Misrepresenting SFL Theory On Probabilities

Fawcett (2010: 337-8):

Unlike the predictions made from the 'rank scale' framework, the probabilities that the new model suggests can be changed. Such changed [sic] may be triggered by the context of co-text (which includes the specific point in the structure), or by some aspect of the context of situation.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading on two counts. On the one hand, the rank scale does no make "predictions"; it is merely a way of modelling formal constituency such that higher rank units consist of lower rank units. On the other hand, in SFL Theory, despite deploying a rank scale, all features in all systems have deemed to have probability values, and it is variation in such probabilities that distinguishes registers. Moreover, these probabilities are continually altered by the process of instantiation: the selection of features in logogenesis, the unfolding of text.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett has not located 'context of situation' in his model. Figure 12 (p210) identifies 'situation' at the level of 'meaning', not 'context', and where SFL Theory locates 'context', Fawcett has 'belief system':

Fawcett's Higher 'Rhetorical Structure Relations' Component

Fawcett (2010: 331-2, 332n):

However, M&M can still point out that the question remains of where, in the overall model, we should express the similarity between (1a) and (3a). My answer is that the place to handle the choice that is realised by these examples is in a higher component of the generation process than the lexicogrammar. This is the component which plans the rhetorical structure relations of the discourse, and so how best to present the relations between any two events. (For the key proposals for this component see Mann and Thompson 1987, and for a useful introductory discussion see Martin 1992.) Indeed, the choice that is realised in (1a), (2a) or (3a) must also be extended to include a realisation such as (4), so that for this reason too it is appropriate to handle it outside the lexicogrammar.¹⁸

(4) He left the room. Then they voted.

¹⁸ In fact, it is also at this stage in generation that the planner needs to consider choosing other conceptually equivalent choices realised in forms which M&M do not mention but which express the same basic temporal relationship of successivity between events, such as They voted after he left the room and After he left the room they voted.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

(1a) He left the room before they voted.

(2a) He left the room before the vote.

(3a) He left the room, then they voted.

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the distinction between (1a) and (3a) is the distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis at the rank of clause, and it modelled in the grammar by the system of clause complexing. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 438):

[2] To be clear, Fawcett does not locate this higher component anywhere in the architecture of his model (Figures 4 and 12):

[3] To be clear, Martin (1992: 251-64) misunderstands Rhetorical Structure Theory.  See, for example, the clarifying critiques here, here, and here.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, these are all different grammatical manifestations of the enhancement category 'time: different':

• in (1a), it is realised logically through clause complexing: hypotaxis;
• in (2a) it is realised experientially through clause transitivity: circumstantiation;
• in (3a), it is realised logically through clause complexing: parataxis; and
• in (4), it is realised textually through cohesive conjunction.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the logico-semantic relation between the clauses in both of these hypotactic complexes is analysed as 'time: different: later', with the first complex ordered dominant^dependent (α^β), and the second ordered dependent^dominant (β^α). Note again that Fawcett frames this in terms of a model of text generation by computers, rather than a model of language spoken or written by humans.

"This Little Grammar"

Fawcett (2010: 302):

Clearly, this little grammar leaves out a rather large proportion of the many complex meanings that can be expressed through the nominal group in English. Equally clearly, it ignores various problems, such as the plurals of words like box and the irregular plurals of men and women, etc. All of these matters are covered in the full lexicogrammar from which this simplified one has been taken. The fact that this little lexicogrammar is very limited in its coverage of English nominal groups is unimportant, because our purpose here is simply to illustrate the basic principles of how a grammar that is founded on the concept of 'choice between meanings' actually works. The key concept, then, is that the system network of a language (or any other sign system) defines the meaning potential of that language, and the realisation component defines the form potential. But when such a lexicogrammar is set to work it also specifies the instances that are possible at the levels of both meaning (in the selection expression of semantic features) and form (in the structured strings of word forms that are the output).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this little grammar leaves out almost all of the grammar of English.

[2] To be clear, this has to be taken entirely on trust, because Fawcett has not produced any evidence of "the full lexicogrammar" in a book that is purported to set out his theory.

[3] To be clear, the fact that this little lexicogrammar is very limited is important, because the absence of a full description casts serious doubt on Fawcett's claim that his theory is a viable alternative to SFL Theory.

[4]  To be clear, this is merely a pretext for not supplying a full description, because explaining the formalism does not preclude the possibility of supplying the systems that model the content of this book.

[5] To be clear, here Fawcett once again confuses 'meaning' as a level of symbolic abstraction (vs form) with language as 'meaning potential' (vs instance): the system pole of the cline of instantiation.

[6] As previously explained, selection expressions — like [voiced, bilabial. stop] — constitute potential as well as instance.

[7] As previously explained, Fawcett's model misconstrues syntactic structures as instances of realisation rules.

