"The Relevant Arguments From The Main Part Of The Book"

Fawcett (2010: 337):

We can summarise the relevant arguments from the main part of the book by saying that the essence of the new proposal for modelling syntax is 

(1) that classes of unit are defined in terms of their internal structures (this being quite different from the way in which Halliday defines 'classes of unit'), 

(2) that each of these classes of unit (or simply 'units') has an internal structure that reflects as directly as possible the types of meaning that they are required to realise, and 

(3) that for each such unit there is a set of statements about the general probability that it will fill each of the elements of each of the various units that are recognised in the grammar. In other words, it makes predictions as to what units will function as elements of what other units — rather as the 'rank scale' concept of 'accountability at all ranks' does, but in a far more flexible manner. 

Many of these predictions are absolute (just as the strong version of the 'rank scale' concept is), in the sense that many combinations are ruled out by not being mentioned as possibilities in summary diagrams such as those in Appendix B, but the vast majority of the statements in Appendix B are probabilistic. 

An important feature of this approach is that it allows for very low probabilities as well as for the high ones — so that it shows that a clause, for example, may occur occasionally (though typically in a truncated form) as a pre-head modifier in a nominal group, e.g., the underlined portion of her recently married sister and a very slowly running river.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in classifying units in terms of how they are structured, Fawcett is giving priority to the view 'from below'. This is in contradiction to the fundamental principle of SFL Theory of giving priority to the view 'from above' (system and function rather than structure and form).

[2] This is misleading, as demonstrated by the fact that, in Fawcett's model, the internal structure of the clause is the same regardless of the experiential meaning being realised. For example, the clause element Complement, in itself, does not distinguish between a Goal, Behaviour, Existent, Senser, Phenomenon, Verbiage, Target, Attribute, Token or Value.

[3] Again, this seriously misunderstands the concept of 'accountability at all ranks', which is the principle that everything in the wording has some function at every rank (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 84), and therefore is not concerned with "predictions as to what units will function as elements of what other units".

[4] This is misleading. On the one hand, there is no "strong" (or "weak") version of the rank scale; the rank scale is merely a way of modelling formal constituency. On the other hand, the rank scale makes no predictions about "what units will function as elements of what other units" because the rank scale is a model of form (units), not function (elements).

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, neither recently married nor very slowly running is a (rankshifted) clause:

Fawcett's Fourth Major Type Of Evidence For Abolishing The Verbal Group

Fawcett (2010: 335-6):

The fourth type of evidence is that the 'full' version of the 'verbal group' (i.e., the version that includes the Finite) is so liable to interruption by other clause elements (the Subject, Complements and Adjuncts) that its status as a grammatical unit should be questioned on these grounds alone. Alternatively, if we interpret the 'verbal group' as consisting of what remains when the Finite and the Main Verb Extension are treated as elements of the clause, there is so little left that we might as well promote these elements to the clause as well (and so avoid the various problems with the 'verbal group' that the paper describes).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is no evidence against the verbal group. On the one hand, contrary to SFL Theory, it gives priority to the view 'from below': structural realisation instead of the meaning that is expressed. On the other hand, discontinuity of structure is textually motivated, and applies equally to nominal groups serving participant roles, as demonstrated by:

discontinuous Phenomenon

discontinuous Carrier

discontinuous Attribute

[2] To be clear, this is merely another restatement of Fawcett's first type of evidence (p335):

The first reason is that, if the Finite is to be promoted to function as an element of the clause, the other 'major' elements of the 'verbal group' must be promoted too.

Fawcett's Second Major Type Of Evidence For Abolishing The Verbal Group

Fawcett (2010: 335):

Part 2 of the paper begins by presenting a set of reasons for dispensing with the 'verbal group' that are all based on the generation of the internal morphology of the elements concerned (e.g., be + en) and the portmanteau forms of some of the elements (e.g., is can function simultaneously as both Operator and Auxiliary, or as Operator and Main Verb). So this evidence too shows that the Operator, Auxiliaries and Main Verb should be in the same unit. In principle this could be either the 'verbal group' or the clause, but after the decision to promote the Finite to the clause it must clearly be the clause.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here again, contrary to SFL Theory, Fawcett is arguing 'from below' — from form instead of function.

[2] To be clear, there has been no decision to "promote" the Finite. In SFL Theory, the Finite is an element of both clause and verbal group structure, as previously explained.

