Summarising The Main Point Made In This Section

Fawcett (2010: 63-4):

Let me summarise the main point that is made in this section. This is that, even if Halliday turns out to be right about the need to add another level of system networks above those in the 'meaning potential' of the lexicogrammar (which I do not think he is), it does not necessarily follow that we must deny that there is also realisation between the established levels of the generative apparatus that I have described in Chapter 3 (this generative apparatus being exemplified both in Appendix A and in Halliday's own early generative grammars). To assert that the only relationships involved in Figure 5 — and so in Figure 4 — are ones of 'instantiation' would be to sacrifice the great insight of the later 1960s and early 1970s that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. are choices in meaning.* And for what would this sacrifice be made? Ultimately, it would be for the abstract (and undesirably limiting) notion that the specification of the 'potential' at every level of language necessarily has the form of a system network. The more desirable alternative, as our work in the COMMUNAL Project at Cardiff has shown, is to allow that a full model of language in use may require different ways of specifying the 'potential'. Indeed this concept is illustrated in the outline proposed in Chapter 3, in that we saw there that it is the role of the realisation rules to specify the 'form potential'.

* It would not solve the problem to label them as 'formal meaning' in contrast with 'semantic meaning' ; they are still patently more semantic than their syntactic correlates.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as already explained, the distinction between semantic networks and grammatical networks provides a systematic means of accounting for grammatical metaphor.

[2] Here again Fawcett confuses the systemic potential of language (meaning potential) with the stratum of lexicogrammar.

[3] To be clear, the 'generative apparatus' is Fawcett's flowchart (Figure 4).  As previously explained many times, it is based on misunderstandings of axis, stratification and instantiation, as well as being internally inconsistent.

[4] This is potentially misleading. To be clear, the exemplication of Fawcett's flowchart in Appendix A involves a system network and realisation rules.  It is this that it has in common with "Halliday's own early generative grammars".  The system itself confuses semantics (a system for 'thing') with lexicogrammar (nominal group features); see the earlier critique here.

[5] As previously explained, this is Fawcett's misunderstanding, deriving from the misunderstandings inherent in his own model.

[6] On the one hand, this is a non-sequitur inferred from a false premiss. On the other hand, in SFL theory, the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. are choices in wording that realise meaning, and in the absence of grammatical metaphor, the wording and meaning agree (are congruent).

[7] On the one hand, 'undesirably limiting' is merely interpersonal attitude (negative appreciation) falsely presented as if logical argument.  On the other hand, the system network is the formalism of Systemic Functional Linguistics, embodying the fundamental principle of meaning as choice.

[8] Again, 'more desirable' is merely interpersonal attitude (positive appreciation) falsely presented as if logical argument.  The claim that work has shown this to be so is merely Fawcett's own assessment, made without providing the evidence on which it is based.

[9] This is potentially misleading.  The only alternative to system networks for representing potential that Fawcett proposes is realisation rules/statements (Figure 4), and in SFL theory, these are located in system networks.

[10] To be clear, in SFL theory, this contrast is the stratificational distinction of wording (lexicogrammar) and meaning (semantics), these being two levels of symbolic abstraction modelling the same phenomenon: linguistic content.

Continuing To Attack A Straw Man

Fawcett (2010: 63):

There is a small further problem in adopting the position represented in Figure 5. This is that it is not clear what we should call this supposed 'level' of language. Halliday calls it the "lexicogrammar" and this makes it, in effect, an alternative term to "form".

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

Here again, as before, Fawcett misrepresents his reorganisation (Figure 5) of his model (Figure 4) as Halliday's model, and fallaciously attacks the straw man he has created.

Arguing On The Basis Of Misunderstandings Of Realisation And Instantiation

Fawcett (2010: 63):

Interestingly, the symbol for the meaning of 'is realised by' in informal realisation rules in a SF grammar is a small arrow pointing diagonally from the top left corner of an imaginary rectangle to the bottom right corner. And one could draw just such an arrow with a felt tip pen right across the diagram in Figure 4, so symbolising that the relationship between the meaning potential and the realised instance is the same, both in individual cases and in the case of the model as a whole. Yet this relationship is in fact, as we can see, one that involves not just realisation but both instantiation (twice) and realisation. 

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] As Fawcett's term 'realised instance' discloses, his flowchart confuses the relations of realisation (between system and structure) and instantiation (between potential and instance), as previously demonstrated on this blog.  In SFL terms, the relation between Fawcett's top-left module (paradigmatic system) and his bottom-right module (syntagmatic structure) is realisation.  A structure is not an instance of a system, by definition.

[2] To be clear, this is only true in terms of Fawcett's flowchart.  As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's flowchart is not consistent with the architecture of SFL theory, and not consistent with itself, in terms of realisation or instantiation.  See, for example, the first critique of Figure 4 here.

Deploying Two Logical Fallacies In Misrepresenting Halliday On Realisation

Fawcett (2010: 63):

The reason why the reinterpretations by Halliday of what "realisation" means cited above are so problematical is that it is not logically possible to hold at the same time the two views that

(1) there are two levels of instances (as Figure 4 suggests that there are), and
(2) the two levels of instances are at the same level of language (as Figure 5 suggests). 

It would only be possible to hold both views if one were to claim at the same time that the selection expression of features chosen from the 'meaning potential' and the structure that so clearly manifests it at a lower level are at the same level. Yet the system networks are patently more 'semantic' than the structures that are generated from them. Indeed, when Halliday first introduced the concept of 'realisation', it was in precisely the sense of the relationship between two levels, i.e., between (1) the system networks at the level of meaning potential and — after first generating a selection expression and then applying the realisation statements — (2) the output structures, which are necessarily at the level of form.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, Halliday is consistent on the meaning of realisation; what varies is the dimension along which the realisation relation obtains: strata vs axes. The "reinterpretations" are Fawcett's misunderstandings that arise from his viewing the architecture of SFL theory through his own flowchart (Figure 4).

