"One Must Choose" Fawcett's Criterion Or Halliday's

 Fawcett (2010: 283):

We replace the 'rank scale' claim by the statement that 

(1) the five major classes of unit (i.e., the clause and the four classes of group) all occur quite frequently at a number of different elements of structure within a number of different classes of unit; 

(2) that they do so with varying degrees of probability, and 

(3) these probabilities (and others) need to be represented in the grammar. 

Thus 'absolute' rules can be seen as extreme cases of probability. 

It is an interesting side-effect of defining classes of unit by their internal structure that it becomes impossible to apply Halliday's criterion of the unit's potential for operation in the unit above it on the 'rank scale'. One must choose one criterion or the other. 

The generalisations captured in the diagrams in Appendix B suggest the value of basing classes of unit on their internal structure, and the corollary is that the description is able to show that all the major classes of unit (the clause and the four groups) can all fill several different elements.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because statements about relations between formal units and elements of structure cannot replace the the rank scale approach to constituency, because the rank scale is only concerned with the composition of formal units — a clause consists of groups ± phrases which consist of words which consist of morphemes — not with the relation between formal constituents and the elements of structure that they realise. 

In theoretical terms, the rank scale is concerned with composition (extension) at the same level of symbolic abstraction, whereas form-function relations obtain across different levels of symbolic abstraction related by intensive identification (elaboration).

[2] To be clear, as previously noted, the clause is a unit, not a class of unit (e.g. adverbial clause), putting the lie to Fawcett's oxymoronic claim that the Cardiff Grammar features classes of units (cf dog breeds) but not units (cf dogs).

[3] This is misleading, because it misrepresents a theoretical inconsistency in Fawcett's model as "an interesting side-effect". The theoretical inconsistency lies in the fact that a functional theory classifies units from above, like Halliday, not from below, like Fawcett. Moreover, it is the non-arbitrary relation between classes of group and phrase (e.g. nominal group) and the meanings they realise (e.g. participant) that makes an interpretation of the functions of grammatical forms possible.

[4] To be clear, a functional theorist chooses Halliday's criterion, whereas a formal theorist chooses Fawcett's criterion.

[5] To be clear, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence. The diagrams in Appendix B merely illustrate Fawcett's model of structure; this alone does not "suggest" the value of taking a perspective that is inconsistent with a functional approach to structure.

[6] This is misleading, because a corollary is a proposition that follows from one already proved, whereas Fawcett's next proposition does not follow from one that has been proved; see [5].

[7] This is misleading, because it misrepresents a mere description of the model as a theoretical advantage of the model.

Misrepresenting SFL As A Constraint-Oriented Theory

Fawcett (2010: 282-3):

But how well does the 'rank scale' way of generalising about relationships between units reflect the patterns of syntax found in English texts? 

The theory presented here is based on the well-tested assumption that we can make more useful generalisations in terms of the concept of class of unit (in its present sense) and element of structure, together with the concept that the relationship between a unit and the element that it fills is probabilistic rather than absolute. 

Thus the present theory of syntax makes much weaker claims as to what is and is not permitted than the IFG version of the theory does. 

Indeed, it is designed to enable the overall description of a language to celebrate the flexibility and richness of structure in language.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this has the relation backwards. The syntagmatic patterns that are found in English texts depend on the model of formal composition that is used: ranked constituency (SFL Theory) or immediate constituency (Formal syntax).

[2] This is misleading. What is assumed is Fawcett's model, and the claim that it enables "more useful generalisations about patterns of syntax found in English texts" is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence — as, indeed, is the claim that the assumption is "well-tested".

[3] The word thus here is misleading, because it falsely construes a logical relation between the previous claim and the non-sequitur that follows. The overall rhetorical effect is to misrepresent two bare assertions as a reasoned argument.

[4] To be clear, on the one hand, this is a bare assertion, however trivial, unsupported by argument. On the other hand, it misrepresents SFL Theory as modelling language in terms of constraints ("permitted") — as in a Formal grammar — instead of in terms of choice.

[5] This is misleading, because, having just misrepresented SFL Theory as a theory of constraints, Fawcett falsely claims that his theory, unlike SFL Theory, is able to "celebrate the richness of structure in language". If Fawcett's theory were a systemic-functional theory, it would be more concerned with the flexibility and richness in the choice of meaning in language.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1961) And (1994) On The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 282):

Let us now turn to Halliday's concept of the 'rank scale', as presented in "Categories". This predicts that every element of the clause will be filled by a group or by a 'rankshifted' clause, and that every element of a group will be expounded by a word (unless filled by a 'rankshifted' group or clause). Thus what Halliday terms "upward rank shift" is permitted, but "downward rank shift" is not. However, we saw in Chapter 7 that the picture changes in IFG, so that Halliday now only permits embedded clauses to function within groups (at least, in English).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As previously explained, the rank scale is a model of formal constituency, not function structures. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 43):

The units of grammar form a hierarchy that is a taxonomy. … The relation among the units, then, is that, going from top (largest) to bottom (smallest), each consists of one, or of more than one, of the unit next below (next smaller). The scale on which the units are in fact ranged in the theory needs a name, and may be called rank.

In SFL Theory, the rank scale is the theoretical dimension wherein clauses consist of groups and phrases which consist of words which consist of morphemes. Each unit on this rank scale is the entry condition for systems that specify the functions (e.g. mental Process) of the constituents (e.g. verbal group) of each unit (e.g. clause).

[2] This is misleading because it is the direct opposite of what is true, as even Fawcett knows.

[3] This is misleading, because it misrepresents rankshift. Clauses can be shifted from clause rank to 

• group rank, where they realise elements of clause structure, such as the Token and Value elements of [[what you see]] is [[what you get]] and
• word rank, where they realise the Postmodifier element of group structure.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1961) On Exponence

Fawcett (2010: 282):

Thus, the highly general concept of 'exponence' from "Categories" was first re-interpreted by Halliday as the second highly general concept of interstratal 'realisation'. Then the researchers at London who were developing generative SF grammars specified the particular types of operation required in realisation. These have been refined over the years, and those set out above can be seen to specify, in their turn, the relationships between categories that are found in the syntax. It is somewhat ironic that the term "exponence" is reintroduced here with roughly the sense that it was originally given by Firth (1957/68:183), before Halliday borrowed it and stretched — indeed overstretched — its meaning in "Categories".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, in Halliday (1961), 'exponence' covered what Halliday later recognised as two distinct theoretical dimensions: realisation (an identifying relation between levels of symbolic abstraction) and instantiation (an ascriptive relation between potential and instance).

