in its list of "basic concepts" three of the four most central concepts from "Categories", i.e., 'unit', 'class (of unit)' and 'element (of structure)'. Moreover, it either omits or re-works each of the three 'scales'. Do the concepts of "Categories" fare any better in IFG ?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, given the preceding, it is not at all surprising that Fawcett also finds this task difficult.

[2] This is misleading. As will be seen in the course of this chapter review, the "disquieting differences" that Fawcett finds arise only from his own misunderstandings of Halliday's theory.

[3] To be clear, as Fawcett has previously acknowledged, Systemic Functional Grammar (IFG) and Scale and Category Grammar ("Categories") are different theories.  There is no reason why a newer theory (e.g. Quantum Mechanics) should be consistent with the theory it replaced (e.g. Newtonian Mechanics).  The differences in the newer theory are motivated by deficiencies in the superseded theory.  In terms of logical fallacies, the reference to the superseded theory constitutes the fallacy of reference known as a red herring.

[4] To be clear, SFL Theory ("the Sydney Grammar") does not "have" a theory of syntax.  It is Fawcett who has a theory of syntax.  A theory of syntax prioritises structure and form, whereas SFL theory prioritises system and function.  SFL theory models grammatical form as a rank scale, with each rank as an entry condition for a system of functions.

Misrepresenting Halliday As Illogical In A Footnote

Fawcett (2010: 94n):

Interestingly, the lack of a specification of a theory of 'instances of syntax' in "Systemic theory" cannot be the result of a general decision by Halliday to exclude any account of instances, because there is a short paragraph that describes the nature of instances at the level of meaning (i.e., the concept of a 'selection expression'). It would therefore have been logical if Halliday had also included an account of the theory of instances at the level of form. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the notion of 'instances at the level of form' is not in Halliday's model, because it is Fawcett's confusion of instance with structure, as previously demonstrated.

[2] To be clear, Halliday (1995 [1993]: 273) clarifies the meaning of 'instances' as follows:

But in systemic theory, realisation is held distinct from 'instantiation,' which is the relation between the semiotic system (the 'meaning potential') and the observable events, or 'acts of meaning,' by which the system is constituted.

[3] This is misleading in at least three ways. Firstly, 'selection expression' is exemplified in Halliday (1995 [1993]: 273) in terms of the grammar (clause):

The selection expression constitutes the grammar's description of the item (e.g., the particular clause so specified);

Secondly, 'selection expressions' figure on all strata in Halliday's model because all strata are modelled as systems.  It is only Fawcett's model that confines systems to the level of meaning.

Thirdly, 'selection expressions' are not confined to the instance pole of the cline of instantiation, since they specify units as potential as well as instance, for example, a mental clause as potential or as instantiated in text.

[4] It would therefore not have been logical.

The Source Of Fawcett's Confusion Between Axial Realisation And Instantiation

Fawcett (2010: 94):

However, the specific 'realisation rules' in each of the two versions are capable of being used to generate different types of structural output — and it is in the part of the theory that describes these outputs — or instances — that the major differences between the two models occur. 

As we shall see in more detail in Section 7.8 of Chapter 7, the output from the Cardiff Grammar is a single structure with a rich labelling of the nodes, while the output from the Sydney Grammar is — at least in principle — a set of several different structural representations. It is the task of the rest of Part 1 to explain just what these differences are, and to examine the extremely serious questions that they raise for the theory of syntax in SFL.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett reveals that it is his notion of 'output' — in his flowchart model (Figure 4) — that is the source of his confusion between structure and instance.  In SFL theory, the relation between paradigmatic system and syntagmatic structure is realisation, which is a relation of identity obtaining between levels of symbolic abstraction (a token-value relation); whereas the relation between system and instance is instantiation, which is a class membership relation between a token and a type (a carrier-attribute relation).  See, for example, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144-5).