Problems With Fawcett's Realisation Component

Fawcett (2010: 299):

This selection expression of features becomes the input to the realisation component. This is the bottom left box in Figure 4 (in Chapter 3), and it contains two main types of statement: (1) realisation rules, as given in Figure 2, and (2) potential structures, which simply show the sequence in which those elements that are fixed in sequence must appear (such as those in the nominal group).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] Reminder:

[2] To be clear, in this model, a selection expression is an instance of a system network, and this instance at the level of meaning is in a realisation relation with potential at the level of form (the realisation component).

[3] To be clear, in this model, syntagmatic structures are instances of realisation rules. On the principle of instantiation, an instance of a potential realisation rule is an actual realisation rule.

The Only System Network In This Entire Publication

Fawcett (2010: 298):

The key concept of a systemic functional grammar is a system — this term being used here in a technical sense where it means a 'choice between two or more semantic features'. The heart of the grammar is therefore the system network of semantic features. Consider the little example shown in Figure 1.

… It is the system network of semantic features that models the meaning potential of a language.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, systems construe the network of choices at all strata, not just semantics. For example, SPEECH FUNCTION is a semantic system, MOOD is a lexicogrammatical system, and TONE is a phonological system.

[2] To be clear, the most obvious problems with this semantic network are

• the distinction between 'mass' and 'count' and 'singular' and 'plural' nouns is grammatical, not semantic;
• it presents words as systemic features, and as subtypes of mass and count.

Object, Thing And Nominal Group

Fawcett (2010: 297):

As we have seen in the main text, a thing is a semantic unit that is typically expresses an object in the belief system and that is realised at the level of form by a nominal group. While the source grammar for "things" has over 150 systems that are realised grammatically (and many thousands more that are realised lexically), the present grammar has just four systems that are realised in grammar and two that are realised in lexis.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, semantically, it is 'participant' that is realised in lexicogrammar as a nominal group (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 177), and 'thing' is a type of participant (op. cit.: 182):

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, there is no 'belief system' above the system of semantics, and 'object' is a type of 'simple thing' and distinguished as either material or semiotic; Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 190):

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, grammar and lexis are united as lexicogrammar, and lexical items are the synthetic realisations of the most delicate lexicogrammatical features, just as the phoneme /b/ is the synthetic realisation of the phonological features [voiced, bilabial, stop].

Fawcett's Functional Semantics Handbook

Fawcett (2010: 294):

This 'syntax handbook' will be complemented in due course by a 'semantics handbook', i.e., my Functional Semantics Handbook: Analysing English at the level of meaning. (Fawcett forthcoming a). This 'semantics handbook' will build on the syntactic analyses provided in the 'syntax handbook', to provide an equivalent framework for the analysis of texts in terms of eight 'strands of meaning'. In the past, users of systemic functional grammars have often found it hard to locate and interpret system networks, so it may be useful to add that those in the Functional Semantic Handbook are designed to be easy to consult and to inte[r]pret — both as an introduction to the systemic-semantic level of language (here English), and for use when analysing a text in systemic-semantic terms. This approach to text analysis solves the difficulty of how to show the multifunctional nature of language in a representation of a text without using the theoretically problematical 'multiple structures' used in IFG.

We have seen an example of an analysis that draws on the two handbooks in Figure 10 in Chapter 7. In such a representation, the multifunctional nature of language is shown in terms of the features that have been chosen at the level of meaning (rather than as 'multiple structures' that lie somewhere between meaning and form, as in IFG). The major feature of the Functional Semantics Handbook will be a full set of system networks that define the meaning potential of English, presented in such a way that they can be used for text analysis.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this promised work is still unpublished, 21 years after the first edition of this book.

[2] To be clear, as previously demonstrated over and over, it is not the 'multiple structures' that are problematic, but Fawcett's understanding of them.

[3] To be clear, as previously demonstrated over and over, Fawcett's representation (Figure 10) confuses paradigmatic features with syntagmatic elements, and provides no metafunctional structures for a theory claimed to be functional.

[4] This is misleading. To be clear, the 'multiple structures' are functions of clause constituents interpreted in terms of the meanings they realise.

"A Theory Of The Type Described Here"

Fawcett (2010: 293):

All in all, we can say that a theory of the type described here — together with the theory of system networks and their realisation as illustrated in Appendix A and in Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993) — provides a principled analysis of English syntax that is at every point explicitly functional. It therefore continues the line of development that extends from "Categories" through "Language as choice in social contexts" and, in some measure "Systemic theory". And since the theory of system networks and of the realisation component are clearly quite close in the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars — at least, so long as Halliday continues to regard the networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. as modelling the 'meaning potential' — it is in the theory of syntax that one of the major differences between the two is to be found.

The other great difference, of course, is the answer to the question "What further components does each model have above the system networks for TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc? But that must await another book!

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence. Moreover, there is much evidence that this is not the case, as demonstrated by Fawcett's focus on syntax and form, and his rejection of the three function structures of the clause as proposed in SFL Theory.

