The Fourth Fundamental Category Of The Cardiff Grammar: Place

Fawcett (2010: 279):

A fourth category that is required in the present theory is that of place, in the sense of the numbered position (or 'slot') in a unit at which an element is positioned. Interestingly, Halliday refers in passing to 'place' in "Categories", but it is not presented as a significant category, and nor is it given any role in his later work. Yet this concept has come to play an essential role in the generative versions of SF grammar — especially in providing the conceptual framework, with 'class of unit' and 'element of structure', for explaining the phenomenon known as 'raising' (as noted in Section 11.7 of Chapter 11). The first appearance of the concept of 'place' in the sense defined here was in Fawcett (1973/81) and it was later described formally in Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993). However, the concept was also used, it appears, in Mann and Matthiessen's computer implementation of Halliday's grammar (as explained in Section 10.4.2 of Chapter 10).

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[1] This is potentially misleading, because Halliday (1961) and Fawcett do not mean the same thing by 'place'. For Fawcett (p279) 'place' refers to

…the numbered position (or 'slot') in a unit at which an element is positioned.

For Halliday (2002 [1961]: 46):

A structure is thus an arrangement of elements ordered in places. Places are distinguished by order alone: a structure XXX consists of three places. Different elements, on the other hand, are distinguished by some relation other than that of order: a structure XYZ consists of three elements which are (and must be, to form a structure) place-ordered, though they can be listed (X, Y, Z) as an inventory of elements making up the particular structure.

[2] This is misleading. The only "generative versions of SF Grammar" that feature Fawcett's concept of 'place' are those of Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar.

[3] See the previous post The Key Rôle Of 'Place' In Handling 'Raising' Phenomena.

[4] To be clear, Fawcett has produced no evidence that Mann & Matthiessen used his concept of 'place' in the Penman Project. But, in any case, the functionality of an adaptation of a theory to the limitations of computers is not an argument for its incorporation into a theory of human language.