Fawcett's First Major Type Of Evidence For Abolishing The Verbal Group

Fawcett (2010: 334-5):

The paper then sets out four major types of reason why this approach in both more workable (e.g., in a generative version of the grammar) and more insightful (e.g., for purposes of text-analysis). The first reason is that, if the Finite is to be promoted to function as an element of the clause, the other 'major' elements of the 'verbal group' must be promoted too. This is because, under the appropriate circumstances, each of the Auxiliaries or the Main Verb can be conflated with the Finite. And it would be a highly illogical grammar that treated an Auxiliary, let us say, as an element of the clause when it is conflated with the Finite and as an element of the 'verbal group' when it is not. Part 1 of the paper then introduces three other elements which must clearly also be promoted to the clause if the Auxiliaries and the Main Verb are, i.e., the Auxiliary Extension, the Infinitive (to) and the Negator (not). All of these are introduced in Appendix B.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because the Finite is not to be "promoted" to clause rank. The Finite is a function in the structures of both the verbal group and clause. The other elements of multivariate verbal group structure, however, only function at group rank, as explained in the previous post.

[2] On the one hand, this is misleading, because, in SFL Theory, the Finite can only conflate with the Event, not with an Auxiliary. On the other hand, and more importantly, inconsistent with SFL Theory, Fawcett here again takes the view 'from below', giving priority to how the meaning is expressed structurally — Finite conflated with Event — rather than to the meaning — finiteness — that is expressed.

[3] To be clear, even ignoring the invalidity of Fawcett's argument, on purely logical grounds, elements that are not elements of the verbal group — Main Verb, Auxiliary Extension, Infinitive — cannot be promoted to the clause.

Fawcett's Important Principle

Fawcett (2010: 332):

An important principle is involved here. It is that, when one is deciding which patterns of similarity and contrast to assign to the system network of meaning potential within the grammar, one should give priority to those choices which are realised directly at the level of form. And one should recognise that other similarities and contrasts may first need to be modelled at a higher level in the process of generation, and then at a later point be mapped, often incongruently, onto the choices in the grammar itself. Thus, when a text-sentence such as (1a) is used to express a relationship between two events in a narrative, that decision should be modelled as part of the rhetorical structure, and predetermination rules should then ensure that the relationship gets mapped onto the choices in the grammar that present one event as locating the position in time of another.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Fawcett's 'important principle' is the direct opposite of the SFL approach to modelling grammar. Halliday (2002 [1984]: 307-8):

To understand [grammatical] categories, it is no use asking what they mean. The question is not ‘what is the meaning of this or that function or feature in the grammar?’; but rather ‘what is encoded in this language, or in this register (functional variety) of the language?’ This reverses the perspective derived from the history of linguistics, in which a language is a system of forms, with meanings attached to make sense of them. Instead, a language is treated as a system of meanings, with forms attached to express them.

That is, where SFL Theory adopts the view 'from above', giving priority to the meanings that are expressed by form, Fawcett adopts the view 'from below', giving priority to the forms that realise meaning. It is this fundamental difference in theoretical approach that is the driving force making the Cardiff Grammar inconsistent with SFL Theory, and it is Fawcett's ignorance of this fundamental difference that prevents him from understanding SFL Theory in its own terms, as this blog has demonstrated over and over and over.

Fawcett's Argument On Hypotaxis vs Embedding [2]

  Fawcett (2010: 327):

(1a, i-iii) He left the room before / after / while they voted.

(3a, i-v) He left the room, then / (,) and then / (,) and they voted.

(3b, i-n) He left the room, but earlier (on) / first/ before that / before his departure / etc. they (had) voted. 

(3c, i-n) He left the room and in that period / during that time / during his absence / etc. they voted. 

(3a, v-n) He left the room, and later (on) / afterwards / after that / after his departure / etc. they voted.

Thus, if we wish to express the meaning of 'subsequent time' in a 'paratactic' structure (i.e., by co-ordination) we can use the grammatical items then or and then as the Linker, such that these correspond in meaning to the Binder after, as used in (1a, i), but if we wish to express the meaning of 'antecedent time', there is no co-ordinating Linker that corresponds to the Binder before. And neither is there a Linker that expresses 'simultaneous time' and that therefore corresponds to the Binder while.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, here Fawcett is arguing against hypotaxis/parataxis agnation on the basis of form —  subclasses of conjunction: linker and binder — rather than function. That is, contrā SFL Theory, Fawcett is arguing 'from below', rather than 'from above'. 

In a functional theory of language, the question of agnation turns on similarity and difference of meaning, not on similarity and difference in how those meaning distinctions are expressed (e.g. structure marker or conjunctive Adjunct). In the paratactic complexes, below, a structure marker (but, and, and) realises the interdependency relation of parataxis, and a conjunctive Adjunct (before that, after that, meanwhile) realises the enhancement relation of relative time. 

But see later posts for further clarifications.