[2] To be clear, 'ironic' means happening in a way contrary to what is expected, and typically causing wry amusement because of this. Fawcett's claim, then, is that it is counter-expectant and wryly amusing that he uses the term 'exponence' in a way that he deems consistent with Firth's usage.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Firstly, Halliday (1961) uses 'exponence' in the same sense as Firth, with no "stretching", and thus no "overstretching". Secondly, Halliday's later replacement of the term 'exponence' with the terms 'realisation' and  'instantiation' is not a stretching of the original term, but the more delicate distinction of two theoretical concepts conflated in the term 'exponence'.

[4] To be clear, here Fawcett trivially implies unethical behaviour on the part of Halliday by construing him as having borrowed something of Firth's and stretched it.

Applying Fawcett's Realisation Operations

Fawcett (2010: 281-2):

The specification of the realisation operations that follows is essentially the same as that given in Section 9.2.1 of Chapter 9, the difference being that this list additionally identifies the type of relationship that corresponds to the operation. In their typical order of application, the major realisation operations are:

1 Insert a unit (e.g., "ngp") into the structure to 'fill' (or 'function at') an element or Participant Role (e.g., "cv") — so introducing to the structure the relationship of filling. (The topmost clause in a text-sentence fills the 'Sentence'.)

2 Locate an element (e.g., "S") at a given place in a unit — so introducing the relationship of componence.

3 Insert an element or Participant Role to be conflated with an existing element, i.e., to be located immediately after it and to be at the same place (e.g., "S/Ag") — so introducing the relationship of conflation.

4 Expound an element by an item — so introducing the relationship of exponence.

5 Re-set the preferences (i.e., the percentage probabilities on features in certain specified systems), including the preselection of features by the use of 100% and 0% probabilities — these probabilities being reset to their original percentages after the next traversal of the network.

6 Re-enter the system network at a stated feature — so possibly also introducing the recursion of co-ordination, embedding or reiteration.

The result of applying Operation 6 (and so in turn Operation 1) is to introduce to the structure either a single unit or two or more co-ordinated units. In either case the resulting structure may additionally involve the addition of more layers of unit, including the embedding of a unit inside another unit of the same class — depending on what choices have been made in the system network.

Blogger Comments:

These realisation operations can be tested for the clause Blessed are the meek.

1. Insert nominal group into clause structure to fill Subject
2. Locate Subject in final location of clause
3. Insert Affected (Medium) to be conflated with Subject
4. Expound the Head by an item: meek
5. Reset percentage probabilities (not provided by Fawcett)
6. Re-enter system network at stated feature (neither provided by Fawcett).

By this description, the nominal group is already structured before it is inserted into a clause that is already structured and includes a Subject. After one pass through an imaginary system network, all that is generated is the one item meek expounding the Head of a nominal group that fills Subject/Affected. In SFL Theory, in contrast, one pass through the system network of a clause specifies all the elements of a clause, not just one element.

Realisation Operations

Fawcett (2010: 281):

The general concept of 'realisation' is made specific through five major types of realisation operation. As we saw in Section 9.2 of Chapter 9, it is they, together with the potential structures, that specify the 'form potential' of a language.

Notice, however, that when they are applied (i.e., to a selection expression of features generated on a traversal of a system network, as described in Appendix A), they generate syntactic structures. The first four operations directly generate four of the relationships in syntax to be described below. And the last two provide the framework for generating structures with the recursion of co-ordination, embedding or re-iteration. Thus the realisation operations in the grammar are directly related to the relationships in the syntax of an output from the grammar — while not, as I emphasised in Chapter 9, being the same as them. In other words, we need both a theory of 'syntax potential' and a theory of syntactic instances'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is the operations that are specific, not realisation. Realisation is the same in each case: the relation between two levels of symbolic abstraction.

[2] To be clear, potential structures do not feature in the representation of Fawcett's model (Figure 4):

[3] To be clear, in Fawcett's text-generation algorithm, realisation operations are misconstrued as:

(i) the form that realises the meanings of system networks and

(ii) the potential that is instantiated as syntactic structure.

[4] To be clear, Fawcett's argument for the distinction between 'syntax potential' and 'syntactic instances' is simply that the two are related, but not the same. That is, he does not provide any argument as to why, or how, syntactic structures can be understood as instances of realisation operations.

The Problem With 'Exponence' In Its "Categories" Sense

Fawcett (2010: 280-1):

Since this is a comparison as well as a summary, we shall take as our starting point one of the 'scales' of "Categories": the highly generalised concept of 'exponence'. The problem with 'exponence' in its "Categories" sense is that it covers a very larger [sic] number of different concepts — i.e., every relationship between "the categories of the highest degree of abstraction" (by which Halliday means the features in the system networks) and "the data" (Halliday 1961/76:71). 

However, when in the 1960s Halliday introduced the concept that systems are choices between meanings, he also introduced the term realisation as a replacement for "exponence", and it quickly came to be used as the standard general term for referring to the relationship between different levels (or strata) of language. In the context of the present discussion it refers to the relationship between meaning and form (as described in Chapter 3 and as summarised in Figure 4 in Section 3.2 of that chapter).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true that, in Scale & Category Grammar, 'exponence' covered "a very larger number of different concepts". What is true is that it covered both realisation and instantiation, the latter being what Fawcett glosses as "a very larger number of different concepts". By this, Fawcett again demonstrates — as he does in Figure 4 — that he does not understand the SFL notion of instantiation. Halliday (1995: 273):

… 'realisation' (formerly 'exponence') is the relation between the 'strata,' or levels, of a multistratal semiotic system-and, by analogy, between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic phases of representation within one stratum. But in systemic theory, realisation is held distinct from 'instantiation,' which is the relation between the semiotic system (the 'meaning potential') and the observable events, or 'acts of meaning,' by which the system is constituted.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, 'exponence' is replaced by both 'realisation' and 'instantiation'.

[3] This is not misleading, because it is true. However, Fawcett's model (Figure 4) violates this relation between meaning and form by falsely positing that:

• system networks are realised by realisation rules, and
• selection expressions are realised by structures.

The Concept Of 'Unit' Has No Rôle In Systemic Functional Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 280):

The first "fundamental category" in "Categories" was that of a 'unit', but this concept, as will by now be abundantly clear, has no role to play in the theory of syntax proposed here, because it is inherently bound up with the concept of 'rank'. The word "unit" is used here, however, as a short form for the concept of 'class of unit'. Surprisingly, the concepts of 'unit' and its partner 'rank' occur only rarely in the recent writings of Halliday and Matthiessen. Yet it is clear that this pair of concepts still provides the general framework for the description of English set out in IFG — just as they underpinned the theory of syntax presented in "Categories".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is nonsensical, because the concept 'class of unit' includes the concept 'unit', just as the concept 'breed of dog' includes the concept 'dog'. Moreover, Fawcett's fear of acknowledging the concept is entirely unnecessary, because 'unit' is only "bound up with" the concept of 'constituency', which can be modelled in ways other than rank (e.g immediate constituent analysis).