[2] Here Fawcett continues his use of the Straw Man logical fallacy (identified in the previous post).  As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's flowchart (Figure 4) does not represent the architecture of SFL theory, and his revised flowchart (Figure 5) does not represent Halliday's view.  Fawcett is attempting to refute a position not held by Halliday.

[3] Here Fawcett argues by using the logical fallacy of circular reasoning known as begging the question (petitio principii).  In saying 'the structure that so clearly manifests it at a lower level', Fawcett is assuming the truth of the claim he is trying to prove by argument.

[4] This bare assertion (presented as reasoned argument) clearly demonstrates that Fawcett does not understand the theoretical meaning of 'realisation'.  It is not a matter of systems being more semantic than structures; it is a matter of systems being more symbolically abstract than structures.

[5] This is misleading.  Here Fawcett misrepresents Halliday by inserting two components of his own flowchart (Figure 4), which is temporally ordered, into the realisation relation between system and structure, which is not temporally ordered.  Realisation is an intensive identifying relation, not a circumstantial identifying relation.

[6] This is another bare assertion (presented as reasoned argument) and another use of the circular reasoning logical fallacy known as begging the question (petitio principii), since it assumes the point Fawcett is trying to prove, namely that structures are at the level of form.

To be clear, SFL theorises grammatical form as a rank scale of constituency: clause, group/phrase, word and morpheme.  However, being a functional theory, the structures at each of these ranks are functions, not forms.  For example, the clause structure Token^Process^Value is a structure of functions, not a structure of forms.  Each of these functions is realised by a form of the rank below, and the structures of these forms, such as Classifier^Thing, are likewise functions, not forms.

Attacking A Straw Man

Fawcett (2010: 62-3):

The implications of the position that "the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic phases of representation" [i.e., the system network and the output structure] are "within one stratum" are illustrated in Figure 5.

 

Figure 5 is essentially a re-arrangement of the two components and two outputs in Figure 4 so that they all appear to function within one level of language. Topologically, the two are equivalent, but this does not mean that they are "mere notational variants" of each other. The disadvantage of Figure 5 is that it loses the important insights captured in Figure 4, which shows the places in the model of the central concepts of realisation (relating the levels of form and meaning) and instantiation (relating the potential and the instances).

If the components and outputs shown in Figure 5 really did constitute a single level of language, it would be a level of a very unusual sort. This is because it still contains the same two levels of 'meaning' and 'form' that Halliday's writings in the early 1970s proposed (as we saw in Section 4.3), and which suggest the model of language shown in Figure 4 in Chapter 3.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, the "implications" of lexicogrammatical systems and structures both being on the same stratum, lexicogrammar, are for Fawcett's flowchart (Figure 4) only, and not for SFL theory, which already incorporates this in its architecture.

Moreover, in falsely presenting Figure 5 as representing Halliday's alternative to Fawcett's Figure 4, Fawcett is engaging in the Straw Man logical fallacy:

giving the impression of refuting an opponent's argument, while actually refuting an argument that was not presented by that opponent.

[2] This is misleading because it is untrue.  Figures 4 and 5 are not topologically equivalent, because 5 cannot be formed from 4 without tearing off the form components and attaching them to the right edge of the meaning components.  Topological equivalence involves deforming only, not tearing and re-attachment.

[3] This is misleading.  As previously demonstrated, Halliday's "important insights" of realisation and instantiation are not coherently "captured" in Fawcett's flowchart.  For example,  in terms of realisation, Figure 4 presents a system network being realised in realisation rules; and in term of instantiation, it presents syntagmatic structure as an instance of realisation rules.  It would be dishonest to claim that Figure 4 is the model of someone who understands the theoretical concepts of realisation and instantiation.

[4] This is misleading.  Even Halliday's writings in the early 1970s do not "suggest" Fawcett's theoretically incoherent flowchart model of language.

(Accusing Halliday Of) Confusing Axial Realisation With Instantiation

Fawcett (2010: 61-2):

Passages in Halliday's recent writings such as the following two seem to be attempts to reconcile the two senses in which he now finds himself using the term "realisation" — senses which in the new model have in fact become incompatible. Is the concept of 'realisation' interstratal or intrastratal — or is it really possible that it can be stretched far enough to be used for both, without losing its integrity? In the first of the two passages Halliday writes:

realisation" is both "the relation between the 'strata', or levels [i.e .the original sense of "realisation"] of a [...] semiotic system — and, by analogy, between the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic phases of representation within one stratum [my emphasis]. (Halliday 1993:4505) 

And in a slightly later work Halliday describes the use of the term "realisation" in the 'intrastratal' sense as an "extension" of the concept of 'realisation', saying: 

Realisation is [...] extended to refer to the intrastratal relation between a systemic feature and its structural (or other) manifestation [my emphasis]. (Halliday 1996:29) 

If Halliday had not used the words "within one stratum" and "intrastratal" in these two passages, they could have been interpreted perfectly satisfactorily as describing the relationship of realisation that holds between the two levels of instances in the model represented in Figure 4 of Chapter 3, i.e., (1) the selection expression of features and (2) the structure at the level of form. And in this case the use of the term "realisation" would not be an "analogy" or an "extension". But Halliday did use those words, and under a strict interpretation of their meaning, the relationship must, in his current framework, be surely be said to be one of 'instantiation' rather than 'realisation'. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  Halliday has only ever used the theoretical term 'realisation' in one sense; as an identifying relation between two levels of symbolic abstraction.  What varies is the dimension along which the relation obtains; e.g.

