Misrepresenting Halliday's Scale & Category Grammar As A Theory Of Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 189-90):

10.1.2 The remaining traces of the concept of a 'rank scale' of 'units'

It would be surprising if the concept that was the backbone of Halliday's original theory of syntax were to disappear without trace from the theory proposed here. After all, the phenomena in language that led Halliday to recognise the concept in the first place are still there. We should ask, therefore, whether the concepts of 'unit' and 'rank', in Halliday's original senses of the terms, have any correlates in the framework of concepts proposed here. Let us examine this question for a moment.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the validity of theorising is not a matter of whether or not it is 'surprising'. 

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The rank scale was not the 'backbone' of Halliday's superseded theory, Scale & Category Grammar. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 41):

The fundamental categories for the theory of grammar are four: unit, structure, class and system.

[3] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. Even Halliday's superseded Scale & Category Grammar was not a theory of syntax. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 39) modelled the levels of language as follows:

On syntax (and morphology), Halliday (2002 [1961]: 51) wrote:

Traditionally these terms have usually referred to “grammar above the word” (syntax) and “grammar below the word” (morphology); but this distinction has no theoretical status. … But it seems worthwhile making use of “syntax” and “morphology” in the theory, to refer to direction on the rank scale. “Syntax” is then the downward relation, “morphology” the upward one; and both go all the way.

[4] To be clear, the theoretical question is how to model such phenomena to the best advantage.

[5] In anticipation of Fawcett's misunderstandings of Halliday's original senses of 'unit' and 'rank', it may be useful to cite Halliday's own words, as a point of departure. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 43):

The category set up to account for the stretches that carry grammatical patterns is the unit. The units of grammar form a hierarchy that is a taxonomy. To talk about any hierarchy, we need a conversational scale; the most appropriate here might seem that of size, going from “largest” to “smallest”; on the other hand size is difficult to represent in tables and diagrams, and may also trap one into thinking in substantial terms, and a vertical scale, from “highest” to “lowest”, has advantages here. For the moment we may use both, eventually preferring the latter. The relation among the units, then, is that, going from top (largest) to bottom (smallest), each consists of one, or of more than one, of the unit next below (next smaller). The scale on which the units are in fact ranged in the theory needs a name, and may be called rank.

Misrepresenting The Theoretical Importance Of Unit And Rank In SFL Theory

  Fawcett (2010: 189):

Taken together, the above facts suggest (1) that those who work in the framework of the Sydney Grammar do not in fact find the concepts of 'unit' and 'rank' useful when they are engaged in the nitty gritty work of describing a language or of describing a text; (2) that they only find the concept of 'rank' useful when embedding occurs, and (3) that in any case the term "embedding" is to be preferred to "rank shift". However, this apparent down-grading of the theoretical importance of the 'rank scale' and 'rank shift' is accompanied by a far stronger claim about the limitations on when 'rank shift' can occur than the claim made in "Categories", as we shall see in Section 11.8.5 of Chapter 11.

Finally, I should perhaps point out that, while the term "unit" is used frequently in the writings of Cardiff grammarians, it is always with the meaning of 'class of unit' (this being the topic of Section 10.2).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As can be seen from the two preceding posts, 'the above facts' are a collection of misleading untruths.

[2] To be clear, this is a non-sequitur. Even if what Fawcett wrote about the concepts of 'unit' and 'rank' in Halliday's current framework had been true, it would still say nothing whatsoever about what Systemic Functional grammarians find useful.

[3] To be clear, each rank is the entry condition to a set of functional systems; for example, the rank of 'clause' is the entry condition to the systems of THEME, MOOD, and TRANSITIVITY. That is its paradigmatic function. By the same token, each unit is the syntagmatic domain that is structured; for example, the unit 'clause' is usually structured as Theme^Rheme. Moreover, the elements of function structure at a higher rank are realised by units of a lower rank; for example, Subject, at the rank of clause, is realised by a nominal group.

[4] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue; see the previous post.

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue. It is the rank scale that models syntax (and morphology) in SFL Theory. It is for this reason that Fawcett misrepresents its theoretical value in SFL Theory. Rank-shift, of course, is important in accounting systematically for instances in which a higher ranked unit realises a structural element of the same rank, or below, as, for example, when a clause realises the Subject of a clause: what you see is what you get.

[6] As we shall see in the examination of Section 11.8.5 of Chapter 11, Fawcett misrepresents Halliday (1994) on this matter, as well.

[7] As previously noted, the term 'class of unit' presupposes the notion of 'unit' (of which there are classes).