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. SFL Theory models grammatical form as a rank scale of units and assigns functions (e.g. Token) to the constituents (e.g. nominal group) of each unit (e.g. clause). However, grammatical form is backgrounded in SFL Theory, because, as a functional grammar, rather than a formal grammar, it gives priority to function over form.

The Concept Of 'System' Has No Rôle In Systemic Functional Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 279-80, 280n):

The fourth "fundamental category" in "Categories" was, of course, the concept of system. It was Halliday's re-interpretation of this term in 1966 as 'choice between meanings' that made it the fundamental concept of a new model of language, and so of a new theory of 'meaning' (as we saw in Chapters 3 and 4). It therefore has no role in the present model of syntax.²

² It would be possible to envisage a model with a set of system networks that represented choices at the level of 'pure' form such that these were 'predetermined' by choices made at a higher level of 'semantics'. Hudson's work (e.g., Hudson 1971) is presented as a systemic model of syntax of just this type (with no ambition to model choices between meanings), but this is not the direction in which Halliday has led Systemic Functional Linguistics. I would claim that the fact that the Cardiff Grammar can indeed operate with system networks that are explicitly intended to model choices in meaning and that can be directly realised in syntax at the level of form vindicates Halliday's original hunch in the 1960s that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. should be regarded as modelling choices between meanings.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the concept of system has no rôle in Fawcett's Theory of Systemic Functional Syntax.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett has provided no evidence of this "fact". He has provided no system networks of meaning, and no realisation rules that specify how choices in systems are realised as his structures. Because his structures are not those of SFL Theory, he cannot claim that they realise the SFL systems of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD and THEME.

[3] To be clear, even if this "fact" were demonstrated, it would not vindicate something that is not true (see [4] below). More importantly, such a "fact" would not distinguish a model in which the system-structure relation is modelled axially — paradigm to syntagm — as in SFL Theory, from a model in which it is modelled stratally — meaning to form —  as in the Cardiff Grammar, because, in both models the relation between system and structure is the same: realisation (symbolic abstraction). 

However, this is undermined by the fact that the Cardiff Grammar (Figure 4) misunderstands the axial distinction between paradigm and syntagm as the distinction between potential and instance, as previously explained.

[4] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Halliday's "original hunch" on the theoretical location of these systems. From the first formulation of these systems, they have been located on the stratum of lexicogrammar. However, because SFL Theory models lexicogrammar in terms of the meanings they realise, these systems are interpretations of lexicogrammatical form (the rank scale of constituents) as meaning. As Halliday (1985: xix, xx) explains:

The Fourth Fundamental Category Of The Cardiff Grammar: Place

Fawcett (2010: 279):

A fourth category that is required in the present theory is that of place, in the sense of the numbered position (or 'slot') in a unit at which an element is positioned. Interestingly, Halliday refers in passing to 'place' in "Categories", but it is not presented as a significant category, and nor is it given any role in his later work. Yet this concept has come to play an essential role in the generative versions of SF grammar — especially in providing the conceptual framework, with 'class of unit' and 'element of structure', for explaining the phenomenon known as 'raising' (as noted in Section 11.7 of Chapter 11). The first appearance of the concept of 'place' in the sense defined here was in Fawcett (1973/81) and it was later described formally in Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993). However, the concept was also used, it appears, in Mann and Matthiessen's computer implementation of Halliday's grammar (as explained in Section 10.4.2 of Chapter 10).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading, because Halliday (1961) and Fawcett do not mean the same thing by 'place'. For Fawcett (p279) 'place' refers to

…the numbered position (or 'slot') in a unit at which an element is positioned.

For Halliday (2002 [1961]: 46):

A structure is thus an arrangement of elements ordered in places. Places are distinguished by order alone: a structure XXX consists of three places. Different elements, on the other hand, are distinguished by some relation other than that of order: a structure XYZ consists of three elements which are (and must be, to form a structure) place-ordered, though they can be listed (X, Y, Z) as an inventory of elements making up the particular structure.

[2] This is misleading. The only "generative versions of SF Grammar" that feature Fawcett's concept of 'place' are those of Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar.

[3] See the previous post The Key Rôle Of 'Place' In Handling 'Raising' Phenomena.

[4] To be clear, Fawcett has produced no evidence that Mann & Matthiessen used his concept of 'place' in the Penman Project. But, in any case, the functionality of an adaptation of a theory to the limitations of computers is not an argument for its incorporation into a theory of human language.

The Third Fundamental Category Of The Cardiff Grammar: Item

Fawcett (2010: 279):

The third major concept in the present theory of syntax is that of the item. This replaces the concepts of 'word' and 'morpheme' on the "Categories" 'rank scale' of units, these two now being simply types of item. The reasons for this major change are given in Section 10.5 of Chapter 10.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, on the one hand, as previously observed, Fawcett's 'item' confuses two distinct notions of word:

1. word as grammatical constituent (composed of morphemes), and
2. word as lexical item (a synthetic realisation the most delicate lexicogrammatical features).

On the other hand, in treating words and morphemes as types of item, Fawcett misconstrues a meronymic relation as a co-hyponymic relation.

Misrepresenting SFL Theory On Structure And Conflation

  Fawcett (2010: 279):

At this point we might remind ourselves that, in the new framework that is proposed here, the multifunctional nature of language is displayed in the analysis of a text at the level of meaning — so avoiding the problems that arise from the challenge of (1) generating and (2) integrating five or more different structures (as described in Chapter 7). This is achieved by arranging the features that have been chosen in generating it in separate lines, as in Figure 10 in Chapter 7. And we should also remind ourselves that the the application of the realisation operations attached to the semantic features generates a single, integrated output structure, so making it both undesirable and unnecessary to generate 'intermediate' structures such as those found in IFG.

The conclusion, therefore, is that single, coterminous elements are the only categories that can be conflated with each other — and this brings out yet more strongly the centrality in the theory of the concept of 'element of structure'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, 'in the new framework that is proposed here', the systemic meanings of all metafunctions are incongruously realised structurally by elements of the interpersonal metafunction: Subject, Complement, Adjunct, Finite ("Operator") and Predicator ("Main Verb"), though, as Figure 10 shows, the experiential elements of Agent and Medium ("Affected") are incongruously presented as both syntactic elements and semantic features.

