Fawcett (2010: 68):
This example of the alternative approaches to a relatively simple part of the grammar demonstrates clearly the value of the use of conditional features in realisation rules. But it also underlines the value of respecting the distinction between the use of the system network notation for representing systemic relationships of choice, and the mis-use of them (as it seems to me to be) to represent conditions on realisation. It is clearly preferable in the case we are considering here, as it is in any model, to have different notations for the two different concepts. This is why, in Appendix B, system networks are used to model choices in meaning (as in Figure 1) and tables are used to model the realisation rules (as in Figure 2). Indeed, this follows the pattern established in Halliday's early grammars (e.g., 1969/81 and 1970/76b).
Blogger Comments:
[1] As previously demonstrated, the example Fawcett uses violates the principles of genuine system networks, and as a consequence, arguments made using it are thus examples of the 'straw man' logical fallacy, and do not apply to system networks.
[2] To be clear, the point at issue is how the conditions on the activation of realisation statements are to be represented. In SFL theory, the conditions are represented by the wiring of networks and the location of features in the network. In Fawcett's model (Figure 4), realisation rules are incongruently located at a different (lower) level of symbolic abstraction (form) than the features (meaning) to which they apply.
[3] To be clear, this is the opposite of what is true. Fawcett's example does not underline the value of this distinction, since it actually demonstrates that it is even possible to incorporate realisation rules into his own misunderstanding of a system network; see previous post.
[4] These are bare assertions, unsupported by evidence or argument.
[5] As previously noted, in this matter, Fawcett misrepresents a presentational limitation in early publications as a theoretical distinction.
[2] To be clear, the point at issue is how the conditions on the activation of realisation statements are to be represented. In SFL theory, the conditions are represented by the wiring of networks and the location of features in the network. In Fawcett's model (Figure 4), realisation rules are incongruently located at a different (lower) level of symbolic abstraction (form) than the features (meaning) to which they apply.
[3] To be clear, this is the opposite of what is true. Fawcett's example does not underline the value of this distinction, since it actually demonstrates that it is even possible to incorporate realisation rules into his own misunderstanding of a system network; see previous post.
[4] These are bare assertions, unsupported by evidence or argument.
[5] As previously noted, in this matter, Fawcett misrepresents a presentational limitation in early publications as a theoretical distinction.
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