Misrepresenting Bracketing Notation

Fawcett (2010: 96):

The next two sections of Chapter 2 describe the differences between "maximal bracketing" and "minimal bracketing" — i.e., what Hudson earlier (1967/81:103) called the "few-ICs approach" vs. the "many-ICs approach (where "ICs" stands for "Immediate Constituents"). Here, we should understand that the term "bracketing" refers to a concept rather than a notation, but it is derived from the ultimately misleading concept that 'constituency' in syntax can be adequately represented by a linear representation of a bracketed string of words and/or morphemes. (See Section 11.2 of Chapter 11 for a discussion of alternative notations for representing the 'componence' part of 'constituency'.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is Halliday's discussion of maximal and minimal bracketing that provides the argument that explains why a functional approach necessarily entails adopting the ranked constituency approach (minimal bracketing); see previous post.

[2] This is misleading, because it is the exact opposite of what is true.  Bracketing is a notation; it is a means — along with tree structure diagrams — of representing constituency analysis, whether immediate constituency or ranked constituency.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  The linear representation of minimal or maximal bracketing expresses precisely the same constituency analysis as a tree diagram, which is Fawcett's preferred mode of representation.

[4] To be clear, as previously explained, Systemic Functional Grammar is not a theory of syntax.

[5] To be clear, Fawcett also (unwittingly) adopts the ranked constituency approach, but uses tree structures, rather than minimal bracketing, as his means of representation, but confuses formal constituents (clause and nominal group) with functional elements of structure (S/Ag, M, C/Af, h, dd, &). Fawcett (2010: 260):

 

In the above analysis, Fawcett interprets a graphological structure signal (Halliday 1994: 3) as a clause constituent (E).

Misrepresenting Halliday's IFG2 Chapter 2: Towards A Functional Grammar

Fawcett (2010: 96):

It is only in Chapter 2 that we reach the application of the 'constituency' concepts discussed in Chapter 1 to grammar itself, and Halliday simply presents the concept of a 'rank scale' of units from 'sentence' to 'morpheme' as "strengthening this conception of grammatical structure" (IFG p. 23). The concepts are simply presented to the reader, with no attempt to justify them as preferable to alternatives by supportive arguments. This is understandable in a work that is presented as a textbook but it does not help us in our quest to understand the theory that underlies the description. In fact they are open to challenge, as we shall see in Section 11.1 of Chapter 11.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is very misleading indeed, because it is deeply untrue.  Halliday clearly sets out the reasons why a functional approach is based on a rank scale, that is: a ranked constituent analysis (minimal bracketing) rather than immediate constituency analysis (maximal bracketing). For example, Halliday (1994: 22-3):

Literally interpreted, the wording 'minimal bracketing' would presumably mean no bracketing at all.  It does not mean that, of course; what it means is functional bracketing — bracketing together only those sequences that have some function relative to a larger unit. …

If we use maximal bracketing, we are taking the concept of bracketing as a powerful explanatory device; in other words, we are attempting to explain as much of grammar as possible in terms of constituent structure.  The concept of constituency is being made to do a lot of work.  If we use minimal bracketing, we are relegating the concept of bracketing to a less important role, requiring the notion of constituency to take us only a limited way in the explanation of the grammar, and no further. This means, of course, that we have to bring in other concepts to take over the burden of interpretation where constituent structure is no longer relevant.  The concepts in question are, in the first instance, functional ones. …

The rank scale provides the basis for a constituent analysis of the 'minimal bracketing' type. In minimal bracketing, each node corresponds to a unit on the rank scale; this is why we refer to it as a 'ranked' constituent analysis. …

We can see now more clearly the difference between the two ways of bracketing.  Maximal bracketing is a statement of the order of composition of the constituent parts. It expresses the idea that some constructions are more closely bonded than others, to the extent that, given any grammatical structure, it is possible to specify the order in which all the pieces are put together, pair by pair. …

It says nothing about the function that any of the pieces have in any construction; in fact it does not imply that they have any function at all. … This is in marked contrast to minimal bracketing, which means putting together as constituents only those sequences that actually function as structural units in the item in question.