[2] To be clear, "the theory of system networks and their realisation as illustrated in Appendix A" will be examined in future posts. But as a foretaste, the only system network that Fawcett provides in this entire publication (p298) construes every noun in English not only as a feature in the network , but also as a feature of either 'mass' or 'count':

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The Cardiff Grammar diverges from this line of development at its very beginning, Scale & Category Grammar (1961). By 1977 (Text as Semantic Choice in Social Contexts), Halliday had already devised the SFL model of stratification that Fawcett does not use, and the metafunctional clause structures that Fawcett rejects.

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue, as the system network above, and the previous examinations of Fawcett's realisation operations demonstrate.

[5] This is misleading, because, although it is true that these systems model 'meaning potential' in Halliday's understanding of the term, language as system, they have never modelled it in Fawcett's misunderstanding of the term, as the semantic stratum.

[6] This is not misleading, because it is not untrue.

[7] To be clear, the "component" that SFL Theory "has above" the system of MOOD is the system of SPEECH FUNCTION; e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 136):

By the same token, the "component" that SFL Theory "has above" the system of TRANSITIVITY is the model of the figure; e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 53):

For the the "component" that SFL Theory "has above" the system of THEME, see the discussion of the text base in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398-413).

[8] To be clear, this book is still awaited, 21 years after the first edition of this publication.

"What Is Certain"

Fawcett (2010: 292-3):

What is certain is that, if the framework for grammar set out in "Categories" had not existed, there would not have been a 'base framework' from which to explore the alternative approaches to the problems of modelling language that have been developed in the years since then within the framework of SFL. And if these explorations had not occurred, the theory of syntax presented here would not have evolved as it has. From this viewpoint, the impressive thing about "Categories" is that it provided a framework of concepts, each of which could be adapted, tested and either adapted further or discarded as a significant part of the developing theory.

The changes in the theoretical apparatus for expressing the categories and relationships of functional syntax that are described in this book reflect, I believe, our growing understanding of what a systemic functional model of language should be like. But these categories no longer constitute the full theoretical apparatus of the grammar, as they did in 1961. They are just the theoretical apparatus that is required at the level of form. But they are the type of theory that is required for a syntax that realises the meaning potential of a language, i.e., the meanings of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is not misleading, because it is true. If Halliday had not devised his original theory, Scale & Category Grammar, 60 years ago in 1961, Fawcett would have had no template on which to build a theory he could call his own.

[2] To be clear, what Fawcett views as impressive is the fact that he was able to use Halliday's original theory to create his own.

[3] To be clear, as the evidence on the blog demonstrates, this belief is not justified. For example, 

• the architecture of the Cardiff Grammar is internally inconsistent, as well as inconsistent with SFL Theory; 
• the approach that Fawcett takes, the view 'from below' is not only inconsistent with SFL Theory, but inconsistent with a functional approach to theorising; and, 
• as Halliday (1985) explained, the 'syntax' approach to grammar is inconsistent with the approach taken in SFL Theory. 

Moreover, the Cardiff Grammar is based on Halliday's superseded Scale & Category Grammar, not Systemic Functional Grammar, and Fawcett has spent his entire book continually misrepresenting SFL Theory in ways that suit his own purposes.

[4] To be clear, here Fawcett repeats his misunderstanding of 'meaning potential' as the stratum of meaning. In SFL Theory, 'meaning potential' refers to language as system, as opposed to language as instance. The stratum of meaning, on the other hand, refers to the semantics that is realised in lexicogrammar. Moreover, in SFL Theory, the lexicogrammatical systems that realise the semantics are not just those of the clause — TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME — but those of all ranks.

Fawcett's "New And More Comprehensive Theory"

Fawcett (2010: 292):

Was the theory described in "Categories", which had such an effect on so many linguists in the subsequent years, completely misguided? Of course not. The impressive thing about it is that it has proved sufficiently bendable (and mendable) for a new and more comprehensive theory to emerge from it. It is perhaps surprising that any of its concepts should have survived, given the fundamental nature of the change brought about by the elevation of the system networks to a higher level. Just as in language tout se tient (Meillet 1937), so it is also true that, in the models that we build to represent language, the function of every part depends upon the function of every other part. So it would be natural to expect that this major change would result in changes throughout the rest of the grammar. And this has happened — more clearly, however, in the present theory of syntax than in the Sydney Grammar.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett's claim here is that Halliday's superseded theory, Scale & Category Grammar (1961), was partially misguided, though Fawcett has been able to "mend" it.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett's claim here is that the impressive thing about Halliday's superseded theory is that he has been able to change it.

[3] To be clear, Fawcett's claim here is that his theory is more comprehensive than Halliday's superseded theory. This is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence.

[4] This is not misleading, because it is true.

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The template for Fawcett's theory, Scale & Category Grammar, did not feature any system networks. Because they did not exist, they could not be elevated to a higher level.

