Fawcett's Problem With The Name 'Nominal Group'

Fawcett (2010: 203n):

⁹ The name "nominal group" is not a particularly good one for this unit, since in everyday usage the term nominal is the adjective corresponding to the noun name, e.g., a nominal candidate in an election is a candidate who stands in name only.  

The problem is that 'naming something' is only one of the three main ways in which nominal group refers to an object — and it is by far the least frequent. Thus every object can be referred to by either (1) a nominal group with a noun or one(s) at its head, or (2) a pronoun — but only certain classes of object can be referred to by a name.  

In other words the term nominal group is the legacy of an idea that has been accepted very widely for a very long time but which is fundamentally mistaken, i.e., that a common noun such as table or water 'names' something. Strictly speaking, a noun denotes the cultural classification of a class of referents, of which the present referent is an instance, e.g., as in the nominal group this book.  

So, while a noun may be used as the pivotal element of a nominal group that refers to an object, it does not 'name' that object. (Lyons (1977) has a useful discussion of these points.)  

Thus the 'nominal group' corresponds to the semantic unit of 'thing' — and so, typically, to the conceptual unit of 'object'. And only sometimes does a nominal group literally 'name' the object.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in the field of linguistics, 'nominal' is the adjectival form of the noun 'noun'. The "everyday usage" of the term 'nominal' is irrelevant to its usage in linguistics, just as the "everyday usage" of the term 'charm' is irrelevant to its usage in subatomic physics.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a nominal group does not refer to an object.  Instead, experientially, a nominal group congruently realises a participant element on the semantic stratum; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 55).

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a common noun realises a class of Thing, and it is the function of the other elements of the nominal group to subclassify the Thing in realising a participant. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 364):

Categorisation within the class is typically expressed by one or more of the functional elements Deictic, Numerative, Epithet and Classifier. They serve to realise terms within different systems of the system network of the nominal group.

[4] To be clear, Lyons did not view language from the perspective of SFL Theory and its epistemological assumptions.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a nominal group realises the meaning participant. It is a noun that realises the meaning Thing.

[6] To be clear, Fawcett's notion of a conceptual level — termed 'belief system' (p210) — which is realised in language is inconsistent with the underlying assumptions of SFL Theory. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 3) are more forthright on the matter:

We contend that the conception of 'knowledge' as something that exists independently of language, and may then be coded or made manifest in language, is illusory.