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On 'Embedding'

 Fawcett (2010: 189):

Furthermore, in the brief section in IFG on 'rank shift', Halliday quickly introduces the terms embedding and embedded as alternatives to "rank" and "rankshifted", and he then drops the original two terms completely. So it seems that Halliday himself appears to prefer the terms "embedding" and "embedded". (This is my preference too — but Halliday would not share the reason for my preference, which is that the term "embedding" expresses the key concept in the new theory that a unit frequently occurs within a unit of the same class without invoking the notion of the 'rank scale'. Again, see Section 11.1 of Chapter 11).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, what Halliday (1994: 188) actually writes is:

[2] To be clear, as can be seen in the quote above, Fawcett here confuses the notion of 'rank', a level in the rank scale of forms, with 'ranking', the status of a form that is not rankshifted.

[3] This is misleading. As can be seen from the quote above, Halliday does not "drop these terms completely". Instead, he explains that he uses the term 'embedded' only as an alternative to 'rank-shifted', excluding 'hypotaxis'. The reader is invited to predict whether or not Fawcett's use of 'embedded' includes the notion of 'hypotaxis'.

[4] This is misleading, because it flatly contradicts the Halliday quote, as can be seen above.

[5] To be clear, this proposition is not discussed in Section 11.1, as will be seen when Chapter 11 is examined.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On Rank And Halliday (1994) On Unit

Fawcett (2010: 188-9):

We should therefore ask how far the concepts of 'unit' and 'rank' are still actually used in Halliday's current framework. As we noted in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 of Chapter 5, the concept of a 'rank scale of units' is surprisingly absent from the list of "basic concepts" of Halliday's authoritative "Systemic theory" (1993), where the focus is mainly on the grammar as a generative device. However, we also noted that in IFG it continues to be used in virtually the same way as in "Categories". Thus Halliday writes, as part of the opening sentence of Chapter 1 of IFG (Halliday 1994:3), that "a passage of English [...] consists of larger units made up out of smaller units, [and] these smaller units, in their turn, are made up out of units that are smaller still." On the other hand, the index of IFG shows that the term "unit" is not used after the introductory chapters (as we saw in Section 6.2.2 of Chapter 6), and nor is "rank", except in the two brief discussions of 'rank shift'. Matthiessen (1995) goes even further, only mentioning the concept of 'unit' twice in his work of almost a thousand pages (though he has rather more to say about 'rank' and 'rank shift').

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. Halliday (1995[1993]: 272):

[2] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. As the title 'Systemic Theory' makes plain, Halliday (1993) is focussed on outlining Halliday's theory of language to a general readership — in an encyclopædia article.

[3] To be clear, this is explicitly stated in Halliday (1993); see [1] above.

[4] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. Halliday (1994) is organised on the basis of rank. Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 7 are concerned with clause rank, and Chapters 6 and 7 Additional are concerned with group/phrase rank.

[5] To be clear, 'unit' refers to form, whereas Systemic Functional Linguistics is concerned with identifying the functions of forms.

∞

189 pages into this publication, Fawcett is repeating his previous misrepresentations of Halliday instead of getting on with outlining his own theory.

Fawcett's Claim That His Theory Does Not Use The Concept 'Unit'

Fawcett (2010: 188):

One reason for approaching the 'new' theory in the way that we now are is that it establishes from the start that there is a major change in this basic aspect of the theory. The precise nature of the concept that replaces the 'rank scale of units' will become clearer in the next section, and clearer still in Section 11.2 of Chapter 11. We shall find that the framework of syntax proposed here retains only a few incidental traces of the concept of 'rank'. There is consequently no role in the present theory for the concept of 'unit' in Halliday's original sense of 'unit on the rank scale'.

The major critical evaluation of the concept of the 'rank scale' will come in Section 11.1 of Chapter 11, under the more general heading of "constituency", and Appendix 4 provides some further notes on 'the rank scale debate'.

Even though the concept of 'unit' is not used here, a concept that was originally derived from it plays a central role in all modern SF grammars. This is class of unit, which we shall come to in Section 10.2. However, while all systemic functional grammars use the concept of 'class of unit', there is an important difference between Halliday's criteria for defining a class of unit and the criteria used by most other systemic functional grammarians who have written on the subject, as we shall see.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett's claim is that 'unit' plays no part in his theory, but that 'class of unit' does. Since 'class of unit' presupposes 'unit', just as 'class of bird' presupposes 'bird', this is nonsensical. The reason why Fawcett would jettison 'unit' as a theoretical concept is that he sees it as inextricably bound to the notion of a rank scale, and he rejects the notion of a rank scale because it is the grammatical rank scale that models syntax (and morphology) in SFL Theory, and which, therefore, makes his own model redundant.

[2] To be clear, as previously explained, a functional grammar relates the class of a unit to the function it generally realises; that is, classes are viewed 'from above'. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 76):

The class of an item indicates in a general way its potential range of grammatical functions. Hence words can be assigned to classes in a dictionary, as part of their decontextualised definition. But the class label does not show what part the item is playing in any actual structure. For that we have to indicate its function. The functional categories provide an interpretation of grammatical structure in terms of the overall meaning potential of the language. For example, see Figure 2.9.

As Fawcett has previously demonstrated, he defines 'class of unit' 'from below' — that is: not in terms of the function it realises — and it will therefore be interesting to examine the validity of the views of "most other systemic functional grammarians who have written on the subject" when Fawcett eventually relates them. Of course, any claim that a proposition is valid because a majority of people support it is an instance of the logical fallacy known as argumentum ad populum.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993 and 1994) On The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 187-8): 

Thus, while the concept of the 'rank scale' has survived into the reincarnation of S&C as Systemic Functional Grammar in the Sydney version, it has not in the Cardiff version. Its centrality in the Sydney version is given a visual manifestation in the well-known summary diagram of the lexicogrammar in which the two dimensions of organisation are (1) the 'rank scale' of units and (2) the four major 'metafunctions' (e.g., Halliday (1971/73b:141), Halliday (1977/78:132) and Martin (1992:18). A similar diagram with eight 'strands of meaning' can be found in Fawcett (1980:95). However, the crucial requirement of the 'units' dimension in such diagrams is not that the units should be arranged on a 'rank scale', but that the set of units should be complete. This may sound a small difference, but it is not, as we shall see.

However, while the "Categories" concept of the 'rank scale' is clearly still present in the Sydney Grammar, we have noted (in Section 5.3 of Chapter 5) that in "Systemic theory" Halliday defines 'rank' in a curious way that avoids mentioning the concept of a 'rank scale of units'. And we have also noted (in Section 6.2 of Chapter 6) that 'rank' has an apparently diminished role in IFG.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The arrangement of units on a rank scale is the theoretical point of such diagrams.

[2] To be clear, the question of whether the set of units is 'complete' or not depends on the criteria on which they are defined. Note that Fawcett's claim is that the concept of 'unit' plays no part in his Cardiff Grammar.

[3] To be clear, this does not sound like a small difference. The organisation of units in a compositional rank scale is distinct from the 'completeness' of a set of units.

[4] This is misleading, because it is still untrue; see the earlier post Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On Rank. What Halliday (1993: 273) actually says is:

Systemic theory retains the concepts of 'rank,' 'realisation,' and 'delicacy' from scale and category grammar. 'Rank' is constituency based on function, and hence 'flat,' with minimal layering;

That is, Fawcett does not understand that a compositional hierarchy of units (constituency) is a scale from the highest rank (clause) to the lowest rank (morpheme).

[5] This is misleading, because it is still untrue, and indeed, it flatly contradicts Fawcett's previous claim (p85):

the concept of the 'rank scale' is still reflected quite strongly in IFG

To be clear, each unit on the rank scale provides the entry condition to the systems of that rank. For example, the unit 'clause' is the entry condition for the systems of THEME, MOOD and TRANSITIVITY. Moreover, the following tables from IFG (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 20-1) put the lie to Fawcett's claim:

Fawcett's Tribute To Halliday (1961)

Fawcett (2010: 187):

The concept of 'unit', in the sense defined in Halliday's "Categories", is inextricably bound up with the concept of 'rank' (as we saw in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2). In other words, there can be no concept of 'unit', in the "Categories" sense of the term, without the concept of a 'scale' of units that relates such units to each other in terms of their 'rank' on that scale — together with the accompanying set of 'rank shift' restrictions as to what 'rank' of unit may occur as an element of what other 'rank' of unit. Thus the concepts of 'unit' and 'rank' are inextricably intertwined in Halliday's theory of language, and together they make up the composite notion of the 'rank scale' that provides the backbone of Scale and Category (S&C) Grammar.

It is a tribute to the continuing influence of Halliday's founding paper "Categories of the theory of grammar" (1961/76) that the most helpful first step in explaining the new theory of syntax to be set out here to state the two basic Hallidayan concepts that it does not have. These are the precisely two concepts of 'unit' and 'rank'.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in both of Halliday's theories, Scale & Category Grammar and Systemic Functional Grammar, the term 'unit' refers to a unit of form — on the grammatical stratum: the clause, phrase, group, word and morpheme — and these are organised in terms of composition, such that a clause consists of one or more groups and phrases, which consist of one or more words, which consist of one or more morphemes. It is this compositional arrangement that constitutes the rank scale. Thus it is the rank scale that models what other theories model as syntax and morphology, and which, therefore, makes Fawcett's "Systemic Functional" syntax redundant.

[2] To be clear, here Fawcett claims that his rejection of Halliday's 'unit' and 'rank' is a tribute to the continuing influence of Halliday's theory. The question as to whether 'unit' and 'rank' are genuinely absent from Fawcett's theory will be explored in future posts.

Fawcett's Modern Systemic Functional Theory Of Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 186):

There are two parts to a theory of instances of syntax: the categories and the relationships by which these are related. We shall begin in Chapter 10 with the more 'object-like' concepts of the theory, i.e., the categories. Then in Chapter 11 we shall examine the relationships. There is a fairly close parallel between this pair of concepts and the "categories" and "scales" of Halliday (1961/76). But it is important to emphasise that my term "relationships" includes a wider range of concepts than Halliday's term "scales".

The structure of what follows therefore broadly reflects that of both Halliday (1961/76) and Fawcett (1974-6/81). …

By the beginning of Chapter 12, therefore, we shall be in a position to summarise the concepts that are required for a modern systemic functional theory of syntax, and also to evaluate how far the seven "fundamental concepts" established in "Categories" are still valid today.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Fawcett's "modern systemic functional theory of syntax" is a development of Scale and Category Grammar (Halliday 1961). This theory, which has long since been superseded by Systemic Functional Grammar, did not include system networks or metafunctions. On this basis, Fawcett's theory can hardly be called 'modern', and might be better termed a Scale and Category theory of syntax, were it not for the fact that even Halliday's first theory modelled syntax (and morphology) as a rank scale.

"Using The Cardiff Grammar As The Baseline For Constructing A Modern Theory Of SF Syntax"

Fawcett (2010: 185-6, 186n):

In Chapters 10 and 11 we turn to the concepts that are required for the specification of 'instances of syntax'. As we have seen, these concepts are drawn on in a computer model of parsing such as that described in Weerasinghe & Fawcett (1993), Weerasinghe (1994) and Souter (1996). However, these concepts are also referred to in the realisation rules, and are in that sense presupposed by them.

As will by now clear, we shall be using the Cardiff Grammar rather than the Sydney Grammar as the baseline for constructing a modern theory of SF syntax.⁵ 

⁵ Apart from the reasons that follow from our findings in Chapter 7, there are two more reasons for this. Firstly, the Cardiff Grammar has taken the revolutionary proposals for changes to the theory made by Halliday in the 1960s (as summarised in Chapter 4) significantly further than the Sydney Grammar has. It has full implementations of (1) explicitly semantic system networks, (2) the concept of lexis as "most delicate grammar", (3) the integration into the system networks of the meanings realised in intonation and (4) the integration of meanings realised in punctuation. Secondly, the Cardiff Grammar provides a much fuller specification than the Sydney Grammar does of the syntactic concepts that are required, both for language in general and for the description of English in particular — especially in its recognition of classes of group and cluster that are not provided for in the Sydney Grammar.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, Fawcett's 'instances of syntax' are actually structures, not instances. Fawcett's model (Figure 4) confuses the realisation relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes with the instantiation relation between potential and instance.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar is his model of syntax. Halliday's "Sydney Grammar" — SFL Theory — models syntax (and morphology) as a rank scale, but Halliday (1985: xiv) explains why the term 'syntax' is inappropriate for a functional grammar:

[3] To be clear, Halliday's work in the 1960s was concerned with Scale and Category Grammar, not with Systemic Functional Grammar. That is, Fawcett's claim is actually that his Cardiff Grammar takes the proposals of Halliday's superseded theory further than Halliday's current theory does.

[4] To be clear, Fawcett does not present any of his 'explicitly system semantic networks' in this entire publication. In SFL terms, such networks are actually the grammatical networks, and can be found in Halliday & Matthiessen (2004, 2014). For genuinely semantic networks, see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

[5] To be clear, Fawcett has nowhere demonstrated, in this publication, how he models 'lexis as most delicate grammar', and it does not figure in his theoretical architecture (Figure 4). Moreover, since Fawcett locates grammatical systems at his level of meaning, his model is committed to lexis as most delicate semantics, not grammar.