The Development Of Fawcett's Theory Of Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 291-2):

In terms of the development of the present theory of syntax, it was the elevation of the system networks to model meaning that led to the reassessment of the role in the new framework of the existing syntactic categories. But it was the work in describing very large quantities of text that led to the establishment of the new meaning for class of unit, and so the recognition of the central place in the theory of the concept of filling (together with the other changes introduced in Fawcett 1974-6/81). And it took the challenge of the computer implementation of the lexicogrammar to show that the concept of a 'rank scale of units' had no role to play in the generative grammar — and so also no role in the use of the theory for describing languages or analysing texts.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading. To be clear, in SFL Theory, the systems of the clause are located on the lexicogrammatical stratum. It is only in the Cardiff Grammar that they are located at its level of meaning, though none of these systems have been produced in this volume.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The approach of classifying units in terms of structure ('from below') rather in terms of the functions they realise ('from above') is a theoretical decision taken before analysing data, not after it, since the data itself does not determine the theoretical orientation. Moreover, Fawcett's approach is inconsistent with a theoretical approach that prioritises function over form.

[3] Again, this is misleading, because it is not true. On the one hand, the theoretical decision to use ranked constituent analysis (a rank scale) or immediate constituent analysis precedes the analysis of data. On the other hand, Fawcett does use a rank scale of sentence-clause-group and cluster-item, despite his claims to the contrary. Moreover, Fawcett has demonstrated many times over that he does not understand the notion of a rank scale as a model of formal constituency.

Fawcett's Understanding Of "The Concepts Underlying IFG"

Fawcett (2010: 285-6):

The core of the IFG framework still appears to be the concept of units on the 'rank scale' — even though it is mentioned only occasionally in IFG and not at all in "Systemic theory". Moreover, the concept of class (which is always 'class of unit') is tied into the 'rank scale' too, in that it is defined in terms of its patterns of operation in the unit next above on the 'rank scale'. The concept of element of structure continues to serve a vital role in the theory, though it receives little overt recognition. The concept of delicacy seems to hover between being a theoretical category and a descriptive convenience. (Systemically the more important concept is dependence, and structurally, as I suggested in Section 10.3.4 of Chapter 10, showing structures with varying degrees of delicacy adds unnecessary complexity to the representation of texts.) And exponence in "Categories" was a concept waiting to be redefined as realisation, and then needing to be split up into specific realisation operations. The original concept of 'exponence' has no role in the theory of syntax that underlies IFG, though 'realisation' is used as the general term for the interstratal relationship. To these concepts from "Categories" Halliday has added three further ones: 'multiple structures' in the clause, and 'parataxis' and 'hypotaxis'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. On the one hand, the rank scale provides the organisation of Halliday (1994), and the entry conditions to grammatical systems. On the other hand, the rank scale is, of course, mentioned in "Systemic Theory". Halliday (1995 [1993]: 273):

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, units (e.g. groups) are classified (e.g. nominal) according to the elements of structure of the higher rank that they prototypically realise (e.g. participant).

[3] This is misleading, though comically so, because all editions of IFG pay far more attention to elements of structure — at clause rank: participants, processes and circumstances — than they do to the systems that specify them.

[4] This is misleading, also comically so, because delicacy is the ordering principle of the system network (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 20), which is the fundamental formalism of Systemic Functional Theory.

[5] This is misleading, because taxis (interdependency) is not more important than delicacy, if only because taxis is confined to the logical metafunction, whereas delicacy is a dimension of every system of all metafunctions.

[6] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue, no matter how many times Fawcett repeats it (the logical fallacy known as the argument from repetition). On the one hand, the organising principle of such structures is composition (extension), not delicacy (elaboration). On the other hand, the bare assertion that they add unnecessary complexity to the description is invalidated by the additional explanatory potential that they provide.

[7] This is misleading. On the one hand, the term 'exponence' (Halliday 1961) was not redefined as realisation. Instead, SFL Theory distinguishes two different types of relation that were conflated in Firth's use of the term: realisation and instantiation. On the other hand, the concept of realisation is not "split up into specific realisation operations". That is, realisation operations are not subtypes of the concept of realisation, but statements that identify circumstances in which the relation obtains. 

[8] This is misleading. On the one hand, the two relations inherent in the original concept of 'exponence', realisation and instantiation, both play very important rôles in SFL Theory. On the other hand, realisation is not merely the relation between strata. Realisation obtains wherever there is a relation of symbolic abstraction, as, for example, between:

• function and form,
• system and structure,
• selection expression and lexical item.

And importantly, SFL Theory reduces syntax (and morphology) to a rank scale of formal units, which is not what Fawcett means by "the theory of syntax that underlies IFG".

[9] This is seriously misleading, because it misrepresents SFL Theory as simply the addition of metafunction structures and taxis to Scale & Category Grammar; see the following post for evidence that invalidates the claim.

"One Must Choose" Fawcett's Criterion Or Halliday's

 Fawcett (2010: 283):

We replace the 'rank scale' claim by the statement that 

(1) the five major classes of unit (i.e., the clause and the four classes of group) all occur quite frequently at a number of different elements of structure within a number of different classes of unit; 

(2) that they do so with varying degrees of probability, and 

(3) these probabilities (and others) need to be represented in the grammar. 

Thus 'absolute' rules can be seen as extreme cases of probability. 

It is an interesting side-effect of defining classes of unit by their internal structure that it becomes impossible to apply Halliday's criterion of the unit's potential for operation in the unit above it on the 'rank scale'. One must choose one criterion or the other. 

The generalisations captured in the diagrams in Appendix B suggest the value of basing classes of unit on their internal structure, and the corollary is that the description is able to show that all the major classes of unit (the clause and the four groups) can all fill several different elements.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because statements about relations between formal units and elements of structure cannot replace the the rank scale approach to constituency, because the rank scale is only concerned with the composition of formal units — a clause consists of groups ± phrases which consist of words which consist of morphemes — not with the relation between formal constituents and the elements of structure that they realise. 

In theoretical terms, the rank scale is concerned with composition (extension) at the same level of symbolic abstraction, whereas form-function relations obtain across different levels of symbolic abstraction related by intensive identification (elaboration).

[2] To be clear, as previously noted, the clause is a unit, not a class of unit (e.g. adverbial clause), putting the lie to Fawcett's oxymoronic claim that the Cardiff Grammar features classes of units (cf dog breeds) but not units (cf dogs).

[3] This is misleading, because it misrepresents a theoretical inconsistency in Fawcett's model as "an interesting side-effect". The theoretical inconsistency lies in the fact that a functional theory classifies units from above, like Halliday, not from below, like Fawcett. Moreover, it is the non-arbitrary relation between classes of group and phrase (e.g. nominal group) and the meanings they realise (e.g. participant) that makes an interpretation of the functions of grammatical forms possible.

[4] To be clear, a functional theorist chooses Halliday's criterion, whereas a formal theorist chooses Fawcett's criterion.

[5] To be clear, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence. The diagrams in Appendix B merely illustrate Fawcett's model of structure; this alone does not "suggest" the value of taking a perspective that is inconsistent with a functional approach to structure.

[6] This is misleading, because a corollary is a proposition that follows from one already proved, whereas Fawcett's next proposition does not follow from one that has been proved; see [5].

[7] This is misleading, because it misrepresents a mere description of the model as a theoretical advantage of the model.

The First Fundamental Category Of The Cardiff Grammar: Class Of Unit

Fawcett (2010: 277-8):

The first fundamental category in the present theory is the concept of class of unit. However, the criteria used for recognising examples of classes of unit (and at the development stage of the grammar for setting up new units) are significantly different from those used in "Categories" and still used in IFG, so that it is effect a different concept from Halliday's 'class of unit'. In "Categories", the class of a unit is said to be determined by its potential for operation at given elements of the unit next above on the 'rank scale' — and in IFG classes of unit still appear to be assigned on the same principle (even though this leads to various anomalies, as pointed out in Section 10.2 of Chapter 10). 

Halliday has stuck by this criterion in spite of the fact that most of his grammatically-minded colleagues of the 1960s and 1970s (Huddleston, Hudson and Sinclair) seem to have given increasing weight to internal structure and semantics, as we saw in Section 10.2.2 of Chapter 10 — so effectively rejecting Halliday's criterion. 

In the present framework, as in Fawcett (1974-6/81), the class of a unit is identified solely by its internal structure, i.e., by its potential array of elements of structure. (But see below for their close relationship with the meanings that they realise.) For English five major classes of unit are recognised here: clause, nominal group, prepositional group, quality group and quantity group, together with the genitive cluster and a number of other classes of cluster that handle the internal structure of various types of 'name'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar recognises 'class of unit', but does recognise 'unit'. That is, it recognises the Classifier, but not the Thing classified. This is like recognising breeds of dogs without recognising dogs. The motivation for this oxymoron is Fawcett's association of 'unit' with the rank scale, which Fawcett vociferously rejects, because he knows the rank scale makes his theory redundant. In truth, 'unit' only implies constituency, not the rank scale approach to constituency.

[2] To be clear, this is not misleading, because it is true.

[3] To be clear, this is misleading, because it is not true, as demonstrated in the examination of Section 10.2. The "various anomalies" were shown to be (motivated) misunderstandings on Fawcett's part.

[4] To be clear, this criterion is fundamental to a functional theory of grammar, and distinguishes it from formal (syntactic) theories. A functional theory gives priority to the view 'from above': the function (e.g. Process) that is expressed by a form (e.g. verbal group). Fawcett's approach, on the other hand, is contrary to this fundamental principle, in that it gives priority to the view 'from below': how forms are expressed structurally.

[5] To be clear, on the one hand, Huddleston, Hudson and Sinclair do not use SFL Theory, and so take a different approach to language, founded on different assumptions. On the other hand, what matters intellectually is not the rejecting of a criterion, but the validity of the reasons for rejecting a criterion. Here Fawcett has once again indulged in the logical fallacies known as the appeal to popularity, since he suggests that his view must be preferred simply because it is held by others, and the argument from authority, since he presents Huddleston, Hudson and Sinclair as authorities whose opinions matter simply on that basis.

[6] To be clear, as explained above, and previously, Fawcett's approach, the view 'from below', is contrary to a functional approach to language.

[7] See, for example, the earlier post Limiting All Classes Of Semantic Unit To Experiential Meaning.

[8] To be clear, 'clause' is a unit, not a class of unit. An adverbial clause is a class of unit; a clause is the unit of which it is a class.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On "Filling" Notation

Fawcett (2010: 251-2):

Interestingly, there is an equivalent gap in the Sydney Grammar's notation for representing the outputs from the grammar. This arises from the surprising fact that there is no diagram in IFG — or in the equivalent diagrams in Matthiessen & Bateman (1991) or Matthiessen (1995) — that shows how such a relationship should be represented in the full analysis of a text-sentence. In all of these works each unit is analysed in its own terms, almost as if the way in which they are to be related to the units above and below them in the structure is self-evident and has no complications. Filling is in fact a complex matter, and it very often happens that the possibilities as to what class of unit may fill an element depends, either in absolute or in probabilisitc [sic] terms, on choices in the generation of the unit above. The most obvious example is the restrictions on what may fill the Complements of particular Main Verbs (for which see Fawcett 1996).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is the direct opposite of what is true. Halliday (1994: 109) provides the following diagram illustrating both clause experiential function types and their realisations by classes of forms at the rank of group/phrase:

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 169) further elaborates the model for all three metafunctional structures:

[2] This is not misleading, because it is true. In SFL theory, each rank provides the entry condition to the systems of that rank, in which the structures of each rank are specified.

[3] This is misleading because, in SFL Theory, formal constituents are related to each other by the rank scale, and the relation between function structures at a higher rank and formal syntagms at the lower rank is specified as realisation.

[4] To be clear, in contradiction of SFL Theory, Fawcett here gives priority to the view 'from below', classes of form that realise functions, instead of the view 'from above', the functions that are realised by forms.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, Complement is an element of interpersonal structure at clause rank, which may be conflated with most, if not all, types of participant in experiential structures. Any restrictions on the class of unit that realises a Complement thus depend on the type of participant with which it is conflated.

Fawcett's Argument For 'Secondary Structure'

Fawcett (2010: 219-20):

In developing a SF grammar, both for very large computer implementations and for text analysis, priority must be given to the "most delicate" possible of structural descriptions, because a full account of the meaning potential of a unit (such as a clause) requires statements about each element in its own right. It is the individual elements of a unit that carry the different meanings that are the focus of interest for a functional grammarian. 

For example, the fact that the main mood meanings of a clause are realised by the configuration of the Subject and Operator is best shown by stating the semantic feature that generates this configuration in an analysis of the meaning potential of the clause, as in Figure 10 in Chapter 7 (rather than introducing an additional layer of structure as part of its syntax, as in the case of "Mood + Residue" in IFG).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Systemic Functional Theory is a model of language as a phenomenon. Text analysis is an application of the theory, and computer implementations require the modification of the theory to accommodate the limitations of computers.

[2] To be clear, on the one hand, this priority flatly contradicts Fawcett's previous argument against what he regards as the "most delicate" structures; see the previous post. On the other hand, this priority is inconsistent with SFL Theory, because it argues for the view 'from below' (structure and form) rather than the view 'from above' (system and function).

[3] To be clear, the focus of interest for a Systemic Functional grammarian is the system that specifies structural realisations.

[4] To be clear, as previously noted, in Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, structural realisations are specified systemically as realisation statements. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

[5] To be clear, as previously noted, Fawcett's Figure 10 confuses systemic features of the clause with elements of structure:

Moreover, the only semantic feature that corresponds to the configuration of Subject and Operator is the unexplained 'information giver'. Significantly, Fawcett does not provide the semantic networks from which these features are derived.

Problems With Fawcett's Quality Group

 Fawcett (2010: 206):

The quality group has as its pivotal element (the apex) an adjective or an adverb (typically a manner adverb). The quality group corresponds to the semantic unit of 'quality'. However we should note that the 'quality' may be a quality of either a 'thing' (e.g., clever) or a 'situation' (e.g., cleverly in He cleverly opened it with a paper clip). Thus quality groups that refer to the quality of an object have an adjective as their apex, and quality groups that refer to an event have, typically, a manner adverb at their apex — but sometimes other classes of adverb, such as the 'usuality' adverb often.¹¹

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett applies a functional label to a formal unit, a group, thereby creating a theoretical inconsistency with regard to other groups in his own model, not least because he labels this group 'from above' (function) despite classifying it 'from below' (structure). In SFL Theory, formal units are assigned functions in the structure of the unit above them in the rank scale. For example, 

• the word clever is assigned the function Epithet in the nominal group a clever device,
• the nominal group (very) clever is assigned the function Attribute in the clause he's not (very) clever, and 
• the adverbial group (very) cleverly is assigned the function Manner: quality in the clause He (very) cleverly opened it with a paper clip.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, qualities can be realised as circumstances (Manner), participants (Attribute) or a feature of a Process, as in he sped around the corner, where sped means 'moved speedily'. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 208):

[3] To be clear, in Fawcett's model, 'situation' is the semantic unit — regardless of metafunction — realised in syntax by a clause. Its nearest equivalent in SFL Theory is the ideational unit 'figure' (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999).

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, this variant of Fawcett's quality group is a nominal group with Epithet as Head, as in (she's) quite clever:

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, this variant of Fawcett's quality group is an adverbial group, as in (he does not plan) very cleverly:

[6] To be clear, in Fawcett's model (Figure 12), 'event' is not language, but a 'belief system' unit, that is typically realised in language as a 'situation' in semantics, and as a clause in syntax. As previously explained, this is inconsistent with the the epistemological assumptions on which SFL Theory is founded.

[7] To be clear, the 'usuality' adverb often does not realise a quality — not least because 'usuality' is interpersonal in function, whereas 'quality' is ideational. This highlights the general inconsistency here: many groups with an adverb as its apex do not construe qualities; for example (from Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 313, 191):

• adverbs of place: abroad, overseas, home, upstairs, downstairs, inside, outside; out, up, down, behind; left, right, straight; there, here
• adverbs of time: today, yesterday, tomorrow; now, then
• adverbs serving as comment Adjuncts: naturally, inevitably, obviously, clearly, plainly, doubtless, indubitably, unsurprisingly, predictably, surprisingly, unexpectedly, evidently, allegedly, supposedly, arguably, presumably, luckily, fortunately, hopefully, sadly, unfortunately, amusingly, funnily, importantly, significantly, wisely, cleverly, foolishly, stupidly, rightly, correctly, justifiably, wrongly, unjustifiably, characteristically, typically, truly, honestly, seriously, admittedly, certainly, actually, really, generally, broadly, roughly, ordinarily, frankly, candidly, honestly, confidentially, personally, strictly, tentatively

"The First Major Difference Between Fawcett's And Halliday's Nominal Group"

Fawcett (2010: 203-4):

Halliday's nominal group is the only class of group that comes at all close to sharing both the same name and the same coverage of phenomena as it does the Cardiff Grammar — but even here there are important differences.

The first is that Halliday treats the type of quality group that has an adjective as its apex (e.g., more generous than most people) is a type of "nominal group" in IFG. He does this in spite [of] the fact that its internal structure is clearly very similar to that of his "adverbial group". Here, then, he is clearly applying the criterion for assigning an expression to a class of unit that what matters is the unit's ability to function at given elements in the unit above on the 'rank scale' (as discussed in Section 10.2.2). His reason is clearly that an 'adjectival group' such as very bright can function in the clause as an Attribute in the same way as a nominal group can, e.g., She is very bright /a very bright student. 

However, this decision appears to ignore the fact that such expressions also function very frequently as the modifier in a nominal group, e.g., the underlined portion of three very bright students. In both cases the unit realises the meaning of a quality of a thing — and so not the meaning of a 'thing'. 

It is not clear why, since Halliday is willing to allow the internal structure of this morning "to determine its primary syntactic assignment" (as we saw in Section 10.2.2) the internal structure of very bright should not also be allowed to determine its class of unit. The solution to the problem is clear: we should use the internal syntax and semantics of a unit to determine its class.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not misleading, because it is true.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the internal structure of a unit is irrelevant to the classification of a unit, because this takes the view 'from below' (structural realisation), whereas SFL Theory takes the view 'from above' (the function being realised).

[3] To be clear, in all of the provided examples, very bright functions as the (sub-modified) Epithet of a nominal group:

[4] This is true, but misleading. It is true because the Epithet very bright does realise a Quality, rather than a Thing, but it is misleading to imply that, on Halliday's model, it realises a Thing. Fawcett's confusion derives from his misconstruing the Head of the nominal group very bright as Thing, instead of Epithet.

[5] This is very misleading indeed. As we saw in the examination of Section 10.2.2, in the cited example, Halliday was demonstrating the alternative approach that he himself was not taking.

[6] As demonstrated above, the only problem, in this instance, is Fawcett's inability to understand SFL Theory.

[7] To be clear, as previously explained, classifying units 'from below' ("internal syntax") is inconsistent with the functional principles of SFL Theory. However, classifying units 'from above' (semantics) is entirely consistent with SFL Theory, and it is the method that Halliday adopts. That is, classifying groups according to their function in clause structure is classifying them according to the meaning they realise in the clause. However, contrary to the claim here, this is not the criterion that Fawcett applies, but rather, the criterion he continually rejects.

Fawcett's Claim That The Cardiff Grammar Provides A Much Fuller Account Of Group Functional Structures

 Fawcett (2010: 202):

It is interesting that, despite the fact that the two grammars are based on the same systemic functional principles, they take such a different approach to the grammar of groups. As I have said, the Cardiff Grammar's approach is as it [is] because of our commitment to relating the elements of the syntactic units to their meaning potential in the system networks — and so to the 'conceptual units' of logical form in the belief system. But it also provides a much fuller account of their functional structures, and this may be because the Cardiff Grammar focusses on the analysis of groups as well as clauses — whereas in IFG and the many derived works the emphasis is overwhelmingly on the clause.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As previously noted, for example,

• the Cardiff Grammar is a development of Halliday's pre-Systemic theory, Scale & Category Grammar, as Fawcett himself admits;
• the Cardiff Grammar is a theory of syntax, whereas SFL Theory is not;
• the Cardiff Grammar gives priority to lower orders of abstraction, structure and form, whereas SFL Theory gives priority to higher orders of abstraction, system and function;
• the Cardiff Grammar architecture (Figure 4) is not only inconsistent with the architecture of SFL Theory, it is inconsistent in its own terms;
• the Cardiff Grammar posits a 'belief system' that is realised in language, whereas SFL Theory does not — Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 3) going so far as to describe such a view as 'illusory'.

[2] As previously explained, the Cardiff Grammar views groups 'from below', classifying them according to how they are realised structurally, whereas SFL Theory views groups 'from above', classifying them according to the function they serve at clause rank. Only the latter approach is consistent with the principles of a systemic functional theory of language.

[3] To be clear, if this were true, the Cardiff Grammar would classify groups according to the meanings they realise, instead of according to how they are structured syntagmatically.

[4] As previously noted, Fawcett's use of the term 'meaning potential' confuses the semantic stratum (meaning) with the system pole of the cline of instantiation (language as meaning potential).

[5] Cf Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 2-3):

In modelling the meaning base [semantics] we are building it 'upwards' from the grammar, instead of working 'downwards' from some interpretation of experience couched in conceptual terms, and seen as independent of language. We contend that the conception of 'knowledge' as something that exists independently of language, and may then be coded or made manifest in language, is illusory. All knowledge is constituted in semiotic systems, with language as the most central; and all such representations of knowledge are constructed from language in the first place.

[6] To be clear, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence.

[7] This is very misleading indeed, because, despite Fawcett's implication, SFL Theory gives "a full account" of group structures as well as clause structures. The reasons for the centrality of the clause in SFL Theory are provided by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 10):

The clause is the central processing unit in the lexicogrammar – in the specific sense that it is in the clause that meanings of different kinds are mapped into an integrated grammatical structure. For this reason the first half of this book is organised around the principal systems of the clause: theme, mood and transitivity. In Part II we move outward from the clause, to take account of what happens above and below it – systems of the clause complex, of groups and phrases, and of group and phrase complexes; and also beyond the clause, along other dimensions so to speak.

The perspective moves away from structure to consideration of grammar as system, enabling us to show the grammar as a meaning-making resource and to describe grammatical categories by reference to what they mean. This perspective is essential if the analysis of grammar is to be an insightful mode of entry to the study of discourse.

Fawcett's 'Fetch' Operation

Fawcett (2010: 177-8):

In the Cardiff Grammar, there is a variant of Operation 4, which we shall call Operation 4a. This is the Fetch operation, and it is used to expound items when the item is not an ordinary word in the language that has a 'meaning', but a 'name'. Thus the 'meaning' of Mr White is nothing to do with the colour quality of 'white'. Rather it is something like 'formal', in contrast with Peter, which may be informal'. In order to expound such meanings, e.g., in a computer model of generation, the generation system must consult its 'knowledge' (or, to use a preferable term, its 'beliefs') in order to discover the specific title (realised as Mr, Mrs, Ms, Dr, etc) and family name of the referent, and then 'fetch' the relevant forms for use in the sentence generator. Hence the need to use a different type of operation in the generation of names.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, all wordings realise ("have") meanings.

