Fawcett On The Rôle Of Lexicogrammar In Halliday (1977/8)

Fawcett (2010: 71):

Halliday then makes the point that "these are strata in Lamb's sense", and the terms in brackets are intended to show the parallels with Lamb's multi-stratal model (Lamb 1966). Of the three levels distinguished here, it is the first two in which we are interested. Let us take the "semantic" level first. Halliday writes:

Let us assume that the semantic system has four components: experiential, logical, interpersonal and textual (1977:176). 

And two paragraphs later he suggests a third basic assumption:

Let us assume that each component of the semantic system specifies its own structures, as the Output' of the options in the network (each act of choice contributing to the formation of the structure). (1977:176) 

Since Halliday never shows any structures that can be de[s]cribed as "semantic" other than the multiple structures of functional elements found in IFG (which we shall be examining in the next chapter), it is clearly these to which he is referring. In other words, choices in the system network in the experiential component result in 'structures' such as 'Agent + Process + Affected'.

What, then, is the role of the level labelled "lexicogrammar" in this approach? It is a role that is very different from that which it is assigned in Halliday's 'two levels of meaning' approach to language, in which the "lexicogrammar" includes everything from the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. to as their final realisation in form. Interestingly, Halliday writes in "Language as choice in social context" that

it is the function of the lexiogrammatical stratum to map the structures onto each other so as to form a single integrated structure [my emphasis] that represents all components [of the semantics] simultaneously. (Halliday 1877:176)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday (1978: 129) explicitly states this to be the case:

It follows from the above that each type of unit — clause, verbal group, nominal group etc. — is in itself a structural composite, a combination of structures each of which derives from one or other component of the semantics.

A clause, for example, has a structure formed out of elements such as agent, process, extent; this structure derives from the system of transitivity, which is part of the experiential component. Simultaneously it has a structure formed out of the elements modal and propositional: this derives from the system of mood, which is part of the interpersonal component. It also has a third structure composed of the elements theme and rheme, deriving from the theme system, which is part of the textual component.

[2] To be clear, the approach in this early paper, written between 1972 and 1976, is different from Halliday's later revised model.  In this paper, structures produced by semantic systems are mapped onto units of the grammatical rank scale.  In the current model, these semantic systems are reconstrued as lexicogrammatical systems, chiefly in order to systematically account for grammatical metaphor.  Semantic systems were later set out in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

[3] As previously explained, this is a (motivated) misunderstanding of Halliday by Fawcett.  Halliday has never proposed a "two levels of meaning" approach to language.  His approach has consistently been to propose two levels of content: meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar).

Fawcett's Claim That His Model Is 'Fully Compatible' With Halliday (1977/8)

Fawcett (2010: 70):

The general picture that it [Halliday (1977/78)] gives of the nature of language and of how the grammar works is fully compatible with the picture given in Chapter 3. That is, the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on are presented as being at the level of semantics, and their realisations are integrated in a single structure at the level of form. (However, Halliday there terms it the 'lexicogrammatical level'; this is a little confusing, since Halliday later uses the term "lexicogrammar" in a sense that includes the system networks.) Thus the paper begins with the words:

Let us assume that the semantic system is one of three levels, or strata, that constitute the linguistic system: 

Semantic (semology)
Lexicogrammatical (lexology: syntax, morphology and lexis)
Phonological (phonology and phonetics). 

(Halliday 1977:176) 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is demonstrably false, as shown in dozens of previous posts.  The picture given in Chapter 3, as represented in Figure 4, is inconsistent in its own terms (e.g. confusing axial realisation with instantiation) and inconsistent with Halliday's model — even with the embryonic model presented in 1977.

[2] For once, this is actually true.  At this early stage of theorising, when Halliday was encoding the semantics (Value) by reference to the lexicogrammar (Token), he located the systems from which 'grammatical structures derive' — TRANSITIVITY, MOOD and THEME — at the level of semantics.  That is, at this early stage, Halliday (virtually) conflated the axial relation of realisation between system and structure with the stratal relation of realisation between semantics and lexicogrammar.  This situation was rectified within the next decade, largely motivated by the need to account systematically for grammatical metaphor.  Later still, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429) explain:

… in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones. As we saw in Chapter 6 in particular, grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures. Since we allow for a stratification of content systems into semantics and lexicogrammar, we are in a stronger position to construe knowledge in terms of meaning. That is, the semantics can become more powerful and extensive if the lexicogrammar includes systems.

[3] This is misleading in a way that supports Fawcett's own model.  Unlike Fawcett, Halliday does not propose a level of form.  As the quote that Fawcett himself provides makes clear, Halliday proposes the three strata of semantics, lexicogrammar and phonology.