[6] To be clear, Fawcett does not present any of the system networks of the meanings realised in intonation in this entire publication. For an SFL approach to intonation, see Halliday & Greaves (2008).

[7] To be clear, Fawcett does not present any of the 'integration of meanings' realised in punctuation in this entire publication.

[8] This misleading. The 'Sydney Grammar' (SFL Theory) does not provide any specifications 'of the syntactic concepts that are required, both for language in general and for the description of English in particular', largely because SFL Theory is not a theory of syntax; see [2] above.

Fawcett's Summary Of His Comparison Of His Operations With SFL's Realisation Statements

Fawcett (2010: 185):

Let me summarise. Leaving aside the "Split" and "Expand" operations of the Sydney Grammar, which are either unworkable or unnecessary, the Sydney Grammar has an equivalent for every realisation operation in the Cardiff Grammar except the first (though these are not always in a one-to-one relationship, as we have seen). These realisation operations are important concepts in the theory, as their treatment in both Halliday (1993) and Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993) clearly demonstrates. 

However, these 'operation' concepts are a part of the grammar itself, so that they are relevant only indirectly to the outputs from the grammar — i.e., to a description of the structure of the text-sentences that are the instances of the potential specified in the grammar. Essentially, their function is to generate the relationships between the categories that we shall establish in Chapter 10. It is in Chapter 11 that we shall meet the relationships again. And it is perhaps significant that the first concept to be discussed there — that of 'rank' — has no equivalent among the realisation operations and will be rejected, while all of those to be considered in Sections 11.2 to 11.8 do have such a relationship.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue, as previously demonstrated.

[2] This is misleading, because it falsely presents Halliday's original model ("the Sydney Grammar") as if it were the derivative model (Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar).

[3] To be clear, this is both a non-sequitur and untrue. It is a non-sequitur because their being part of the grammar does not logically entail that realisation 'operations' are only indirectly relevant to the structures they specify; for example, the PROCESS TYPE system is also part of the grammar, and yet it is "directly relevant" to the experiential structure of the clause. And it is untrue because 'operations' (realisation statements) "directly" specify how system selections (paradigmatic axis) are realised structurally (syntagmatic axis).

[4] To be clear, here again Fawcett misunderstands the realisation relation between system and structure as the instantiation relation between system and instance — and he does so despite the fact that his term 'realisation operations' explicitly identifies the relation as realisation, not instantiation.

[5] To be clear, the claim that Fawcett's realisation operations (listed below) generate relationships between categories will be tested in the examination of Chapters 10 and 11.

1. Insert a unit (to fill an element). 

2. Locate an element at a place in a unit.

3. Conflate an element or Participant Role with an existing element. 

4. Expound an element by an item.

4a. Fetch a name to expound an element. 

5. Prefer certain features on re-entry to the system network , including preselection. 

6. For an element, re-enter the system network.

[6] To be clear, in SFL Theory, rank is not an "equivalent" of realisation statements. The rank scale provides the entry conditions to the systems of each rank, and realisation statements accompany features in those networks. Moreover, the rank scale is the means by which SFL Theory models form — i.e. syntax and morphology — and so is the theoretical dimension that makes Fawcett's model of syntax redundant. So it is hardly surprising that Fawcett rejects the 'concept' of rank. 

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On The Realisation Statement 'Conflate'

Fawcett (2010: 184-5):

Matthiessen & Bateman (1991) and Matthiessen (1995) call Halliday's "Split" operation "Expand", but otherwise there is, in principle, no difference between them and Halliday. In practice, however, they do not fully implement Halliday's concept that the MOOD structure consists primarily of "Mood + Residue" and only secondarily of "Subject + Finite + Complement" (or whatever it happens to be). See the examination of their account of generation in Section 7.4.2 of Chapter 7, which showed that their model is not a 'structure conflation' model, as the IFG model is, but an 'element conflation' model. As I argued there, this fact demonstrates that in the theoretical-generative strand of work in the Sydney Grammar the concept of 'structure conflation' is unnecessary, undesirable, and ultimately unworkable.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, Halliday (1995 [1993]: 272) specifies an 'Expand' realisation statement, not a "Split" operation:

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. It is only Fawcett, not Halliday, who regards these structures as 'primary' and 'secondary'.

