Fawcett's Higher 'Rhetorical Structure Relations' Component

Fawcett (2010: 331-2, 332n):

However, M&M can still point out that the question remains of where, in the overall model, we should express the similarity between (1a) and (3a). My answer is that the place to handle the choice that is realised by these examples is in a higher component of the generation process than the lexicogrammar. This is the component which plans the rhetorical structure relations of the discourse, and so how best to present the relations between any two events. (For the key proposals for this component see Mann and Thompson 1987, and for a useful introductory discussion see Martin 1992.) Indeed, the choice that is realised in (1a), (2a) or (3a) must also be extended to include a realisation such as (4), so that for this reason too it is appropriate to handle it outside the lexicogrammar.¹⁸

(4) He left the room. Then they voted.

¹⁸ In fact, it is also at this stage in generation that the planner needs to consider choosing other conceptually equivalent choices realised in forms which M&M do not mention but which express the same basic temporal relationship of successivity between events, such as They voted after he left the room and After he left the room they voted.

Blogger Comments:

Reminder:

(1a) He left the room before they voted.

(2a) He left the room before the vote.

(3a) He left the room, then they voted.

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the distinction between (1a) and (3a) is the distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis at the rank of clause, and it modelled in the grammar by the system of clause complexing. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 438):

[2] To be clear, Fawcett does not locate this higher component anywhere in the architecture of his model (Figures 4 and 12):

[3] To be clear, Martin (1992: 251-64) misunderstands Rhetorical Structure Theory.  See, for example, the clarifying critiques here, here, and here.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, these are all different grammatical manifestations of the enhancement category 'time: different':

• in (1a), it is realised logically through clause complexing: hypotaxis;
• in (2a) it is realised experientially through clause transitivity: circumstantiation;
• in (3a), it is realised logically through clause complexing: parataxis; and
• in (4), it is realised textually through cohesive conjunction.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the logico-semantic relation between the clauses in both of these hypotactic complexes is analysed as 'time: different: later', with the first complex ordered dominant^dependent (α^β), and the second ordered dependent^dominant (β^α). Note again that Fawcett frames this in terms of a model of text generation by computers, rather than a model of language spoken or written by humans.

Fawcett's Argument On Hypotaxis vs Embedding [3]

   Fawcett (2010: 327-8):

(3b, i-n) He left the room, but earlier (on) / first/ before that / before his departure / etc. they (had) voted. 

(3c, i-n) He left the room and in that period / during that time / during his absence / etc. they voted. 

(3a, v-n) He left the room, and later (on) / afterwards / after that / after his departure / etc. they voted.

It is always possible, of course, to express a roughly equivalent meaning by a combination of the Linker and and an Adjunct such as afterwards or during that time, etc., these Adjuncts being shown by underlining in (3b,i-n) and (3c, i-n). 

But this is a very different matter, in terms of the systemic choices that are available, as these examples show — because the introduction of the Adjunct opens up a very much larger range of possibilities than is available within the Linker. (Indeed, the use of "n" in the numbering of the examples symbolises the open-endedness of the available options.) 

Moreover, a similar range of options to those shown in (3b, i-n) and (3c, i-n) is also available to express the concept of 'subsequent time', as (3a, i-n) demonstrates. Thus the system of choices within 'paratactic' relations is significantly different from that when the relationship is one of 'dependence' (whether this is interpreted as 'hypotaxis' or as embedding). 

The lists of examples given in each of Tables (7(6) and 7(7) on pages 216 and 217 of IFG in fact illustrate precisely this difference. (These tables cover not just temporal relations but the full range of types of embedded clause that express a Circumstance, and in so doing they provide further evidence for the position taken here.) Halliday must therefore be aware that the parallels are limited.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, it is only the conjunctive Adjuncts in Fawcett's data that mark temporal relations between the clauses in these paratactic complexes. These are:

• earlier (on)
• first
• before that
• later (on)
• afterwards
• after that

The circumstantial Adjuncts in Fawcett's data, on the other hand, do not mark temporal relations between the clauses in these paratactic complexes. Instead, they realise time as a circumstance of the Process of the clause in which they figure. These are:

• before his departure
• in that period
• during that time
• during his absence
• after his departure

[2] This is misleading because, in the case of conjunctive Adjuncts, this is not a "very different matter in terms of the systemic choices that are available", because, in terms of relating two clauses in a paratactic complex, the "introduction of the [conjunctive] Adjunct" does not "open up a very much larger range of possibilities than is available within the Linker [structure marker]". In such cases, the systemic choices are restricted to 'parataxis' and 'expansion: enhancing: temporal', varying for 'same' or 'different: earlier' or 'different: later'. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 438):

Here Fawcett has simply confused expressions of systemic choices ("the lists of examples") with the systemic choices that they express.

Inconsistencies In The Data Used For Fawcett's Argument

Fawcett (2010: 327):

Here is a set of examples, all of which are potential text-sentences (though these too have been adapted from the original example in order to create 'minimal pairs'). I suggest that they provide a useful basic set of data for exploring this area of the grammar.

(1a, i-iii) He left the room before / after / while they voted.

(2a, i-iii) He left the room before / after / during the vote.

(1b, i-iii) Before / after / while they voted, he left the room.

(2b, i-iii) Before / after / during the vote he left the room.

(3a, i-v) He left the room, then / (,) and then / (,) and they voted.

(3b, i-n) He left the room, but earlier (on) / first/ before that / before his departure / etc. they (had) voted. 

(3c, i-n) He left the room and in that period / during that time / during his absence / etc. they voted. 

(3a, v-n) He left the room, and later (on) / afterwards / after that / after his departure / etc. they voted.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett is arguing the question of hypotaxis vs embedding on the basis of how temporal distinctions are realised in the grammar. However, his argument is unnecessarily complicated by inconsistencies in the organisation of the data in terms of temporal features:

[2] To be clear, (3biv) is inconsistent with the other members of this set, since it construes a concessive relation rather than a temporal relation.

This is because before his departure functions as a circumstantial Adjunct, whereas the others — earlier (on), first, before that — function as conjunctive Adjuncts that realise the temporal relation.

So, in the case of the clause with the circumstantial Adjunct, the expansion relation is expressed only through but, which in this instance, signifies a concessive causal relation; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 478).

[3] To be clear, all the members of (3c) include circumstantial Adjuncts — in that period, during that time, during his absence — and the expansion relation is expressed only through and, which in these instances, signifies positive additive extension; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 471).

[4] To be clear, (3aviii) is inconsistent with the other members of this set, since it construes positive additive extension rather than temporal enhancement.

Again, this is because after his departure functions as a circumstantial Adjunct, whereas the others — later (on), afterwards, after that — function as conjunctive Adjuncts that realise the temporal relation.

So, in the case of the clause with the circumstantial Adjunct, the expansion relation is expressed only through and, which in this instance, signifies positive additive extension; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 471).

Fawcett's Argument Against Expansion And Projection

Fawcett (2010: 321n):

¹² Many of those who accept Halliday's approach to 'paratactic' and 'hypotactic' relations in structure would claim that the categorisations of relations between clauses (and other units) into 'projection' and 'expansion' (and then of the latter into 'elaboration', 'extension' and 'enhancement') are independently self-justifying. But there are in fact different ways of analysing all of these phenomena that many others, including myself, consider to be more insightful. See Section 11.9 of Chapter 11 and Fawcett (1996) and (in press) for examples of these.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because no-one who understands Halliday's model — including its epistemological assumptions — would claim that the logico-semantic relations of expansion and projection are "independently self-justifying". To be clear, the theoretical value of these distinctions lies in their explanatory potential, which is substantial. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 127) point out:

expansion and projection are trans-phenomenal categories in the sense that they are manifested over the system as a whole — not merely in different logical environments across ranks but also experientially.

For example, expansion and projection are manifested in relational processes:

• elaboration as intensive,
• extension as possessive, and
• enhancement and projection as circumstantial.

Similarly, expansion and projection are manifested in circumstances:

• elaboration as Role,
• extension as Accompaniment,
• enhancement as Extent, Location, Manner, Cause, Contingency, and
• projection as Matter, Angle.

Moreover, expansion is manifested in the textual systems of cohesive conjunction and lexical cohesion. In the case of the latter:

• elaboration is manifested as repetition, synonymy, hyponymy,
• extension is manifested as meronymy, and
• enhancement is manifested as collocation (in many cases).

See also Table 10-3 in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 670-2).

[2] To be clear, this is a bare assertion unsupported by argument.

[3] To be clear, Section 11.9, How embedding and co-ordination can replace 'hypotaxis' and 'parataxis', clearly has considerably less explanatory potential than the logico-semantic relations of expansion and projection (see [1]). Moreover, clarifications and critiques of the section can again be viewed here:

• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic And Paratactic Projection
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic Extension And Enhancement
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic "Elaboration"
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Paratactic Expansion
• Summary Of How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotaxis And Parataxis

[4] To be clear, Fawcett (in press) is still unpublished 21 tears after the first edition of this volume.

The Third Fundamental Category Of The Cardiff Grammar: Item

Fawcett (2010: 279):

The third major concept in the present theory of syntax is that of the item. This replaces the concepts of 'word' and 'morpheme' on the "Categories" 'rank scale' of units, these two now being simply types of item. The reasons for this major change are given in Section 10.5 of Chapter 10.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, on the one hand, as previously observed, Fawcett's 'item' confuses two distinct notions of word:

1. word as grammatical constituent (composed of morphemes), and
2. word as lexical item (a synthetic realisation the most delicate lexicogrammatical features).

On the other hand, in treating words and morphemes as types of item, Fawcett misconstrues a meronymic relation as a co-hyponymic relation.

Summary Of How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotaxis And Parataxis

Fawcett (2010: 272):

To summarise: we treat four of Halliday's five types of 'hypotaxis' and two of his five types of 'parataxis' as embedding, and one type of 'hypotaxis' and his three 'expansion' types of 'parataxis' as co-ordination. Thus the features that generate these examples are found in various parts of the system network. This approach, then, is less novel than Halliday's, but it is equally systemic and functional. And it has all been implemented in COMMUNAL.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the relation of the Cardiff Grammar's embedding and co-ordination to tactic and logico-semantic relations in SFL Theory is represented below: 

[2] To be clear, Fawcett neither provides the system network that generates his examples, nor names the features, nor specifies the various locations of these features in the network.

[3] This is a bare assertion, unsupported by reasoned argument. Moreover, it evades the issues of whether this approach is theoretically inconsistent or has less explanatory potential than the SFL approach.

How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Paratactic Expansion

 Fawcett (2010: 271-2):

Finally, IFG's three types of 'paratactic expansion' (with clauses linked by a semi-colon, and and so) are simply three types of co-ordination.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in treating all types of paratactic expansion as co-ordination, Fawcett simply equates co-ordination with parataxis — independent of expansion type. This creates a theoretical inconsistency with his equation of co-ordination with hypotaxis, in the case of elaboration.

How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic "Elaboration"

 Fawcett (2010: 271):

However, Halliday's third type of 'hypotactic expansion' [i.e. elaboration] is analysed as a special type of co-ordination, termed a 'pseudo-relative', as follows:

[John[S] ran[M] away[Mex], [Cl]][which[S] surprised[M] everyone[C] [CI]].

Here which surprised everyone is treated as equivalent to and this surprised everyone, and the two clauses jointly fill a sentence (which is omitted above).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the combination of elaboration and hypotaxis yields a non-defining relative clause as the dependent (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 464), whereas it is the combination of extension and parataxis that yields co-ordination (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 472).

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, strictly speaking, this is not a case of elaboration, since the meaning of the relative clause does not elaborate the meaning of the primary clause. Instead, it is a case of extension, since it adds meaning to the meaning of the primary clause; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 468). This is also borne out by the lack of tone concord in its phonological realisation, since tone concord characterises genuine instances of hypotactic elaboration; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 467).

In short, Fawcett here exemplifies elaboration with a case of extension in order to justify treating elaboration as co-ordination (extension).

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the two clauses are hypotactically related in a clause complex.

How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic Extension And Enhancement

Fawcett (2010: 271):

Within the 'expansion' type of 'hypotaxis', Halliday distinguishes 'elaboration', 'extension' and 'enhancement'. The last two are treated here as follows:

John [S] ran [M] away [Mex], whereas Fred stayed behind [A].

John [S] ran [M] away [Mex], because he was scared [A].

In other words, the two clauses embedded in an Adjunct express two of the many types of 'logical' relationship for which Adjuncts are used: the first is an Adversative Adjunct (cp. in contrast, on the other hand), while the second is a Cause Adjunct (cp. therefore, for this reason). And both are thematisable.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the Cardiff Grammar treats dependent clauses as embedded if they are extending or enhancing — though as co-ordinated if elaborating (see next post). The distinction between interdependency (taxis) and embedding is very important in SFL Theory. Halliday (1994: 242):

[2] To be clear, this confuses form (clauses) with function (Adjunct). On Fawcett's model, the two clauses are each embedded in a clause, and fill (realise) an Adjunct.

[3] To be clear, the claims here are that:

• the clause whereas Fred stayed behind serves the same function as in contrast and on the other hand
• the clause because he was scared serves the same function as therefore and for this reason.

These claims can be invalidated by substituting the (conjunctive) Adjuncts for the clauses:

• John ran away in contrast/on the other hand
• John ran away therefore/for this reason.

Clearly, the logical relation is expressed by the conjunctions in these clauses, whereas and because, not by the clauses themselves.

Fawcett's 'Reiteration' Viewed Through The Lens Of SFL Theory

Fawcett (2010: 270-1):

The third type of recursion in language is much less frequent in English. It is reiteration. It occurs when a performer makes the choice to repeat an item for emphasis, and it therefore typically occurs with items that are themselves 'emphasisers', as in She's very very nice. The two occurrences of very are represented as jointly expounding a single temperer (using "<+").

Blogger Comments

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, repetition is a subtype of paratactic elaboration. In Fawcett's example, very very is a paratactic elaborating word complex that serves as the Sub-Modifier of the Head/Epithet of a nominal group:

[2] To be clear, repetition is not limited to emphasis through the use of grammatical items like very in nominal groups. For example, the following instance of repetition illustrates the use of a lexical item, go, in a projected paratactic elaborating clause complex:

Fawcett's 'Co-ordination' Viewed Through The Lens Of SFL Theory

Fawcett (2010: 263-4):

The first type of recursion is co-ordination. Here two or more units fill a single element of structure. It occurs between all units: clauses and all classes of groups and occasionally clusters. Typically the units are (or in the case of the genitive cluster, contain) potential referring expressions, because co-ordination is ultimately not between syntactic units but between mental referents.

Co-ordination is typically marked by an overt Linker, such as and or or, and these two Linkers can occur with all units. (The linker has a lower case "l" when it co-ordinates groups.) A Linker or linker may co-occur with intonational marking or a punctuation mark (e.g., the two commas in Peter, his brother, his brother's wife and their children).

While some co-ordinators (e.g., and and or) occur with all units, each class of unit has its own set, with its own probabilities. Thus there is not a single set of choices in co-ordination for all units, as some grammars imply.

Sometimes the meaning of 'co-ordination' is re-enforced by another linker that introduces the first unit, as in both my wife and myself. This suggests that the L/linker should be treated as an element of the unit that it introduces, rather than as a 'structural signal' that is not part of either unit (cp. Halliday 1966).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, Fawcett's co-ordination largely corresponds to paratactic extension (but see a later post for anomalies in this regard).

[2] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, Fawcett's "mental referents" correspond to ideational meanings — prototypically participants (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999) — and, grammatically, paratactic extension ("co-ordination") obtains between formal units of the rank scale. Fawcett's notion of "mental referents" is inconsistent with the epistemological assumptions of SFL Theory (see, e.g., Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 416, 426, 442, 603).

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, grammar is linguistic content, whereas graphology and phonology are linguistic expression. That is, importantly, they are different levels of symbolic abstraction.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, system choices are functional rather than formal. Here again, contrā SFL Theory, Fawcett takes the view 'from below', identifying systemic features with the expressions of meanings rather than the meanings they express.

[5] This is potentially misleading. In his reply to Matthews' criticisms of the concept of rank, Halliday (2002 [1966]: 125) wrote:

Given an adequate representation of the underlying grammar, there is no need to insist that every element should be assigned constituent status at all; it is quite usual not to recognise intonation features as constituents, and the same considerations could apply, as Matthews points out, provided limitations were stated, to markers such as and and or. I do not know how to specify in a general formation the conditions under which accountability in constituent terms would not be required.

In SFL Theory, the equivalents of Fawcett's L/linkers are analysed as constituents at all ranks; eg clause (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 457):

group (op cit: 566):

and word (op cit: 564):

and, at clause rank, they serve as structural Theme (op cit: 107-8).

Inconsistencies Caused By The Notion Of Exponence

Fawcett (2010: 259):

How far should this useful principle be extended? For example, should we say that the Subject of a clause that is ultimately expounded by a single pronoun such as he is to be directly expounded by it? Clearly, few linguists would wish to do this, but the criteria for not doing so are rarely stated clearly. 

There are in fact several reasons for not extending the principle to such cases. The first is the sheer centrality of the choices in the nominal group in the grammar as a whole. It is the unit that is used for referring to 'objects', and within it we need to be able to choose between the three major ways of referring to objects that are exemplified by my friend, she and Ivy respectively. The second reason is the sheer frequency of all three types. And the third is the need to be able to co-ordinate different types (as in my friend and I and Ivy and I).

A more problematical case is the treatment of tall in a tall man. Since modifiers are quite frequently filled by quality groups, as in the underlined portion of a very tall man, we treat examples such as a tall man as cases where the modifier is filled by a quality group that has only an apex.

