Why Fawcett Thinks SFL Requires A Separate Component For Realisation Rules

Fawcett (2010: 64-5):

4.8 Why a SFL model of language requires a separate component for the realisation rules 

Finally, we must consider the implications for the model of language summarised in Figure 4 of another interesting change in Halliday's representations of his model of language. It is a change that correlates with the view that we have just been examining, i.e., the view that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. belong at the same level as their outputs. 

The reason why it is important to examine this change too is that it carries with it an implication that is even more drastic in its consequences for the model of language outlined in Figure 4 than the change discussed in the last section. This is because it implies that the grammar has no separate component for the realisation rules. If this concept were to be sustained, there would be no 'form potential' in Figure 4 that corresponded to the 'meaning potential'. And this in turn would have serious consequences for the picture of language to be presented here, and especially in Chapters 5 and 9, where we shall make a major distinction in the theory of syntax to be presented there between 'syntax potential' and 'instances of syntax'.

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Reminder:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett is considering the implications of his own misunderstanding of SFL — see [2] below — for his own model (Figure 4) which, as demonstrated many times on this blog, is internally inconsistent and confuses the system-structure relation (realisation) with the system-instance relation (instantiation).

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory, the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and their "outputs" are both located on the same stratum of symbolic abstraction, namely: lexicogrammar.  Because Fawcett's "output" confuses structure with instance, it is necessary to take each in turn.

For system and structure, while both are located on the same stratum, they differ in terms of symbolic abstraction within that stratum, with the higher level, system, realised by the lower level, structure.  For system and instance, on the other hand, both are most obviously located on the same stratum, since a grammatical instance is an instance of a grammatical system.

[3] To be clear, in SFL theory, realisation statements that specify structural realisations are located in systems, at points that satisfy the conditions for their activation (instantiation entails both the selection of features and the activation of realisation statements).

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In short, Fawcett's reason why SFL requires a separate component for realisation rules is that it will have serious consequences for his own model if it doesn't.