[2] To be clear, Systemic Functional Linguistics is a theory that prioritises system and function over structure and form (i.e. syntax).  The 'extremely serious' questions that Fawcett raises arise from his (already demonstrated) confusion between element (of function structure) and rank constituent (of form) — as will be seen in future posts.

On Fawcett's 'Form Potential' And 'Instances Of Meaning' Being Compatible With SFL Theory

Fawcett (2010: 93): 

The position, therefore, is that the generative apparatus in the two frameworks is broadly comparable. Or, to put it in terms of the diagram of language in Figure 4 in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, the 'form potential' of the two models is fairly similar. Moreover, both models also recognise the importance of instances at the level of meaning, i.e., the concept of a 'selection expression'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  In Fawcett's Figure 4, 'form potential' is modelled as realisation rules (that are instantiated as structures!):

In SFL theory, however, there is no level of form. Instead, form is modelled on the grammatical stratum as a rank scale whose units serve the entry conditions for grammatical functions, as exemplified by 'clause' being the entry condition for the system PROCESS TYPE.

[2] This is misleading.  On the one hand, in SFL theory, instances are not limited to the level of meaning.  On the other hand, selection expressions are not limited to the instance pole of the cline of instantiation, since, for example, the selection expression [voiced, bilabial, stop] specifies the phoneme /b/ as both potential and instance.

On The Compatibility Of The Cardiff Grammar With SFL Theory

Fawcett (2010: 93):

However, before we leave the topic of "Systemic theory", it is important to bring out the impressive extent to which the set of concepts that it foregrounds are similar to the equivalent set of concepts in the Cardiff Grammar framework, e.g., as set out in Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993). …

As we saw in Section 4.9 of Chapter 4, the stage in the develo[p]ment of Halliday's model at which it most resembled the current Cardiff Grammar was that reflected in Halliday (1970/76b) and what I have described as the "pivotal paper" of "Language as choice in social contexts" (1977/78).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett assesses the extent to which his version of Halliday's theory is consistent with Halliday's theory as 'impressive'.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue; see the post Fawcett's Claim That His Model Is 'Fully Compatible' With Halliday (1977/8).  Moreover, Halliday's theory has changed significantly in the meantime, now featuring two 'system-structure cycles' in order to account for grammatical metaphor, as previously explained.

On The Most Fundamental And Great Theoretical Problems Raised By IFG

Fawcett (2010: 92):

But it is in our examination of the major concepts of IFG that the most fundamental problems will arise, and this gives rise to what I expect to be the most controversial chapter in the book — Chapter 7. There I shall examine and discuss the great theoretical problems that are raised by Halliday's representations of structure in IFG and elsewhere, and so demonstrate the need for a new — or partly new — theory of syntax for SFL. 

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because it is untrue. As will be seen, the theoretical "problems" that Fawcett will identify arise from his own misunderstandings of Halliday's model, including his previously identified confusion of structural element with rank constituent.

Misrepresenting Halliday's Earlier And Later Grammatical Theories As A Single Theory Of Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 92):

At this point in our exploration of Halliday's presentation of his ideas about syntax, we might reasonably conclude that Halliday has completely changed the "basic concepts" of his theory. This, however, would be a mistake, as we shall see in the next chapter. Indeed, before we draw our final conclusions about what sources it will be useful to consult in building a theory of syntax for a modern systemic functional grammar — and so before we draw our final conclusions about the extent to which the concepts of "Categories" are still valid today — we must bring certain other bodies of work into the picture. These are: (1) the theoretical concepts that underlie IFG, since this work constitutes the major manifestation of the 'text-descriptive' strand of the work in the Sydney Grammar framework, and (2) the fullest statement of the requirements of a theory of SF syntax yet made, i.e., Fawcett (1974-6/81), together with the subsequent revisions to that work. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  As previously noted, Halliday has explicitly explained (1985, 1994: xiv) why his grammatical theory is not a theory of syntax.  In misrepresenting Halliday, Fawcett is falsely presenting his own theory, of syntax, as consistent with Halliday's theory.