Ultimately, then, the criterion is a matter of economy. In other words, when a further layer of structure unit is required relatively frequently — as in the case of the nominal group that fills the Subject and the quality group that fills the modifier — we always introduce the additional unit. However, when the lower unit occurs only relatively infrequently — as in the case of the quantifying determiner cited above, we introduce a system to handle the choice that is manifested ultimately as variation in depth of exponence.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the rank scale makes this principle — and the problems it generates — unnecessary, as demonstrated previously and below.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the pronoun he simply serves as the Thing/Head of a nominal group that serves as the Subject of a clause.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, nominal groups do not "refer" to 'objects'. Instead, congruently (and ideationally) they realise participants; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 177). Clearly, the nominal groups rare privilege and insatiable greed do not refer to 'objects'.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, these nominal groups are structured as follows:

The participant that each realises depends on the clause in which each functions.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, these are instances in which the Subject is realised by an extending paratactic nominal group complex:

[6] To be clear, in SFL Theory, Fawcett's quality group corresponds to the (± submodified) Epithet of a nominal group:

Mistaking A Structure Marker For A Functional Element

  Fawcett (2010: 212):

Note however that, despite the small size of the item expounding the genitive element, it serves a function that is equivalent to a preposition, through its expression of the relationship of 'generalised possession' (i.e., 'part-whole' relationships, etc, as well as 'ownership'). Compare the dog's back legs and the back legs of the dog.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the preposition of in the nominal group the back legs of the dog is not a functional element but a structure marker. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 341, 425):

Note that the structure the cooking of the rice, where the Medium follows of, is not an exception; of is functioning here, as it typically does, not as preposition but as structure marker – cf. genitive ‘s in the rice’s cooking. …

The exception is prepositional phrases with of, which normally occur only as Postmodifier; the reason is that they are not typical prepositional phrases, because in most of its contexts of use of is functioning not as minor Process/Predicator but rather as a structure marker in the nominal group (cf. to as a structure marker in the verbal group).

[2] To be clear, the part-whole relation obtains within the nominal group, not within the cluster, thereby invalidating the notion of the cluster as the unit that construes (generalised) possession.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, these are both nominal groups, one with a nominal group — the dog's — embedded as Deictic, and the other with a prepositional phrase — of the dog — embedded as Qualifier:

Some Problems With Fawcett's Treating Hypotaxis As Embedding

 Fawcett (2010: 192n):

³ However, there is still the major difference between the two models in what types of relationship they permit between two (or more) clauses that make up a sentence. While the Sydney Grammar allows for "paratactic" and "hypotactic" relationships between clauses, the Cardiff Grammar recognises only the first of these. The prototypical type of "paratactic" relationship is that of 'co-ordination', as in My brother has arrived but his girlfriend will be a few minutes late, and all grammars recognise this relationship. In contrast, Halliday's "hypotactic" relationship between two units is not recognised in most other grammars. It is said to be one of 'dependency' without 'embedding', an example being He told us that he would be there. In Halliday's model the unit that he would be there is said to be 'projected by' the superordinate clause He told us, rather than being an element of it. In the Cardiff Grammar it would be regarded as a 'Participant' in the Process of 'telling', and it would be treated as an embedded clause that fills a Phenomenon that is conflated with a Complement. Thus the Cardiff Grammar treats virtually all of Halliday's "hypotactic" relationships as types of embedding.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the relation of clause to clause complex ('sentence') is not constituency ('make up'). In each clause nexus, one clause is the expansion or projection of the other.

[2] To be clear, recognising one type of interdependency, parataxis, but not the other, hypotaxis, introduces theoretical inconsistency, and prevents the recognition of agnate clause complexes (and their further agnates), as will be seen in later discussions.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, 'co-ordination' involves two dimensions of choice: interdependency (parataxis) and expansion (extension).

[4] To be clear, here Fawcett implies the logical fallacy known as argumentum ad populum: a proposition is claimed to be true or good solely because a majority or many people believe it to be so.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, dependency (taxis) is distinct from embedding (rankshift).

[6] To be clear, the locution clause (that he would be there) is projected by the main (α) clause, not the superordinate clause. A superordinate clause is a clause that contains another clause. That is, the superordinate clause in this instance is he told us that he would be there, not he told us.

[7] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the Range of a verbal Process is Verbiage, not Phenomenon. Phenomenon is a participant of a mental clause, not a verbal clause.

[8] To be clear, this reduces the explanatory potential of the theory. For example, it fails to distinguish embedded facts, which are clause participants, from projected ideas, which are not.