[2] This is misleading. On the one hand, as previously demonstrated, these problems are imaginary, since they arise from Fawcett's misunderstandings of SFL Theory. On the other hand, because Fawcett has exported most of what is lexicogrammar in SFL Theory to semantic systems, and not provided those semantic systems (or realisation rules), he has hidden any the potential problems that arise in such a model.

[3] To be clear, as acknowledged by Fawcett, and illustrated in Figure 10, the Cardiff Grammar incongruously presents paradigmatic features as syntagmatic elements of structure. This is inconsistent in terms of axis. Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 10, the Cardiff Grammar incongruously conflates categories of different levels of symbolic abstraction: Subject (syntax) with Agent (semantics), and Complement (syntax) with Affected (semantics). This is inconsistent in terms of stratification.

[4] To be clear, on the one hand, Fawcett does not provide these realisation operations. On the other hand, in Fawcett's model (Figure 4), realisation operations are located at the level of form, not meaning (semantics).

[5] This is misleading, because the metafunctional structures in IFG are not intermediate structures, but construals of the different metafunctional meanings realised in the clause. Fawcett's misrepresentation in this regard arises from his inability to understand that these structures are integrated in a syntagm of clause constituents, as previously explained.

[6] This is misleading, because it falsely implies that this is not the case in SFL Theory. Fawcett has falsely claimed that SFL conflates structures rather than elements. Moreover, Fawcett's model incongruously conflates his semantic features (Agent, Affected) with his syntactic elements (Subject, Complement).

[7] To be clear, this is a non-sequitur, because the conflation of elements says nothing at all about the centrality of the notion of 'element of structure' in a theory, since conflation can be posited in any theory that features the notion of 'element of structure' — whether as central or peripheral in the theory.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Conflation

 Fawcett (2010: 278-9):

Moreover, in his writings from the late 1960s onwards the emphasis is always placed on the concept that an element of a clause such as 'Subject' is not a single element but a conflation of three "functions" — and so the expression in structure of the concept that language simultaneously realises several different types of meaning.

However, as we saw in Chapter 7, Halliday immediately extended the concept of the conflation of single coterminous elements to the much more ambitious concept that a whole unit such as the clause can be represented as a series of simultaneous but different structures. This implied in turn that the various structures, each roughly the length of a clause and each with 'elements' that were not coterminous with the elements in the other structures of the same clause, were to be unified, by the application of a final 'structure conflation' rule of an unspecified type, into a single, integrated structure. But the concept that five or more different clause-length structures can be 'integrated' is, as we have seen, theoretically untenable (except in the trivial sense that involves dismembering the structures into their 'lowest common denominators').

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Firstly, 'Subject' is not an element of a clause, but of the interpersonal structure of a clause. Secondly, 'Subject' is a single element of the interpersonal structure of a clause. Thirdly, 'Subject' is not a conflation of three functions; 'Subject' is one of the three functions that are conflated (e.g. Subject/Theme/Behaver).

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. 'Subject' is the realisation of just one type of meaning, interpersonal, not several types of meaning.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The SFL notion that clause structures vary by metafunction is not an extension of the concept of conflation, if only because conflation requires the prior distinction of metafunctional structures whose elements can be conflated. Importantly, unknown to Fawcett, in SFL Theory, structures can not be conflated, because a structure is the relation between elements. See the posts examining Chapter 7 here.

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The SFL model, which Fawcett demonstrably does not understand, does not imply a structure conflation rule, if only because structures are not conflated in SFL Theory.

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Revealingly, here Fawcett switches terminology from 'conflation' to 'integration', which suggests he is, in fact, aware of the SFL principle that he is choosing not to mention. In SFL Theory, the three metafunctional structures of the clause are integrated in the syntagm of its constituents (groups ± phrases). Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 74):

The clause, as we said, is the mainspring of grammatical energy; it is the unit where meanings of different kinds, experiential, interpersonal and textual, are integrated into a single syntagm.

[6] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, there are three clause structures: textual, interpersonal and experiential. Fawcett's miscalculation arises from misconstruing information structure as clause structure, and from counting the textual and interpersonal structures twice, as previously explained.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Recognising Elements Of Structure

 Fawcett (2010: 278):

A modern theory of SF syntax is — or should be — an explicitly functional theory of language, so that the criteria for recognising an element of structure are — or should be — functional and semantic rather than formal and positional. 

Thus the elements of a unit are those that are required to realise the meanings that have been selected in the system networks for realisation in this unit — ultimately, of course, as items (see below).

Halliday has surprisingly little to say in "Categories" (or indeed in any later writings) about the criteria for recognising elements of structure (especially the elements of groups).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, given that this is Fawcett's belief, it is surprising that he has, nowhere in this publication, provided "functional and semantic" criteria for recognising his elements of structure, and has, instead, foregrounded form (classes of unit) and position (place).

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, functional elements of grammatical structure (syntagmatic axis) are specified by realisation rules (such as 'insert Subject') in the grammatical system networks (paradigmatic axis) that the grammatical structures realise. In the absence of grammatical metaphor, grammar (wording) and semantics (meaning) are in agreement (congruent).

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday ± Matthiessen (1985, 1994, 2004, 2014) devote three chapters to providing criteria for recognising elements of clause structure, one chapter for each metafunction, and one chapter to providing criteria for recognising elements of group and phrase structure. For example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 240, 249) provide the recognition criteria for Scope and Senser as follows:

…the Scope of a ‘material’ clause is not in any way affected by the performance of the process. Rather it either (i) construes the domain over which the process takes place … or (ii) construes the process itself, either in general or specific terms…

In a clause of ‘mental’ process, there is always one participant who is human; this is the Senser: the one that ‘senses’ – feels, thinks, wants or perceives… . More accurately, we should say human-like; the significant feature of the Senser is that of being ‘endowed with consciousness’. Expressed in grammatical terms, the participant that is engaged in the mental process is one that is referred to pronominally as he or she, not as it.

It is the fact that, in a functional theory, such criteria are 'from above' — rather than 'from below' — that may explain why Fawcett is unable to recognise them as criteria.

The Second Fundamental Category Of The Cardiff Grammar: Element Of Structure

Fawcett (2010: 278):

We turn now from 'class of unit' to 'element of structure'. In "Categories" the "fundamental category" was said to be the concept of the 'structure' of a unit, but in the present theory it is recognised that the more specific and so more useful notion is the concept of element of structure. In Halliday (1956/76) element had been one of the key concepts, but in "Categories" it was curiously sidelined in favour of the less specific concept of the structure of a unit. The concept of 'element of structure' is nonetheless present throughout IFG, and it is impossible to envisage a SF grammar that did not give it a central role. This, then, is the second major category in the present theory of syntax.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true that 'element' was "sidelined in favour the less specific structure of a unit" in Halliday (1961). To be clear, Halliday (2002 [1961]: 41) identifies the fundamental categories of Scale-&-Category grammar as unit, structure, class and system, and then discusses structure in terms of elements (Halliday (2002 [1961]: 46-9). It is this that Fawcett misrepresents as a "sidelining" of 'element' in favour of 'structure'.