[2] This is misleading, since it misrepresents two distinct theories, Scale and Category Grammar (Halliday 1961) and Systemic Functional Grammar (Halliday 1993), as a single theory.

[3] To be clear, the theoretical concepts that have been carried over into the current theory (Systemic Functional Grammar) from the previous theory (Scale and Category Grammar) are outlined in the work Fawcett has just reviewed (Halliday 1993).

[4] To be clear, the theoretical concepts that underlie IFG are outlined in the work Fawcett has just reviewed (Halliday 1993).

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On Delicacy, Realisation And Rank

Fawcett (2010: 92):

As for the three 'scales' found in "Categories", the concepts of 'delicacy' and 'exponence' (the latter now renamed "realisation") have changed as a natural consequence of the elevation of 'system' to model 'meaning potential'. And the term 'rank' (which has no meaning without 'unit', in its "Categories" sense) is re-interpreted in "Systemic theory" as a general statement about 'flat tree constituency', with no statement at all about the concepts of a 'rank scale' and the associated limitations on 'rank shift'. According to "Systemic theory", then, it would appear that all of the concepts that are presented in "Categories" as "fundamental" have either been dropped or been changed — many quite drastically. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The concepts of delicacy, exponence (as realisation) and rank have not changed across the two theories, as Halliday (1995 [1993]: 273) makes clear:

Systemic theory retains the concepts of 'rank,' 'realisation,' and 'delicacy' from scale and category grammar. 'Rank' is constituency based on function, and hence 'flat,' with minimal layering; 'delicacy' is variable paradigmatic focus, with ordering from more general to more delicate; 'realisation' (formerly 'exponence') is the relation between the 'strata,' or levels, of a multistratal semiotic system — and, by analogy, between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic phases of representation within one stratum. But in systemic theory, realisation is held distinct from 'instantiation,' which is the relation between the semiotic system (the 'meaning potential') and the observable events, or 'acts of meaning,' by which the system is constituted.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's mistaken notion of 'system' being "elevated" to "meaning potential" arises from his (motivated) confusion of language as potential with meaning as stratum (semantics).

[3] This is misleading, on two counts: because it is untrue, as previously demonstrated, and because it is irrelevant (a red herring).  Moreover, the implication here is that new theories should be consistent with the theories that they replace.  In this way of thinking, quantum mechanics should be consistent with classical mechanics, and both should be consistent with the physics of Aristotle, and so on.

On The Differences Between Scale And Category Grammar And Systemic Functional Grammar

Fawcett (2010: 91-2):

Let me now summarise the differences between "Categories" and "Systemic theory". They could hardly be greater. The fact is that "Systemic theory" presents an almost completely new set of "basic concepts". These are: 'system' and 'system network' (but both in the 'meaning potential' sense), 'instantiation', 'selection expression', 'realisation' and 'structure' (the last being used in a highly generalised sense that is quite different from its precise sense in "Categories"). Thus the list of "basic concepts" in "Systemic theory" does not mention two of the four original "fundamental" categories at all ('unit' and 'class'), and the two that are included as "basic concepts" now have significantly different meanings ('system' and 'structure'). The concept of 'element' is referred to, as we have seen, but it is not presented as a "basic concept", and it has a significantly different sense from that of the term "element" in "Categories". 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, "Categories" (Halliday 1961) and "Systemic theory" (Halliday 1993) expound two different theories: Scale And Category Grammar and Systemic Functional Grammar, respectively.  Fawcett's comparison of them in setting up the context for his own theory exemplifies the rhetorical strategy known as the red herring logical fallacy.

[2] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, Fawcett confuses meaning potential (language as system) with meaning as level of symbolic abstraction (the semantic stratum).

