Fawcett's Argument Against Halliday's Notion Of A Phrase As A Contracted Clause

Fawcett (2010: 205-6, 206n):

Indeed, we might well ask what evidence there is to support the claim that a phrase is "a contraction of a clause". Halliday gives none, so we must look for it ourselves. (As we do so, however, we shall also dig up evidence for taking the contrary view.)  

The strongest evidence that I can think of is the fact that, when a prepositional group is functioning as the qualifier in nominal group, it often seems possible to 'expand' it to a clause. For example, the last two words of the title of the popular British TV programme Neighbours from Hell are a prepositional group or phrase, and this can be "expanded" into a clause by adding who come so that it reads Neighbours who come from Hell.  

However, if we follow this line of argument to its logical conclusion, we shall find ourselves deriving all modifiers from a clause that fills the qualifier, e.g., friendly neighbours from neighbours who are friendly — and so on for many other types of modifier. In other words, if Halliday is going to relate prepositional groups functioning as qualifiers to clauses, why not do the same with quality groups that are functioning as modifiers? …  

Moreover, even if we consider only prepositional groups functioning as qualifiers, there are examples such as young men with long hair that cannot be 'expanded' (i.e., we shall not find examples such as young men who are with long hair).  

Finally, consider the even more frequent use of prepositional groups when they function as clause elements. In such cases there is normally no possibility of 'expanding' the group or phrase to a clause. For example, we can say I'll put it in the box, but we cannot expand in the box in any natural way into a clause.¹⁰

 ¹⁰ It is true that we can replace a prepositional group such as at five o'clock by a clause in I'll call round when it's five o'clock — but that is a replacement rather than an expansion. The utterance I'll call round when it's at five o'clock sounds very odd, and I'll put it where it's in the box sounds if anything even odder.

The conclusion must be that, within the linguistic description of a text, we should treat prepositional groups as syntactic units in their own right. In other words, we should not try to capture at the level of syntax the fact that the referents of young men with long hair are (probably) the same as the referents of young men who have long hair.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is very misleading indeed, because it is the direct opposite of what is actually true. Halliday (1994: 158) supports his claim as follows:

A prepositional phrase can be interpreted as a shrunken clause, in which the preposition serves as a ‘minor process’, interpreted as a kind of mini-verb, and the nominal group as a participant in this minor process. This needs explaining.

The preposition, it was suggested, acts as a kind of intermediary whereby a nominal element can be introduced as an ‘indirect’ participant in the main process. We saw also that in circumstantial and possessive relational processes there are often close parallels between be + preposition and a verb, e.g.

the delay was because of a strike ~ was caused by a strike

a carpet was over the floor ~ covered the floor

the bridge is across the river ~ crosses/spans the river

a path is along(side) the wood ~ skirts the wood

a halo is around the moon ~ surrounds the moon

This similarity between verb and preposition can also be seen in cases where there is a close relationship between a prepositional phrase and a non-finite dependent clause:

he cleaned the floor with a mop ~ using a mop

grass grows after the rain ~ following the rain

In this way certain prepositions are themselves derived from non-finite verbs; e.g. concerning, according to, given, excepting. These considerations suggest that the nominal group stands to the preposition in some kind of transitivity relation, as well as in a relationship like that of Complement to Predicator in mood structure.

[2] To be clear, it will be seen that the evidence that Fawcett adduces does not address Halliday's reasoning for characterising a phrase as a contracted clause, rather than an expanded word (group).

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the reason why from Hell is a not a group is that it is not an expansion of a word, in this case, of the preposition from. One reason why it is a phrase, a contracted clause, is because the function of its preposition is analogous to the function of a verb(al group) in a clause; see [1].

[4] To be clear, as demonstrated above, this line of argumentation is irrelevant to Halliday's reasons for characterising a phrase as a contracted clause.

[5] To be clear, clausal agnates of the phrase with long hair include having long hair, wearing long hair, sporting long hair etc.

[6] To be clear, this is both misleading and a non-sequitur. It is misleading because it falsely implies that Halliday does not treat prepositional phrases as "syntactic units in their own right"; Halliday treats both prepositional phrases and preposition groups as "syntactic units in their own right".

It is a non-sequitur because the conclusion prepositional groups are syntactic units in their own right does not logically follow from either a valid or invalid argument as to whether Halliday's prepositional phrases are contracted clauses.