[2] To be clear, this gives priority to the view 'from below', the expression 'white', rather than the view from 'above', the meaning realised by 'white' (surname vs colour). In SFL Theory, priority is given to to the view 'from above'.

[3] To be clear, 'formal' vs 'informal' does not distinguish the meanings of White vs Peter, but rather the different tenor variables of the situation type (cultural context), enacted by the choice of surname vs forename.

[4] To be clear, this only applies to a computer model of generation, not to the logogenesis of spoken, signed or written texts by flesh-&-blood human beings. Moreover, in SFL Theory, 'knowledge' and 'beliefs' are meanings (the semantic stratum of language).

The Location(s) Of Phonology In Fawcett's Model

Fawcett (2010: 40n):

The Cardiff Grammar recognizes that it is only items that require expression in segmental phonology (which includes inherent word stress). One effect of this is that the two major aspects of phonology — intonation and segmental phonology — are treated as two separate components. They may look like one component when you view language 'from below', but if you look at intonation and segmental phonology 'from above', i.e., from the viewpoint of the meaning potential of the system networks, and if you then ask how meanings are realized in language, it becomes clear that the two are very different from each other: intonation realizing meanings directly, while segmental phonology does not. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] 'Inherent word stress' is not a feature of segmental phonology;  but see [2].

[2] The main theoretical disadvantage of treating intonation and segmental phonology as "two separate components" is that it omits rhythm from the model, since 'inherent word stress' is insufficient to account for the rich diversity of speech rhythms and the lexicogrammatical distinctions they realise.  The inclusion of rhythm is necessary for the modelling of intonation, since tone groups are realised by feet, and the ictus of each foot identifies the elements of potential tonic prominence, which in turn identifies the focus of New information.

[3] This misunderstands Halliday's 'trinocular perspective'.  It not possible to look at language 'from below', because there is no level of symbolic abstraction below language.

[4] To be clear, looking at phonology 'from above' means looking at it in terms of its function in various contexts (Halliday 2008: 141), as the expression of some content (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 504).

[5] To be clear, looking at 'how meanings are realised' — i.e. in terms of its various modes of expression — is looking at 'meaning from below' (Halliday 2008: 141).

[6] The claim here is:

• if you view meaning in terms of how it is realised,
• (then) it becomes clear that intonation realises meaning directly while segmental phonology does not.

This is not a reasoned argument, since no reasons are provided in support of the conclusion.  It is merely a bare assertion that has been dressed up to look like reasoning through the use of a conditional relation.  The advantages of such a model, to the theory as a whole, need to be both identified and supported by reasoned argument.

What Fawcett Means By 'Form'

Fawcett (2010: 39):

We turn now to the level of form — and it is at this level that we require a theory of syntax. The term "form" is used here in a wider sense than that in "Categories" (or indeed any of Halliday's later writings) because it includes, as well as syntax and grammatical and lexical items, components for intonation or punctuation (depending on whether the medium is speech or writing). This is an approach to the concept of 'form' that looks at language 'from above', i.e., intonation and punctuation are here considered to be types of 'form' because, like syntax and items, they directly realize meanings.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in Fawcett's model, content (syntax and grammatical and lexical items) and expression (intonation or punctuation) are located at the same level of symbolic abstraction.  The distinction between content and expression, as different levels of symbolic abstraction, is the fundamental distinction in semiotic systems.

[2] This misunderstands Halliday's 'trinocular' perspective.  On the SFL model, to look at language 'from above' means observing in terms of its function in various cultural contexts.  Halliday (2008: 141):

When we are observing and investigating language, or any other semiotic system, our vision is essentially trinocular. We observe the phenomenon we want to explore — say, the lexicogrammar of language — from three points of vantage. We observe it from above, in terms of its function in various contexts. We observe it from below, in terms of its various modes of expression. And thirdly, we observe it from its own level: from within, or from round about, according to whether we are focussing on the whole or some of its parts.

On the other hand, it is not possible to look at form 'from below' — i.e. as the content of some expression — because form is the lowest level of symbolic abstraction.  There is no lower level from which to look at form.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 504):

A stratified semiotic defines three perspectives, which (following the most familiar metaphor) we refer to as ‘from above’, ‘from roundabout’, and ‘from below’: looking at a given stratum from above means treating it as the expression of some content, looking at it from below means treating it as the content of some expression, while looking at it from roundabout means treating it in the context of (i.e. in relation to other features of) its own stratum.