Fawcett's Eight Major Types Of Meanings

Fawcett (2010: 51n):

In fact, Halliday recognises four 'metafunctions': the experiential, logical, interpersonal and textual. I have long advocated the value of recognising the eight major types of meaning listed in the main text (and three minor ones), e.g., as described in Fawcett (1980), (in press) and (forthcoming a). This difference in the degree of 'delicacy' between the Sydney and Cardiff Grammars — a metaphor explored in Gregory (1987) — will be reflected in the descriptions of texts in Sections 7.2 and 7.9 of Chapter 7, but it has no direct consequences for the theoretical concepts discussed in the present book. 

Blogger Comments:

As the term 'metafunction' suggests, these are 'functions of functions' or 'the functions behind functions'.  That is, they are of a different order to the functions of which they are 'meta'; cf. phenomenon vs metaphenomenon.  Fawcett's eight major types of meaning confuse functions of the two distinct orders, grouping second-order functions — the experiential, interpersonal and logical metafunctions — with first-order functions — polarity, validity, affective, thematic and informational, the first three of which are interpersonal, and the final two textual.

Misunderstanding The Theoretical Significance Of 'Functional'

Fawcett (2010: 50-1):

If the word semantic had not been associated with the narrow definition of 'meaning' that it had for most linguists in the 1960s and 1970s, it is possible that Halliday's revised model of language might have been called "Systemic Semantic Grammar". Instead, it is Systemic Functional Grammar — and the chief significance of the term "functional" is that it serves as a useful reminder of the third of Halliday's great innovative concepts.  This is the insight that every piece of text (such as, for example, a simple clause) realises several different types of meaning, often in the same element. In other words, it serves for the expression of 'representational' meaning or, to use Halliday's term, experiential meaning; logical meanings … interpersonal meanings … and … textual meanings …

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misrepresents Halliday because, as demonstrated in previous posts, Halliday makes a clear distinction between semantics and grammar; see [2].

[2] This misunderstands the chief significance of the term 'functional' in SFL theory.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49):

Being a ‘functional grammar’ means that priority is given to the view ‘from above’; that is, grammar is seen as a resource for making meaning — it is a ‘semanticky’ kind of grammar. But the focus of attention is still on the grammar itself. 

Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organising principle adopted is that of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices.

Misrepresenting Halliday On The Stratal Location Of Grammatical Systems

Fawcett (2010: 50):

On this basis, many systemic functional linguists have assumed that the networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on, do (or should) represent choices in meaning, and that they therefore do (or should) constitute the level of semantics. And for at least some of us who were working in SFL in the 1970s, the corollary of this was that, when we saw Halliday's system networks as still reflecting contrasts that were formal rather than semantic (e.g., his MOOD network, which has remained virtually unchanged since the 1960s, in contrast with his TRANSITIVITY network) we revised them by 'pushing' them towards the semantics — exactly as Halliday himself had done with his networks for TRANSITIVITY during the 1960s.

However, it is not the case that all systemic linguists took this position, and it is certainly not the case that Halliday himself consistently did so, as we shall see in Sections 4.6 and 4.7.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here once again Fawcett argues for his misunderstanding of Halliday by means of the logical fallacy known as 'Argumentum ad populum':

Argumentum ad populum (appeal to widespread belief, bandwagon argument, appeal to the majority, appeal to the people) – a proposition is claimed to be true or good solely because majority or many people believe it to be so.

[2] Once again, see any of the previous posts on the distinctions

• between meaning potential (language as system) and meaning as stratum (semantics), and
• between functional grammar (wording viewed from semantics) and semantics (meaning).

See also Halliday & Matthiessen (1999) for Halliday's semantic systems of the ideational metafunction.

[3] This is misleading because it is manifestly untrue.  As such features as 'declarative', 'interrogative' and 'imperative' demonstrate, Halliday's MOOD system, like his TRANSITIVITY system, is concerned with functional contrasts, not formal.

[4] Here Fawcett, having interpreted Halliday's MOOD system as reflecting contrasts at the level of form, nevertheless located the system at the level of meaning (semantics).

[5] This is misleading because it is manifestly untrue.  It was Fawcett and his colleagues who mistook Halliday's grammatical systems for semantic systems, not Halliday; see [1] and [2].

[6] This is misleading because it is manifestly untrue, as we shall see in the critiques of Sections 4.6 and 4.7.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On System Networks

Fawcett (2010: 49-50):

Today, very many systemic functional linguists would take it as axiomatic that system networks such as those for TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. model choices between meanings, i.e., semantic features. These linguists include those who work in the framework of the Cardiff Grammar (including those in China and Japan), those working with the Nottingham Grammar (as described in Berry (1975, 1977 and 1996:8-9), those who are applying systemic functional grammar to other semiotic systems (e.g., Kress & van Leeuwen 1997, van Leeuwen 1999 and probably O'Toole 1994). Moreover, Halliday himself continues to write in a similar manner at times, e.g., in IFG:

In a functional grammar, [...] a language is interpreted as a system of meanings [my emphasis], accompanied by forms through which the meanings can be expressed (Halliday 1994:xix).

In this view of the basic architecture of language, then, the meaning potential constitutes the level of semantics.  More precisely, it is the task of the system networks to model those 'meanings' that are expressible through realisation rules at the level of form (Figure 4 in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3).

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here again Fawcett argues for his misunderstanding of Halliday by means of the logical fallacy known as 'Argumentum ad populum':

Argumentum ad populum (appeal to widespread belief, bandwagon argument, appeal to the majority, appeal to the people) – a proposition is claimed to be true or good solely because majority or many people believe it to be so.

[2] Again, see any of the previous posts on the distinctions

• between meaning potential (language as system) and meaning as stratum (semantics), and
• between functional grammar (wording viewed from semantics) and semantics (meaning).

See also Halliday & Matthiessen (1999) for Halliday's semantic systems of the ideational metafunction.

[3] Here again Fawcett misunderstands Halliday in a way the favours his own (unsupported) position; see [2].

[4] Here Fawcett misleads by omission: failing to tell the reader that this (incorrectly sourced) quote from Halliday (1994: xiv) is part of an argument in which Halliday gives reasons for the inappropriateness of the term 'syntax' in a functional approach to grammar:

[5] This clarification (more precisely) of Fawcett's own misunderstanding (see [2]) is merely a restatement of his own model (Figure 4) — itself riddled with internal inconsistencies due to his misunderstandings of the dimensions of realisation and instantiation, as previously demonstrated here and elsewhere.