[6] Strictly speaking, un système oú tout se tient.

[7] On the one hand, this is misleading, because it gives the false impression that the architecture of the Cardiff Grammar (Figure 4) is internally consistent. On the other hand, the comparison made with SFL Theory ("the Sydney Grammar") is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence.

Fawcett's "Richly Deserved" Tribute To His Use Of Halliday's Original Theory

Fawcett (2010: 291):

Before we conclude, I would like to pay tribute to the role of Halliday's "Categories' in the development of the modern "theory of syntax for Systemic Functional Linguistics" that has been presented here. This tribute is richly deserved in spite of the fact that, as we have seen, only one of the seven original concepts of "Categories" has anything like its original meaning in the new theory of syntax. Indeed, even though Halliday still holds to his original 'rank scale' concept in IFG, in practice the concepts of 'rank' and 'unit' place [sic] little part in the description of English offered there.

However, such changes are surely no more than one should expect — given the influences on the theory in the intervening period. The first of these was directly theoretical, i.e., the revolutionary set of changes to the theory summarised in Chapter 4, of which the most fundamental was the elevation of the concept of 'system' to the semantics. The second was the widespread application of the theory to descriptions of a variety of languages, and then in turn the application of these descriptions to the task of describing large quantities of text (especially, however, texts in English) — all of which had the potential to stimulate modifications to the theory. And the third major influence on the theory was the demanding requirements of the large scale computer implementations of SFL, which have led to further advances.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett is paying "richly deserved" tribute to his own use of Halliday's first theory, Scale & Category Grammar (its role in his developing his own theory of syntax).

[2] To be clear, if Fawcett has redefined 6 of the 7 original concepts of Halliday (1961), his theory cannot be consistent with the original theory that he used as his template.

[3] On the one hand, this is misleading because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, the rank scale identifies the formal constituents that are interpreted in terms of function, and each unit on the rank scale is the entry point to the systems that specify the function structures of that unit.

On the other hand, this is disingenuous, because if Fawcett honestly believed that the rank scale played little part in IFG (SFL Theory), he would not have spent so much time in the body of this work, and in its Appendices, arguing against the validity of the rank scale.

[4] To be clear, this is only true of Fawcett's model, and Fawcett provides no such systems in this entire publication. In Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, system is the fundamental theoretical formalism, and not only are all strata are modelled as system networks, but system is the model of the potential of which texts are instances.

[5] To be clear, the biographical recount, that these applications of "the" theory led to modifications and further advances, is a bare assertion, that can only be taken on trust.

"The Importance Of Clear And Usable Representations"

Fawcett (2010: 288-9):

A theory of syntax has a responsibility to provide a notation for representing the structure of text-sentences. Throughout this book I have emphasised that we need two representations of each text-sentence, one at the level of form — where the main problem is that of how to represent a functional syntax — and one at the level of meaning — where I have shown that the question of how to display meaning can be resolved by bringing in the concept that lies at the core of the theory, i.e., the features from the system networks themselves.

In Figure 10 in Chapter 7 I showed an example of an analysis in these terms. The purpose at that point was to show that there is an alternative way to represent, in an easily interpretable form, the concept that a clause realises in one structure several different types of meaning — with some elements realising two or three such types of meaning. It was important, at that point in the argument, to demonstrate that there is an alternative way of representing this important aspect of language, because I had just shown that representations of the type used in IFG have no status in the theory. Clearly, if it is possible, it is preferable to use representations that are fully consistent with the theory, and the purpose of Figure 10 is to demonstrate that it is.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because, as previously demonstrated, Fawcett's method of representation, as exemplified in Figure 10, is not consistent with SFL Theory.

For example, Fawcett's representation of semantics confuses elements of syntagmatic structure (agent, subject theme) with features of paradigmatic systems (positive, unassessed) and presents the paradigmatic features as if they were syntagmatic elements. And, of course, Fawcett does not provide the system networks from which these semantic features are derived.

Moreover, Fawcett's representation of syntax confuses formal units (Main Verb) with functional elements (Subject, Complement, Adjunct), and requires that the meanings of all metafunctions in the semantics are realised by elements of structure, in the syntax, that are essentially interpersonal.

[2] This is misleading, because, as previously demonstrated, Fawcett has shown no such thing. See

• Fawcett's Claim That All Of The Representations Throughout IFG Have No Status In The Theory
• Fawcett's Claim That The Metafunction Structures In IFG Have No Status In The Theory

To be clear, the theoretical status of box diagrams in SFL Theory is that they represent the metafunctional (clause) structures that are specified by metafunctional system networks on the lexicogrammatical stratum.

Misrepresenting Both The Cardiff Grammar And SFL Theory

Fawcett (2010: 287):

Finally, we should return to the IFG framework in order to note that it requires, as well as 'multiple structures' such as those found in IFG, a way of modelling the integration of these different structures in a final, integrated structure, i.e., one in which the five or more structures of an IFG-style representation must be integrated. It currently lacks this, so that it requires a theory of syntax such as that outlined here to model this integrated structure.

Thus, even though the two theories of syntax share a common origin in "Categories", they are now very different. The two theories are equally 'systemic' and 'functional', in that they both operate within the generalised model of level of language that was presented in Chapter 3 and summarised in Figure 4 in Section 3.2 of that chapter. However, as we saw in Section 7.4 of Chapter 7, the Sydney Grammar appears to need an additional component in order to integrate its multiple structures.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. To be clear, in SFL Theory, the clause has only three lines of structure — textual, interpersonal and experiential — and these are integrated in the syntagm of groups ± phrases that realise them. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 74, 212):

The clause, as we said, is the mainspring of grammatical energy; it is the unit where meanings of different kinds, experiential, interpersonal and textual, are integrated into a single syntagm.

[2] To be clear, here Fawcett finally reveals his motive for continually misrepresenting SFL Theory on the integration of structure: his desire for his model of structure to fill the integrating rôle. However, even ignoring the fact that this rôle, unknown to Fawcett, is already filled, it can be readily seen that Fawcett's proposal would result in theoretical inconsistencies. For example, consider Fawcett's example (p289):

That very experienced reporter had guessed that they had lost all of the money

and how Fawcett's theory of syntax would integrate 'the multiple structures found in IFG':

[3] This is misleading, because SFL is a theory of grammar, not a theory of syntax. SFL Theory models syntax and morphology as a rank scale, a notion that Fawcett rejects, but unwittingly uses.

[4] On the one hand, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence. On the other hand, it is misleading, because it is demonstrably untrue. Fawcett's theory is not "equally systemic" since, as Fawcett explicitly admits (p280), the concept of system 'has no rôle in the present model of syntax'. By the same token, Fawcett's theory is not "equally functional" since the perspective taken on the grammar is not 'from above', in terms of function, but 'from below', in terms of structure, as demonstrated, for example, by Fawcett's means of classifying groups.

[5] This is very misleading indeed, because it is a deliberate gross misrepresentation. SFL Theory does not "operate within the generalised model of level of language…summarised in Figure 4". Ignoring the demonstrated fact that Fawcett's theoretical architecture in internally inconsistent, the falseness of the claim can be demonstrated by comparing the models. Fawcett (p36):

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 26, 31):

Fawcett's Understanding Of "The Concepts Underlying IFG"

Fawcett (2010: 285-6):

The core of the IFG framework still appears to be the concept of units on the 'rank scale' — even though it is mentioned only occasionally in IFG and not at all in "Systemic theory". Moreover, the concept of class (which is always 'class of unit') is tied into the 'rank scale' too, in that it is defined in terms of its patterns of operation in the unit next above on the 'rank scale'. The concept of element of structure continues to serve a vital role in the theory, though it receives little overt recognition. The concept of delicacy seems to hover between being a theoretical category and a descriptive convenience. (Systemically the more important concept is dependence, and structurally, as I suggested in Section 10.3.4 of Chapter 10, showing structures with varying degrees of delicacy adds unnecessary complexity to the representation of texts.) And exponence in "Categories" was a concept waiting to be redefined as realisation, and then needing to be split up into specific realisation operations. The original concept of 'exponence' has no role in the theory of syntax that underlies IFG, though 'realisation' is used as the general term for the interstratal relationship. To these concepts from "Categories" Halliday has added three further ones: 'multiple structures' in the clause, and 'parataxis' and 'hypotaxis'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. On the one hand, the rank scale provides the organisation of Halliday (1994), and the entry conditions to grammatical systems. On the other hand, the rank scale is, of course, mentioned in "Systemic Theory". Halliday (1995 [1993]: 273):

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, units (e.g. groups) are classified (e.g. nominal) according to the elements of structure of the higher rank that they prototypically realise (e.g. participant).

[3] This is misleading, though comically so, because all editions of IFG pay far more attention to elements of structure — at clause rank: participants, processes and circumstances — than they do to the systems that specify them.

[4] This is misleading, also comically so, because delicacy is the ordering principle of the system network (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 20), which is the fundamental formalism of Systemic Functional Theory.

[5] This is misleading, because taxis (interdependency) is not more important than delicacy, if only because taxis is confined to the logical metafunction, whereas delicacy is a dimension of every system of all metafunctions.

[6] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue, no matter how many times Fawcett repeats it (the logical fallacy known as the argument from repetition). On the one hand, the organising principle of such structures is composition (extension), not delicacy (elaboration). On the other hand, the bare assertion that they add unnecessary complexity to the description is invalidated by the additional explanatory potential that they provide.

[7] This is misleading. On the one hand, the term 'exponence' (Halliday 1961) was not redefined as realisation. Instead, SFL Theory distinguishes two different types of relation that were conflated in Firth's use of the term: realisation and instantiation. On the other hand, the concept of realisation is not "split up into specific realisation operations". That is, realisation operations are not subtypes of the concept of realisation, but statements that identify circumstances in which the relation obtains. 