[4] To be clear, Halliday (1978: 128-9) proposes systems for both semantics and lexicogrammar:

Third, we will assume that each stratum, and each component [metafunction], is described as a network of options, sets of interrelated choices having the form 'if a, then either b or c'.

with the lexicogrammatical stratum system organised by rank:

Fifth, we shall assume that the lexicogrammatical system is organised by rank (as opposed to immediate constituent structure); each rank is the locus of structural configurations, the place where structures from the different [metafunctional] components are mapped onto each other.

Theoretical Indeterminacy, Computer Modelling And The Value Of Fawcett's Framework

Fawcett (2010: 69):

Halliday has written at different times in terms of both frameworks, and also in terms that suggest that the boundary between the two is indeterminate (Halliday 1996:29). While I recognise the 'indeterminacy' that is bound to be found in living systems such as natural human languages, I think that it is right to accept the challenge of trying to make the model sufficiently explicit to be incorporated in a computer model of language. And doing this in turn suggests the value of recognising the component 'modules' of Figure 4 in Chapter 3.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously demonstrated, this is misleading because it strategically misrepresents Halliday.  Halliday has never espoused the misunderstanding in Fawcett's model (Figure 4) of realisation rules as a lower level of abstraction ('form potential') than the features they apply to.

[2] This is misleading because it strategically misrepresents Halliday (1996), which is concerned with the theoretical indeterminacy of the nature and location of the boundary between semantics and grammar, not the boundary between Fawcett's framework and Halliday's.  Halliday (2002 [1996]: 411):

But there is another opening-up effect which is relevant to the present topic: this concerns the nature and location of the stratal boundary between the grammar and the semantics. This is, of course, a construct of the grammatics; many fundamental aspects of language can be explained if one models them in stratal terms, such as metaphor (and indeed rhetorical resources in general), the epigenetic nature of children’s language development, and metafunctional unity and diversity, among others. But this does not force us to locate the boundary at any particular place. One can, in fact, map it on to the boundary between system and structure, as Fawcett does (system as semantics, structure as lexicogrammar); whereas I have found it more valuable to set up two distinct strata of paradigmatic (systemic) organisation. But the point is that the boundary is indeterminate – it can be shifted; and this indeterminacy enables us to extend the stratal model outside language proper so as to model the relationship of a language to its cultural and situational environments.

[3] Strictly speaking, living systems are biological, whereas languages are semiotic, though both can be construed as evolving, complex adaptive systems.

[4] To be clear, making a model of human language explicit is distinct from adapting a model to the constraints of computer technology; and this is distinct from claiming that such an adapted computer model also applies to language as a natural phenomenon.  And these are distinct from the questions of whether a model is internally self-consistent or consistent with the phenomenon being modelled.

[5] To be clear, this is a non-sequitur.  Merely adapting a theoretical architecture to the constraints of computer technology does not, of itself, "suggest the value" of Fawcett's particular method of doing so, nor does it say anything about its value as a model of human language.

[6] To be clear, the architecture of SFL theory is dimensional, not modular, and Fawcett's model (Figure 4) is a flowchart for text generation.  Moreover, as previously demonstrated, it is internally inconsistent, confusing the realisation relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes with instantiation relation between system and instance (inter alia).

On 'Form Potential' Being Limited To Realisation Rules

Fawcett (2010: 69):

But when the 'form potential' is not given a specific identity in overall diagrams of how language works, as is the case in diagrams where language is represented as a system network with the realisation rules presented as 'footnotes' on the features, there is a temptation to see the processes described in Figure 4 and exemplified in Appendix A as all occurring within one 'level', as in Figure 5.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett limits 'form potential' to realisation rules only, and excludes systems (potential) from his 'form potential'.  In SFL theory, however, grammatical form is theorised as a rank scale of units — clause, group/phrase, word, morpheme — each of which is the entry condition to a system of potential.  Because SFL is a functional theory, the potential of such forms is modelled in terms of the functions (Senser, Finite, Theme etc.) that their formal constituents serve.

[2] To be clear, given the above, 'form potential' is "given a specific identity in overall diagrams of how language works", whether it is defined in Fawcett's narrow sense of realisation rules or in the broader SFL sense of rank-ordered systems with realisation statements located at their place of application.  This is because the theoretical distinction between realisation statements and system networks does not depend on their formal arrangement but on the different theoretical functions they serve.

[3] To be clear, this is a statement about Fawcett's model (Figure 4), not about the architecture of SFL theory, despite being presented as such.  As previously explained — see Attacking A Straw Man — Figure 5 is Fawcett's reworking of his own Figure 4 that he falsely attributes to Halliday and falsely claims to be topologically equivalent to his Figure 4.