[7] To be clear, what follows is not a paraphrase of the preceding conclusion, because it introduces new claims; see [6] and [8].

[8] To be clear, the referents of the nominal groups young men with long hair and young men who have long hair are irrelevant to the argument as to whether a phrase is a contracted clause.

Misrepresenting Halliday On The Distinction Between 'Group' And 'Phrase'

Fawcett (2010: 205):

The equivalent term in IFG is not "prepositional group" but "prepositional phrase". Halliday has maintained a distinction between 'group' and 'phrase' from the very start, stating in "Categories" that it is needed to express a difference between classes of unit that is "so fundamental that it is useful to have two names for this unit" (1961:253). Interestingly, Kress (or Halliday?) has chosen to omit this passage from the 1976 version, perhaps because Halliday, unsatisfactorily, gives no reason for this intriguing claim. The reason is finally stated in IFG, i.e., that, "whereas a group is an expansion of a word, a phrase is a contraction of a clause" (1994:180). This offers a potentially interesting perspective on the distinction — as Halliday's ideas often do — but it is no[t] self-evidently worthy of the epithet "fundamental".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not misleading, because it is true.

[2] To be clear, whatever the case in the "1976 version" of this pre-Systemic paper, the original passage appears in the 'Collected Works' series. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 45):

It is at the rank of the phrase that there is most confusion – because there are here the greatest difficulties – in the description of English; one reason is that in English this unit carries a fundamental class division (see below, 5), so fundamental that it is useful to have two names for this unit in order to be able to talk about it: I propose to call it the group, but to make a class distinction within it between group and phrase.

[3] To be clear, what Halliday (1994: 179-80) actually writes is more informative:

… a group is in some respects equivalent to a WORD COMPLEX – that is, a combination of words built up on the basis of a particular logical relation. This is why it is called a GROUP (= ‘group of words’). … A PHRASE is different from a group in that, whereas a group is an expansion of a word, a phrase is a contraction of a clause. Starting from opposite ends, the two achieve roughly the same status on the rank scale, as units that lie somewhere between the rank of a clause and that of a word.

and he later clarifies (1994: 212, 213):

It is important to make a distinction between a PREPOSITION GROUP, such as right behind or immediately in front of, which is a Modifier-Head structure expanded from and functionally equivalent to a preposition, and a PREPOSITIONAL PHRASE, which is not an expansion of anything but a clause-like structure in which the Process/Predicator function is performed by a preposition and not by a verb. …

But note that prepositional phrases are phrases, not groups; they have no logical structure as Head and Modifier, and cannot be reduced to a single element. In this respect, they are clause-like rather than group-like; hence when we interpret the preposition as ‘minor Predicator’ and ‘minor Process’ we are interpreting the prepositional phrase as a kind of ‘minor clause’ – which is what it is.

However, earlier in the text (1994: 158), Halliday had already provided argumentation on the clause-like nature of the prepositional phrase:

A prepositional phrase can be interpreted as a shrunken clause, in which the preposition serves as a ‘minor process’, interpreted as a kind of mini-verb, and the nominal group as a participant in this minor process. This needs explaining.

The preposition, it was suggested, acts as a kind of intermediary whereby a nominal element can be introduced as an ‘indirect’ participant in the main process. We saw also that in circumstantial and possessive relational processes there are often close parallels between be + preposition and a verb, e.g.

the delay was because of a strike ~ was caused by a strike

a carpet was over the floor ~ covered the floor

the bridge is across the river ~ crosses/spans the river

a path is along(side) the wood ~ skirts the wood

a halo is around the moon ~ surrounds the moon

This similarity between verb and preposition can also be seen in cases where there is a close relationship between a prepositional phrase and a non-finite dependent clause:

he cleaned the floor with a mop ~ using a mop

grass grows after the rain ~ following the rain

In this way certain prepositions are themselves derived from non-finite verbs; e.g. concerning, according to, given, excepting. These considerations suggest that the nominal group stands to the preposition in some kind of transitivity relation, as well as in a relationship like that of Complement to Predicator in mood structure.