[8] This is misleading. On the one hand, the two relations inherent in the original concept of 'exponence', realisation and instantiation, both play very important rôles in SFL Theory. On the other hand, realisation is not merely the relation between strata. Realisation obtains wherever there is a relation of symbolic abstraction, as, for example, between:

• function and form,
• system and structure,
• selection expression and lexical item.

And importantly, SFL Theory reduces syntax (and morphology) to a rank scale of formal units, which is not what Fawcett means by "the theory of syntax that underlies IFG".

[9] This is seriously misleading, because it misrepresents SFL Theory as simply the addition of metafunction structures and taxis to Scale & Category Grammar; see the following post for evidence that invalidates the claim.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1961) On Exponence

Fawcett (2010: 282):

Thus, the highly general concept of 'exponence' from "Categories" was first re-interpreted by Halliday as the second highly general concept of interstratal 'realisation'. Then the researchers at London who were developing generative SF grammars specified the particular types of operation required in realisation. These have been refined over the years, and those set out above can be seen to specify, in their turn, the relationships between categories that are found in the syntax. It is somewhat ironic that the term "exponence" is reintroduced here with roughly the sense that it was originally given by Firth (1957/68:183), before Halliday borrowed it and stretched — indeed overstretched — its meaning in "Categories".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, in Halliday (1961), 'exponence' covered what Halliday later recognised as two distinct theoretical dimensions: realisation (an identifying relation between levels of symbolic abstraction) and instantiation (an ascriptive relation between potential and instance).

[2] To be clear, 'ironic' means happening in a way contrary to what is expected, and typically causing wry amusement because of this. Fawcett's claim, then, is that it is counter-expectant and wryly amusing that he uses the term 'exponence' in a way that he deems consistent with Firth's usage.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Firstly, Halliday (1961) uses 'exponence' in the same sense as Firth, with no "stretching", and thus no "overstretching". Secondly, Halliday's later replacement of the term 'exponence' with the terms 'realisation' and  'instantiation' is not a stretching of the original term, but the more delicate distinction of two theoretical concepts conflated in the term 'exponence'.

[4] To be clear, here Fawcett trivially implies unethical behaviour on the part of Halliday by construing him as having borrowed something of Firth's and stretched it.

Realisation Operations

Fawcett (2010: 281):

The general concept of 'realisation' is made specific through five major types of realisation operation. As we saw in Section 9.2 of Chapter 9, it is they, together with the potential structures, that specify the 'form potential' of a language.

Notice, however, that when they are applied (i.e., to a selection expression of features generated on a traversal of a system network, as described in Appendix A), they generate syntactic structures. The first four operations directly generate four of the relationships in syntax to be described below. And the last two provide the framework for generating structures with the recursion of co-ordination, embedding or re-iteration. Thus the realisation operations in the grammar are directly related to the relationships in the syntax of an output from the grammar — while not, as I emphasised in Chapter 9, being the same as them. In other words, we need both a theory of 'syntax potential' and a theory of syntactic instances'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is the operations that are specific, not realisation. Realisation is the same in each case: the relation between two levels of symbolic abstraction.

[2] To be clear, potential structures do not feature in the representation of Fawcett's model (Figure 4):

[3] To be clear, in Fawcett's text-generation algorithm, realisation operations are misconstrued as:

(i) the form that realises the meanings of system networks and

(ii) the potential that is instantiated as syntactic structure.

[4] To be clear, Fawcett's argument for the distinction between 'syntax potential' and 'syntactic instances' is simply that the two are related, but not the same. That is, he does not provide any argument as to why, or how, syntactic structures can be understood as instances of realisation operations.

The Problem With 'Exponence' In Its "Categories" Sense

Fawcett (2010: 280-1):

Since this is a comparison as well as a summary, we shall take as our starting point one of the 'scales' of "Categories": the highly generalised concept of 'exponence'. The problem with 'exponence' in its "Categories" sense is that it covers a very larger [sic] number of different concepts — i.e., every relationship between "the categories of the highest degree of abstraction" (by which Halliday means the features in the system networks) and "the data" (Halliday 1961/76:71). 

However, when in the 1960s Halliday introduced the concept that systems are choices between meanings, he also introduced the term realisation as a replacement for "exponence", and it quickly came to be used as the standard general term for referring to the relationship between different levels (or strata) of language. In the context of the present discussion it refers to the relationship between meaning and form (as described in Chapter 3 and as summarised in Figure 4 in Section 3.2 of that chapter).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true that, in Scale & Category Grammar, 'exponence' covered "a very larger number of different concepts". What is true is that it covered both realisation and instantiation, the latter being what Fawcett glosses as "a very larger number of different concepts". By this, Fawcett again demonstrates — as he does in Figure 4 — that he does not understand the SFL notion of instantiation. Halliday (1995: 273):

… 'realisation' (formerly 'exponence') is the relation between the 'strata,' or levels, of a multistratal semiotic system-and, by analogy, between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic phases of representation within one stratum. But in systemic theory, realisation is held distinct from 'instantiation,' which is the relation between the semiotic system (the 'meaning potential') and the observable events, or 'acts of meaning,' by which the system is constituted.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, 'exponence' is replaced by both 'realisation' and 'instantiation'.

[3] This is not misleading, because it is true. However, Fawcett's model (Figure 4) violates this relation between meaning and form by falsely positing that:

• system networks are realised by realisation rules, and
• selection expressions are realised by structures.

The Concept Of 'System' Has No Rôle In Systemic Functional Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 279-80, 280n):

The fourth "fundamental category" in "Categories" was, of course, the concept of system. It was Halliday's re-interpretation of this term in 1966 as 'choice between meanings' that made it the fundamental concept of a new model of language, and so of a new theory of 'meaning' (as we saw in Chapters 3 and 4). It therefore has no role in the present model of syntax.²

² It would be possible to envisage a model with a set of system networks that represented choices at the level of 'pure' form such that these were 'predetermined' by choices made at a higher level of 'semantics'. Hudson's work (e.g., Hudson 1971) is presented as a systemic model of syntax of just this type (with no ambition to model choices between meanings), but this is not the direction in which Halliday has led Systemic Functional Linguistics. I would claim that the fact that the Cardiff Grammar can indeed operate with system networks that are explicitly intended to model choices in meaning and that can be directly realised in syntax at the level of form vindicates Halliday's original hunch in the 1960s that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. should be regarded as modelling choices between meanings.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the concept of system has no rôle in Fawcett's Theory of Systemic Functional Syntax.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett has provided no evidence of this "fact". He has provided no system networks of meaning, and no realisation rules that specify how choices in systems are realised as his structures. Because his structures are not those of SFL Theory, he cannot claim that they realise the SFL systems of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD and THEME.

[3] To be clear, even if this "fact" were demonstrated, it would not vindicate something that is not true (see [4] below). More importantly, such a "fact" would not distinguish a model in which the system-structure relation is modelled axially — paradigm to syntagm — as in SFL Theory, from a model in which it is modelled stratally — meaning to form —  as in the Cardiff Grammar, because, in both models the relation between system and structure is the same: realisation (symbolic abstraction). 

However, this is undermined by the fact that the Cardiff Grammar (Figure 4) misunderstands the axial distinction between paradigm and syntagm as the distinction between potential and instance, as previously explained.

[4] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Halliday's "original hunch" on the theoretical location of these systems. From the first formulation of these systems, they have been located on the stratum of lexicogrammar. However, because SFL Theory models lexicogrammar in terms of the meanings they realise, these systems are interpretations of lexicogrammatical form (the rank scale of constituents) as meaning. As Halliday (1985: xix, xx) explains:

Misrepresenting SFL Theory On Structure And Conflation

  Fawcett (2010: 279):

At this point we might remind ourselves that, in the new framework that is proposed here, the multifunctional nature of language is displayed in the analysis of a text at the level of meaning — so avoiding the problems that arise from the challenge of (1) generating and (2) integrating five or more different structures (as described in Chapter 7). This is achieved by arranging the features that have been chosen in generating it in separate lines, as in Figure 10 in Chapter 7. And we should also remind ourselves that the the application of the realisation operations attached to the semantic features generates a single, integrated output structure, so making it both undesirable and unnecessary to generate 'intermediate' structures such as those found in IFG.

The conclusion, therefore, is that single, coterminous elements are the only categories that can be conflated with each other — and this brings out yet more strongly the centrality in the theory of the concept of 'element of structure'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, 'in the new framework that is proposed here', the systemic meanings of all metafunctions are incongruously realised structurally by elements of the interpersonal metafunction: Subject, Complement, Adjunct, Finite ("Operator") and Predicator ("Main Verb"), though, as Figure 10 shows, the experiential elements of Agent and Medium ("Affected") are incongruously presented as both syntactic elements and semantic features.

[2] This is misleading. On the one hand, as previously demonstrated, these problems are imaginary, since they arise from Fawcett's misunderstandings of SFL Theory. On the other hand, because Fawcett has exported most of what is lexicogrammar in SFL Theory to semantic systems, and not provided those semantic systems (or realisation rules), he has hidden any the potential problems that arise in such a model.

[3] To be clear, as acknowledged by Fawcett, and illustrated in Figure 10, the Cardiff Grammar incongruously presents paradigmatic features as syntagmatic elements of structure. This is inconsistent in terms of axis. Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 10, the Cardiff Grammar incongruously conflates categories of different levels of symbolic abstraction: Subject (syntax) with Agent (semantics), and Complement (syntax) with Affected (semantics). This is inconsistent in terms of stratification.