[3] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Halliday's model. As previously demonstrated in the examination of Fawcett's Section 7.4.2, and shown above in Halliday's realisation statement (b), in SFL Theory, it is only elements that are conflated, not structures.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Maximally Extended Theme

Fawcett (2010: 184):

The other line of structure where Halliday frequently shows more than one line of structural analysis is in THEME, and this happens whenever there is a case of 'multiple theme'. For example, on page 55 of IFG there are three lines of structure for THEME in the analysis of Well but then Ann surely wouldn't the best idea be to join the group. On the pattern of the IFG approach to the structure of MOOD (as in Figure 7 of Chapter 7), Halliday's grammar would operate by first generating the 'multiple theme' of Well but then Ann surely wouldn't the best idea, since he analyses all of these items as different 'subcomponents' of the 'Theme', and it would then "split" it into its separate parts. It seems most unlikely that Halliday (or anyone else) would wish to treat all of these as parts of a single element, but that is the clear implication of the introduction of his "Split" operation. (See Section 10.3.4 of Chapter 10 for a discussion of 'primary' and 'secondary' structures.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the example in Halliday (1994: 55) is:

[2] As previously explained for Mood, the grammar does not first "generate" a multiple Theme and then expand it into textual and interpersonal sub-components. This is to mistake a system network of relations for an algorithmic procedure. The identity relation between system and structure is intensive (elaboration), not circumstantial (enhancement: temporal): thematic structure realises systemic features selected from simultaneous networks, including those that specify textual and interpersonal Themes; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 106):

[3] This is misleading, because it is the opposite of what is true. To be clear, all the sub-components do indeed constitute Theme as a single element of clause structure. The reason why this seems 'most unlikely' to Fawcett is that his 'systemic syntax' views grammar from below: giving priority to structure over system, and to form over function. In this case, because the structure has multiple forms, he assumes that there cannot be a single functional element realising the system of THEME.

[4] Again, it is only Fawcett who regards these structures as 'primary' and 'secondary'.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On The Realisation Statement 'Expand'

Fawcett (2010: 184):

The last realisation operation that requires a comment is Halliday's Operation (e) of "Split". This has no equivalent in the Cardiff Grammar. A "Split" operation is only needed in a grammar which represents both 'primary' and 'secondary' structures (as introduced in "Categories" and still used regularly for some aspects of structure in IFG). Halliday introduces it to enable the grammar first to generate what he would term a 'primary structure' (such as "Mood + Residue" in Figure 7 in Chapter 7), and then to 'split' the 'Mood' element into the two elements of its supposedly 'secondary' structure, i.e., into "Subject + Finite". Halliday does not explain why he thinks it desirable to generate the "Mood" element first and then to split it into two, but we can presume that the intention is to give expression to the idea that the "Mood + Residue" structure is 'primary' and the "Subject + Finite" structure is 'secondary'. Nor does Halliday explain what would actually happen in practice when a "Split" operation is carried out.

The reason why the Cardiff Grammar has no such realisation operation is, of course, that we recognise only one degree of 'delicacy' in the structures of the clause, so that there is no need for an operation whose function is to add another line of analysis to the representation. Instead, we treat the Subject and the Operator (Halliday's "Finite") as direct elements of the clause.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, Halliday (1995 [1993]: 272) does not propose an Operation of "Split", but a realisation statement of 'expand':

(e) 'Expand' an element into a further configuration (e.g., expand mood into subject+ finite);

[2] Non-trivially, the grammar does not first "generate" a Mood element and then expand it into Subject and Finite elements. This is to mistake a system network of relations for an algorithmic procedure. The identity relation between system and structure is intensive (elaboration), not circumstantial (enhancement: temporal).

[3] This is misleading. It is only Fawcett who regards these structures as 'primary' and 'secondary'.

[4] This is misleading. On the one hand, Halliday does explain why a Mood element is necessary. For example, the presence of the Mood element realises the feature 'indicative' (Halliday 1994: 74). On the other hand, the realisation statement 'expand' is not used in the system network of MOOD; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

[5] To be clear, Halliday's explains that this realisation statement expands an element into a further configuration. 

[6] To be clear, in SFL Theory, delicacy (hyponymy) is a sub-type of elaboration (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 145) and a dimension of systems, not structures. In contrast, the relation of Subject and Finite to the Mood element is composition (meronymy), a subtype of extension (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 146).

[7] This is misleading, since Subject and Finite are "direct" elements of the clause in SFL Theory also. Or more precisely, the notion of 'direct' is irrelevant here, deriving, as it does, from Fawcett's misunderstanding of a system network as a sequenced algorithm; see [2] above.