Moreover, Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 276) essentially relate the minor Processes of prepositional phrases realising circumstances to Process types of the clause:

… circumstances of expansion [Extent, Location, Manner, Cause, Contingency, Accompaniment, Rôle] relate to ‘relational’ clauses, circumstances of projection [Matter, Angle] relate to projecting ‘mental’ and ‘verbal’ clauses …

[4] To be clear, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by argument. The facts that 

• a group is an expansion of words, whereas a phrase is not,
• a phrase includes a minor Process/Predicator, whereas a group does not, and
• a phrase can introduce an indirect participant in the clause Process, but a group can not

are important distinctions in terms of the theory itself.

Exponents Of The Elements Of Fawcett's Prepositional Group

 Fawcett (2010: 204-5):

The element 'preposition' is typically expounded by an item from the word class with the same name, i.e., by a preposition. But occasionally it is filled by a quality group, as in the underlined portions of very near the wall and more like his mother than he used to be. (In this last example the quality group is discontinuous; see Section 11.7 of Chapter 11 for 'discontinuity'.) And in other cases the unit of the quantity group is 'borrowed' to express the internal structure within the prepositional element, as in right into the corner. 

The second major element is the completive, and this is practically always filled by one or more nominal groups; see Appendix B and, for a more complete picture of this unit, Fawcett (in press).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously observed, this misconstrues a formal unit (at the rank of word), a preposition, as an element of function structure (at the rank of group) — and in a model that purports not to feature a rank scale. To be clear, in SFL Theory, a preposition serves in a preposition group which realises the functional element minor Process/Predicator in a prepositional phrase.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the underlined portions in these examples — Fawcett's quality and quantity groups — are preposition groups, involving modification, that serve as the minor Process/Predicator in a prepositional phrase. 

[3] Arguably, in SFL Theory, this is a nominal group rather than a prepositional phrase (Fawcett's preposition group), in which like his mother serves the same function as cautious in the agnate wording more cautious than he used to be:

On this analysis, like his mother is an embedded prepositional phrase of comparison, serving as the Head of the Epithet of the nominal group. Cf the near agnate: more mother-like than he used to be.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, Fawcett's 'completive' is the Range of a minor Process, in terms of the experiential metafunction, and the Complement of a minor Predicator, in terms of the interpersonal metafunction. The most obvious disadvantages of Fawcett's model are that 

• (i) it does not distinguish the two different metafunctional rôles, 
• (ii) the term 'completive' interprets the function of the nominal group as merely completing the prepositional group, and 
• (iii) the term 'completive' fails to recognise the fact that the Complement of a prepositional phrase — just like the Complement of a clause — can be made the Subject of a clause, as exemplified by:

[5] To be clear, the "more complete" picture of this unit in Appendix B (p306) is as follows, noting that its structural elements include both a conjunction (and) and a punctuation mark (.):

[6] As previously noted, Fawcett (in press) is still unpublished, 21 years after the first publication of this work.

Problems With Fawcett's Prepositional Group

Fawcett (2010: 204):

The prepositional group has as its pivotal element a preposition, and it corresponds to the meaning of 'minor relationship with thing' at the level of semantics. It is tempting to rename the group with an explicitly functional label (e.g., the 'relator group'), but the formal term "preposition" is so strongly established that we shall not do this. (However, one 'preposition' in English is in fact a 'postposition', i.e., ago in examples such as a year ago.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, there are two theoretical anomalies here. The first is the misconstrual of a formal unit, a preposition, as an element of function structure. The second is the misconstrual of a prepositional phrase ("group") as a univariate structure, since Fawcett's 'pivot' corresponds to the Head of a logical structure, thereby construing other elements as Modifiers of a preposition. In SFL Theory, a prepositional phrase is not an expansion of a unit, and so cannot be modelled as a univariate structure.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the preposition of a prepositional phrase functions interpersonally as a minor Predicator, and experientially as a minor Process.

[3] To be clear, to give formal units such as groups or phrases functional labels would create a theoretical inconsistency.

[4] To be clear, ago is an adverb, and in terms of SFL Theory, in the case of a year ago it serves as the Qualifier of a nominal group:

"The Second Major Difference Between Fawcett's And Halliday's Nominal Group"

Fawcett (2010: 204):

The second major difference between the two models is that the coverage of the nominal group in the Cardiff Grammar is considerably fuller than that in IFG. This is especially true with respect to the many types of determiner that it introduces and the concept of 'selection' that holds between them, e.g., as in five of the ripest of those mangoes. 