[2] To be clear, on the one hand, this is nonsensical, because, since 'element' and 'structure' are mutually defining, one cannot be more useful than the other. On the other hand, it is misleading, because it gives the false impression that Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar has some advantage over its source, Halliday's Scale-&-Category Grammar, despite the fact that both theories (necessarily) use both concepts.

[3] This is not misleading, because it is true. In SFL Theory, it is the relation between functional elements that constitutes the structure. Moreover, elements are the syntagmatic functions (e.g. Phenomenon) assigned to forms (e.g. nominal group), and as functional theory, SFL is concerned with the functions of forms.

The First Fundamental Category Of The Cardiff Grammar: Class Of Unit

Fawcett (2010: 277-8):

The first fundamental category in the present theory is the concept of class of unit. However, the criteria used for recognising examples of classes of unit (and at the development stage of the grammar for setting up new units) are significantly different from those used in "Categories" and still used in IFG, so that it is effect a different concept from Halliday's 'class of unit'. In "Categories", the class of a unit is said to be determined by its potential for operation at given elements of the unit next above on the 'rank scale' — and in IFG classes of unit still appear to be assigned on the same principle (even though this leads to various anomalies, as pointed out in Section 10.2 of Chapter 10). 

Halliday has stuck by this criterion in spite of the fact that most of his grammatically-minded colleagues of the 1960s and 1970s (Huddleston, Hudson and Sinclair) seem to have given increasing weight to internal structure and semantics, as we saw in Section 10.2.2 of Chapter 10 — so effectively rejecting Halliday's criterion. 

In the present framework, as in Fawcett (1974-6/81), the class of a unit is identified solely by its internal structure, i.e., by its potential array of elements of structure. (But see below for their close relationship with the meanings that they realise.) For English five major classes of unit are recognised here: clause, nominal group, prepositional group, quality group and quantity group, together with the genitive cluster and a number of other classes of cluster that handle the internal structure of various types of 'name'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar recognises 'class of unit', but does recognise 'unit'. That is, it recognises the Classifier, but not the Thing classified. This is like recognising breeds of dogs without recognising dogs. The motivation for this oxymoron is Fawcett's association of 'unit' with the rank scale, which Fawcett vociferously rejects, because he knows the rank scale makes his theory redundant. In truth, 'unit' only implies constituency, not the rank scale approach to constituency.

[2] To be clear, this is not misleading, because it is true.

[3] To be clear, this is misleading, because it is not true, as demonstrated in the examination of Section 10.2. The "various anomalies" were shown to be (motivated) misunderstandings on Fawcett's part.

[4] To be clear, this criterion is fundamental to a functional theory of grammar, and distinguishes it from formal (syntactic) theories. A functional theory gives priority to the view 'from above': the function (e.g. Process) that is expressed by a form (e.g. verbal group). Fawcett's approach, on the other hand, is contrary to this fundamental principle, in that it gives priority to the view 'from below': how forms are expressed structurally.

[5] To be clear, on the one hand, Huddleston, Hudson and Sinclair do not use SFL Theory, and so take a different approach to language, founded on different assumptions. On the other hand, what matters intellectually is not the rejecting of a criterion, but the validity of the reasons for rejecting a criterion. Here Fawcett has once again indulged in the logical fallacies known as the appeal to popularity, since he suggests that his view must be preferred simply because it is held by others, and the argument from authority, since he presents Huddleston, Hudson and Sinclair as authorities whose opinions matter simply on that basis.

[6] To be clear, as explained above, and previously, Fawcett's approach, the view 'from below', is contrary to a functional approach to language.

[7] See, for example, the earlier post Limiting All Classes Of Semantic Unit To Experiential Meaning.

[8] To be clear, 'clause' is a unit, not a class of unit. An adverbial clause is a class of unit; a clause is the unit of which it is a class.

Victory, Defeat And Humility

Fawcett (2010: 276-7):

If after making this small investment of time the reader's decision is that the original approach to, let us say, the 'rank scale' is superior to the approach taken here (in which the nearest equivalent is 'filling probabilities'), it would be helpful to future generations if the reasons could be given for maintaining that approach, in the light of the evidence offered here (and in Appendix C for the 'rank scale'). 

Indeed, we should not assume that the outcome to an exchange of views will necessarily be 'victory' or 'defeat'. One possible type of outcome is what has been called a 'transcending solution', i.e., the emergence from the discussion of a better idea than either party held at the start (so not a mere compromise), and this may well be a possibility in some areas. At other times, of course, we must hope for the humility, in both ourselves and our interactants, to say "Yes, I now see that the weight of the evidence is on your side, so I shall change my position."

It is my hope, then, that the effect of the publication of the work that has been developed in the framework described here will not be to separate further these two versions of the theory, but rather to provide ways of helping the theory as a whole to make the further improvements over the standard model (as represented currently by Halliday 1994 and Matthiessen 1995) that are clearly needed to make the theory stronger and more usable for the new century.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this blogger has made a huge investment of time and provided reams of evidence demonstrating that Fawcett's theory is internally inconsistent and based on misunderstandings of Halliday's two theories. It can only be hoped that this will prove "helpful to future generations".

[2] To be clear, here Fawcett frames the relative intellectual value of theories in combative terms of victory and defeat (of a personal position).

[3] To be clear, the close examination of Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar on this blog suggests that this is not a possible outcome.

[4] The reader is invited to consider whether or not Fawcett has himself in mind in his hope for humility.

[5] To be clear, the SFL Community has, for the most part, ignored Fawcett's model, so the question of a further separation of SFL Theory and the Cardiff Grammar is largely irrelevant. Indeed, it could be argued, on the evidence here, that the continued existence of the Cardiff Grammar crucially depends on it being ignored instead of critically examined.

On the other hand, from a personal point of view, this blogger can confirm that the effect of closely examining Fawcett's book has been to deepen his understanding of SFL Theory, its development, its self-consistency, and its explanatory potential.

Fawcett's Hoped-For Response To His Book

Fawcett (2010: 276):

In this book, then, I have set out an account of some of the major areas where we who work in the framework of the Cardiff Grammar wish to supplement or replace concepts relating to syntax proposed by Halliday. Moreover, I have tried to avoid merely presenting alternative approaches, and also to state the reasons for them. My hope is that those who work in the framework of the Sydney Grammar will resist the temptation to respond to this book as if it were an 'attack' on their model.¹  

Instead, I hope that they might undertake the experiment suggested near the start of Chapter 11, and work with the approach suggested here for a couple of hours or days — or even weeks, months or years (which is of course what my colleagues and I have done with Halliday's proposals). It is only in this way that one really discovers the merits and demerits of a description, and so of the theory that underlies it.

¹ It is unfortunate that the overwhelmingly dominant metaphor for academic discussion is that of combat. Why should it not be a co-operative enterprise, such as building a house together? See Appendix C for examples of the problems that may arise is [sic] academic 'debate.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, as this blog has demonstrated, Fawcett has largely failed in this attempt. See, for example, the posts on 11.9 How embedding and co-ordination can replace 'hypotaxis' and 'parataxis' (pp271-2), where no argumentation at all is made for his alternative approach.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, as this blog has demonstrated, Fawcett has only argued for his own model by misrepresenting the model he hopes to replace. This is a version of the logical fallacy known as 'arguing by default'. Dawkins (2021: 415):

Two rival theories, A and B, are set up. Theory A explains loads of facts and is supported by mountains of evidence. Theory B has no supporting evidence, nor is any attempt to find any. Now a single little fact is discovered, which A allegedly can't explain. Without even asking whether B can explain it, the default conclusion is fallaciously drawn: B must be correct. Incidentally, further research usually reveals that A can explain the phenomenon after all…

Moreover, Fawcett's argumentation has made copious use of bare assertions (evidence here), non-sequiturs (evidence here), and logical fallacies (evidence here).

[3] To be clear, here Fawcett frames negative responses to his proposals as unthinking 'attacks' rather than as reasoned argumentation based on evidence.

[4] To be clear, in the end, this blogger will have spent 5 years working with 'the approach suggested here', and in this way has 'really discovered the merits and demerits of the description, and so of the theory that underlies it'.

[5] To be clear, as is widely known in the SFL community, Fawcett is the number one violator of his own ethical prescription. A few examples here will illustrate the point.

See "Yet Another Serious Source Of Embarrassment For The Concept Of The Rank Scale":

Fawcett (2010: 256n): 

We might note that the data that we are about to consider are yet another serious source of embarrassment for the concept of the 'rank scale'.

See Robin Fawcett Negatively Appreciating Halliday And Matthiessen (2004):

On Wed, 2/7/08, Robin Fawcett wrote on the Sysfling List:

That suggests that IFG is becoming a less adequate guide as time passes, not a better one....

See Robin Fawcett Negatively Judging And Negatively Appreciating Halliday And Matthiessen (1999):

On 29 June 2011 at 08:42, Robin Fawcett wrote to Sysfling:

Indeed, if Michael Halliday and Christian Matthiessen had formed a clear view of the way in which the choices described in their Construing Experience through Meaning determine the choices in the major system networks of the lexicogrammar, they would surely have said so in that book. I have looked hard for a section that makes this connection, but I have yet to find it. This suggests that the model proposed there is simply one possible, half-complete hypothesis that needs to be subject to the normal process in science of development, testing, evaluation, revision (or rejection), retesting, re-evaluation, and so on.

On 9/1/12, Robin Fawcett wrote on the Sysfling List:

I would particularly like to support the calls for discussions to avoid being offensive, this being entirely unnecessary. Courtesy costs nothing.

The Two Sorts Of Changes That The Cardiff Grammar Makes To SFL Theory

Fawcett (2010: 275-6):

There are two sorts of changes that we who contribute to the Cardiff Grammar have made to the 'standard theory', as summarised in IFG. The first sort arises because the programme of exploration that Halliday sketched out had not been carried out in the Sydney framework, perhaps through a shortage of personnel. An example is the development of very large system networks for 'lexis as most delicate grammar' (1961/76:69) by Tucker and myself, assisted by others who have worked on the COMMUNAL Project such as Carlsen, Osman, Ball, and Neale. The work by Tucker, Lin and myself on incorporating probabilities into the system networks also falls into this category, in that Halliday has occasionally pointed out the importance of probabilities in language while leaving the implementation to others (one exception being Halliday & James 1993). 

In other cases, however, we have found it necessary to take a different approach Halliday's, in order to enable the model to reflect the data with greater coverage and, we think, more insightfully. It was for this reason that Tench developed his revised and extended version of Halliday's 1960s model of intonation (Tench 1996), and that Huang and I developed an explicitly functional approach to the experiential enhanced theme construction (Halliday's 'predicated theme' and formal grammar's 'it-cleft' construction); see Fawcett & Huang (1995), Huang (1996) and Huang & Fawcett (1996).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading on two fronts. On the one hand, the Cardiff Grammar takes Scale-&-Category Grammar as its underlying template, not SFL Theory. On the other hand, the types of differences between the Cardiff Grammar are considerably more than two, as demonstrated by the arguments on this blog.

[2] To be clear, on the one hand, contrary to the claim, this is not a change to SFL Theory, merely work carried out on the basis of the theory. On the other hand, there are compelling reasons to seriously doubt Fawcett's claim. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 67):

If we maintain the grammarian’s viewpoint all the way across the cline, lexis will be defined as grammar extended to the point of maximum delicacy. It would take at least a hundred volumes of the present size to extend the description of the grammar up to that point for any substantial portion of the vocabulary of English; and, as we have noted, the returns diminish the farther one proceeds.

[3] To be clear, Halliday retired in 1987, twenty-three years before the 2nd edition of Fawcett's book.

[4] Again, on the one hand, contrary to the claim, this is not a change to SFL Theory, merely work carried out on the basis of the theory. On the other hand, it is misleading to imply that probabilities play the same role in the Cardiff Grammar (e.g. 'filling probabilities') as they do in SFL Theory (e.g. instantiation probabilities varying for register).

[5] To be clear, as demonstrated here, the different approach taken by Fawcett is motivated by his misunderstandings of SFL Theory, and the bare assertions that his model provides "greater coverage" of the data and is more insightful can only be maintained by those who cannot follow the reasoning on this blog.

[6] This is misleading, because it falsely implies that the model of predicated Theme in SFL Theory is not explicitly functional.

"This Should Not Be A Matter Of Surprise — Let Alone Resentment"

Fawcett (2010: 275):

Section 12.2 will examine the 'categories', and Section 12.3 the 'scales' and the 'relationships' into which the 'scales' have developed. Then in Section 12.4 we will stand back from the comparison of individual concepts, and compare the Sydney Grammar and the Cardiff Grammar as two alternative models of language as a whole. The two have an enormous amount in common, of course, but they also have a number of important differences.