[4] To be clear, on the one hand, Fawcett does not provide these realisation operations. On the other hand, in Fawcett's model (Figure 4), realisation operations are located at the level of form, not meaning (semantics).

[5] This is misleading, because the metafunctional structures in IFG are not intermediate structures, but construals of the different metafunctional meanings realised in the clause. Fawcett's misrepresentation in this regard arises from his inability to understand that these structures are integrated in a syntagm of clause constituents, as previously explained.

[6] This is misleading, because it falsely implies that this is not the case in SFL Theory. Fawcett has falsely claimed that SFL conflates structures rather than elements. Moreover, Fawcett's model incongruously conflates his semantic features (Agent, Affected) with his syntactic elements (Subject, Complement).

[7] To be clear, this is a non-sequitur, because the conflation of elements says nothing at all about the centrality of the notion of 'element of structure' in a theory, since conflation can be posited in any theory that features the notion of 'element of structure' — whether as central or peripheral in the theory.

A Common Framework For Comparing SFL Theory And The Cardiff Grammar

Fawcett (2010: 274-5):

The starting point for the summaries that follow must be the framework for a modern SF grammar that we established in Chapter 3. As Figure 4 in Section 3.2 of that chapter showed, its two principle characteristics are (1) that it consists essentially of the two levels of meaning and form, and (2) that there is at each level (a) a component that specified the potential, and (b) an Output' from the grammar, i.e., the instance at that level.

As we have seen, an additional advantage of this formulation of the model is that it is at a sufficiently high level of generalisation to provide a common framework in which we may compare the Sydney the Cardiff Grammars. Moreover, its ability to provide this common framework is not affected by Halliday and Matthiessen's increasing commitment, culminating in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999), to the idea of having a 'two-level' model of 'semantics' (as we saw in Section 4.6 of Chapter 4). In that model, you will recall, there is both the level of 'meaning potential' that Halliday recognised in the early 1970s as the semantics (e.g., Halliday 1971/73a:41-2), and a level of 'semantics' that is higher than this, roughly equivalent to Martin's (1992) 'discourse semantics'. The proposal that this common ground exists follows directly from statements of Halliday's from the late sixties to the present, such as:

In a functional grammar, [...] a language is interpreted as a system of meanings, accompanied by forms through which the meanings can be expressed" (Halliday 1994:xix).

Indeed, it can be argued that all of the concepts that are required in a modern SF grammar follow from accepting the need to recognise the appropriate 'division of labour' between the two levels of semantics and form in such a model.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, it is the theoretical architecture of the Cardiff Grammar, as represented in Figure 4, that both invalidates the theory and illustrates the extent to which Fawcett does not understand the dimensions of SFL Theory. For example, Figure 4

• misrepresents the axial relation of realisation (paradigmatic system-syntagmatic structure) as the instantiation relation between potential and instance;
• misrepresents a selection expression as an instance of a system network; an instance of a potential system network is an actual system network; a selection expression can be both potential and instance, as demonstrated by the selection expression for the phoneme /b/: [voiced, bilabial, stop] which characterises both the phoneme as potential and the phoneme in a text;
• misrepresents structure as an instance of realisation rules, despite the structure being specified as the realisation of the realisation rules;
• misrepresents a system network and realisation rules as different levels of symbolic abstraction (meaning and form), despite the fact that both the network and the realisation rules include the features of the same level of abstraction (meaning); and
• conflates content (syntax) and expression (phonology/graphology) as the same level of symbolic abstraction (form).

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Even ignoring all the theoretical inconsistencies embodied in Figure 4, it cannot provide a common framework for comparing SFL Theory with the Cardiff Grammar, if only because the two models assume different principles of stratification: meaning/wording/sounding (SFL Theory) vs meaning/form (Cardiff Grammar).

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As pointed out in the examination of Section 4.6, SFL Theory has a 'one-level' model of semantics (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999) and a 'one-level' model of lexicogrammar (Halliday 1985, 1994, Halliday & Matthiessen 2004, 2014). The motivation for this misrepresentation is Fawcett's desire for his model to replace the SFL model of grammatical structure.

[4] To be clear, while it is true that Martin presents his discourse semantics as a stratum above lexicogrammar, the truth, nevertheless, lies elsewhere. As demonstrated here, Martin's (1992) discourse semantics is largely Halliday & Hasan's (1976) lexicogrammatical cohesion, misunderstood and rebranded as his own invention.

[5] This is misleading because it is untrue. The Halliday quote — which does not appear on the cited page — does not suggest that Fawcett's Figure 4 offers a common ground for comparing his model with SFL Theory. It merely acknowledges that in SFL Theory, lexicogrammatical forms are interpreted in terms of the meanings they realise. Cf Halliday (1994: xvii):

[6] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the 'division of labour' is not between meaning and form, but between meaning, wording and sounding, with wording being the interpretation of lexicogrammatical form (e.g. nominal group) in terms of its function in realising meaning (e.g. Senser).