On The Topological Equivalence Of SFL Architecture And Fawcett's Flowchart

Fawcett (2010: 74-5):

I then gave some of the reasons why I think he is wrong to dismiss his earlier insight that the system networks constitute the level of semantics, and I argued that the topological relationships between the different parts of the model of language summarised in Figure 4 remain intact — even when the diagram is redrawn in order to make them appear to occupy a single stratum of language, as in Figure 5. The key point is that, since the relationships remain the same, it is still possible to make a direct comparison between the output structures of the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, a principal reason why the system networks are located on the stratum of lexicogrammar, rather than semantics, is that distinguishing semantic and grammatical systems improves the explanatory power of the theory by providing the means of systematically accounting for grammatical metaphor.  But this is not the only reason. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 428-9):

Within systemic-functional linguistics, Fawcett (e.g. 1980) has pioneered a "cognitive model of an interactive mind". There are many fundamental similarities with the approach we are taking here, e.g. in construing an experiential system of process configuration within the content plane. However, there are two related differences of particular interest in the context of our present discussion:

(i) in Fawcett's model, there is only one system-structure cycle within the content plane: systems are interpreted as the semantics, linked through a "realisation component" to [content] form, which includes items and syntax, the latter being modelled structurally but not systemically; 

(ii) in Fawcett's model, the semantics is separate from the "knowledge of the universe", with the latter as a "component" outside the linguistic system including "long term memory" and "short term sort of knowledge". 

With respect to (i), in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones. As we saw in Chapter 6 in particular, grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures. Since we allow for a stratification of content systems into semantics and lexicogrammar, we are in a stronger position to construe knowledge in terms of meaning. That is, the semantics can become more powerful and extensive if the lexicogrammar includes systems. It follows then with respect to (ii) that for us "knowledge of the universe" is construed as meaning rather than as knowledge. This meaning is in the first instance created in language; but we have noted that meaning is created in other semiotic systems as well, both other social-semiotic systems and other semiotic systems such as perception. Our account gives language more of a central integrative role in the overall system. It is the one semiotic system which is able to construe meanings from semiotic systems in general.

[2] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, Fawcett's model summarised in Figure 4 is invalidated by its own internal inconsistencies, including its misconstrual of axial realisation of form as instantiation.

[3] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, Figure 5 is not topologically equivalent to Figure 4, since the one cannot be formed from the other without tearing. Moreover, in terms of Fawcett's argument, it is a 'straw man' of Fawcett's own invention.  See the earlier post Attacking A Straw Man.