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  The sense of 'structure' is the same in both theories, but it is expanded in Systemic theory, due to the innovation of the notion of 'metafunction'.  In the earlier theory, structure is limited to what will become interpersonal structure in the later theory, whereas it is supplemented with the structures of the other metafunctions in the later theory.

[4] To be clear, the terms 'unit' and 'class' are formal categories, whereas Systemic Functional Grammar gives priority to function, as Halliday (1995 [1993]: 272) makes clear. On the other hand, the two concepts are inherent in rank, which is listed as a basic concept (op. cit.: 273).

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  As Halliday (1995 [1993]: 272) explains:

[Systemic theory's] immediate source is as a development of scale and category grammar. The name 'systemic' derives from the term 'system; in its technical sense as defined by Firth (1957); system is the theoretical representation of paradigmatic relations, contrasted with 'structure' for syntagmatic relations. In Firth's system-structure theory, neither of these is given priority; and in scale and category grammar this perspective was maintained. In systemic theory the system takes priority; the most abstract representation at any level is in paradigmatic terms. Syntagmatic organisation is interpreted as the 'realisation' of paradigmatic features.

[6] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  On the one hand, 'element' features in the basic concept 'realisation statements', and on the other hand, it is used in precisely the same sense as in the earlier theory.  As previously explained, Fawcett's misunderstanding arises from confusing (structural) 'element' with (rank) 'constituent.

On Halliday's And Fawcett's Versions Of Halliday's Theory Sharing The Same General Framework

Fawcett (2010: 91):

There would be widespread agreement among systemic functional linguists — and especially among those who are interested in the theoretical-generative strand of work in SFL — that "Systemic theory" provides an excellent (though necessarily highly compressed) summary of the essential concepts of Halliday's SF grammar. Indeed, the model described in Chapter 3 and summarised in Figure 4 (in Section 3.2 of that chapter) can be seen as an alternative statement of broadly the same set of concepts — subject to the qualifications expressed above and in Section 4.7 of Chapter 4. 

From the viewpoint of the topic of this book, this difference is not crucial, since we are focussing here on the theory of syntax, i.e., the theory of both the potential and the instances at the level of form. In Section 4.6 of Chapter 4 we established that the difference between the levels of the system networks in the Sydney and the Cardiff versions of SFL, while significant in some cases, did not invalidate the view that the two share the same general framework, and this view is supported by the broad similarity between the 'realisation operations' in the two frameworks that we have noted. This means that we are indeed in a position to make a direct comparison between the theories of syntax presented in each of the two theories. 

However, from this last perspective "Systemic theory" has one great weakness. This is that it does not provide a specification of the "basic concepts" of the part of the theory whose task it is to account for the status of the instances at the level of form. It is these concepts with which IFG is concerned.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's model (Figure 4) is not only inconsistent with Halliday's theory, it is invalidated by its own internal inconsistencies, including the confusion of axial realisation with instantiation.

[2] To be clear, a systemic-functional theory, by definition, gives priority to system and function over syntagm and form.  In Halliday's theory, grammatical form is modelled as the rank scale, with each rank as the entry condition for grammatical functions.

[3] To be clear, Fawcett's potential at the level of form includes functions in realisation rules, and his instances at the level of form are the realisation of these functions in structures.

[4] This misleading.  The view that Fawcett's theorising is of the same general framework, SFL, is not at issue.  What is at issue is if Fawcett's version of Halliday's theory is itself valid, both in terms of SFL theory and in terms of internal consistency.

[5] To be clear, in Halliday's version of his own theory, realisation statements are located in system networks at the levels (strata) of semantics, lexicogrammar and phonology.  In Fawcett's version of Halliday's theory, realisation operations are located only at one of two levels, the level of form, which is, incongruously, a lower level of abstraction than the systemic features to which they apply.  Moreover, Fawcett's realisation operations are incongruously held to specify instances, rather than realisations.