Can they be re-integrated into a single model? We who work in the framework of the Cardiff Grammar have learnt a tremendous amount from the work that is here characterised as the Sydney Grammar, and I have established in Chapter 3 that the two models have a sufficient amount in common to enable comparisons to be made. There is also, therefore, a basis for the exchange of concepts between the two models. Yet at the same time we who contribute to the Cardiff view of language have also found it valuable to make a number of changes, as this book shows. This should not be a matter of surprise — let alone resentment — because it is simply not reasonable to expect Halliday (or anyone else) to have 'got it right' at the first attempt (S&C) or even the second attempt (his SFL of the 1970s onwards). The purpose of writing this book is to try to contribute to the development of a more fully adequate systemic functional model of language, and I hope that the proposals made here will be considered by my fellow systemic functional linguists in that light.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the reason why SFL Theory and the Cardiff Grammar have "an enormous amount in common" is that both derive from Halliday's theorising, and the reason they have "a number of important differences" is that Fawcett misunderstands Halliday's theorising, as demonstrated over and over and over on this blog.

[2] To be clear, the term 're-integrated' suggests that the two models were once integrated. This is misleading, because it is untrue. The commonality of SFL Theory and the Cardiff Grammar derives from their antecedent: Halliday's superseded theory, Scale-&-Category Grammar. Moreover, as this blog has demonstrated, the Cardiff Grammar cannot be integrated into SFL Theory, because, unknown to Fawcett, it is based on different principles and internally inconsistent (Figure 4).

[3] To be clear, the reason why those who work in the framework of the Cardiff Grammar have "learnt a tremendous amount" from SFL Theory is that both models derive from Halliday's theorising.

[4] To be clear, as this blog demonstrates, the theoretical changes made by those "who contribute to the Cardiff view of language" derive from misunderstandings of SFL Theory and result in an internally inconsistent model (Figure 4).

[5] To be clear, here Fawcett frames any reaction to his model as emotional ('surprise', 'resentment', 'not reasonable') rather than cognitive (e.g. rational) and argued from evidence.

[6] To be clear, Fawcett's modest implication here is that the Cardiff Grammar is closer to "getting it right" than SFL Theory.

[7] To be clear, whether or not this is Fawcett's true purpose in writing this book, its proposals have been taken very seriously indeed on this blog and assessed in terms theoretical competence, theoretical consistency and explanatory power.

A Common Framework For Comparing SFL Theory And The Cardiff Grammar

Fawcett (2010: 274-5):

The starting point for the summaries that follow must be the framework for a modern SF grammar that we established in Chapter 3. As Figure 4 in Section 3.2 of that chapter showed, its two principle characteristics are (1) that it consists essentially of the two levels of meaning and form, and (2) that there is at each level (a) a component that specified the potential, and (b) an Output' from the grammar, i.e., the instance at that level.

As we have seen, an additional advantage of this formulation of the model is that it is at a sufficiently high level of generalisation to provide a common framework in which we may compare the Sydney the Cardiff Grammars. Moreover, its ability to provide this common framework is not affected by Halliday and Matthiessen's increasing commitment, culminating in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), to the idea of having a 'two-level' model of 'semantics' (as we saw in Section 4.6 of Chapter 4). In that model, you will recall, there is both the level of 'meaning potential' that Halliday recognised in the early 1970s as the semantics (e.g., Halliday 1971/73a:41-2), and a level of 'semantics' that is higher than this, roughly equivalent to Martin's (1992) 'discourse semantics'. The proposal that this common ground exists follows directly from statements of Halliday's from the late sixties to the present, such as:

In a functional grammar, [...] a language is interpreted as a system of meanings, accompanied by forms through which the meanings can be expressed" (Halliday 1994:xix).

Indeed, it can be argued that all of the concepts that are required in a modern SF grammar follow from accepting the need to recognise the appropriate 'division of labour' between the two levels of semantics and form in such a model.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, it is the theoretical architecture of the Cardiff Grammar, as represented in Figure 4, that both invalidates the theory and illustrates the extent to which Fawcett does not understand the dimensions of SFL Theory. For example, Figure 4

• misrepresents the axial relation of realisation (paradigmatic system-syntagmatic structure) as the instantiation relation between potential and instance;
• misrepresents a selection expression as an instance of a system network; an instance of a potential system network is an actual system network; a selection expression can be both potential and instance, as demonstrated by the selection expression for the phoneme /b/: [voiced, bilabial, stop] which characterises both the phoneme as potential and the phoneme in a text;
• misrepresents structure as an instance of realisation rules, despite the structure being specified as the realisation of the realisation rules;
• misrepresents a system network and realisation rules as different levels of symbolic abstraction (meaning and form), despite the fact that both the network and the realisation rules include the features of the same level of abstraction (meaning); and
• conflates content (syntax) and expression (phonology/graphology) as the same level of symbolic abstraction (form).

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Even ignoring all the theoretical inconsistencies embodied in Figure 4, it cannot provide a common framework for comparing SFL Theory with the Cardiff Grammar, if only because the two models assume different principles of stratification: meaning/wording/sounding (SFL Theory) vs meaning/form (Cardiff Grammar).

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As pointed out in the examination of Section 4.6, SFL Theory has a 'one-level' model of semantics (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999) and a 'one-level' model of lexicogrammar (Halliday 1985, 1994, Halliday & Matthiessen 2004, 2014). The motivation for this misrepresentation is Fawcett's desire for his model to replace the SFL model of grammatical structure.

[4] To be clear, while it is true that Martin presents his discourse semantics as a stratum above lexicogrammar, the truth, nevertheless, lies elsewhere. As demonstrated here, Martin's (1992) discourse semantics is largely Halliday & Hasan's (1976) lexicogrammatical cohesion, misunderstood and rebranded as his own invention.

[5] This is misleading because it is untrue. The Halliday quote — which does not appear on the cited page — does not suggest that Fawcett's Figure 4 offers a common ground for comparing his model with SFL Theory. It merely acknowledges that in SFL Theory, lexicogrammatical forms are interpreted in terms of the meanings they realise. Cf Halliday (1994: xvii):

[6] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the 'division of labour' is not between meaning and form, but between meaning, wording and sounding, with wording being the interpretation of lexicogrammatical form (e.g. nominal group) in terms of its function in realising meaning (e.g. Senser).

"What Theoretical Concepts Are Required For The Description Of Syntax In A Modern Systemic Functional Grammar?"

Fawcett (2010: 274):

Let us now look again at the two questions with which we began this book. The first was:

What theoretical concepts are required for the description of syntax in a modern, large-scale systemic functional grammar?"