It follows from this that, as we expressed it earlier, maximal bracketing is a way of explaining as much as possible about linguistic structure by means of the notion of constituency. … With minimal bracketing we are merely saying: combine those and two and tall and trees, in a single operation; the result is a group consisting of four words. This tells us very little, and so it suggests that if we are using minimal bracketing some other concept is being brought in in order to explain the grammatical structure. This is where the concept of FUNCTION is introduced. It will be necessary to to say something about the particular function that each part has with respect to the structure as a whole. 

[2] As previously noted, Halliday (1994: xxvii, xxvi) explicitly states in the Introduction:

This is not an account of systemic theory… No attempt is made to 'teach' the categories.

[3] As will be seen, in the challenge in Section 11.1, Fawcett confuses formal constituent (rank unit) with functional element of structure, thereby invalidating his argument.

Fawcett's Problems With Halliday's IFG Chapter On Constituency

Fawcett (2010: 96):

Chapter 1 is entitled "Constituency". It is here, one might think, that we should find a set of statements about the type of theory of syntax that will be used in the descriptive chapters of the book. But what we are given instead is a highly generalised introduction to the concept of 'constituency', this being illustrated from the English and Chinese writing systems and from English intonation. Halliday then uses these to illustrate the concept of a 'rank scale of units'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Systemic Functional Grammar is not a theory of syntax; it is Fawcett's model that is a theory of syntax.  In the introduction, Halliday (1994: xiv) explains:

[2] Here Fawcett complains that Halliday's chapter entitled 'constituency' is concerned with constituency rather than a theory of syntax.  At the end of the chapter, where Halliday (1994: 12-6) explains the significance of constituency, he explains why he chose to begin his account with the notion of constituency, and in doing so, discusses such theoretical concepts as:

• mode of expression (p12)
• realisation (p15)
• strata (p15)
• the stratal distinction between lexicogrammar and semantics (p15)
• the theoretical priority given to paradigmatic systems over syntagmatic structures (p15)
• the notion that functional configurations are assigned to structural units (p16).

[3] To be clear, the reason why a rank scale of units is discussed in a chapter entitled 'constituency' is that the rank scale is the means of modelling constituency in Systemic Functional Grammar.

On The "Introduction" Of IFG Not Setting Out The Theoretical Categories That Underlie The Book

Fawcett (2010: 95-6):

The "Introduction" of IFG provides twenty-two pages of wide-ranging discussion, taking in "natural grammar", "grammar and semantics", "sentence and word", "system and text", "the spoken language", "the unconscious language", "theoretical approach", "applications", "the 'code", and "possible grammars". However, while this "Introduction" includes many interesting passages (e.g., that concerning "grammar and semantics", which I have referred to in Chapters 3 and 4), and while it certainly gives the reader a general sense of Halliday's approach to language, it does not set out for the reader the set of theoretical categories that underlie the main body of the book.

 Blogger Comments:

This is misleading because it misrepresents IFG. On the one hand, as Halliday (1994: xxvii, xxvi) explicitly states in the Introduction:

This is not an account of systemic theory… No attempt is made to 'teach' the categories.

On the other hand, the following theoretical categories are introduced in the introduction:

• metafunction (xiii)
• element (xiv)
• units (xiv, xxi)
• strata (xiv)
• system network (xiv, xxvi)
• stratal realisation (xvii, xx)
• structure (xviii)
• grammatical metaphor (xviii)
• rank (xix)
• paradigmatic vs syntagmatic (xix)
• cohesion (xx)
• system probabilities (xxii)
• instantiation (xxii)
• entry condition (xxvi)
• realisation statement (xxvi)
• axial realisation (xxvii)
• delicacy (xxvii)
• context of situation and context of culture (xxx-i)

On The Surprising Disquieting Difference Between IFG And Systemic Theory

Fawcett (2010: 95):

In this chapter, like the last, the task is to summarise the "basic concepts" presented in a major recent work by Halliday. This time the work is IFG (using the 1994 edition). Surprisingly, perhaps, we shall find it quite difficult to establish the theoretical concepts that underlie the description of English structure given in IFG. And then, when we have identified them, we shall find a disquieting difference between these "basic concepts" and those that we found in "Systemic theory". This in turn raises questions about the relationships between IFG and "Systemic theory" and between IFG and "Categories", and so about how far the Sydney Grammar can be said to have a theory of syntax. 

We saw in the last chapter that "Systemic theory" does not include in its list of "basic concepts" three of the four most central concepts from "Categories", i.e., 'unit', 'class (of unit)' and 'element (of structure)'. Moreover, it either omits or re-works each of the three 'scales'. Do the concepts of "Categories" fare any better in IFG ?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, given the preceding, it is not at all surprising that Fawcett also finds this task difficult.

[2] This is misleading. As will be seen in the course of this chapter review, the "disquieting differences" that Fawcett finds arise only from his own misunderstandings of Halliday's theory.

[3] To be clear, as Fawcett has previously acknowledged, Systemic Functional Grammar (IFG) and Scale and Category Grammar ("Categories") are different theories.  There is no reason why a newer theory (e.g. Quantum Mechanics) should be consistent with the theory it replaced (e.g. Newtonian Mechanics).  The differences in the newer theory are motivated by deficiencies in the superseded theory.  In terms of logical fallacies, the reference to the superseded theory constitutes the fallacy of reference known as a red herring.

[4] To be clear, SFL Theory ("the Sydney Grammar") does not "have" a theory of syntax.  It is Fawcett who has a theory of syntax.  A theory of syntax prioritises structure and form, whereas SFL theory prioritises system and function.  SFL theory models grammatical form as a rank scale, with each rank as an entry condition for a system of functions.

Misrepresenting Halliday As Illogical In A Footnote

Fawcett (2010: 94n):

Interestingly, the lack of a specification of a theory of 'instances of syntax' in "Systemic theory" cannot be the result of a general decision by Halliday to exclude any account of instances, because there is a short paragraph that describes the nature of instances at the level of meaning (i.e., the concept of a 'selection expression'). It would therefore have been logical if Halliday had also included an account of the theory of instances at the level of form. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the notion of 'instances at the level of form' is not in Halliday's model, because it is Fawcett's confusion of instance with structure, as previously demonstrated.

[2] To be clear, Halliday (1995 [1993]: 273) clarifies the meaning of 'instances' as follows:

But in systemic theory, realisation is held distinct from 'instantiation,' which is the relation between the semiotic system (the 'meaning potential') and the observable events, or 'acts of meaning,' by which the system is constituted.

[3] This is misleading in at least three ways. Firstly, 'selection expression' is exemplified in Halliday (1995 [1993]: 273) in terms of the grammar (clause):

The selection expression constitutes the grammar's description of the item (e.g., the particular clause so specified);

Secondly, 'selection expressions' figure on all strata in Halliday's model because all strata are modelled as systems.  It is only Fawcett's model that confines systems to the level of meaning.

Thirdly, 'selection expressions' are not confined to the instance pole of the cline of instantiation, since they specify units as potential as well as instance, for example, a mental clause as potential or as instantiated in text.

[4] It would therefore not have been logical.

The Source Of Fawcett's Confusion Between Axial Realisation And Instantiation

Fawcett (2010: 94):

However, the specific 'realisation rules' in each of the two versions are capable of being used to generate different types of structural output — and it is in the part of the theory that describes these outputs — or instances — that the major differences between the two models occur. 

As we shall see in more detail in Section 7.8 of Chapter 7, the output from the Cardiff Grammar is a single structure with a rich labelling of the nodes, while the output from the Sydney Grammar is — at least in principle — a set of several different structural representations. It is the task of the rest of Part 1 to explain just what these differences are, and to examine the extremely serious questions that they raise for the theory of syntax in SFL.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett reveals that it is his notion of 'output' — in his flowchart model (Figure 4) — that is the source of his confusion between structure and instance.  In SFL theory, the relation between paradigmatic system and syntagmatic structure is realisation, which is a relation of identity obtaining between levels of symbolic abstraction (a token-value relation); whereas the relation between system and instance is instantiation, which is a class membership relation between a token and a type (a carrier-attribute relation).  See, for example, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 144-5).

[2] To be clear, Systemic Functional Linguistics is a theory that prioritises system and function over structure and form (i.e. syntax).  The 'extremely serious' questions that Fawcett raises arise from his (already demonstrated) confusion between element (of function structure) and rank constituent (of form) — as will be seen in future posts.

On Fawcett's 'Form Potential' And 'Instances Of Meaning' Being Compatible With SFL Theory

Fawcett (2010: 93): 

The position, therefore, is that the generative apparatus in the two frameworks is broadly comparable. Or, to put it in terms of the diagram of language in Figure 4 in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, the 'form potential' of the two models is fairly similar. Moreover, both models also recognise the importance of instances at the level of meaning, i.e., the concept of a 'selection expression'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  In Fawcett's Figure 4, 'form potential' is modelled as realisation rules (that are instantiated as structures!):

In SFL theory, however, there is no level of form. Instead, form is modelled on the grammatical stratum as a rank scale whose units serve the entry conditions for grammatical functions, as exemplified by 'clause' being the entry condition for the system PROCESS TYPE.

[2] This is misleading.  On the one hand, in SFL theory, instances are not limited to the level of meaning.  On the other hand, selection expressions are not limited to the instance pole of the cline of instantiation, since, for example, the selection expression [voiced, bilabial, stop] specifies the phoneme /b/ as both potential and instance.

On The Compatibility Of The Cardiff Grammar With SFL Theory

Fawcett (2010: 93):

However, before we leave the topic of "Systemic theory", it is important to bring out the impressive extent to which the set of concepts that it foregrounds are similar to the equivalent set of concepts in the Cardiff Grammar framework, e.g., as set out in Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993). …

As we saw in Section 4.9 of Chapter 4, the stage in the develo[p]ment of Halliday's model at which it most resembled the current Cardiff Grammar was that reflected in Halliday (1970/76b) and what I have described as the "pivotal paper" of "Language as choice in social contexts" (1977/78).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett assesses the extent to which his version of Halliday's theory is consistent with Halliday's theory as 'impressive'.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue; see the post Fawcett's Claim That His Model Is 'Fully Compatible' With Halliday (1977/8).  Moreover, Halliday's theory has changed significantly in the meantime, now featuring two 'system-structure cycles' in order to account for grammatical metaphor, as previously explained.

On The Most Fundamental And Great Theoretical Problems Raised By IFG

Fawcett (2010: 92):

But it is in our examination of the major concepts of IFG that the most fundamental problems will arise, and this gives rise to what I expect to be the most controversial chapter in the book — Chapter 7. There I shall examine and discuss the great theoretical problems that are raised by Halliday's representations of structure in IFG and elsewhere, and so demonstrate the need for a new — or partly new — theory of syntax for SFL. 

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because it is untrue. As will be seen, the theoretical "problems" that Fawcett will identify arise from his own misunderstandings of Halliday's model, including his previously identified confusion of structural element with rank constituent.

Misrepresenting Halliday's Earlier And Later Grammatical Theories As A Single Theory Of Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 92):

At this point in our exploration of Halliday's presentation of his ideas about syntax, we might reasonably conclude that Halliday has completely changed the "basic concepts" of his theory. This, however, would be a mistake, as we shall see in the next chapter. Indeed, before we draw our final conclusions about what sources it will be useful to consult in building a theory of syntax for a modern systemic functional grammar — and so before we draw our final conclusions about the extent to which the concepts of "Categories" are still valid today — we must bring certain other bodies of work into the picture. These are: (1) the theoretical concepts that underlie IFG, since this work constitutes the major manifestation of the 'text-descriptive' strand of the work in the Sydney Grammar framework, and (2) the fullest statement of the requirements of a theory of SF syntax yet made, i.e., Fawcett (1974-6/81), together with the subsequent revisions to that work. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  As previously noted, Halliday has explicitly explained (1985, 1994: xiv) why his grammatical theory is not a theory of syntax.  In misrepresenting Halliday, Fawcett is falsely presenting his own theory, of syntax, as consistent with Halliday's theory.

[2] This is misleading, since it misrepresents two distinct theories, Scale and Category Grammar (Halliday 1961) and Systemic Functional Grammar (Halliday 1993), as a single theory.

[3] To be clear, the theoretical concepts that have been carried over into the current theory (Systemic Functional Grammar) from the previous theory (Scale and Category Grammar) are outlined in the work Fawcett has just reviewed (Halliday 1993).

[4] To be clear, the theoretical concepts that underlie IFG are outlined in the work Fawcett has just reviewed (Halliday 1993).

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On Delicacy, Realisation And Rank

Fawcett (2010: 92):

As for the three 'scales' found in "Categories", the concepts of 'delicacy' and 'exponence' (the latter now renamed "realisation") have changed as a natural consequence of the elevation of 'system' to model 'meaning potential'. And the term 'rank' (which has no meaning without 'unit', in its "Categories" sense) is re-interpreted in "Systemic theory" as a general statement about 'flat tree constituency', with no statement at all about the concepts of a 'rank scale' and the associated limitations on 'rank shift'. According to "Systemic theory", then, it would appear that all of the concepts that are presented in "Categories" as "fundamental" have either been dropped or been changed — many quite drastically. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The concepts of delicacy, exponence (as realisation) and rank have not changed across the two theories, as Halliday (1995 [1993]: 273) makes clear:

Systemic theory retains the concepts of 'rank,' 'realisation,' and 'delicacy' from scale and category grammar. 'Rank' is constituency based on function, and hence 'flat,' with minimal layering; 'delicacy' is variable paradigmatic focus, with ordering from more general to more delicate; 'realisation' (formerly 'exponence') is the relation between the 'strata,' or levels, of a multistratal semiotic system — and, by analogy, between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic phases of representation within one stratum. But in systemic theory, realisation is held distinct from 'instantiation,' which is the relation between the semiotic system (the 'meaning potential') and the observable events, or 'acts of meaning,' by which the system is constituted.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's mistaken notion of 'system' being "elevated" to "meaning potential" arises from his (motivated) confusion of language as potential with meaning as stratum (semantics).

[3] This is misleading, on two counts: because it is untrue, as previously demonstrated, and because it is irrelevant (a red herring).  Moreover, the implication here is that new theories should be consistent with the theories that they replace.  In this way of thinking, quantum mechanics should be consistent with classical mechanics, and both should be consistent with the physics of Aristotle, and so on.

On The Differences Between Scale And Category Grammar And Systemic Functional Grammar

Fawcett (2010: 91-2):

Let me now summarise the differences between "Categories" and "Systemic theory". They could hardly be greater. The fact is that "Systemic theory" presents an almost completely new set of "basic concepts". These are: 'system' and 'system network' (but both in the 'meaning potential' sense), 'instantiation', 'selection expression', 'realisation' and 'structure' (the last being used in a highly generalised sense that is quite different from its precise sense in "Categories"). Thus the list of "basic concepts" in "Systemic theory" does not mention two of the four original "fundamental" categories at all ('unit' and 'class'), and the two that are included as "basic concepts" now have significantly different meanings ('system' and 'structure'). The concept of 'element' is referred to, as we have seen, but it is not presented as a "basic concept", and it has a significantly different sense from that of the term "element" in "Categories". 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, "Categories" (Halliday 1961) and "Systemic theory" (Halliday 1993) expound two different theories: Scale And Category Grammar and Systemic Functional Grammar, respectively.  Fawcett's comparison of them in setting up the context for his own theory exemplifies the rhetorical strategy known as the red herring logical fallacy.

[2] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, Fawcett confuses meaning potential (language as system) with meaning as level of symbolic abstraction (the semantic stratum).

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  The sense of 'structure' is the same in both theories, but it is expanded in Systemic theory, due to the innovation of the notion of 'metafunction'.  In the earlier theory, structure is limited to what will become interpersonal structure in the later theory, whereas it is supplemented with the structures of the other metafunctions in the later theory.

[4] To be clear, the terms 'unit' and 'class' are formal categories, whereas Systemic Functional Grammar gives priority to function, as Halliday (1995 [1993]: 272) makes clear. On the other hand, the two concepts are inherent in rank, which is listed as a basic concept (op. cit.: 273).

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  As Halliday (1995 [1993]: 272) explains:

[Systemic theory's] immediate source is as a development of scale and category grammar. The name 'systemic' derives from the term 'system; in its technical sense as defined by Firth (1957); system is the theoretical representation of paradigmatic relations, contrasted with 'structure' for syntagmatic relations. In Firth's system-structure theory, neither of these is given priority; and in scale and category grammar this perspective was maintained. In systemic theory the system takes priority; the most abstract representation at any level is in paradigmatic terms. Syntagmatic organisation is interpreted as the 'realisation' of paradigmatic features.

[6] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  On the one hand, 'element' features in the basic concept 'realisation statements', and on the other hand, it is used in precisely the same sense as in the earlier theory.  As previously explained, Fawcett's misunderstanding arises from confusing (structural) 'element' with (rank) 'constituent.