Fawcett's Summary Of His Argument Against Metafunctional Clause Structures

Fawcett (2010: 143):

In summary, we can say that the main focus of interest among most systemic functional linguists is the description of texts. When one is working on text analysis, what matters most is that one has as one's working tool the most insightful method of analysis that one can find. The approach to representing structure in IFG has one great advantage over others (such as an updated Scale and Category analysis, e.g., as advocated in Morley 2000). This is, of course, that it provides a clear visual image of the multifunctional nature of language — and so a clear mental construct. Moreover, it is currently the only SF framework for describing language that is available in published form (i.e., in IFG and the various derived publications). This fact has led to the widespread acceptance of IFG-style analyses as the only 'correct' SF analyses — and so, coincidentally, to the widespread acceptance of the 'structure conflation' model.

Furthermore, it seems probable that most inquirers into the nature of SFL have ignored works such as Halliday's "Systemic theory" (1993) and Matthiessen & Bateman's Text Generation and Systemic Functional Linguistics. (1991) — and yet it is in such works that we find the statements that define the Sydney version of the theory. On the other hand, even these works fail to bring out the fact (as we have seen it to be) that there is no theoretical-generative SF grammar that is capable of either (1) generating multiple structures of the type illustrated in IFG and (2) integrating them into a single structure.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, any "correctness" of the model of clause structure in IFG (Halliday 1994) lies in it being consistent with SFL Theory.

[2] This is misleading, because it misrepresents both SFL Theory and the text linguists who apply SFL Theory.  As previously explained, the notion of 'structure conflation' does not feature in SFL Theory, and as such, there is no acceptance of the model whatsoever.

[3] This is misleading. To be clear, "the Sydney version of the theory" is Halliday's own version of the theory he himself painstakingly devised, whereas other "versions" are merely alterations to Halliday's theory based on misunderstandings, such as those exposed on this blog. For "statements that define" Halliday's version of his own theory, see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999) and IFG (Halliday 1985, 1994; Halliday & Matthiessen 2004, 2014).

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue on two counts, since metafunctional clause systems do "generate" metafunctional clause structures, and since integrating them into a single structure is not a requirement of the theory. To be clear, clause structures are integrated in the formal syntagm (of group/phrase rank units) that realises them.

Fawcett's Third Reason Why IFG-Style Multiple Structures Have Become So Widely Assumed To Be A Central Part Of The Theory

Fawcett (2010: 143):

The third reason why the representations used in IFG have become so widely accepted as an integral part of the theory is that IFG does not invite its readers to consider the problems of how these very different structures are to be conflated into a single, unified structure. There is no reason, of course, why Halliday should have addressed this question in IFG, since its aim is to provide an insightful model for describing texts, rather than to show how a SF grammar works. But the result is that vital questions about this important aspect of the theory have long remained both unasked and unanswered — and it is upon the validity of the theory that the validity of the description ultimately rests.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it misrepresents SFL Theory. To be clear, the reason why the question of structure conflation has long been unasked and unanswered is that it is neither a feature, nor a requirement, of SFL theory, as many of the previous posts have explained. This issue only arises through Fawcett's own theoretical misunderstandings, principally his confusion of formal constituency (the rank scale) with function structure (at clause rank).

[2] This is true.

Fawcett's Second Reason Why IFG-Style Multiple Structures Have Become So Widely Assumed To Be A Central Part Of The Theory

Fawcett (2010: 142-3):

A second reason for the current status of the IFG style representations is the great disparity between the numbers of publications in each of the two major 'strands' of the theory — these being what I described in Section 5.2 of Chapter 5 as the 'theoretical-generative' and the 'text-descriptive' strands. The fact is that most of those who read Halliday's work read it for its applicability in the description of texts, so that the readership of a theoretical paper such as "Systemic theory" will be a small fraction of the readership of IFG. Indeed, many of Halliday's other publications are also addressed to readers who wish to use his theory for one of various fields of 'applied linguistics' or to inter-disciplinary audiences. Typically the intended reader is someone who wishes to use the theory to describe texts, for any of a wide variety of possible purposes. Indeed, Halliday describes IFG as "a grammar for [...] text analysis" (1994:xv). For such purposes there is an undeniable initial attractiveness about a model in which (1) a text requires analysis at one level rather than two (even if it turns out that there are several structures at the one level) and (2) the 'multifunctionality' of language is 'reified' in those structures.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained here, Fawcett's notion of a 'text-descriptive aspect of theory' conflates the focus on instances of language ('text') with the practice of describing particular languages ('descriptive').