It also includes a full treatment of compound nouns — a very important category that is the source of many problems in text analysis and text generation. Halliday simply omits these from IFG (presumably on the grounds that the primary focus in IFG in on the clause, with groups and words receiving a much lighter treatment). For a fuller picture of the nominal group, see Appendix B and Fawcett (in press).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence, or by the provision of a scale by which to objectively measure different degrees of fullness.

[2] To be sure, the Cardiff Grammar does propose many types of determiner (pp304, 306), though few of these are "determiners" from the perspective of SFL Theory:

On the other hand, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the Cardiff Grammar treats Numeratives as determiners, and does not distinguish Deictics from post-Deictics, nor Classifiers from Epithets. More importantly, it mixes word classes (determiner) with experiential elements (qualifier) with logical elements (modifier, head). Most importantly, this confusion of theoretical principles is the incongruous solution to Fawcett's previous argument against viewing the nominal group as a logical structure (194-5):

Once we recognise that each element of a syntactic unit makes a unique contribution to realising the meaning of that unit, we can dispense with the traditional, over-narrow characterisation of the internal structure of groups as a series of 'modification' relationships. In its extreme form, this model presents groups as simply the 'hypotactic expansion' of the word class that functions as the 'head', in a series of 'modifier-head' relationships. …

The nearest that the present grammar comes to a generalised concept of a 'modifier + head' relationship is its recognition of the fact that other elements of a group typically depend on the presence of the 'pivotal element'. Thus when the grammar generates a "common nouns" as the head of a nominal group, other elements realising other types of meaning typically get brought into play as well. Thus it is preferable to characterise the nominal group as a unit for expressing the wide range of types of meaning associated with a 'thing', rather than in terms of an over-simple series of 'modifier + head' relationships.

[3] To be clear, this concept will be examined when it is discussed in the text.

[4] To be clear, the "full treatment" of compound nouns in this volume is a single mention in Appendix B (p306):

[5] This is very misleading indeed, because it misrepresents Halliday (1994). A compound noun, as a noun, serves as the Thing of a nominal group, but, as Halliday (1994: 185) explains, there is often indeterminacy between 'compound noun' and 'Classifier + Thing' interpretations:

[6] To be clear, Fawcett (in press) is still unpublished, 21 years after the first edition of this volume.

"The First Major Difference Between Fawcett's And Halliday's Nominal Group"

Fawcett (2010: 203-4):

Halliday's nominal group is the only class of group that comes at all close to sharing both the same name and the same coverage of phenomena as it does the Cardiff Grammar — but even here there are important differences.

The first is that Halliday treats the type of quality group that has an adjective as its apex (e.g., more generous than most people) is a type of "nominal group" in IFG. He does this in spite [of] the fact that its internal structure is clearly very similar to that of his "adverbial group". Here, then, he is clearly applying the criterion for assigning an expression to a class of unit that what matters is the unit's ability to function at given elements in the unit above on the 'rank scale' (as discussed in Section 10.2.2). His reason is clearly that an 'adjectival group' such as very bright can function in the clause as an Attribute in the same way as a nominal group can, e.g., She is very bright /a very bright student. 

However, this decision appears to ignore the fact that such expressions also function very frequently as the modifier in a nominal group, e.g., the underlined portion of three very bright students. In both cases the unit realises the meaning of a quality of a thing — and so not the meaning of a 'thing'. 

It is not clear why, since Halliday is willing to allow the internal structure of this morning "to determine its primary syntactic assignment" (as we saw in Section 10.2.2) the internal structure of very bright should not also be allowed to determine its class of unit. The solution to the problem is clear: we should use the internal syntax and semantics of a unit to determine its class.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not misleading, because it is true.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the internal structure of a unit is irrelevant to the classification of a unit, because this takes the view 'from below' (structural realisation), whereas SFL Theory takes the view 'from above' (the function being realised).

[3] To be clear, in all of the provided examples, very bright functions as the (sub-modified) Epithet of a nominal group:

[4] This is true, but misleading. It is true because the Epithet very bright does realise a Quality, rather than a Thing, but it is misleading to imply that, on Halliday's model, it realises a Thing. Fawcett's confusion derives from his misconstruing the Head of the nominal group very bright as Thing, instead of Epithet.

[5] This is very misleading indeed. As we saw in the examination of Section 10.2.2, in the cited example, Halliday was demonstrating the alternative approach that he himself was not taking.

[6] As demonstrated above, the only problem, in this instance, is Fawcett's inability to understand SFL Theory.

[7] To be clear, as previously explained, classifying units 'from below' ("internal syntax") is inconsistent with the functional principles of SFL Theory. However, classifying units 'from above' (semantics) is entirely consistent with SFL Theory, and it is the method that Halliday adopts. That is, classifying groups according to their function in clause structure is classifying them according to the meaning they realise in the clause. However, contrary to the claim here, this is not the criterion that Fawcett applies, but rather, the criterion he continually rejects.

Fawcett's Problem With The Name 'Nominal Group'

Fawcett (2010: 203n):

⁹ The name "nominal group" is not a particularly good one for this unit, since in everyday usage the term nominal is the adjective corresponding to the noun name, e.g., a nominal candidate in an election is a candidate who stands in name only.  

The problem is that 'naming something' is only one of the three main ways in which nominal group refers to an object — and it is by far the least frequent. Thus every object can be referred to by either (1) a nominal group with a noun or one(s) at its head, or (2) a pronoun — but only certain classes of object can be referred to by a name.  

In other words the term nominal group is the legacy of an idea that has been accepted very widely for a very long time but which is fundamentally mistaken, i.e., that a common noun such as table or water 'names' something. Strictly speaking, a noun denotes the cultural classification of a class of referents, of which the present referent is an instance, e.g., as in the nominal group this book.  

So, while a noun may be used as the pivotal element of a nominal group that refers to an object, it does not 'name' that object. (Lyons (1977) has a useful discussion of these points.)  

Thus the 'nominal group' corresponds to the semantic unit of 'thing' — and so, typically, to the conceptual unit of 'object'. And only sometimes does a nominal group literally 'name' the object.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in the field of linguistics, 'nominal' is the adjectival form of the noun 'noun'. The "everyday usage" of the term 'nominal' is irrelevant to its usage in linguistics, just as the "everyday usage" of the term 'charm' is irrelevant to its usage in subatomic physics.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a nominal group does not refer to an object.  Instead, experientially, a nominal group congruently realises a participant element on the semantic stratum; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 55).

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a common noun realises a class of Thing, and it is the function of the other elements of the nominal group to subclassify the Thing in realising a participant. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 364):

Categorisation within the class is typically expressed by one or more of the functional elements Deictic, Numerative, Epithet and Classifier. They serve to realise terms within different systems of the system network of the nominal group.

[4] To be clear, Lyons did not view language from the perspective of SFL Theory and its epistemological assumptions.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a nominal group realises the meaning participant. It is a noun that realises the meaning Thing.

[6] To be clear, Fawcett's notion of a conceptual level — termed 'belief system' (p210) — which is realised in language is inconsistent with the underlying assumptions of SFL Theory. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 3) are more forthright on the matter:

We contend that the conception of 'knowledge' as something that exists independently of language, and may then be coded or made manifest in language, is illusory.

The Pivotal Element Of The Nominal Group

 Fawcett (2010: 203, 203n):

The nominal group has as its pivotal element either a noun, a pronoun or a proper name. The latter, however, is not in fact an item (as a noun and a pronoun are) but a unit. It is most frequently the unit of the human proper name cluster, which has its own internal structure. (For this see Section 10.2.12).

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in Fawcett's model, the pivotal element of the nominal group is the head. Fawcett (p304) identifies the elements of the nominal group as follows:

In Fawcett's model (p226), structural elements of the unit 'nominal group' are expounded (realised) by items (words and morphemes):

The third of the three major categories in the present theory of syntax (with 'unit' and 'element') is the item. This term includes both 'word' (in its traditional sense) and 'morpheme'. …

In the present theory of syntax, the lowest syntactic category on each branch of the tree in a tree diagram representation of a sentence is an element (e.g., the head of a nominal group). And each such lowest element is expounded by an item — or as we shall see shortly, by items (in the plural).

In other words, despite Fawcett's claims to the contrary, his model assumes a de facto rank scale of (at least):

1. clause,
2. (class of) unit,
3. item.

