Criticising Martin For The Wrong Reasons

 Fawcett (2010: 332-3, 333n):

As M&M very fairly point out, "Fawcett (1980), [...] working within a theoretical framework closely related to Halliday's, treats all of Halliday's hypotactic clauses through embedding, the very position which Huddleston espouses." After also indicating that Martin (1988) suggests an analysis of such examples in which the experiential analysis at clause rank is in these terms, they go on: "The theory can thus be seen to accommodate a range of approaches to the question of subordination" (M&M 1991:29). ¹⁹ 

¹⁹ However, I am surprised to find Martin advocating this idea, because it involves an insuperable problem. This is that the second part of his proposal is that there should be a "simultaneous analysis" (showing the 'logical' structure) at the 'rank' of the "clause complex". This is, as we have seen, a different 'unit' on the 'rank scale' from the clause, so that if Martin's idea were to be adopted there would even more serious problems for the concept of conflating these two structures than those already specified in Section 7.4 of Chapter 7. It may be that Martin would now wish to reconsider this proposal.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from Fawcett's description, Martin's problematic analysis of he said he'd go would be something like:

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue, as previously demonstrated. As the term 'clause complex' suggests, the rank at which this unit complex is located is 'clause'.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As previously explained in the examination of Fawcett's Section 7.4, in SFL Theory, it is only elements of structure that can be conflated, not entire structures. The notion of structure conflation is nonsensical because a structure is the relation between elements. 

Throughout Section 7.4, Fawcett confused the false notion of 'structure conflation' with the notion of the integration of the three metafunction structures through their realisation in a syntagm of clause constituents: groups and phrases.

[4] To be clear, even if Martin were the type to reconsider his own proposals, and capable of doing so, at 71 years, he does not have enough years left him to reconsider all the proposals he needs to reconsider. See, for example, the clarifying critiques of Martin (1992) and Martin & Rose (2007).

Misrepresenting Halliday As Theoretically Inconsistent And Intellectually Dishonest

Fawcett (2010: 323n):

¹⁶ As with many other concepts, the idea that all groups can be handled as word complexes is one for which at least some support can be gleaned from Halliday's writings (e.g., "a group is in some respects equivalent to a word complex (IFG pp. 179-80), and "a group is the expansion of a word" (p. 180). Indeed, Halliday sometimes gives the concept of a group as a word complex more weight than the concept of a group as the expression of a semantic unit with its own set of functional elements. One clear case is his treatment of quality groups when they fill the modifier in a nominal group, as in the case of very small in some very small ones (IFG pp. 192 and 194). Thus very small is said to be a 'complex' of two words that are 'hypotactically related' rather than a group of words. Yet the same words would be a group for Halliday if they filled a Complement, as in The egg was very small. We can guess that the reason why he adopts this somewhat inconsistent position is that it at least has the virtue (from his viewpoint but not mine) that it avoids having to recognise such examples as yet another cased of the unwanted phenomenon of 'rank shift' — which, if acknowledged, would be further evidence against the concept of the 'rank scale'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading in a trivial way. The idea that all groups can be handled as word complexes does not find "at least some support" in Halliday's writings; it is Halliday's model.

[2] To be clear, with the nominal group, which is Fawcett's chief concern, Halliday gives equal weight to the logical ("word complex") and experiential ("its own set of functional elements") structures. With the verbal group, which is lacking from Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar, the logical structure is of greater value, because it 'embodies the single most important semantic feature of the English verb, its recursive tense system' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 398). It is the groups that are of no concern to Fawcett — adverbial, conjunction, preposition — that are structured only logically.

[3] To be clear, the (ideational) semantic unit that is realised by the group is the element: participant, process, circumstance, relator; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 177-226).

[4] To be clear, quality groups do not feature in Halliday's model.

[5] This is misleading. In such instances, very small  is a subcomplex within the logical structure of the nominal group, corresponding to the Epithet in the experiential structure. Halliday (1994: 194):

To be clear, very small is a "group of words", but in this instance, it does not constitute an entire nominal group (of words).

[6] To be clear, in this instance, very small  is once again a subcomplex within the logical structure of the nominal group, once again corresponding to the Epithet in the experiential structure. The difference in this case is that the Epithet conflates with the Head of a nominal group with no Modifier:

In a functional grammar, where the view is 'from above', it is the function of words that is criterial, not the words as forms ("the same words").

[7] This is misleading, because Halliday does not adopt an inconsistent position, as demonstrated above. Once again, as throughout this book, Fawcett has falsely assumed that he correctly understands Halliday's model.

[8] This is misleading on three counts. Firstly, both examples involve internal bracketing, not rankshift, and so the question of recognising rankshift does not arise. Secondly, rankshift is not an "unwanted phenomenon"; for example, it provides a systematic explanation of how the complexity of written language (lexical density) is brought about. Thirdly, rankshift is not "evidence against the concept of the rank scale" because it is consistent with the notion of a rank scale, with the rank scale providing the yardstick by which to identify the shift.

But it must be said, the really nasty thing here is that Fawcett has falsely accused Halliday of intellectual dishonesty: of trying to conceal what Fawcett wrongly claims to be a problem for the model. In this book of 12 chapters, only 3 were devoted to expounding Fawcett's model, but all 12 were devoted to misrepresenting Halliday's model in a way that favoured Fawcett's argument for his own model.

Seriously Misrepresenting Huddleston On Univariate Structure

Fawcett (2010: 320-1):

The above argument goes rather further in exploring the implications for the concept of the 'rank scale' of Halliday's proposals than does Huddleston's review, perhaps in part because he concentrates on different matters (relations between words and groups, and issues of left and right branching). While I shall not attempt to summarise these here, I shall cite his interesting concluding words. These deserve attention because he was, as we noted in Section 5.1 of Chapter 5, one of the small team (with Halliday, Hudson and Henrici) who worked on these problems in the 1960s. Indeed, it was Huddleston who wrote one of the key S&C papers on this topic (Huddleston 1965/81). Since he was so closely involved, we should give due weight to his statement that

historically, the layered univariate structure was introduced in the context of an attempt to solve certain problems stemming from the total accountability requirement of the rank model. [...] "The problems we have been discussing [layering in 'paratactic' and 'hypotactic' structures] are created by the [rank scale] model". (Huddleston 1988:151)

The clear implication of this revealing statement is that the purpose of introducing the concepts of 'paratactic' and 'hypotactic' relations in structure to the theory was less their inherent insightfulness than to shore up the ailing concept of the 'rank scale'. This is therefore secondary evidence for the position taken here, i.e., that the concept of the 'rank scale' is ultimately not a useful one. Moreover we now have a replacement for it, i.e., the concept of a set of units, each of which is capable of filling several elements of one or more higher units in a tree representation, supplemented for text analysis by filling probabilities.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's exploration of the implications on the rank scale proceeds from misunderstandings of unit complexes with regard to the rank scale.

[2] Again, to cite a conclusion without the argument on which it is based is a fallacious use of the argument from authority (argumentum ad verecundiam).

[3] This is very misleading indeed. Huddleston's point is that if a rank scale is assumed, then total accountability at all ranks entails layered univariate structures in the model.  Fawcett misrepresents this as meaning univariate structures were devised primarily as an attempt "to shore up the ailing concept of the rank scale".

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Fawcett has merely misrepresented Huddleston — see [3] — in a way that agrees with his desires.

[5] To be clear, Fawcett ranks his units on a scale from higher to lower, but denies that his model includes a rank scale.

The Case Of The Missing Unit Complexes

Fawcett (2010: 320, 320n):

Is there any reason why Halliday should not include in his representations the 'unit-complexes' that the description implies? The reason why he does not address this question is, I would guess, that the additions to the 'rank scale' that such structures imply would threaten its viability because of the unacceptable quantity of 'singulary branching' that the maintenance of the principle of 'accountability at all ranks' would introduce. They are therefore unwelcome in Halliday's theory, both as 'units on the rank scale' and as the representation of such units on paper.¹⁰

¹⁰ A possible alternative answer might in principle be that, while this would suit 'hypotactic' structures quite well, it would not suit 'paratactic' structures, because co-ordination does not involve a 'modifier-head' relationship (as is recognised in all theories). However, given Halliday's view of the centrality of the 'rank scale' in the theory, it seems more likely that the reason suggested in the main text is the right one.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In all his representations Halliday does include the unit complexes that the description makes explicit ("implies"). For example, in the following representation (Halliday 1994: 216), the unit complex that is "included" is the clause complex:

[2] To be clear, one possible reason why Halliday does not address this question is that, because he writes at a level to be comprehensible to an intelligent 12-year-old, he would be justified in assuming that, for most readers, the question would not arise.

"The Theoretical Core Of The Problem That 'Unit Complexes' Raise"

Fawcett (2010: 320):

We come now to the theoretical core of the problem that 'unit complexes' raise for the concept of the 'rank scale'. Halliday's descriptions of these additional layers of structure are always in terms of what he terms their "elements", e.g., the 'hypotactic' ones are said to be in a series of 'modifier-head' relationships to each other (IFG p. 217-8), represented by the symbols "α β γ" etc. But these elements are not treated as elements of a unit (as in the case of the modifier and head of a nominal group), but as elements that are somehow able to function in relation to each other without the use of the concept of 'unit'. Yet in SFL the concepts of 'unit' and 'element' are mutually defining. In other words, an element is by definition an element of the structure of something, and in SF theory that "something" is a unit. Yet in IFG we are presented with 'elements' that are shown in the diagrams as relating directly to each other, without any indication of the unit of which the element is a component — or indeed of the unit that fills the element. In other words, the concept of a 'unit' is in fact covertly present, even through it is not referred to at any point.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading. On the one hand, a hypotactic structure is not a series of "modifier-head" relationships. A hypotactic structure comprises one Head and one Modifier, either of which may nest a hypotactic or paratactic subcomplex. In a clause structured as α β γ, α constitutes the Head and β γ the Modifier, as demonstrated in Halliday (1994: 217). And, on the other hand, modification is only a first step in understanding hypotaxis. Halliday (1994: 218):

As a first step, therefore, we can interpret the relationship between these clauses as one of modification … . The concept of modification needs to be enriched by allowing for systematic alternatives along two separate dimensions: (i) type of INTERDEPENDENCY or TAXIS; (ii) the LOGICO-SEMANTIC RELATION.

[2] This misrepresentation is misleading. To be clear, on the one hand, the elements of a unit complex are the units that are complexed. For example, the elements of a clause complex are clauses. Taxis is a relation between forms (units on the rank scale). This is distinct from elements of a (multivariate) function structure of a unit, such as Predicator as a functional element of clause structure. And on the other hand, these units (elements) relate to each other in the unit complex. Viewed in terms of constituency, a clause complex is the "unit" of which the clauses are "components".

Misunderstanding The Place Of Unit Complexes On The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 319):

However, it makes little difference which way one decides on this matter, because my essential point stands in either case. This is that the effect on the concept of the 'rank scale' of introducing 'parataxis' and 'hypotaxis' is that it greatly increases the number of units on the 'rank scale'. Indeed, since in Halliday's model there can be unit complexes of both the 'paratactic' and the 'hypotactic' types above each basic unit, the number of units on the 'rank scale' is increased to at least twelve. Moreover, since either the 'paratactic' or the 'hypotactic' structure may come above the other (or indeed between two instances of the other) there may be even more layers still. The model with which Halliday's account of 'univariate' structures leaves us is therefore one which has, in principle, potentially very many layers of unit complexes (either 'paratactic' or 'hypotactic' or both) above each of the four basic 'units' of the 'rank scale'.

Blogger Comments:

As previously explained, this is misleading because it is untrue. Parataxis and hypotaxis are relations that obtain between units in unit complexes at one of the four ranks of the rank scale. Here Fawcett explicitly demonstrates the extent to which he does not understand either the rank scale or taxis.

Misunderstanding Huddleston On Minimal Bracketing

 Fawcett (2010: 319):

I agree with Huddleston (1988:148-9), therefore, when he says that "hypotactic univariate structures do not lend themselves satisfactorily to the minimal bracketing principle", i.e., to a representation of such structures as "α β γ" . 

Huddleston devotes four pages to a discussion of 'maximal' vs. 'minimal' bracketing and an examination of Halliday's illustrative analyses (pp. 148-51), and his strongly worded conclusion (which seems to be justified) is that "the α β γ structure is unmotivated and inconsistently applied" (1988:151).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the 'minimal bracketing principle' is ranked constituent analysis, which construes formal constituency as a rank scale; see Halliday (1994: 20-8). Hypotactic univariate structures, on the other hand, are complexes of units of the rank scale. There is no inconsistency between the two notions: the former defines the units which are complexed in the latter.