[2] To be clear, the paper "Systemic theory" (Halliday 1993) is a five-page entry in a linguistics encyclopædia that succinctly explains the architecture of the theory to anyone unfamiliar with SFL Theory.

[3]  To be clear, Fawcett's argument here is that one reason why the three metafunctional structures of the clause — as exemplified in IFG (Halliday 1994) — are "so widely assumed to be to be a central part of the theory" is that text linguists find them attractive. The first of Fawcett's attractions is the attraction of doing half as much work, while the second is the attraction of theoretical consistency.

On the first point, the number of levels of analysis required depends on the purpose of the analysis, but the rank scale provides the possibility of four levels of analysis within the lexicogrammatical stratum, and the analysis of grammatical metaphor requires identifying the incongruent relations between two strata: lexicogrammar and semantics.

On the second point, to the extent that 'reify' just means 'realise', in this context, the structures do "reify" the 'multifunctionality' of language systems.

Fawcett's First Reason Why IFG-Style Multiple Structures Have Become So Widely Assumed To Be A Central Part Of The Theory

Fawcett (2010: 142):

Given that systemic functional grammars do not generate IFG-style multiple structures, how it is that such structures have become so widely assumed to be a central part of the theory? There are at least the following three reasons. 

The first, of course, is that Halliday himself seems to have assumed the insightfulness of this approach from the earliest days of the metafunctional hypothesis. Notice, however, that historically it emerged as an extension of the 'element conflation' approach, and not as a replacement for it. In Halliday (1969/8 l:138f.) he introduces both the 'element conflation model' and the 'structure conflation model'. Having shown in detail how 'element conflation' works (as described in Section 7.2), Halliday then writes that "the clause has a number of different but simultaneous structures" (as already cited in Section 7.2 above). It seems that in the few lines between these two quotations Halliday has switched from thinking in terms of the rigorous demands of building a generative grammar to the more open-ended task of trying to provide an insightful diagrammatic representation on paper. In other words, the two diagrams of the different structures given on pages 143 and 144 of Halliday (1969/81) give a significantly different picture of conflation from that given in the generative part of the paper. As I have already pointed out, the generative grammar does not generate the elements "Rheme", "Given" and "Residue", so that the two positions are only compatible if we interpret the 'multiple structures' of IFG as visual aids to help us to a better understanding of the view that the various 'strands of meaning' occur simultaneously in the clause, rather than as parts of the generative systemic functional grammar of the first part of the paper.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The "IFG-style multiple structures" of the clause do realise the clause systems that specify them; see the previous posts on "structure conflation" for the misunderstandings that lead Fawcett to believe otherwise. However, while the metafunctions are "a central part of the theory", structure is less so, since Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory gives priority to system over structure.

[2] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Halliday. Halliday nowhere introduces a "structure conflation model". As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's mistaken notion of "structure conflation" arises from confusing element conflation with the integration of the three metafunctional structures of the clause in the syntagm of group/phrase units that realise them. Fawcett's model lacks a rank scale, and so lacks the means of integrating the three structural lines.

[3] This is true.

[4] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Halliday. Halliday's "diagrammatic representation on paper" is consistent with both element conflation and structural integration through rank scale relations.

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue. A previous quote from Fawcett (p130) makes clear that this claim rests on Fawcett's false notion of "structure conflation":

On page 143 he emphasises the concept that "the clause has a number of different but simultaneous structures" (while pointing out certain caveats, as indicated in the last subsection). But on the facing page he sets out a table of realisation statements that demonstrates clearly that the model is in fact one that simply conflates 'functions' — and not structures.

[6] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Halliday. "As I have already pointed out", these elements are "generated" as the complementary functions of Theme, New and Mood, respectively.

[7] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, there is only one position on the matter, since what Fawcett regards as a second position is his own misunderstanding of Halliday's model as entailing "structure conflation".

On the other hand, the "multiple structures of IFG" are both "visual aids to help us to a better understanding of the view that the various 'strands of meaning' occur simultaneously in the clause", and "parts of the generative systemic functional grammar of the first part of the paper". Or, more plainly, in SFL Theory, the three lines of clause structure realise the three metafunctional systems of the clause.

Fawcett's Representations Of Clause Features As Structural Elements

Fawcett (2010: 141): 

To describe such representations as "mental constructs" does not imply that they have no role to play in establishing an understanding of the nature of language. Indeed, many scholars would take the view that IFG provides the best available broad-coverage functional description of English that we have today. However, the recognition of their current value does not exclude the possibility that there may be other and better systemic functional represent[at]ions of texts — and specifically ones that focus on the direct use in the representation of a clause of the features that have been selected in the system networks. Section 7.8 will outline one such alternative that is currently being prepared for publication. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously explained, all theories are "mental constructs" and representations of theory, such as representations of the SFL model of clause structure, are representations of "mental constructs".

[2] To be clear, "better systemic functional representations of texts" do not include representations of clause structure, such as Fawcett's Figure 10, that confuse systemic features (paradigmatic axis) with structural elements (syntagmatic axis).

Confusing Systemic Features With Structural Elements

Fawcett (2010: 141):

From the theoretical viewpoint, such constructs [SFL representations of metafunctional clause structures] are a representation of what one stage in the generation of a text-sentence might be like — if it were the case that the grammar worked by first generating several functional structures and then conflating them. 

From the practical viewpoint of the text analyst, they may be a helpful 'reification' of the abstract semantic features that they represent. In other words, we might wish to say that, in this type of representation, the abstract features are made visible as 'objects' on the page, through the device of viewing them as 'elements' of clause-length structures, and by labelling each element of each supposed 'structure'. 

The only problem with representing the structure of language in this manner — i.e., in the IFG manner — is, as we have seen, that no systemic functional grammar actually generates such structures. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, SFL representations of metafunctional clause structures are not "a representation of what one stage in the generation of a text-sentence might be like", and the grammar does not work "by first generating several functional structures and then conflating them."

This is because the metafunctional systems of the clause, in which the realisation statements such as 'conflate' are located, are simultaneous systems, and there is no temporal relation between system and structure, since the relation between them is realisation, which is an intensive identifying relation, not a circumstantial one.

[2] To be clear, representations of structure are representations of how systemic selections are realised structurally. This does not mean that each feature in a network is realised by one element in a structure. The valeur of a feature is its relation to other features in the same paradigmatic system, whereas the valeur of an element is its relation to other elements in the same syntagmatic structure. As previously foreshadowed, Fawcett's model of structure (Figure 10) confuses systemic features with structural elements.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As previously explained, the structures represented in "the IFG manner" are realisations of the grammatical systems of SFL. See the previous posts for the misunderstandings on which Fawcett's claim is based.

The Nature And Purpose Of SFL Representations Of Clause Structure

Fawcett (2010: 141):

What status, then, should we give to a representation of the structure of a clause-length text-sentence that shows it as consisting of several lines of structure, as found in IFG and the many derived works? The answer, I suggest, is that it is a mental construct whose purpose is to make it easier for the text analyst to think about the multifunctional nature of language in structural terms.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from the epistemological perspective of SFL Theory, not only is linguistic theory a mental construct, but language itself is a mental construct. That is, language, as a phenomenon, is a construal of experience as meaning, and a theory of language, as a metaphenomenon, is a reconstrual of language as meaning, where 'construal' means an intellectual construction.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, the purpose of SFL representations of clause structure as realising three metafunctional lines of meaning is to represent how SFL Theory models clause structure.  As such, the concern is not with "thinking about" the metafunctions in structural terms, but with "thinking about" structure in metafunctional terms.

"The Proliferation Of Multi-Strand Analyses Of Functional Structure"

Fawcett (2010: 140-1):

To summarise so far: we have seen that when Halliday suggests that different patterns of elements in the clause tend to be associated with different strands of meaning, he is simply pointing out a tendency rather than issuing a prescriptive statement. And yet the proliferation of multi-strand analyses of functional structure in IFG and in the many 'spin-off works has established and re-enforced a firm belief in many users of the theory that this is an accurate model of the structure of language. Indeed, many of those who use Halliday's theory would be surprised that there could be any other way of representing the structure of language in a SF framework. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it strategically confuses the notion of metafunctionally organised clause structures (those of theme, mood and transitivity) with the type of structure favoured by each metafunction (culminative, prosodic and segmental).

Importantly, in SFL Theory, 'structure' refers to the relation between elements, and so the valeur of each element is its relation to other elements of the metafunctional structure in which it figures. This is why "different patterns of elements" are necessarily associated with "different strands of meaning".

[2] To be clear, the 'multi-strand analyses of function structure' have proliferated in publications because such analyses accurately demonstrate how clause structure is modelled in SFL Theory.

[3] To be clear, other ways of "representing the structure of language in a SF framework" are only theoretically valid if they are consistent with the architecture of SFL Theory, and those that are consistent are only preferable if they have more explanatory power than the standard  model.

Fawcett's Claim That Halliday's Clause Structures Sacrifice The Purity Of The Theory

Fawcett (2010: 140):

In practical terms, however, the simple fact that Halliday always represents the structure of clauses as a set of parallel structures sends a powerful message to his readers that the structure of language combines several 'strands of meaning'.

It is just possible, of course, that Halliday simply regards the 'multiple structure' model of structure as [a] convenient reification of 'how language really is', and that he considers it worth sacrificing the purity of the theory to provide a strong visual image of the clause as the realisation of the several different 'strands' of meaning.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the reason why Halliday represents the syntagmatic dimension of clauses as three metafunctional structures is that this is how his theory models clause structure.

[2] On the one hand, there is a sense in which the representation of structure is a reification, since SFL conceives of structure as the relation between elements, but represents it on the page as a thing (box diagram). However, this is not Fawcett's meaning here, since he only understands structure in terms of its representation, a box diagram, a thing, rather than as a relation between elements.

On the other hand, the wording 'how language really is' makes the common epistemological error of assuming that language "really" is something, as if reality were not itself a conscious construal of experience as meaning. Models of reality, including models of language, are models of meanings construed of experience, and are (interpersonally) assessed, for example, according to how reliably, self-consistently and extensively they account for the meanings they model.

[3] The implication here is that Halliday's 'three-strand' model of clause structure contaminates an otherwise pure theory, and that a single-strand model, such as Fawcett's, lacking the contaminant, remains pure.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Structure

Fawcett (2010: 140):

In a table on p. 36 of IFG, for example, one column lists words ('constituency', 'prosodic', etc) that describe the "favoured type of structure" [my emphasis]. And in "Systemic theory" (1993:4506) his wording is that "the different metafunctions [...] tend to be realised by different structural resources" [my emphasis]. In other words, from the theoretical viewpoint it can be said that he is simply pointing out interesting tendencies in the structural patterns in which each type of meaning gets realised. This falls a long way short of saying that each strand of meaning must obligatorily be realised in that type of structure. Indeed, the emphasis in his general descriptions is on the fact that, in his words, "constituent structure is the prototype to which all three [in fact four] metafunctions can be referred" (1994:35), and the box diagram representations that he provides in IFG are, of course, simply one way of representing the 'flat tree' type of constituency. But the fact remains, as I pointed out in the last subsection, that Halliday gives 'function' labels to many of the 'long boxes' in his diagrams that it would be more accurate to leave unlabelled.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because Fawcett misrepresents his source. Halliday (1994: 36) describes the favoured structure type of the experiential metafunction as segmental, not constituency:

That is, constituency is the principle on which segmental structure is based. The distinction is very important from a theoretical point of view, because constituency is modelled in SFL as a rank scale of forms, whereas segmental structure is a configuration of functions.

[2] This is deliberately misleading, because Fawcett omits from the quote the words that contradict his claim: Halliday's glossing of 'constituent structure' as the rank scale. Halliday (1994: 35):

[3] Here Fawcett once again confuses the notion of 'flat tree constituency', the 'minimal bracketing' approach to constituency on which the rank scale is based, with syntagmatic structures at one of those ranks, the clause. See Halliday (1994: 20-8).