The Lack Of Distinction Between Phrase And Group In The Cardiff Grammar

Fawcett (2010: 203):

In the following four sub-sections I shall comment briefly on each of the four classes of group that are recognised in the Cardiff Grammar's description of English. No distinction is made here between a 'phrase' and a 'group', so that those who prefer the term "phrase" to "group" (e.g., Sinclair 1990) could rename them as classes of "phrase" without affecting the concept itself.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in SFL Theory, there is an important distinction between 'phrase' and 'group'. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 362-3):

A phrase is different from a group in that, whereas a group is an expansion of a word, a phrase is a contraction of a clause. Starting from opposite ends, the two achieve roughly the same status on the rank scale, as units that lie somewhere between the rank of a clause and that of a word.

A group, as an expansion of a word, has a logical structure, whereas a phrase, like a clause, does not. For example, compare the structures of the preposition group long before and the prepositional phrase long before the flood:

As can be seen, like a clause, the constituents of a phrase are groups (preposition and nominal).

Problems With Fawcett's Recognition Criterion For Groups

Fawcett (2010: 202):

Typically, a group is capable of functioning as a complete referring expression — in the sense that it can stand on its own, after ellipsis, as a natural-sounding answer to a question such as Who's this?, Where did you put it?, What is she like? and How much do you love him?, each of which can be responded to by one of the four classes of group. 

The main exception to this generalisation is that quantity groups with certain items as their 'amount' occur only within quality groups and other quantity groups, and consequently cannot stand alone (e.g., far too is very unlikely as an answer to the question How heavy was it?). 

Thus the ability to function as a referring expression is a useful guideline when trying to identify a stretch of words in a text that constitutes a clause or group, and not an absolute test of one.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the ability of a group to function as a referring expression is its potential to realise a function at clause rank. This is the criterion that Halliday uses to classify groups, but the criterion that Fawcett rejects. That is, Fawcett's criterion for identifying groups ('from above') is inconsistent with his criterion for classifying groups ('from below'). Moreover, this constituency relation between clause and group implies a rank scale of forms, which Fawcett also rejects. Furthermore, Fawcett's criterion also justifies the verbal group — e.g. What do you usually do at night? Sleep — which Fawcett also rejects.

[2] To be clear, this exception would suggest that it is theoretically inconsistent to treat such syntagms as groups.

Fawcett's Claim That The Cardiff Grammar Provides A Much Fuller Account Of Group Functional Structures

 Fawcett (2010: 202):

It is interesting that, despite the fact that the two grammars are based on the same systemic functional principles, they take such a different approach to the grammar of groups. As I have said, the Cardiff Grammar's approach is as it [is] because of our commitment to relating the elements of the syntactic units to their meaning potential in the system networks — and so to the 'conceptual units' of logical form in the belief system. But it also provides a much fuller account of their functional structures, and this may be because the Cardiff Grammar focusses on the analysis of groups as well as clauses — whereas in IFG and the many derived works the emphasis is overwhelmingly on the clause.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As previously noted, for example,

• the Cardiff Grammar is a development of Halliday's pre-Systemic theory, Scale & Category Grammar, as Fawcett himself admits;
• the Cardiff Grammar is a theory of syntax, whereas SFL Theory is not;
• the Cardiff Grammar gives priority to lower orders of abstraction, structure and form, whereas SFL Theory gives priority to higher orders of abstraction, system and function;
• the Cardiff Grammar architecture (Figure 4) is not only inconsistent with the architecture of SFL Theory, it is inconsistent in its own terms;
• the Cardiff Grammar posits a 'belief system' that is realised in language, whereas SFL Theory does not — Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 3) going so far as to describe such a view as 'illusory'.

[2] As previously explained, the Cardiff Grammar views groups 'from below', classifying them according to how they are realised structurally, whereas SFL Theory views groups 'from above', classifying them according to the function they serve at clause rank. Only the latter approach is consistent with the principles of a systemic functional theory of language.

[3] To be clear, if this were true, the Cardiff Grammar would classify groups according to the meanings they realise, instead of according to how they are structured syntagmatically.

[4] As previously noted, Fawcett's use of the term 'meaning potential' confuses the semantic stratum (meaning) with the system pole of the cline of instantiation (language as meaning potential).

[5] Cf Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 2-3):

In modelling the meaning base [semantics] we are building it 'upwards' from the grammar, instead of working 'downwards' from some interpretation of experience couched in conceptual terms, and seen as independent of language. We contend that the conception of 'knowledge' as something that exists independently of language, and may then be coded or made manifest in language, is illusory. All knowledge is constituted in semiotic systems, with language as the most central; and all such representations of knowledge are constructed from language in the first place.