The short answer is that the concepts we need are specified in Chapters 10 and 11, and summarised in the last sections of those chapters. However, in the next three sections of this chapter I shall provide an integrated summary of the proposed new theory of syntax, and at the same time a comparison between it and the various other frameworks for syntax in SFL that I described in Part 1. The subsidiary question with which we began was:

How far are the founding concepts introduced by Halliday in "Categories" still valid in a modern, large-scale systemic functional grammar?

I shall return to this in Section 12.7 of this chapter.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously noted, on the one hand, SFL Theory is not a description of syntax, for reasons given in Halliday (1985: xiv):

On the other hand, the linguistic phenomena that formal theories model as syntax and morphology are modelled as a rank scale in SFL Theory. This is why Fawcett devotes so much space in his book to misleading the reader by misrepresenting the rank scale, and calling it an "embarrassment" (pp 256, 310) to SFL Theory.

[2] To be clear, here again Fawcett modestly claims that the theoretical concepts that are needed in a modern systemic functional grammar are those that he has devised, despite the fact that

• his model is not modern, since it is based on Scale-&-Category Grammar (Halliday 1961), not Systemic Functional Grammar;
• his model prioritises structure over system; and
• his model prioritises the perspective of form (syntax) over the perspective of function.

Moreover, as this blog demonstrates over and over and over, Fawcett's Cardiff is internally inconsistent, and inconsistent with both the founding assumptions and the architecture of SFL Theory.

[3] To be clear, the term 'large-scale' is redundant here. SFL Theory models language as a whole, varying according to contexts of use.

[4] To be clear, Halliday (1995 [1993]: 272, 273) usefully outlines some what is — and not — common to Scale-&-Category Grammar and Systemic Functional Grammar: 

Fawcett's Claim That The Metafunction Structures In IFG Have No Status In The Theory

 Fawcett (2010: 273-4):

However, this leaves the long-established 'multiple structure' representations shown in the box diagrams of IFG and other works with no status in the theory. So the remaining question is whether the 'multiple structures' are nonetheless useful in text description — perhaps on the grounds that they are the best functional representations that are generally available at present (as it is arguably the case). This in turn raises the practical questions of how usable they in fact are in text analysis, and what alternatives are currently available, or soon will be. We shall return to these matters in the final section of this chapter.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is misleading — though comically so — because it is so obviously the opposite of what is true. The theoretical status of (clause) box diagrams in SFL Theory is that they represent the metafunctional (clause) structures that are specified by metafunctional (clause) system networks on the lexicogrammatical stratum. 

[2] As will be seen in the examination of Fawcett's questioning of the usefulness and usability (of representations) of metafunction structures, Fawcett continues to misrepresent SFL Theory, and again confuses layers in the sense of rank (form) with layers in the sense of structure (function).

Fawcett's 2 Reasons Why Adding The Cardiff Grammar Syntactic Representation To SFL Clause Structures Cannot Reconcile The Two Theories

Fawcett (2010: 273-4):

However, we also saw in Chapter 7 that we cannot reconcile the two versions of the theory by simply adding the syntactic representation of the Cardiff Grammar to the 'multiple structures' of the Sydney Grammar, as a way to integrate them in a single structure. 

The first reason is that in the Cardiff Grammar it is simply not necessary to have any such 'intermediate' instantial representation between (1) the selection expression of features that are the output from the system networks and (2) the single, integrated structure that must be the final structural representation of any text-sentence (e.g., as shown in the upper half of Figure 10 in Chapter 7) — a fact that is demonstrated by the successful operation of the computer version of the Cardiff Grammar. 

The second reason why we cannot simply add the Cardiff representation of syntax to an IFG-style 'multiple structure' representation is that there are major (and probably insuperable) theoretical problems for the generative version of a model of language that is intended first to generate a set of five or more different structures for a clause and then, by the application of some type of 'structure conflation' rule that no SF theorist has yet attempted to formalise, to integrate them all into a single structure. 

It seems from the experience of those who have tried (in the Penman Project as reported in Matthiessen & Bateman 1991, and in the early stages of the COMMUNAL Project as described in Fawcett, Tucker & Lin 1993) that it is just not possible to incorporate 'multiple structures' in a generative SF grammar. The clear conclusion is that such grammars should be based on the concept of 'element conflation' rather than 'structure conflation'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] For the detailed arguments that demonstrate that Fawcett's claims in his Chapter 7 are based on multidimensional misunderstandings of SFL Theory, see the 103 posts here.

[2] To be clear, the unquestioned assumption here is that it would be theoretically advantageous to reconcile the Cardiff Grammar and SFL Theory. As this blog has demonstrated, over and over and over, unknown to Fawcett, the Cardiff Grammar is inconsistent — in terms of both theoretical assumptions and architecture — with both SFL Theory and itself.

[3] To be clear, as demonstrated in the examination of Chapter 7, there is no theoretical requirement that the three metafunctional structures of the clause be integrated into any single structure, let alone that of the Cardiff Grammar, which is itself a confused hybrid of form (Main Verb) interpersonal function (Subject, Complement, Adjunct).

[4] To be clear, Fawcett's first reason for why the Cardiff Grammar syntactic model cannot be added to the SFL model of clause structure is that the architecture of Cardiff Grammar does not require the SFL model of clause structure. This is analogous to arguing that the model of alchemy cannot be added to the model of chemistry because the model of alchemy does not require the model of chemistry.

[5] To be clear, Fawcett's second reason for why the Cardiff Grammar syntactic model cannot be added to the SFL model of clause structure is that the SFL model of clause structure has major theoretical problems. However, as demonstrated in the examination of Chapter 7, this problem arises from Fawcett's misunderstanding of SFL Theory, especially his false claims that (i) the metafunctional clause structures are not syntagmatically integrated, and that (ii) the metafunctional clause structures need to be integrated in a single structure. As previously explained, the metafunctional clause structures are integrated in a syntagm of clause constituents.

[6] To be clear, the reason why 'no SF theorist' has attempted to formalise a structure conflation rule is that structure conflation is not a feature of SFL Theory. Here, also, Fawcett misleads by shifting terminology from structure 'integration' to structure 'conflation' to set up his final misleading point in this extract; see [8] below.

[7] To be clear, on the one hand, as previously demonstrated, this misrepresents Matthiessen & Bateman (1991), and on the other hand, any adaptations of theory to the limitations of computers is not an argument about the validity of the theory itself, since the theory describes what humans can do, not what machines can do.

[8] To be clear, on the one hand, this is a non sequitur, because Fawcett has not presented an argument weighing up the relative theoretical values of structure vs element conflation. On the other hand, it is misleading, because it falsely attributes structure conflation to SFL Theory, and falsely claims that element conflation is not a feature of SFL Theory.