Fawcett (2010: 69):
To summarise: when simple realisation statements are written under the features in network diagrams, these are best regarded as an informal version of the full realisation rule. Such diagrams may have the laudable effect of focussing attention on the system networks themselves — but they bring with them the unfortunate side-effect that they make the realisation rules appear to be relatively minor 'footnotes' to the features in the networks. And they are not. In a fully explicit theoretical model of how language works, therefore, it is necessary to show the realisation rules as a separate component, as was done in Halliday's first generative grammars (as cited above), in other early systemic grammars such as the very large one described in Hudson (1971), and in all versions of the Cardiff Grammar (e.g., in Figure 2 of Appendix B). Including the conditions on realisation within the system network has the further disadvantage that it muddles two aspects of language: (1) choices between meanings and (2) their realisation at the level of form.
Blogger Comments:
[1] To be clear, this is not a summary of Fawcett's previous argument, nor is it logically entailed by what has been argued; see previous posts. Instead, it is a new bare assertion of what Fawcett assesses as "best", unsupported by evidence or argument.
[2] To be clear, the system network is the formalism of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, and embodies the theory's fundamental perspective on language: meaning as choice. Fawcett's claim here is that it is "laudable" to focus attention on the theory's formalism.
[3] To be clear, this, again, is not a summary of Fawcett's previous argument, nor is it logically entailed by what has been argued; see previous posts. Instead, it is a new bare assertion of what Fawcett assesses as "unfortunate", unsupported by evidence or argument.
Moreover, representing realisation statements in system networks has the advantage of being consistent with theory and displaying how the conditions of their application relate to all other choices within the entire system.
[2] To be clear, the system network is the formalism of Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, and embodies the theory's fundamental perspective on language: meaning as choice. Fawcett's claim here is that it is "laudable" to focus attention on the theory's formalism.
[3] To be clear, this, again, is not a summary of Fawcett's previous argument, nor is it logically entailed by what has been argued; see previous posts. Instead, it is a new bare assertion of what Fawcett assesses as "unfortunate", unsupported by evidence or argument.
Moreover, representing realisation statements in system networks has the advantage of being consistent with theory and displaying how the conditions of their application relate to all other choices within the entire system.
[4] To be clear, this is not entailed by the previous argument, nor by the new bare assertions that are misrepresented here as a summary of the argument. As previously explained, Fawcett's model of realisation rules as a separate component (Figure 4) misconstrues one level of symbolic abstraction, grammatical features (in systems and rules) as two levels (meaning and form), and misconstrues the realisation relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes as the instantiation relation between potential and instance.
[5] This is misleading. On the one hand, Halliday's "first generative grammars" did not model realisation rules along the lines of Fawcett's model (Figure 4), and on the other hand, Halliday's "first generative grammars" didn't model realisation rules as a component, because the architecture of SFL theory is dimensional, not componential (modular).
[6] This is another example of the informal logical fallacy known as
To be clear, in SFL theory, grammatical form is modelled as a rank scale (clause, group/phrase, word, morpheme). Each form (rank unit) is structured in terms of function, with function being the meaning encoded by the wording. (wording = Identifier/Token, meaning = Identified/Value)
In the absence of grammatical metaphor, meaning and wording are congruent (in agreement). It is grammatical metaphor that motivates the distinction between meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar).
[6] This is another example of the informal logical fallacy known as
argumentum ad populum (a.k.a. appeal to widespread belief, bandwagon argument, appeal to the majority, appeal to the people) wherein a proposition is claimed to be true or good solely because a majority or many people believe it to be so.[7] To be clear, here Fawcett assesses Halliday's model in terms of the misunderstandings in his own. Specifically, on the basis of his own misunderstanding of features (in systems and rules) as different levels of symbolic abstraction, he assesses Halliday's model as muddled because it doesn't mistakenly assign them to different levels of abstraction. Moreover, in SFL theory, realisation statements specify the function of form, not form, as demonstrated by the realisation statement 'Finite^Subject' for polar interrogative MOOD.
To be clear, in SFL theory, grammatical form is modelled as a rank scale (clause, group/phrase, word, morpheme). Each form (rank unit) is structured in terms of function, with function being the meaning encoded by the wording. (wording = Identifier/Token, meaning = Identified/Value)
In the absence of grammatical metaphor, meaning and wording are congruent (in agreement). It is grammatical metaphor that motivates the distinction between meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar).
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