• globally between strata,
• locally within strata, between function (Process) and form (verbal group), and
• locally within strata between paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes.

[2] This is misleading on two counts.  Firstly, there is no "new" model, as previously explained.  Secondly, the 'interstratal' and 'intrastratal' senses of realisation are not incompatible.  Both involve an identity relation between two levels of symbolic abstraction.

[3] This makes it clear that Fawcett does not understand the meaning of 'realisation'; he merely takes it as a label for the relation between strata.  It thus also suggests he does not understand that strata represent levels of symbolic abstraction, as the inconsistencies in his flowchart (Figure 4) also suggest.

[4] To be clear, both of the Halliday quotes are concerned with the realisation relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes on the stratum of lexicogrammar.  As such, they do not describe the relation the two "levels of instances" in Fawcett's flowchart:

As previously demonstrated, a selection expression of features is an instance of systemic potential, whereas structure is the realisation of system, not an instance of it. That is, the flowchart confuses instantiation with (axial) realisation.

[5] To be clear, here Fawcett confuses axial realisation (the subject of the Halliday quotes) with instantiation, and does so on the basis of the confusion in his own model.

In short, Fawcett projects his own misunderstanding onto Halliday.

Confusing Axial Realisation With Stratal Realisation

Fawcett (2010: 61):

The specific problem is that, in the earlier stage of the development of the theory (when the system networks were regarded as being at a higher level than the structures that manifest them), Halliday had identified the set of operations that change the selection expression into the structures as 'realisation statements'. So are the outputs from the system networks of TRANSTIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on really at the level of form, or are they are the same level as the system networks, i.e., at a level that has been "pushed [...] fairly far [...] in the direction of the semantics" (Halliday 1994:xix)?

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  As previously explained, system networks are at a higher level of symbolic abstraction than the structures that realise them, and, contrary to Fawcett's misrepresentation, this is as true now as it was in earlier stages of Halliday's development of his theory. This is the relation between paradigmatic axis and the syntagmatic axis, and it applies to every stratum of language: semantics, lexicogrammar and phonology.  That is, different levels of symbolic abstraction (system and structure) can be construed within a given level of symbolic abstraction (stratum).  This is why the term 'realisation' applies to both axial and stratal relations.

[2] This is correct.  In SFL theory, a realisation statement specifies how a systemic feature is realised structurally.

[3] Again, Fawcett's term 'outputs' blurs the distinction between the theoretical dimensions of axis (structure as the "output" of system) and instantiation (instance as the "output" of potential).

[4] To be clear, on the one hand, 'form' is not a level in the SFL hierarchy of stratification.  On the other hand, grammatical systems and structures are at different levels (axes) of symbolic abstraction, within the same level (stratum) of language (lexicogrammar).

[5] To be clear, the level that has been "pushed fairly far in the direction of semantics" is the stratum lexicogrammar (Halliday 1994: xix).

Misunderstanding And Confusing Realisation And Instantiation

Fawcett (2010: 61):

Taking this position brings with it a serious problem. We shall address it now, because it is a problem which, like the introduction of the higher level of meaning, has the potential to make it impossible to compare the representations at the level of form of the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars. 

The problem is as follows. In his earlier descriptions of the grammar (1969/81) and (1970/76b), Halliday showed the relationship between the system networks and the output structures to be one of realisation. But in his this [sic] second approach to the representation of meaning the relationship must logically be regarded as one of instantiation. This is because system and structure are presented in the new model as being at the same level of language.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  As previously demonstrated, Halliday has only had one view on this matter, and Fawcett's misrepresentations derive from his own misunderstandings of stratification.

[2] This is true.  In Halliday's model, the relation between the paradigmatic axis and the syntagmatic axis, between system and structure, is realisation.

[3] Fawcett's use of the word 'output' is the source of his confusion, since it confuses two distinct dimensions of SFL theory:

• syntagmatic structure as the "output" of paradigmatic system (realisation),
• instance as the "output" of systemic potential (instantiation).

[4] Fawcett's argument is as follows:

Premiss (reason): because system and structure are presented as being at the same level of language

Conclusion (result): the relationship must logically be regarded as one of instantiation

To be clear, the conclusion does not follow from the premiss.  Presenting system and structure as being of the same level of language does not logically entail that the relation between them is necessarily one of instantiation (the relation between system and instance).

This also confirms — along with his flowchart (Figure 4) — that Fawcett does not understand the theoretical dimension of instantiation.

[5] To be clear, in SFL theory, system and structure are modelled as the same level of language, whether at the level of semantics, lexicogrammar or phonology.  However, they are modelled as different levels of symbolic abstraction within that level of language, such that the lower level Token, structure, realises the higher level Value, system.

This also confirms — along with his flowchart (Figure 4) — that Fawcett does not understand the theoretical relation of realisation.

Halliday's Refusal To Add To Fawcett's Flowchart

Fawcett (2010: 60-1):

However, adding to the model in Figure 4 in this way has not been Halliday's response to the situation. Instead, his later works present the view that the system networks of meaning potential and their outputs at the level of form shown in Figure 4 are all at the same level. 

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] This is misleading.  The reasons Halliday has not added to Fawcett's model in Figure 4 are, as previously argued:

• it is not Halliday's model, 
• it is not a model of language consistent with SFL theory, and
• it is not a model consistent with itself.

[2] This is misleading.  To be clear, Halliday's later works do not present "system networks of potential and their outputs at the level of form at the same level", not least because "outputs at the level of form" is not Halliday's model.  One reason for this is that Fawcett's "outputs at the level of form" confuses two distinct dimensions of SFL theory: axis (local) and instantiation (global); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32).

The relation between system and structure is the identifying relation of symbolic abstraction between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes.  For a given stratum, syntagmatic structure (Token) realises paradigmatic system (Value).

On the other hand, the relation between system and instance is the attributive relation of instantiation, such that an instance is a token (Carrier) of the type (Attribute) system.  See Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 145).

In the next post, it will be seen that Fawcett accuses Halliday of confusing realisation and instantiation.

The First Of Two Possible Effects Of Semantic Systems On Fawcett's Flowchart

Fawcett (2010: 60):

It would be reasonable, if this higher level of system networks really is necessary, simply to add the higher level to the model illustrated in Figure 4 of Chapter 3. This would require the addition of the following sub-components: (1) a new higher system network (a second 'meaning potential'), which would generate its own set of features after each traversal of the network), (2) the selection expression of the 'instances' that have been chosen, (3) a 'realisation component' that states what the effect of each choice is (i.e., 'preselection' rules, which would specify that if Feature X is chosen in the higher network, Feature Y must be chosen in the lower network), and (4) the output from the operation of that component, i.e., the list of features to be chosen in the lower network. The result of this change would be to add the components decribed [sic] here above the model shown in Figure 4 of Chapter 3. This is the first of the "two possible effects" referred to in the title of this section.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This higher level of system networks (semantic stratum) really is necessary if grammatical metaphor is to be systematically accounted for, and if knowledge is to be included in the SFL model of language.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429):

… grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures. Since we [unlike Fawcett] allow for a stratification of content systems into semantics and lexicogrammar, we are in a stronger position to construe knowledge in terms of meaning. That is, the semantics can become more powerful and extensive if the lexicogrammar includes systems.

[2] This is misleading.  It would not be reasonable, because, as previously demonstrated, the flowchart depicted in Fawcett's Figure 4 is inconsistent with the architecture of SFL theory.

[3] This is misleading.  Here Fawcett describes how he would change his flowchart to accommodate the SFL distinction between meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar), as if such changes are relevant to the architecture of SFL theory.  That is to say, Fawcett's presumption is that Halliday's stratified model of language has to conform to Fawcett's self-inconsistent flowchart.

Misrepresenting Fawcett's Flowchart As The Architecture Of SFL Theory

Fawcett (2010: 60):

I claimed in Chapter 3 that Figure 4 (in Section 3.2 of that chapter) represents the way in which both the Sydney and the Cardiff grammars operate. As we have seen, Halliday's more recent writings have increasingly strongly taken the position — which he first explored in the 1970s — that there is a 'higher semantics' as well as the 'meaning potential' within the lexocogrammar (e.g., Halliday 1993 and 1996). How would this affect the overall model of language?

Blogger Comments:

Here again Fawcett makes multiple use of the logical fallacy known as proof by (repeated) assertion. 

[1] To be clear, Fawcett's Figure 4 (p36) is:

As first demonstrated here, and many times since, the model represented in Figure 4 is invalidated by its own internal inconsistencies, arising from misunderstandings of axis, stratification and instantiation.  Fawcett's flowchart does not represent the architecture of SFL theory, not least because the architecture is dimensional, not modular.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

[2] This is misleading, because, since the inception of SFL theory, Halliday has always posited a level of semantics (meaning) above a level of lexicogrammar (wording).  For example, Halliday & Hasan (1976: 5):

[3] Here Fawcett confuses meaning potential (the system pole of the cline of instantiation) with lexicogrammar (the level of wording in the hierarchy of stratification).

[4] On the one hand, the level of semantics is already a part of the SFL model.  On the other hand, by 'the overall model of language', Fawcett means his own flowchart (Figure 4), which he is about to use as the benchmark for assessing Halliday's model, as will be seen in the next few posts.  

Misrepresenting Halliday As Inconsistent With The SFL Model Of Language

Fawcett (2010: 60):

Nonetheless, there has been a knock-on effect of Halliday's adoption of the second position which leads him to describe the grammar in a way that appears to be in conflict with the general SFL model of language proposed in Chapter 3 and in expressed in Figure 4. The next section describes this problematical change of position by Halliday, and the simple alternative.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Halliday, since, as previously demonstrated, Halliday only ever had one position on this matter (the stratal location of his grammatical networks).

[2] Here Fawcett presents his own model (Figure 4) as the benchmark by which to assess Halliday's version of Halliday's theory.  As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's model is invalidated by its internal inconsistencies with regard to the theoretical dimensions of axis, instantiation and realisation.

[3] The question of whether Halliday's version of Halliday's theory is problematical, and the question whether Fawcett's proposed alternative is valid, will be examined in the review of the next section.

Misrepresenting Halliday In A Footnote

Fawcett (2010: 59n-60n):

I should point out that, when Halliday adds a further level of system networks above the existing level, he neces[s]arily also add[s] a further component to the model, to enable the grammar to 'map' the choices made at one level onto the choices available at the lower level. However, he does not describe what this extension to the model entails, so I shall attempt to provide a summary of this in the next section. A further problem is that Halliday uses the term 'preselection' in two senses. The first is the standard sense of the 'preselection' that occurs in a realisation rule which 'pre-selects' a feature to be chosen on a subsequent traversal of the network (as we shall see in Chapters 5 and 9). But his second use is for the 'preselection' of a choice in a network that results from a choice in a higher component. It is of course important to keep a clear distinction between the levels (or strata) of language and the layers of structure within syntax. In the Cardiff Grammar, therefore, we use "preselection" only in the established sense of the relationship between layers of the tree structure. We use the terms "predetermine" and "predetermination" for the relationship between any higher component in the process of generation and the choices in the system network. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is manifestly untrue.  The semantic networks Fawcett alludes to are presented in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), which devotes 618 pages describing "what this extension to the model entails".

[2] This is misleading, because it is manifestly untrue.  There is only one sense of 'preselection' in the two usages cited by Fawcett: the selection of one feature entails the selection of another.  That is, the probability of their co-selection is 1.  The theoretical location of the features involved is irrelevant to the meaning of the term.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 375):

More specifically, inter-stratal realisation is specified by means of inter-stratal preselection: contextual features are realised by preselection within the semantic system, semantic features are realised by preselection within the lexicogrammatical system, and lexicogrammatical features are realised by preselection within the phonological/graphological system.

[3] This is misleading, because it presents Fawcett's reinterpretation of a term introduced into SFL by Halliday as the established sense.

[4] To be clear, in SFL theory, there is no causal relation between strata.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 25):

In any stratal system (i.e. any system where there are two strata such that one is the realisation of the other) there is no temporal or causal ordering between the strata. … the relationship is an intensive one, not a causal circumstantial one.

[5] To be clear, in Fawcett's model (Figure 4), because system networks are located at the highest level, meaning, there is no higher component.

[6] To be clear, in SFL theory, this process is the process of instantiation: the selection of features during logogenesis, the unfolding of text at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation.

Confusing Language As System With Language As Stratified

Fawcett (2010: 59):

From the viewpoint of our concerns in this book, however, this major difference of view about what is required 'above' the meaning potential that belongs within the grammar is relatively unimportant. As I have argued in this section, both of the two models have networks for TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. that are at the level of 'meaning potential'. Moreover, the features in both are realised by essentially the same types of 'realisation operation', as we shall see in Chapters 5 and 9.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here again Fawcett confuses the SFL notions of language as system ('meaning potential') and language strata as levels of symbolic abstraction ('above', 'level').  The theoretical dimensions confused are thus those of instantiation and stratification.

[2] The validity of this claim will be examined in the reviews of Chapters 5 and 9.

Misrepresenting Halliday And Deploying A Logical Fallacy

Fawcett (2010: 59):

I am therefore as confident as it is ever possible to be in science that it is indeed possible to make a reality of Halliday's original proposal that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on should be, to adapt Halliday's metaphor (1994:xix) "pushed all the way to the semantics". We who work in the framework of the Cardiff Grammar — together with all of the many other systemic functional grammarians who take the view that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. constitute the major level of meaning in language — have therefore come to a different conclusion from Halliday on this matter.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, since it misrepresents Halliday.  As previously explained, Halliday's systems have, from their beginnings, been presented as grammatical systems, not semantic systems.

[2] The citing of others who share Fawcett's view is here presented as an argument in its favour.  In terms of logical fallacies, this is another instance of the fallacy of relevance known as an appeal to popularity:

Appeals to popularity suggest that an idea must be true simply because it is widely held. This is a fallacy because popular opinion can be, and quite often is, mistaken.

[3] To be clear, on the SFL model, there is only one level of meaning in language: semantics.  Lexicogrammar constitutes the level of wording, the lower stratum of the content plane.

The Hypothesis That Grammatical Systems Can Be Developed Into A Model Of Semantics

Fawcett (2010: 58-9):

In the work done over the last fifteen years by my colleagues and myself at Cardiff, one of our main goals has been to develop a new model of a SF grammar that tests the hypothesis that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on are capable of being developed into a fully adequate model of semantics. Indeed, the very large computer implementation of a grammar (including lexis, intonation and punctuation) that we have built at Cardiff operates on precisely these principles. The first stage of this work was described in Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993) and related papers, and many aspects of the later stages have been reported in the many other papers listed in Fawcett (1998).  As a result of all this work by the many members of the team, I am convinced that, in Halliday's own words (1994:xix), the "choices in the grammar [i.e., the system networks] can be essentially choices in meaning without the grammar thereby losing contact with the ground".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the theoretical motivation for distinguishing semantic systems (e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen 1999) from lexicogrammatical systems (e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen 2014) is the resultant ability to systematically account for grammatical metaphor as an incongruence between the two levels of symbolic abstraction.  As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237) explain:

Of course, what we are recognising here as two distinct constructions, the semantic and the grammatical, never had or could have had any existence the one prior to the other; they are our analytic representation of the overall semioticising of experience — how experience is construed into meaning. If the congruent form had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.

[2] The citing of work carried out in Fawcett's framework is here presented as an argument in its favour.  In terms of logical fallacies, this is the fallacy of relevance known as an appeal to popularity:

Appeals to popularity suggest that an idea must be true simply because it is widely held. This is a fallacy because popular opinion can be, and quite often is, mistaken.

Misrepresenting Halliday's Grammatical Systems As Semantic

Fawcett (2010: 58):

The perception that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. represent the meaning potential of a language is, in my view, the most significant of all of Halliday's insights. As I pointed out above, one important result of accepting this major claim is that it challenges us to develop our system networks further, with the explicit goal of making them represent choices between meanings (rather than forms), and so to model the level of semantics in language.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This continues the misrepresentation of Halliday's grammatical systems as semantic systems, and the misrepresentation of meaning potential (language as system) as semantics (meaning as a level of symbolic abstraction).

[2] To be clear, in Systemic Functional Linguistics, the system network is the theoretical formalism for modelling all strata.  In SFL, language is stratified as meaning (semantics), wording (lexicogrammar) and sounding/writing (phonology/graphology) — not meaning and form — with grammatical form incorporated through the rank scale of clause, group/phrase, word and morpheme.

For system networks that represent choices between meanings, see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999); for system networks that represent choices between wordings, see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014).

A False Claim Invalidly Inferred From A False Claim

Fawcett (2010: 58): 

In terms of the change from "Categories" to a modern SF grammar, we may say that the effect of the fundamental change in the theory in the late 1960s was that the concept of 'system' was removed from the account of language at the level of form, and made the central concept at the level of meaning. As a result there were now the two levels of 'instances' shown in Figure 4 of Chapter 3: the selection expression at the level of meaning and the richly labelled tree structure at the level of form.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This continues the misrepresentation of Halliday's grammatical systems as semantic systems and meaning potential (language as system) as semantics (meaning as a level of symbolic abstraction).

[2] This is a non-sequitur, since the latter claim is not entailed by the former, regardless of the validity of either claim.  That is, the relocation of grammatical systems to the level of meaning does not necessarily result in Fawcett's model of "two levels of instances".

[3] As Figure 4 shows, Fawcett's model confuses the dimension of instantiation: the relation between system and instance (selected features) with the dimension of axis: the relation between system and structure (tree structure).  (It also proposes that systems are realised by realisation rules.)

See also the critique of Figure 4 here.

Misrepresenting Halliday's Grammar As Semantic

Fawcett (2010: 58): 

For the purpose of a general comparison between the two models, then, we may treat the level of 'meaning potential' in Halliday's grammar (i.e., the level at which TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on are located) as roughly equivalent to the semantic system networks of the Cardiff Grammar. In other words, Halliday's adoption of the second position on levels of meaning makes no significant difference to the components of the model of language that we shall assume to be common to all of those who work in the framework of SFL. (But see the next section for a caveat to this claim.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] This continues the confusion between meaning potential (language as system) and meaning as a level of symbolic abstraction (semantic stratum), and the use of the confusion to misrepresent Halliday's grammar as semantic.

[2] This continues the misrepresentation of Halliday as having two "positions" on the stratification of the content plane as meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar), and the wrongful attribution to Halliday of recasting his grammatical systems are semantic.

[3] This is misleading.  On the one hand, the relocation of Halliday's grammatical systems to semantics creates serious theoretical inconsistencies and reduces its explanatory power (grammatical metaphor), as explained in previous posts.  On the other hand, the relocation is precisely what Fawcett needs in order to make theoretical space for his theory of syntax.

[4] But see the review of the next section for an examination of this caveat.

The Claim That The Outputs Of System Networks Are At The Level Of Form

Fawcett (2010: 58): 

Notice, moreover, that the outputs from any grammar with system networks of either type must be considered to be at the level of form, because they specify the sequence of the items that constitute the 'final' output ("final", that is, apart from specifying the output's spoken or written shape). And this is true of both the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars, despite the differences between the types of representation that are found in each. (However, there are theoretical problems about the status of the Sydney Grammar representations, as we shall see in Chapter 7.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] As the term 'output' suggests, this misunderstands the notion of system in the architecture of SFL theory.  The process of selecting systemic features and activating realisation statements during logogenesis, the unfolding of text, is the process of instantiation, and so the relation between system and text is one of instantiation.   Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 51):

But ‘text’ is a complex notion. In the form in which we typically receive it, as spoken and written discourse, a text is the product of two processes combined: instantiation, and realisation. The defining criterion is instantiation: text as instance. But realisation comes in because what becomes accessible to us is the text as realised in sound or writing. We cannot directly access instances of language at higher strata – as selections in meaning, or even in wording. But it is perhaps helpful to recognise that we can produce text in this way, for ourselves, if we compose some verse or other discourse inside our heads. If you ‘say it to yourself’, you can get the idea of text as instance without the additional property of realisation.

[2] See the review of Chapter 7 for the theoretical misunderstandings on which this falsehood is based.

Conceding That The Cardiff Approach Has Been Invalidated In Principle

Fawcett (2010: 57-8):

Since our purpose in this book is to establish the theory that is required for modelling syntax at the level of form, we must ask the question: "Does Halliday's adoption of the second position on the levels of meaning in language mean that the general framework within which we are comparing the Sydney and the Cardiff approaches to analysing syntax, as summarised in Figure 4 of Chapter 3, becomes inval[i]d?" The answer is that it might in principle have been invalidated by Halliday's recent decision, but that in practice it does not. The reason is that, whether or not we add a higher layer of 'meaning' to our model of language, there is still a level of meaning potential within the grammar. It is a level of description that Halliday describes as having "been pushed [...] fairly far [...] in the direction of the semantics" (Halliday 1994:xix). From the 'theoretical-generative' viewpoint (a concept that will be introduced in Section 5.2 of Chapter 5), there seems to be no very significant difference between the mode of operation of a grammar in which system networks that have been pushed "fairly far in the direction of the semantics" and one in which the system networks have been pushed all the way. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, SFL theory models grammatical form as the rank scale.  Paradigmatically, each level on the rank scale serves as the entry condition for functional systems of that rank; syntagmatically, functions at one rank are realised by forms of the rank below.  As far as the term 'syntax' is concerned, Halliday (1994: xiv) explains its inappropriateness for SFL theory as follows:

[2] As previously explained, since the inception of Systemic Grammar, Halliday has only had one position on stratification of language.  The notion of a second position arises from a (motivated) misunderstanding on Fawcett's part: confusing meaning potential (language as system) with semantics (meaning as stratum).

[3] As previously demonstrated, the Cardiff model is invalidated by its own internal inconsistencies, arising from misunderstandings of axis, delicacy, stratification and instantiation.

[4] This is misleading.  On the one hand, Fawcett uses his misunderstanding of 'meaning potential' to misrepresent lexicogrammar as a level of meaning, rather than wording.  On the other hand, Fawcett confuses the notion of a grammar 'pushed in the direction of semantics' with semantics.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 39) explain:

Being a ‘functional grammar’ means that priority is given to the view ‘from above’; that is, grammar is seen as a resource for making meaning — it is a semanticky kind of grammar. But the focus of attention is still on the grammar itself. Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organising principle adopted is that of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices.

Not Addressing The Theoretical Motivation For The Stratification Of The Content Plane

Fawcett (2010: 57n):

In my view the addition of this new level of meaning is an unnecessary complication to the theory. It has the considerable disadvantage that it requires a whole new level of system networks, which together must cover the same broad range of types of meaning as the existing ones. We need to be absolutely sure that this very large new level of system networks really is needed, before we commit ourselves to a vast amount of new work, the result of which will be to complicate even further what is already a very rich and complex model of language. I believe that the evidence is that this vast extension of the theory is neither desirable nor necessary — so long as we actually carry out the implications of Halliday's proposal that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on should model choices between meanings. I consider that the phenomena that have led Halliday to adopt his latest position are to be explained in other ways (one being to further semanticise some of Halliday's networks, e.g., that for MOOD). See Fawcett (forthcoming a) for a set of such semantic system networks.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here Fawcett studiously ignores the reasons given for the stratification of the content plane in the work he has just cited, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237):

Of course, what we are recognising here as two distinct constructions, the semantic and the grammatical, never had or could have had any existence the one prior to the other; they are our analytic representation of the overall semioticising of experience — how experience is construed into meaning. If the congruent form had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.

[2] As previously explained, this level of meaning is not new, and the "old level of meaning", lexicogrammar, is wording, not meaning.

[3] These clauses project bare assertions, unsupported by reasoned argument.

[4]  This promised work was "forthcoming" in 2000, and is still "forthcoming" in 2018.

Misrepresenting Halliday And Misunderstanding Stratification

Fawcett (2010: 56-7):

Thus Halliday himself did not take on the task of a thorough re-working of the existing systemic descriptions that the revolutionary new model logically called for. However, the few new networks that emerged from that period such as those for 'modality' (Halliday 1970/76a) are more clearly oriented to meaning than most of the 1964 networks reproduced in Halliday (1976). The position remains that some of Halliday's networks (e.g., TRANSITIVITY, the network for generating Participant Roles, etc.) have been pushed very much further towards the semantics than others (e.g., the MOOD network). 

In recent years, however, Halliday appears to have reached the decision that it really is necessary to add a second and higher level of 'meaning'. This is the position that is expressed in Halliday (1996), Matthiessen (1995) and in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999) — the latter being the exploration of a possible 'experiential semantics'. As a consequence of this decision, Halliday now uses the term "semantics" for this new level of 'meaning' — while continuing, however, to describe the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on as "meaning potential" (e.g., Halliday 1993:4505).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the task that Fawcett thinks was "logically" called for was the reconstrual of Halliday's grammatical systems as semantic systems; see below. Here yet again Fawcett employs the logical fallacy of proof by assertion: repeating a false claim as if multiple repetitions of the claim have established it as valid. 

[2] To be clear, Halliday's system of modality is a grammatical system, and, like all grammatical systems, including TRANSITIVITY and MOOD, it was theorised from the viewpoint of semantics, that is: in terms of the meanings it realises.

[3] This misunderstands the SFL stratification hierarchy.  Semantics is not "a new added second and higher level of meaning".  On the one hand, it is misleading to claim that semantics is a "new added" level, since it was theorised as a level in, for example, Halliday & Hasan (1976).  On the other hand, on the SFL model, there is only one level of meaning, semantics, and this is distinguished from the level of wording, lexicogrammar, with these two constituting the two levels of the content plane.

[4] As previously explained, Fawcett continually mistakes 'meaning potential' (language as system) for 'meaning' as a level of symbolic abstraction (semantic stratum).

On The Need To Incorporate Martin's Discourse Semantics Into Semanticised Clause Systems

Fawcett (2010: 56):

As will perhaps be obvious, the position taken here is that the semanticisation of the system networks for TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on that constitute the meaning potential should incorporate many of the types of meaning covered in Martin's 'discourse semantics', so enabling the overall model of language to remain as it is in Figure 4 of Chapter 3, rather than becoming increasingly complex.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, for the semantics of TRANSITIVITY, see Chapter 4 'Figures' in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 128-76), and the semantic system realised by MOOD is SPEECH FUNCTION.   This distinction between semantics and lexicogrammar provides the means of modelling grammatical metaphor systematically.  For the semantics of the textual metafunction, see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398-414).

[2] Here Fawcett again misconstrues 'meaning potential' (language as system) as the stratum of meaning (semantics) — a misunderstanding that supports his position.

[3] As demonstrated in great detail here, Martin's discourse semantics is based on misunderstandings of SFL theory at all scales and is wholly inconsistent with it.  Incorporating it into the semantic counterparts of grammatical systems would therefore severely compromise the theory overall.

[4] As previously demonstrated here (and in subsequent posts), Fawcett's Figure 4 ('The main components of a systemic functional grammar') is invalidated by internal inconsistencies arising from misunderstandings of the theoretical dimensions of realisation, instantiation, delicacy and axis.

Misrepresenting Martin (1992) And Halliday & Hasan (1976) In A Footnote

Fawcett (2010: 56n):

The reason why the coverage in Cohesion in English was limited was not, of course, that the authors were unaware that other factors also contribute to the 'cohesion' of a text, but because they explicitly confined their goals in that work to covering those aspects of 'cohesion' that are not realised in structures — and Halliday takes the position that TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on are all meanings that are indeed realised in structures. (But see my discussion of the reasons for disagreeing with this view in Chapter 7.) Yet the fact is that TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. can also contribute to the 'cohesion' of a text, as Martin (1992) clearly demonstrates. Perhaps one of the reasons for the popularity of Cohesion in English is the fact that its ideas can be applied to the analysis of texts without having a full understanding of the SFL approach to understanding language. The re[s]ult is that most studies of cohesion do only part of the job. This has in turn had an unfortunate effect on work in some areas where SFL can usefully be applied, such as psychiatric linguists, where the two major areas of study are cohesion and syntax (the latter being of the 'phrase-structure' type).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading and misrepresents Halliday & Hasan (1976: 7), who explicitly define their term 'cohesion' as only referring to non-structural text-forming resources:

In other words, a text typically extends beyond the range of structural relations, as these are normally conceived of.  But texts cohere; so cohesion within a text — texture — depends on something other than structure.  There are certain specifically text-forming relations which cannot be accounted for in terms of constituent structure; they are properties of the text as such, and not of any structural unit such as a clause or sentence.  Our use of the term COHESION refers specifically to these non-structural text-forming relations.

[2] See the critique of Chapter 7 for the misunderstandings on which  Fawcett's views are based.

[3] On the one hand, this is misleading because it gives the false impression that Fawcett uncovered something unacknowledged in Halliday & Hasan (1976: 6-7):

Structure is, of course, a unifying relation.  The parts of a sentence or a clause obviously 'cohere' with each other by virtue of the structure.  Hence they also display texture; the elements of any structure have, by definition, an internal unity which ensures that they all express part of a text. … In general, any unit which is structured hangs together so as to form text.  All grammatical units — sentences, clauses, groups, words — are internally 'cohesive' simply because they are structured.

On the other hand, it confuses the general notion of 'cohesive' with the technical term 'cohesion' that refers only to non-structural text-forming relations; see [1] above.

To be clear, Halliday (1994: 334) identifies the structural and non-structural resources of the textual metafunction — theme, information and cohesion — as the creators of texture:

 

[4] This is misleading because it misrepresents Martin (1992), in as much as Martin has nothing at all to say about these grammatical systems contributing to the cohesion of a text, as demonstrated here.

[5] These are bare assertions, unsupported by evidence, and based on misunderstandings of cohesion, including those outlined above.

Misrepresenting Martin (1992)

Fawcett (2010: 56):

However, the major effort to provide system networks that could function as the 'higher semantics' in the framework of the Sydney Grammar has been Martin's development of what he calls a "discourse semantics", as described in his valuable English Text (Martin 1992). Martin's theory of language constitutes a separate 'sub-dialect' of the Sydney Grammar that is significantly different from that of Hasan and indeed Halliday — but he too, like Hasan and Cloran, works on the assumption that his 'discourse semantic' system networks will be 'realised' by a grammar such as that of Halliday (1994) and Matthiessen (1995). However, even Martin's 620-page work does not provide a full coverage of the proposed higher level of system networks. This is understandable, both because of the size of the task and because the focus of English Text is not on the grammar as a whole, but on providing a much more complete coverage of the topic of 'cohesion' than the limited coverage in Halliday & Hasan's Cohesion in English (1976).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As demonstrated here in meticulous detail, Martin (1992) is based on fatal misunderstandings of SFL theory across all scales.

[2] To be clear, the commonly used geographical description of Martin's misunderstandings of SFL theory is 'The Sydney School'.

[3] This is true.  Martin (1992) is not only 'significantly different' from Halliday's theory, but also, more importantly, wholly inconsistent with it, as demonstrated here.

[4] This is misleading.  Martin's networks provide no realisation statements that specify how discourse semantic features are realised in lexicogrammatical systems (evidence here).  Moreover, Martin (1992) misunderstands strata as modules (evidence here), and demonstrates that he does not understand the theoretical term 'realisation' (evidence here).

[5] This is an empty claim in the absence of a means of determining what would constitute "full coverage".

[6] This misunderstands both SFL theory and Martin (1992).  In SFL theory, cohesion is a non-structural resource of the textual metafunction at the level of lexicogrammar.  As demonstrated here, Martin (1992) misunderstands these systems, rebrands them, distributes them across different metafunctions, and relocates them to the level of (discourse) semantics.

[7] This is misleading in as much as it falsely implies that Martin (1992) complements the description of Halliday & Hasan (1976) in a theoretically consistent way.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1984)

Fawcett (2010: 55-6):

In just one area of meaning Halliday provided a small "semantic" network which 'preselected' options in what has always been the rather 'form-centred' MOOD network (Halliday 1984:13). This little network for the semantics of MOOD only had eight pathways through it, but Hasan & Cloran (1990) and Hasan (1992) have developed very much fuller system networks which can be regarded as expansions of it for use in describing children's language, all within the Sydney Grammar framework.*

* See Fawcett (1999:247-9, 258-9) for a discussion of some of the differences between Halliday's 'grammatical' network for MOOD and my much richer MOOD network, which is explicitly at the level of semantics. See Fawcett (forthcoming a) for the full version of the computer-implemented network for MOOD (which replaces that in Fawcett 1980:103).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading on at least four counts.  Firstly, the semantic network in Halliday (1984) is that of SPEECH FUNCTION (Figure 2):


Secondly, the semantic network is clearly distinguished from the grammatical system of MOOD (Figure 3):


Thirdly, the term 'preselected' does not appear in Halliday (1984).  Its use here serves to blur the distinction between the two networks.

Fourthly, the use of the term 'semantics of mood' and the avoidance of the term 'speech function' also serves to blur the distinction between the two networks.

The reason for these attempted deceptions is that the validity of Fawcett's model — the Cardiff Grammar — depends on the MOOD network being semantic, not grammatical.

[2] To be clear, what Fawcett refers to geographically as 'the Sydney Grammar framework' is Halliday's version of his own theory.

[3] A MOOD network at the level of semantics mistakes wording for meaning and, more importantly, is unable to account for grammatical metaphor, as when a command (speech function, semantics) is incongruently realised as an interrogative clause (mood, lexicogrammar).

[4] To be clear, Fawcett (forthcoming a) is Functional Semantics Handbook: Analyzing English at the Level of Meaning. London: Continuum, and it is still "forthcoming" 18 years after the first edition of this publicaton.