Showing posts with label orders of experience. Show all posts
Showing posts with label orders of experience. Show all posts

Tuesday, 10 December 2019

Fawcett's Claim That Halliday's Analysis Of A Clause Typically Involves At Least Seven Lines Of Analysis

Fawcett (2010: 115):
We come finally to the seventh line of analysis shown in the standard analyses of texts in IFG . This shows textual 'cohesion', but as Halliday does not propose it as a type of structure we shall pay no further attention to it here. 
Halliday's analysis of a clause therefore typically involves at least seven lines of analysis. It is as if the variation in the structures of the various lines of analysis is seen as a phenomenon of language that is to be celebrated. But we must ask: "Is it a linguistic phenomenon rather than a metaphenomenon, i.e., a product of Halliday's version of the theory?". I shall argue in Section 7.4 (1) that it is indeed a metaphenomenon; (2) that this approach to representing the multi-functional nature of language brings with it enormous problems; and (3) that there is a preferable approach that achieves the same goals. 


Blogger Comments:

[1] This raises the question as to how, or if, the Cardiff Grammar integrates cohesion into its model.

[2] This is misleading.  Here Fawcett has switched back from his own terminology, 'text-sentence', on which his argument has been constructed, to the SFL notion of 'clause' and repeated his false claim that a clause "typically involves at least seven lines of analysis", instead of three.

To recap, in these seven lines of analysis, Fawcett includes:
  • information structure, which is not a system of the clause, but of the informations unit,
  • logical structure, which is not a system of the clause, but of the clause complex,
  • cohesion, which is not a system of the clause, or any other grammatical unit,
and misrepresents the interpersonal structure of the clause as two lines of analysis, instead of one.

[3]  The fatuousness of this remark can be made self-evident by transposing its type to physics:
it is as if the number of different subatomic particles is a physical phenomenon that is to be celebrated.
[4] To be clear, any proposed linguistic structure can be nothing other than a construal ("product") of one theory of language or another.  Such construals are assessed in terms of their validity.

[5] It will be seen in the examination of Section 7.4 that the enormous problems that Fawcett identifies only arise, once again, from his own misunderstandings of Halliday's theory.

[6] To be clear, the approach that Fawcett finds preferable is his own, and whether or not it achieves the same goals will be examined when his approach is finally revealed.

Friday, 15 November 2019

The Two Processes Of Generation And Understanding

Fawcett (2010: 104):
The reason why the two processes of generation and understanding cannot be treated as mirror images of each other is that each of the two processes of generation and understanding involves a different kind of 'problem-solving'. This arises because the two processes operate in different directions. More specifically, the evidence that is taken into account when deciding to make one analysis rather than another when parsing the syntax of a text is different from the evidence that is drawn on to determine the choices in generation. In parsing, the available linguistic data are those that are observable in the surrounding text at the level of form; in generation in the decisions are taken at the level of meaning (or in a higher component), so that the data that affect choices are at the level of semantics (or above it).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett is not concerned with modelling language, but with the problems that a computational linguist needs to solve when trying to use a theory of language for the purposes of text generation and parsing.  Moreover, the theory of language being used is his own 'flowchart' model ('syntax', 'level of form', 'level of semantics'), which, as previously demonstrated, is inconsistent with the architecture of SFL Theory.

[2] To be clear, when applied to language, rather than computation, this is at odds with SFL theory, where structural interpretations are made on the basis of systemic contrasts. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49):
Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organising principle adopted is that of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices. In other words, the dominant axis is the paradigmatic one: the fundamental components of the grammar are sets of mutually defining contrastive features. Explaining something consists not in stating how it is structured but in showing how it is related to other things: its pattern of systemic relationships, or agnateness (agnation).
[3] To be clear, this confuses linguistic data with linguistic theory. Linguistic data are what is to be modelled, whereas 'level of form' and 'level of meaning' are dimensions of Fawcett's theoretical model (Figure 4).

In terms of SFL Theory, lexicogrammar is a purely abstract level of representation. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 613-4):
For these to be possible you need a semiotic of a different kind, one that allows for a purely abstract level of representation "in between" the two faces of the sign, To put this another way (as we did at the beginning of the book), the sign has to be deconstructed so that, instead of content interfacing directly with expression, the relationship is mediated by a systematic organisation of form (a lexicogrammar).