[6] To be clear, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence.

[7] This is very misleading indeed, because, despite Fawcett's implication, SFL Theory gives "a full account" of group structures as well as clause structures. The reasons for the centrality of the clause in SFL Theory are provided by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 10):

The clause is the central processing unit in the lexicogrammar – in the specific sense that it is in the clause that meanings of different kinds are mapped into an integrated grammatical structure. For this reason the first half of this book is organised around the principal systems of the clause: theme, mood and transitivity. In Part II we move outward from the clause, to take account of what happens above and below it – systems of the clause complex, of groups and phrases, and of group and phrase complexes; and also beyond the clause, along other dimensions so to speak.

The perspective moves away from structure to consideration of grammar as system, enabling us to show the grammar as a meaning-making resource and to describe grammatical categories by reference to what they mean. This perspective is essential if the analysis of grammar is to be an insightful mode of entry to the study of discourse.

Misunderstanding The Relation Between Groups And Words

Fawcett (2010: 201-2):

Following the principles set out in Sections 10.2.1 and 10.2.2, the present grammar takes a rather different approach to the groups found in English syntax from that of IFG. In IFG, Halliday in fact recognises only two major classes of group, to each of which he devotes quite substantial sections of his chapter on groups. Thus there are 18 pages on the nominal group (pp. 180-96) and 30 pages on the verbal group (pp. 180-210). However, the elements of his 'verbal group' are treated here as elements of the clause — the full reasons being set out in Fawcett (2000) and (forthcoming b). Halliday also gives a page and a half to each of the 'adverbial group' (pp. 210-1) and the 'prepositional phrase' (pp. 212-3). In addition, in order to model the structures that occasionally occur inside prepositions and conjunctions, he introduces two new groups: the 'preposition' and 'conjunction groups' (pp. 210-212). He is right that we need to have a unit to cover such phenomena, but here I offer a simpler solution to the problem (in Section 10.2.8 of Chapter 10). In contrast, Fawcett (in press) gives substantial chapters to each of the four main classes of group recognised here, i.e., the nominal, prepositional, quality and quantity groups. Thus only one of the four classes of group recognised here receives detailed treatment in IFG. (For further comments on Halliday's 'classes of group' see Sections 10.2.4 to 10.2.8.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, in a trivial way. Halliday (1994: 180):

[2] To be clear, Fawcett (forthcoming b) and Fawcett (in press) are still unpublished, 21 years after the first edition of this publication.

[3] This is a serious misunderstanding of SFL Theory. Preposition and conjunction groups do not model structures that "occur inside prepositions and conjunctions". Instead, prepositions and conjunctions are constituents of preposition groups and conjunction groups, respectively. Any structure "within" prepositions and conjunctions is realised by their constituents: morphemes.

[4] To be clear, this is because three of Fawcett's four classes of group derive from misunderstandings of SFL Theory, as will be demonstrated when they are examined.

The Main Verb As Pivotal Element Of The Clause

Fawcett (2010: 201):

The most important syntactic fact about the English clause is the great variety in the positions in which its elements occur. However, this is not a matter of so-called 'free word order' (i.e., 'free element order'), since each positional difference realises a different meaning, however fine the distinction.

There is no element of the clause that is obligatorily realised — not even the Main Verb. Moreover it varies in its position, so that there is no element that can be used as an 'anchor-point' from which to start building the structure of the unit in generation — a vital point to which we shall return in Section 10.4.2.

In text analysis, however, it is useful to begin with a working assumption that each unit has a 'pivotal element' that is typically realised, and in the case of the clause in English this 'pivotal element' is the Main Verb.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the different meanings here are textual in terms of metafunction:

• unmarked Theme vs marked Theme,
• unmarked New vs marked New

and variation is motivated by the textual function of relating the clause to its environment, especially the preceding co-text; see, e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 120, 282).

[2] As previously explained, Fawcett's notion of a pivotal element corresponds to the Head of a logical structure, since the Head is the element which is potentially modified by optional elements. However, as previously discussed, Fawcett (p 196) rejects logical structure in his model of syntax, and in SFL Theory, the clause does not include a logical structure.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a verb is a formal constituent (of the verbal group), not an element of function structure.