[2] To be clear, here Fawcett glosses 'to the minimal bracketing principle' as 'to a representation of such structures as α β γ'. This demonstrates that Fawcett does not understand Huddleston's argument; see [1].

[3] To be clear, Fawcett does not provide Huddleston's argument. Endorsing Huddleston's conclusion without providing his argument amounts to a fallacious use of the argument from authority. 

Misrepresenting Halliday On Hypotactic Structures

Fawcett (2010: 319):

I should add, however, that Halliday would probably not agree that every additional element in a 'hypotactic' unit complex (after the first two) adds a new layer of structure — even though diagrams such as those referred to above clearly imply that they do. In Halliday (1965/81:34) he says that "a hypotactic structure is better thought of as a chain of dependencies". Indeed, 'box diagrams' such as those in the lower halves of Figures 7-2 and 7-3 on p. 217 of IFG show the elements "α β γ" as a set of adjacent symbols — so implying that they are all elements of the same unit. This in turn raises the question of whether it is possible to have a recursive 'modifier-head' relationship between three elements α, β and γ, because the β element has to function as both a head (to γ) and a modifier (to α), which is arguably illogical. Halliday certainly intends this interpretation (1965/81:36), but I find his reasons for its desirability unpersuasive, and I would analyse all of his examples in terms of embedding.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true that the diagrams — in Halliday (1994: 216-9) — imply that a complex with more than two units necessarily entails what Fawcett calls 'an additional layer of structure'. Clause complexes may be simply linear — e.g. α β γ — but they may involve the nesting of sub-complexes with the complex. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 442):

Many clause complexes are linear sequences … But we also often find internal bracketing, or nesting. This is where what is being linked by a logico-semantic relation is not a single clause but rather a ‘subcomplex’ – a clause nexus in its own right.

We can show nesting in either of two ways. (i) The nesting can be represented explicitly as internal bracketing – e.g. 1 ^ 2(α ^ β); (ii) or it can be represented as a simple string – e.g. 1 ^ 2α ^ 2β.

[2] To be clear, Figures 7-2 and 7-3 both represent instances of nesting:

[3] To be clear, there is no "implication" here. The α β γ symbols in Figures 7-2 and 7-3 symbolise the hypotactic structure of a subcomplex within each clause complex. Each symbol categorises a clause (unit) in the clause (unit) complex. This demonstrates again that Fawcett does not understand hypotactic structures or their diagrammatic representations.

[4] To be clear, the structure α β γ is a "recursive modifier-head relationship". In a linear α β γ clause complex, the dominant α is Head and the dependent units are Modifier. Halliday (1994: 216):

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue that Halliday intends Fawcett's misinterpretation. In a linear structure, there is no Head-Modifier relation within the Modifier. This only occurs when the Modifier itself is a nested subcomplex, as illustrated in Figures 7-2 and 7-3. It is clear from this that Fawcett does understand the notion of nesting in complexes.

[6] Clearly, Fawcett is unpersuaded by Halliday's argument because he does not understand his model of hypotactic structures, as demonstrated above. This incomprehension explains why Fawcett would analyse all of Halliday's examples in terms of embedding.

Seriously Misrepresenting Halliday On Unit Complexes

Fawcett (2010: 318, 318n):

However, so far as the two 'rank scale' concepts of (1) 'accountability at all ranks' and (2) 'rank shift' are concerned, Halliday treats the 'unit complexes' as if they were not part of the 'rank scale'. He does not consider, therefore, that every clause should be analysed as serving a function in a clause complex, that every group should be seen as filling an element in a group complex, and so on. (And yet, as we shall shortly see, this is precisely what he does say, at some points.) Although he does not state in IFG why it is undesirable to treat 'unit complexes' as 'units' on the 'rank scale', we can infer that the reason is the additional layers of 'singulary branching' that would occur — because one of his reasons for introducing 'hypotaxis' in 1965 was to avoid the "somewhat artificial increase in 'depth' in number of layers [introduced by embedding]." ⁸

⁸ A defender of Halliday's position might be tempted to offer a modified model of the standard column of units on the 'rank scale', in which each type of unit complex was placed beside its equivalent basic unit rather than above it. But this would not resolve the problem, because it would leave the relationship between a 'unit' and its equivalent 'unit complex' undefined. There is in fact no alternative, in Halliday's framework, to accepting unit complexes as additional units on the 'rank scale'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is the opposite of what is true. In SFL Theory, a clause complex is a complex of clauses, and 'clause' is a unit on the rank scale; a group complex is a complex of groups, and 'group' is a unit on the rank scale; etc.