[4] This "fact" is misleading, since it is the opposite of true. As previously explained, the functions in question, Rheme, Residue and Given are negatively defined as 'not Theme', 'not Mood' and 'not New', and it makes no difference in accuracy whether these functions are represented as a positive (+ label) or a negative (– label).

Misrepresenting Halliday And Matthiessen As Inconsistent

Fawcett (2010: 139, 139n):

Even though Halliday himself defines 'conflation' as a relationship that operates on individual elements, as we saw in Chapter 5 (Halliday 1993:4505), he also writes regularly about the structure of clauses in a way that appears to give IFG-style representations some status in the theory (e.g., 1993:4506) — so implying that conflation also occurs between structures with many elements. 

Matthiessen similarly defines the term "conflation" as an operation that relates individual "functions" (1995:778), and then goes on to write about "the structural unification of the metafunctional strands — the conflations of the textual, interpersonal and experiential clause functions" (Matthiessen 1995:613-17). 

Are Halliday and Matthiessen being inconsistent in such passages? Or is it possible that they do not in fact take the absolute position on this issue that one might assume? ²¹

²¹ In the above quotation from Matthiessen, it would just be possible to interpret the plural form "conflations" as being intended to suggest that the 'unification' of the various metafunctional strands in fact comes about — to the extent that it does — through many individual 'conflations'. But I do not think that this was in fact his intended meaning. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, these claims are true. Halliday and Matthiessen do write of conflation as a realisation statement that operates on individual elements, and Halliday does give IFG-style representations some status in the theory, not least because they represent analyses based on the theory.

[2] This non-sequitur is misleading, because it is untrue. Giving IFG-style representations "some status in the theory" does not imply that structures are conflated.

[3] To be clear, here Fawcett confuses two distinct aspects of SFL Theory in the Matthiessen quote. On the one hand, 'the structural unification of the metafunctional strands' refers to the integration of the three metafunctional clause structures in the syntagm of group/phrase rank units that realise them. On the other hand, 'the conflations of the textual, interpersonal and experiential clause functions' refers to any conflations of elements across these structures, as in cases where Theme, Subject and Actor are conflated.

[4] To be clear, Halliday and Matthiessen are not being inconsistent in such passages — merely misunderstood (as explained above).

On The Representation Of Structure In SFL

Fawcett (2010: 138-9):

Conflation is, by all current SF definitions, an operation that applies only to individual, coterminous elements. If this is so — and the theoretical writings of both the chief architect of SFL and the major implementers of both the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars leave no room for doubt that it is — we are left with the following question: "What is the role of the representations of functional structure in IFG?"

To ask this is to question one of the basic assumptions about the representation of language that Halliday has been making since the late sixties. Yet it is not, I shall argue, one of those assumptions that is fundamental to the theory, because the concept that such representations are designed to display (i.e., the multifunctional nature of language) can be displayed equally well — and in fact more appropriately — in a representation of the level of meaning (as we shall see in Section 7.8). It is the multifunctional nature of language — and not its representation in a particular manner — that is to be placed among the fundamental concepts of SFL.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is true. In SFL Theory, the realisation rule 'conflate' only operates on elements of structure that are realised by the same unit of form at the rank below, as when the elements of different metafunctional clause structures, such as Theme, Subject and Actor, are realised by the same nominal group.

[2] To be clear, the realisation rule 'conflate' has no bearing on the rôle of structural representations. That is, the question is a non-sequitur.

[3] To be clear, the role of the representations of functional structure in IFG is to represent theoretical construals of language.

[4] To be clear, this confuses representing language with theorising language. A representation of language is less abstract than language, since a representation is a token of a value, whereas a theory of language is more abstract than language, since theorising assigns theoretical values to language tokens.

[5] This is seriously misleading. To represent metafunctional clause structures at the level of semantics (Fawcett's 'meaning') instead of lexicogrammar (Fawcett's 'form') is to represent not only a different theorisation of language, but one which is inconsistent with SFL Theory.

[6] As we shall see in the examination of Section 7.8, Fawcett's "more appropriate" representation of clause structure confuses function (e.g. 'Subject') with form (e.g. 'Main verb'), at the level of syntax (form), and confuses syntagmatic structural elements (e.g. 'theme') with paradigmatic features (e.g. 'positive') at the level of semantics (meaning), as demonstrated his Figure 10 (p148):