[6] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  Halliday's theory is not a theory of syntax.  Halliday (1985/1994: xiv):

[7] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  To be clear, 'instances at the level of form' do not feature in Halliday's theory, and so their theoretical status in Halliday's model does not need to be accounted for. However, since Fawcett's 'instances of form' translates to 'structures' in Halliday's theory, Halliday (1993) identifies syntagmatic structure as the realisation of paradigmatic system, with the basic concept of realisation statements in systems specifying structural realisations.  Halliday (1995 [1993]: 272):

The system has one further component, namely the 'realisation statement' that accompanies each option. This specifies the contribution made by that option to the structural configuration; it may be read as a proposition about the structural constraints associated with the option in question.

Falsely Presenting A Non-Sequitur As A Conclusion Of Two False Propositions

Fawcett (2010: 90-1):

Let us now summarise the place in "Systemic theory" of the more specifically 'structural' concepts from "Categories". The categories of 'unit', 'class (of unit)' and 'element' are not included in the presentation of the "basic concepts". Moreover, while the term "element" is used in presenting the realisation statements, it has a different sense from that in "Categories". 

On the other hand, "Systemic theory" includes a set of seven 'realisation operations'. While the latter are related to the "categories" that are missing in "Systemic theory" — in the sense that they generate the structures that exemplify the missing categories — the relationship is not self-evident. In Section 9.2.1 of Chapter 9 we shall see exactly how a revised set of realisation operations can generate all of the specific categories and relationships that are needed to specify the instances at the level of form in a modern systemic functional grammar.

Thus two sets of concepts are required in a full theory of syntax: (1) the theoretical concepts that specify the syntax potential, and (2) the theoretical concepts that specify the instances. The theory of 'syntax potential' will be presented and discussed in Chapter 9 of Part 2, and the theory of 'instances of syntax' will be set out in Chapters 10 and 11.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  As previously demonstrated, Halliday's term 'element' retains the same meaning across the two theories, and Fawcett's misunderstanding on the matter arises from confusing 'element' with 'constituent'.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  As previously demonstrated, the "categories" that Fawcett mistakenly thinks are missing in Halliday (1993) are those that serve as the entry conditions to the systems at each rank: clause, group/phrase, word and morpheme.

[3] To be clear, Fawcett's 'instances of form' (in Figure 4) refers to 'one layer of a richly labelled tree structure'.  As previously noted, this confuses instance (of potential) with the structure (realising system).

[4] This is misleading, because it falsely presents this non-sequitur as a conclusion entailed by the preceding discussion.

[5] To be clear, Fawcett (p172) identifies 'syntax potential' as part of 'form potential', which, in turn, he (p36) identifies as 'realisation rules/statements' (Figure 4).  However, it turns out (p175) that 'realisation operations' and 'potential structures' are the two parts of 'syntax potential'.  This compositional inversion will be examined further in the analysis of Fawcett's Chapter 9.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On Realisation And Instantiation

Fawcett (2010: 90):

Let me summarise the "basic concepts' of "Systemic theory". These are: 'system', 'system network', 'selection expression', 'realisation' and 'structure' — the latter, however, only being used in a highly generalised sense. In addition, Halliday makes a fundamental distinction between 'realisation' and 'instantiation', exactly as we have done as in Chapter 3. However, he then he goes on to blur the distinction by saying that the term "realisation" is not only used for "the relation between strata" but also, "by analogy", for "the relation between the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic phases of representation within one stratum". I find this an unfortunate formulation, because it suggests that there is an immediate relationship between the system networks ("the paradigmatic [...] phase") and the output structure ("the [...] syntagmatic phase"). In other words, this way of describing matters overlooks (1) the relation of instantiation between the system networks and the selection expression, (2) the selection expression itself, (3) the realisation rules (which are triggered by the features in the selection expression), and finally (4) instantiation relation between these and the output structures that they generate. In other words, at this point in "Systemic theory" Halliday's second view of 'meaning' (as described in Section 4.6 of Chapter 4) appears to be dominant — i.e., the one in which the system networks are assumed to be at the same level as the final output structures. Apart from this short passage, however, the theoretical model of language presented in "Systemic theory", with its two components of the system networks and the realisation statements, is essentially the same as the general systemic functional model proposed in Chapter 3.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday (1995[1993]: 272-3) presents the system, which includes realisation statements and selection expressions, as the basic concept of Systemic theory, and lists rank, realisation (stratal and axial), delicacy, instantiation and metafunction as the other basic concepts.  Structure, on the other hand, is only mentioned in relation to metafunction:

These metafunctions define the dimensions of semantic space; and since they tend to be realised by different structural resources — experiential meanings segmentally, interpersonal meanings prosodically, logical meanings in iterative structures, and textual meanings in wavelike patterns …

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's model (Figure 4) confuses the realisation relation between system and structure with the instantiation relation between potential and instance; see further below.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  It is Fawcett who "blurs the distinction", not Halliday.  The relation between the paradigmatic axis (system) and the syntagmatic axis (structure) is realisation, not instantiation.  Instantiation, on the other hand, is the relation between potential (system) and instance (text).

[4] To be clear, this is neither unfortunate, nor a suggestion.  It is a statement about the architecture of Systemic theory: paradigmatic systems are realised by syntagmatic structures.

[5] These four claims are misleading, because they are untrue.

• A selection expression is not an instance of system; it is the bundle of features that define a unit, whether as potential or instance, as in the case of the features [voiceless, velar, stop] defining the phoneme /k/, as potential or instance.
• As such, a selection expression is irrelevant to both instantiation and axial realisation.
• Realisation statements are activated by feature selection, not selection expressions.  Here Fawcett is presenting his own logically-inconsistent model as the benchmark for assessing Halliday's.
• The relation between realisation rules and the structures they generate is, as the name implies, realisation, not instantiation.

[6] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  Halliday has one view on meaning.  As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's misunderstanding on the matter derives from his confusing meaning potential (language as system) with meaning (the stratum of semantics).

[7] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  Moreover, it is contradicted by Fawcett's own report (above) of Halliday (1993):

"realisation" is not only used for "the relation between strata" but also, "by analogy", for "the relation between the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic phases of representation within one stratum".

Clearly, Fawcett does not understand that realisation is a relation between different levels of symbolic abstraction.

[8] This is very serious misrepresentation indeed.  As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's model (Figure 4) is not only inconsistent with Halliday's theory, it is internally inconsistent, as shown again here, where Fawcett presents selection expressions as instance of systems, and syntagmatic structures as instances of realisation rules.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Semantics

Fawcett (2010: 89-90):

One reason may be that he was not sufficiently confident of its place [i.e. the semantic stratum] in the overall theory at the time of writing "Systemic theory" to give it this status. Another possible reason may be that he limited himself, in what was necessarily a short paper, to just those concepts that he believed to be common to all 'dialects' of SFL. In other words, he may have omitted the concept of a 'higher semantics' on the grounds that some other systemic functional linguists (including those working in the framework of the Cardiff Grammar) consider that the existing system networks (or replacements for them that are more explicitly semantic) are all that is needed to model those aspects of 'meaning' that it is appropriate to model as lying within language. Either way, the absence of this concept from this key summary of the theory seems to signal that at the time of writing Halliday was less confident of its centrality in his view of language than he appears to have become in subsequent works, such as Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  The "subsequent" work, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), was first conceived between 1980 and 1983 when Matthiessen was a research assistant at the Information Sciences Institute at the University of Southern California, more than a decade before Halliday (1993). Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: ix):

This book was conceived dialogically: it started as notes on discussions between the two authors when CM was working at the University of Southern California's Information Sciences Institute and MAKH was visiting there as a consultant.

 Moreover, Fawcett was the series editor for the publication.

[2] This is misleading.  Here Fawcett has falsely attributed his own view on the matter to Halliday.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue, as demonstrated in the previous post.