[2] This is misleading. On the one hand, in SFL Theory, clauses in a clause complex do not function as elements of a clause complex because a clause complex is not a higher rank than the clause. Likewise, groups do not function as ("fill") elements of a group complex because a group complex is not a higher rank than the group.

On the other hand, in SFL Theory, a secondary clause in a clause complex functions either as an expansion of the primary clause in terms of elaboration, extension or enhancement or as a projection of it. Likewise, a secondary group in a group complex functions either as an expansion of the primary group in terms of elaboration, extension or enhancement or as a projection of it.

[3] This is misleading, because here Fawcett falsely implies an inconsistency in IFG where there is none.

[4] To be clear, Halliday frequently advised his students to write at a level that could be understood by an intelligent 12-year-old. We can infer from this that he assumed that an intelligent 12-year-old would understand that a unit complex is a complex of rank scale units.

[5] This is not only irrelevant, given the above, but also misleading. In this pre-Systemic paper, there can be no singulary branching in hypotactic structures. Halliday (2002 [1965]: 235):

In constituent terms, all hypotactic structures can in fact be represented as binary; that is, as having no more than two constituents at a single layer.

[6] This is very misleading indeed, because the quote from Halliday (1965) is not concerned either with Halliday's reason for introducing hypotaxis or with embedding. The "somewhat artificial increase in 'depth' in number of layers" is a disadvantage that results from treating hypotactic structures 'as having no more than two constituents in a single layer' (see [5]). And it is for this reason that Halliday (2002 [1965]: 235) instead proposes:

In the present analysis, hypotactic structures are not being treated as exclusively binary, but are considered as capable of extension on one layer as well as by layering one within another.

[7] As previously explained, unit complexes are complexes of units located on the rank scale. A clause complex is a univariate structure at the rank of clause.

[8] To be clear, in SFL Theory, there is no "relationship" between a unit and its equivalent unit complex, except in the tautological sense that one is a complex of the other. On the other hand, units in a unit complex are related in terms of interdependency and logico-semantic types.

[9] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The alternative "to accepting unit complexes as additional units on the 'rank scale' " is simply understanding that unit complexes are complexes of rank scale units.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Unit Complexes

 Fawcett (2010: 318):

Firstly, then, we need to note that in Halliday's current model any such "unit complex" is located above the equivalent "basic unit" on the 'rank scale'. (These terms were introduced by Huddleston himself, in his important contribution in Huddleston 1965/81:46.) In other words, Halliday's model states 

(1) that above the clause there is the 'clause complex' (the term "sentence" being permitted as an equivalent when referring to written rather than spoken text); 

(2) that between the clause and the group/phrase there is the 'group/phrase complex'; 

(3) that between the group/phrase and the word there is the 'word complex'; and 

(4) that between the word and the morpheme there is the 'morpheme complex'. 

In principle, then, the introduction of 'unit complexes' to the theory doubles the number of 'units' on the 'rank scale'. Moreover, there is no doubt that a unit complex is a type of 'unit' in Halliday's theory, because he refers to it as a 'unit' — writing, for example, that "the clause complex is the only grammatical unit that we shall recognise above the clause" (IFG p. 216).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true. A unit complex is the structural relation of units at the rank of the unit:

• a clause complex is the structural relation of units at clause rank;
• a group/phrase complex is the structural relation of units at group/phrase rank;
• a word complex is the structural relation of units at word rank; and
• a morpheme complex is the structural relation of units at morpheme rank.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, sentence is a unit on the stratum of graphology, not lexicogrammar. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 436):

… the clause complex is realised graphologically as a ‘sentence’, in the way that this has evolved, over the centuries, as a unit in the written language. The sentence is the highest unit of punctuation on the graphological rank scale and has evolved in the writing system to represent the clause complex as the most extensive domain of grammatical structure. We will use the term sentence to refer only to this highest-ranking graphological unit of punctuation.

[3] This is misleading, because it is not true. As explained above, unit complexes are located at the rank of the units in the complex.

[4] To be clear, a unit complex is a unit in the sense of unit with univariate structure.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a clause complex is not 'above' the clause in terms of the rank scale, as demonstrated, for example, by the location of the clause complexing system at clause rank; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 438):