On 'Form Potential' Being Limited To Realisation Rules

Fawcett (2010: 69):

But when the 'form potential' is not given a specific identity in overall diagrams of how language works, as is the case in diagrams where language is represented as a system network with the realisation rules presented as 'footnotes' on the features, there is a temptation to see the processes described in Figure 4 and exemplified in Appendix A as all occurring within one 'level', as in Figure 5.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett limits 'form potential' to realisation rules only, and excludes systems (potential) from his 'form potential'.  In SFL theory, however, grammatical form is theorised as a rank scale of units — clause, group/phrase, word, morpheme — each of which is the entry condition to a system of potential.  Because SFL is a functional theory, the potential of such forms is modelled in terms of the functions (Senser, Finite, Theme etc.) that their formal constituents serve.

[2] To be clear, given the above, 'form potential' is "given a specific identity in overall diagrams of how language works", whether it is defined in Fawcett's narrow sense of realisation rules or in the broader SFL sense of rank-ordered systems with realisation statements located at their place of application.  This is because the theoretical distinction between realisation statements and system networks does not depend on their formal arrangement but on the different theoretical functions they serve.

[3] To be clear, this is a statement about Fawcett's model (Figure 4), not about the architecture of SFL theory, despite being presented as such.  As previously explained — see Attacking A Straw Man — Figure 5 is Fawcett's reworking of his own Figure 4 that he falsely attributes to Halliday and falsely claims to be topologically equivalent to his Figure 4.

As previously explained, in Figure 4, Fawcett confuses realisation with instantiation; and in Figure 5, Fawcett misattributes his own confusion to Halliday.