As previously explained, in Figure 4, Fawcett confuses realisation with instantiation; and in Figure 5, Fawcett misattributes his own confusion to Halliday.

'Form Potential' As A Separate Component

Fawcett (2010: 69):

When the 'form potential' component of a systemic functional grammar is shown as the separate component that it undoubtedly is (as in Figure 4), this helps to make it clear that the system networks are a different component from the realisation rules — and one that is at a higher level.

 Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett indulges in the logical fallacy of circular reasoning (circulus in probando):

the reasoner begins with what he or she is trying to end up with; sometimes called assuming the conclusion.

That is, Fawcett's argument is if P then P, where

P: 'form potential' is shown clearly as a separate component from system networks.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett's logical fallacy here might be interpreted as a variant of proof by repeated assertion.  Moreover, as Halliday (1994: 89) points out: 'you only say you are certain when you are not'.

[3] As previously explained, Fawcett's model (Figure 4) misconstrues the same level of symbolic abstraction, grammatical features, as different levels of abstraction, depending on whether they figure in system networks or in realisation rules.  Moreover, Fawcett's model misconstrues the relation between realisation rules and what realises them — i.e. realisation — as the instantiation relation between potential and instance.

Fawcett's Justification For Realisation Rules As A Separate Component

Fawcett (2010: 69):

To summarise: when simple realisation statements are written under the features in network diagrams, these are best regarded as an informal version of the full realisation rule. Such diagrams may have the laudable effect of focussing attention on the system networks themselves — but they bring with them the unfortunate side-effect that they make the realisation rules appear to be relatively minor 'footnotes' to the features in the networks. And they are not. In a fully explicit theoretical model of how language works, therefore, it is necessary to show the realisation rules as a separate component, as was done in Halliday's first generative grammars (as cited above), in other early systemic grammars such as the very large one described in Hudson (1971), and in all versions of the Cardiff Grammar (e.g., in Figure 2 of Appendix B). Including the conditions on realisation within the system network has the further disadvantage that it muddles two aspects of language: (1) choices between meanings and (2) their realisation at the level of form.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not a summary of Fawcett's previous argument, nor is it logically entailed by what has been argued; see previous posts.  Instead, it is a new bare assertion of what Fawcett assesses as "best", unsupported by evidence or argument.

[2] To be clear, the system network is the formalism of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, and embodies the theory's fundamental perspective on language: meaning as choice.  Fawcett's claim here is that it is "laudable" to focus attention on the theory's formalism.

[3] To be clear, this, again, is not a summary of Fawcett's previous argument, nor is it logically entailed by what has been argued; see previous posts.  Instead, it is a new bare assertion of what Fawcett assesses as "unfortunate", unsupported by evidence or argument.

Moreover, representing realisation statements in system networks has the advantage of being consistent with theory and displaying how the conditions of their application relate to all other choices within the entire system.

[4] To be clear, this is not entailed by the previous argument, nor by the new bare assertions that are misrepresented here as a summary of the argument.  As previously explained, Fawcett's model of realisation rules as a separate component (Figure 4) misconstrues one level of symbolic abstraction, grammatical features (in systems and rules) as two levels (meaning and form), and misconstrues the realisation relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes as the instantiation relation between potential and instance.

[5] This is misleading.  On the one hand, Halliday's "first generative grammars" did not model realisation rules along the lines of Fawcett's model (Figure 4), and on the other hand, Halliday's "first generative grammars" didn't model realisation rules as a component, because the architecture of SFL theory is dimensional, not componential (modular).

[6] This is another example of the informal logical fallacy known as

argumentum ad populum (a.k.a. appeal to widespread belief, bandwagon argument, appeal to the majority, appeal to the people) wherein a proposition is claimed to be true or good solely because a majority or many people believe it to be so.

[7]  To be clear, here Fawcett assesses Halliday's model in terms of the misunderstandings in his own.  Specifically, on the basis of his own misunderstanding of features (in systems and rules) as different levels of symbolic abstraction, he assesses Halliday's model as muddled because it doesn't mistakenly assign them to different levels of abstraction.  Moreover, in SFL theory, realisation statements specify the function of form, not form, as demonstrated by the realisation statement 'Finite^Subject' for polar interrogative MOOD.

To be clear, in SFL theory, grammatical form is modelled as a rank scale (clause, group/phrase, word, morpheme).  Each form (rank unit) is structured in terms of function, with function being the meaning encoded by the wording.  (wording = Identifier/Token, meaning = Identified/Value)

In the absence of grammatical metaphor, meaning and wording are congruent (in agreement).  It is grammatical metaphor that motivates the distinction between meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar).