Misrepresenting 'Filling' As An Alternative To The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 336-7, 337n):

Even if we set aside the case for abolishing the 'verbal group' set out in the last section, as well as the more general evidence of the value of a description of English such as that summarised in Appendix B, it is surprising that the evidence produced by Matthews, Huddleston and others summarised above has not persuaded Halliday to reconsider the status of the 'rank scale' concept.  

After all, it is clear that the strongest claim that can be made for it is that it characterises a tendency towards a pattern to which there are in fact a great many exceptions.  

One sometimes gets the impression that support for the 'rank scale' is maintained simply because of a general perception that 'there is no alternative'.²¹ 

But there now is an alternative: a simple unordered set of classes of unit, each of which is capable of filling several elements of one or more higher units, as presented in Section 10.2 of Chapter 10.

²¹ This is the 'TINA' attitude to change that is close to the heart of many a right-wing politician — and so not, one would assume, Halliday's.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the reason why the evidence produced by Matthews, Huddleston and others have not persuaded Halliday to reconsider the rank scale concept is that the evidence is no evidence at all, since it derives from theoretical misunderstandings, as demonstrated in previous posts.

[2] This is misleading. The rank scale is one of two ways of modelling formal constituency — the other being immediate constituent analysis (Halliday 1994: 20-8). In SFL Theory, it is the means of modelling morphology and syntax, which is why it leaves no room for Fawcett's 'functional syntax', which is why Fawcett is motivated to argue against its theoretical value. The theoretical value of the rank scale includes the fact that it identifies the entry conditions for networks at each rank, and, in doing so, identifies the formal units to which meanings are assigned.

[3] To be clear, this is a false impression, since the alternative to ranked constituent analysis (minimal bracketing) is immediate constituent analysis (maximal bracketing), as explained in Halliday (1994: 20-8).

[4] To be clear, as previously explained, Fawcett's notion of 'filling' is no alternative to the rank scale, because it is concerned with form-function relations, not with form-form relations (constituency). On the other hand, Fawcett's notion of 'higher' — and therefore 'lower' — units discloses the fact that his model ranks units on a scale from high to low.

[5] To be clear, Fawcett here invites the reader to associate the attitude he falsely attributes to Halliday, a lifelong communist, with the attitude of right-wing politicians. This is achieved textually by the punctuation, which places tonic prominence on the word 'assume', thereby making it the Focus of New information, and interpersonally through the most likely tone, tone 4, which expresses 'reservation' in declarative MOOD.

Problems With Treating Verbal Group Elements As Clause Elements

 Fawcett (2010: 334):

The paper demonstrates that the solution to these problems is to treat all of the elements of the supposed 'verbal group' as direct elements of the clause, as is done in the Cardiff Grammar. Indeed, to do so is simply to carry through to its logical conclusion the change already initiated by Halliday in promoting the Finite to function as an element of the clause (a change that in fact dates back to Halliday 1967:218), and echoed in his treatment of off as an Adjunct in They called the meeting off.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is a very problematic non-solution to (previously demonstrated) non-problems. In SFL Theory, the verbal group is the entry condition for the recursive system of TENSE, which is realised by a univariate structure. Fawcett's proposal would insert a univariate structure into part of the multivariate structure of a clause — the clause itself having no univariate structure. Moreover, such a proposal would transfer all the systems of the verbal group to the clause, even though they do not apply to the clause as a whole. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 410):

[2] This is misleading. The Finite operator was not "promoted" to clause structure; it is theorised as a functional element of both the clause and verbal group. The remaining multivariate structure elements of the verbal group, Polarity, Auxiliary and Event, on the other hand, operate only at group rank, with the Event, and any others present, corresponding to the Predicator at clause rank':

Accordingly, "promoting" these other verbal group elements to clause rank would not be a "logical conclusion".

[3] To be clear, the adverb off is irrelevant to matters concerning the verbal group because it serves as the Head element of an adverbial group, not as an element of a verbal group.

Fawcett's Claim That Phrasal Verbs Undermine The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 334):

In a rather similar manner, Halliday analyses the word off in They will call the meeting off as an Adjunct in IFG, i.e., as an element of the clause rather than as an element of the 'verbal group'. Yet we might have expected him to have analysed it as an element of the 'verbal group' since it is the co-realisation, with call, of the meaning of the single Process of 'calling off', and called is unequivocally an element of the 'verbal group' in IFG.

Blogger Comments:

 [1] This is not misleading, because it is true. See IFG (Halliday 1994: 208) on the phrasal verb as Process rather than Process + circumstance.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the reason why the word  off is not analysed as realising an element of the verbal group is that it serves no function in the verbal group. Instead, the word off is analysed as an adverb that serves as the Head element of an adverbial group.

Fawcett's Claim That The Finite Operator Undermines The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 333-4):

Interestingly, none of the previous critics of the concept of the 'rank scale' (except Hudson 1971, implicitly) have discussed the role of the 'verbal group' as either supporting or undermining the concept of the 'rank scale'. Yet the reasons for abolishing the 'verbal group' and promoting its elements to function as elements of the clause are so persuasive that this set of reasons alone is sufficient to cause one to re-think the viability of the concept of 'accountability at all ranks', and so the 'rank scale' itself. In the present section, therefore, I shall provide an outline of the argument set out in my two-part paper "In place of Halliday's 'verbal group'" (Fawcett 2000 and forthcoming b).

Part 1 begins by pointing out a number of inconsistencies, from the functional viewpoint, in the way in which Halliday labels the elements of his 'verbal group' in IFG. It then demonstrates the way in which these problems are resolved in the alternative approach taken in the Cardiff Grammar.

The most obvious of these inconsistencies is the way in which IFG presents the Finite (which is very roughly equivalent to the Cardiff Grammar's Operator). At one point (p. 72) Halliday describes the Finite as "part of the verbal group [my emphasis]", while at another (p. 79) he says that "the predicator ... is realised by a verbal group minus the Finite [my emphasis]". And the Finite is in fact shown in the analyses of clauses throughout IFG as part of the more delicate of the two analyses of 'interpersonal' meaning in the clause, i.e., as an element of the clause. (However, if it really is to be modelled an element of the clause as well as an element of the 'verbal group', this would bring horrendous problems in its train for a generative SF grammar.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the reason why critics of the rank scale have not cited the verbal group in their arguments is that it neither supports nor undermines the rank scale. The verbal group is merely the outcome of modelling formal constituency as a rank scale wherein clauses consist of groups.

[2] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, Fawcett's argument against the verbal group with regard to the rank scale confuses form with function. In SFL Theory, the value of the verbal group includes the fact that it is the entry condition for the recursive system of TENSE.

[3] To be clear, the Finite operator is a functional element, not a formal constituent, and is thus irrelevant to the rank scale as a way of modelling formal constituency.

[4] This is not misleading, because it is true.

[5] To be clear, this is yet another bare assertion, unsupported by argument.

"The Generalisations That Halliday Gives Up"

Fawcett (2010: 333):

M&M make many valuable points in their "Response to Huddleston". The main weakness in the case that they present in the sections of their "Response" summarised above is this: they do not show how the generalisations that Halliday gives up in order to foreground the similarities between the 'hypotactic' and 'paratactic' analyses are to be handled in the grammar. If M&M are to 'defend' the position taken in IFG successfully, they need to address this question. But perhaps there should be less 'attacking' and 'defending', and more accepting of genuine 'problem examples', together with more exploring of comprehensive solutions to such problems, in the framework of a multi-component model?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday does not "give up" any generalisations in "foregrounding the similarities" of hypotaxis and parataxis. On the contrary, the distinction between hypotaxis and parataxis provides a generalisation, the system of TAXIS (interdependency), which Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar lacks. Importantly, the distinction between interdependency and embedding provides a more detailed specification of the different types of grammatical environments in which the generalised meanings of expansion and projection are manifested.

[2] To be clear, it is Fawcett who chooses to construe M&M's 'Response To Huddleston" in terms of 'attacking' and 'defending', the former being his own preferred modus operandi.

[3] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, the 'problem examples' that have been presented by Huddleston and Fawcett are not genuine 'problem examples' when examined with a sufficient grasp of SFL Theory.

Misrepresenting An Argument Against Parataxis As An Argument Against Hypotaxis

Fawcett (2010: 331):

In the second part of their case, M&M suggest a second analysis of Huddleston's example, i.e., as two co-ordinated clauses with ellipsis in the second, thus: He left before the debate or (he left) (at least) before the vote was taken. But again, I am afraid, I have to point out a problem. While their analysis appears at first to be another possible one, we need to take account of the fact that one can insert either to the left of before the debate, so that it becomes He left either before the debate or (at least) before the vote was taken. And this fact demonstrates clearly that the grammar must allow for the possibility of generating the prepositional group and the clause as jointly filling an Adjunct.

Thus M&M suggest that two possible analyses should be allowed (the first being Huddleston's and mine). They therefore do not address the question of which of the two is systemically preferable, and why. Moreover, Huddleston's criticism of IFG stands. In other words, he is right that Halliday's decision to treat all clauses embedded directly in clauses as 'hypotaxis' means that the Sydney Grammar cannot handle examples such as Huddleston's.

Finally, to demonstrate that Huddleston's example is not a 'special case', consider the following example with a simple 'additive' Linker: On average, people died earlier in those days, both from diseases such as diphtheria and because they worked such dreadfully long hours. Notice that here (as in Huddleston's example) the item both prevents the M&M analysis in terms of two co-ordinated clauses with ellipsis. The conclusion, then, must be that we should treat all such 'beta' clauses as embedded clauses. … Withe respect to the areas of the grammar described here, then, M&M fail to rebut Huddleston's critical comments. 

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is an argument about parataxis, and as such, not relevant to the question of hypotaxis. Moreover, this being the case, it could be equally directed against Fawcett's model of co-ordination.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, Huddleston's criticism does not stand, with regard to hypotaxis, because it is an argument about parataxis. On the other hand, SFL Theory (IFG, Halliday) does not treat all such "embedded" clauses as hypotaxis. By distinguishing between embedding (rankshift) and hypotaxis, SFL Theory provides such explanatory advantages as distinguishing between

• defining relative clauses (embedded) and non-defining relative clauses (dependent), and
• pre-projected facts (embedded) and reported projections (dependent).

The conclusion, then, is the distinction between rankshifted and dependent clauses has explanatory advantages over the lack of distinction.

Fawcett's Argument On Hypotaxis vs Embedding [6]

 Fawcett (2010: 328-9):

If we put this evidence together with that of my alternative analyses of the examples of Halliday's ten major categories for 'paratactic' and 'hypotactic' relations between clauses (as set out in Section 11.9 of Chapter 11), we have two separate pieces of evidence that the grammar should not in fact foreground the contrast between 'parataxis' vs. 'hypotaxis' as a system that is to be entered simultaneously with one for 'expansion' vs. 'projection', etc. 

The alternative is that each type of 'co-ordination' and each type of 'dependence' should be modelled in terms of the systemic choices that are available to it, so avoiding the ever present temptation to the grammarian, i.e., that of modifying the description to conform to the theory.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, neither of these constitute evidence about the system of TAXIS (parataxis vs hypotaxis). The argument Fawcett has just made relies on misrepresenting expressions of systemic features as systemic features (see the preceding five posts), and his alternative analyses in Section 11.9 are merely presented rather than supported by argument; see:

• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic And Paratactic Projection
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic Extension And Enhancement
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic "Elaboration"
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Paratactic Expansion
• Summary Of How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotaxis And Parataxis

[2] To be clear, this is precisely how the two types of interdependency — parataxis ("co-ordination") and hypotaxis ("dependence") — are modelled in SFL Theory, in conjunction with the systems of LOGICO-SEMANTIC TYPE and RECURSION. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 438):

[3] To be clear, it is not the description that is at risk of being modified so as to conform to theory, but the data that is described in terms of a theory. More importantly, Fawcett's insinuation here is that Halliday has succumbed to the temptation of intellectual dishonesty.

Fudging The Data

 Fawcett (2010: 326):

(I have slightly altered the wording of Huddleston's examples to create 'minimal pairs' that make the relevant contrasts fully explicit.)

(1a) He left the room before they voted. 

(2a) He left the room before the vote. 

(3a) He left the room, then they voted.

Huddleston's grammatical analysis of (la) — which is broadly similar to mine — is to treat it as a single clause in which the embedded clause before they voted functions as an Adjunct that identifies the 'time position' of the event of 'leaving' by relating it to an event that is already known to the addressee (the 'voting' event), in the same way that before the vote does in (2a). Indeed, Halliday and M&M would agree with Huddleston and me that, when the event of 'voting' is nominalised as in (2a), it serves this function and is therefore an Adjunct. So why, we might ask, do they not also treat before they voted in (la) as an Adjunct? Essentially, their approach is to interpret (la) as a relating of two events (rather than as a 'main' event that is located in time by relating it to another event) — and to claim that this 'relating' can be achieved either 'paratactically', as in (3a), or 'hypotactically' as in the second interpretation of (la).

Blogger Comments:

In SFL Theory, the three instances are analysed as follows:

[1] This is misleading, on two counts. On the one hand, Fawcett's slight alteration of the data does not create 'minimal pairs', and on the other hand, it does not make the relevant contrasts fully explicit. Instead, the contrast it makes explicit is one of time: 'earlier' ((1a) and (1b)) vs 'later' (1c), which is the irrelevant to the distinction between hypotaxis and embedding.

[2] To be clear, this is bare assertion unsupported by reasoned argument.

[3] This is not misleading, because it is essentially true.

Agreeing With Huddleston's Conclusion

Fawcett (2010: 324):

There is much in Huddleston's review, therefore, with which I disagree. However, it will be clear that I share his conclusion that most of the uses to which 'hypotaxis' has been put by Halliday are better handled by a simple embedding relationship (but one by co-ordination; see Section 11.9 of Chapter 11). And I also share his view (though for a set of reasons that only partly overlap with his) that "the constraints this [i.e., the requirement of 'accountability at all ranks'] imposes on the grammar have numerous unsatisfactory consequences" (Huddleston 1988:141). Indeed, I would also agree with his statement (though again for reasons that only partly overlap with his) that

the unsatisfactory nature of the constituent structures given in [IFG] derives in very large measure from their foundation in rank theory. (Huddleston 1988:155)

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, agreeing with someone's conclusion is not reasoned argument. Fawcett has still not provided Huddleston's actual argument, and it is clear from previous posts that Fawcett does not understand hypotaxis, especially with regard to how unit complexes relate to the rank scale.

The rhetorical purpose of providing Huddleston's conclusion before providing his argument is to prime the reader to prejudge the argument through prior alignment with the conclusion.

Misrepresenting Halliday As Theoretically Inconsistent And Intellectually Dishonest

Fawcett (2010: 323n):

¹⁶ As with many other concepts, the idea that all groups can be handled as word complexes is one for which at least some support can be gleaned from Halliday's writings (e.g., "a group is in some respects equivalent to a word complex (IFG pp. 179-80), and "a group is the expansion of a word" (p. 180). Indeed, Halliday sometimes gives the concept of a group as a word complex more weight than the concept of a group as the expression of a semantic unit with its own set of functional elements. One clear case is his treatment of quality groups when they fill the modifier in a nominal group, as in the case of very small in some very small ones (IFG pp. 192 and 194). Thus very small is said to be a 'complex' of two words that are 'hypotactically related' rather than a group of words. Yet the same words would be a group for Halliday if they filled a Complement, as in The egg was very small. We can guess that the reason why he adopts this somewhat inconsistent position is that it at least has the virtue (from his viewpoint but not mine) that it avoids having to recognise such examples as yet another cased of the unwanted phenomenon of 'rank shift' — which, if acknowledged, would be further evidence against the concept of the 'rank scale'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading in a trivial way. The idea that all groups can be handled as word complexes does not find "at least some support" in Halliday's writings; it is Halliday's model.

[2] To be clear, with the nominal group, which is Fawcett's chief concern, Halliday gives equal weight to the logical ("word complex") and experiential ("its own set of functional elements") structures. With the verbal group, which is lacking from Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar, the logical structure is of greater value, because it 'embodies the single most important semantic feature of the English verb, its recursive tense system' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 398). It is the groups that are of no concern to Fawcett — adverbial, conjunction, preposition — that are structured only logically.

[3] To be clear, the (ideational) semantic unit that is realised by the group is the element: participant, process, circumstance, relator; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 177-226).

[4] To be clear, quality groups do not feature in Halliday's model.

[5] This is misleading. In such instances, very small  is a subcomplex within the logical structure of the nominal group, corresponding to the Epithet in the experiential structure. Halliday (1994: 194):

To be clear, very small is a "group of words", but in this instance, it does not constitute an entire nominal group (of words).

[6] To be clear, in this instance, very small  is once again a subcomplex within the logical structure of the nominal group, once again corresponding to the Epithet in the experiential structure. The difference in this case is that the Epithet conflates with the Head of a nominal group with no Modifier:

In a functional grammar, where the view is 'from above', it is the function of words that is criterial, not the words as forms ("the same words").

[7] This is misleading, because Halliday does not adopt an inconsistent position, as demonstrated above. Once again, as throughout this book, Fawcett has falsely assumed that he correctly understands Halliday's model.

[8] This is misleading on three counts. Firstly, both examples involve internal bracketing, not rankshift, and so the question of recognising rankshift does not arise. Secondly, rankshift is not an "unwanted phenomenon"; for example, it provides a systematic explanation of how the complexity of written language (lexical density) is brought about. Thirdly, rankshift is not "evidence against the concept of the rank scale" because it is consistent with the notion of a rank scale, with the rank scale providing the yardstick by which to identify the shift.

But it must be said, the really nasty thing here is that Fawcett has falsely accused Halliday of intellectual dishonesty: of trying to conceal what Fawcett wrongly claims to be a problem for the model. In this book of 12 chapters, only 3 were devoted to expounding Fawcett's model, but all 12 were devoted to misrepresenting Halliday's model in a way that favoured Fawcett's argument for his own model.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1965) On Hypotaxis

Fawcett (2010: 321):

Finally, we should note that the position taken by Halliday himself on this issue is exploratory rather than dogmatic. He writes that "hypotaxis is in some ways intermediate between parataxis and [...] rankshift; in fact all hypotaxis could be regarded as rankshift" (1965/81:40). And over twenty years later (IFG p. 216) he introduces this aspect of his model with hedging expressions such as "the tendency is [...]", "we shall assume [...]", "we shall interpret [...]".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday takes a scientific approach by proposing hypotheses and then providing arguments to demonstrate why and how such hypotheses are valuable.

[2] This is deliberately misleading through selective omission — the logical fallacy known as contextonomy.  What Halliday (1981 [1965]) actually wrote in this pre-Systemic paper was the following: 

Hypotaxis is in some ways intermediate between parataxis and multivariate structure involving rankshift; in fact all hypotaxis could be regarded as rankshift, although this would result in very different bracketing of constituents and would obscure the important respects in which hypotaxis differs from rankshift and resembles parataxis. We may summarise the types of structure dealt with as follows:

Fawcett's Argument Against Expansion And Projection

Fawcett (2010: 321n):

¹² Many of those who accept Halliday's approach to 'paratactic' and 'hypotactic' relations in structure would claim that the categorisations of relations between clauses (and other units) into 'projection' and 'expansion' (and then of the latter into 'elaboration', 'extension' and 'enhancement') are independently self-justifying. But there are in fact different ways of analysing all of these phenomena that many others, including myself, consider to be more insightful. See Section 11.9 of Chapter 11 and Fawcett (1996) and (in press) for examples of these.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because no-one who understands Halliday's model — including its epistemological assumptions — would claim that the logico-semantic relations of expansion and projection are "independently self-justifying". To be clear, the theoretical value of these distinctions lies in their explanatory potential, which is substantial. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 127) point out:

expansion and projection are trans-phenomenal categories in the sense that they are manifested over the system as a whole — not merely in different logical environments across ranks but also experientially.

For example, expansion and projection are manifested in relational processes:

• elaboration as intensive,
• extension as possessive, and
• enhancement and projection as circumstantial.

Similarly, expansion and projection are manifested in circumstances:

• elaboration as Role,
• extension as Accompaniment,
• enhancement as Extent, Location, Manner, Cause, Contingency, and
• projection as Matter, Angle.

Moreover, expansion is manifested in the textual systems of cohesive conjunction and lexical cohesion. In the case of the latter:

• elaboration is manifested as repetition, synonymy, hyponymy,
• extension is manifested as meronymy, and
• enhancement is manifested as collocation (in many cases).

See also Table 10-3 in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 670-2).

[2] To be clear, this is a bare assertion unsupported by argument.

[3] To be clear, Section 11.9, How embedding and co-ordination can replace 'hypotaxis' and 'parataxis', clearly has considerably less explanatory potential than the logico-semantic relations of expansion and projection (see [1]). Moreover, clarifications and critiques of the section can again be viewed here:

• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic And Paratactic Projection
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic Extension And Enhancement
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic "Elaboration"
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Paratactic Expansion
• Summary Of How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotaxis And Parataxis

[4] To be clear, Fawcett (in press) is still unpublished 21 tears after the first edition of this volume.

Seriously Misrepresenting Huddleston On Univariate Structure

Fawcett (2010: 320-1):

The above argument goes rather further in exploring the implications for the concept of the 'rank scale' of Halliday's proposals than does Huddleston's review, perhaps in part because he concentrates on different matters (relations between words and groups, and issues of left and right branching). While I shall not attempt to summarise these here, I shall cite his interesting concluding words. These deserve attention because he was, as we noted in Section 5.1 of Chapter 5, one of the small team (with Halliday, Hudson and Henrici) who worked on these problems in the 1960s. Indeed, it was Huddleston who wrote one of the key S&C papers on this topic (Huddleston 1965/81). Since he was so closely involved, we should give due weight to his statement that

historically, the layered univariate structure was introduced in the context of an attempt to solve certain problems stemming from the total accountability requirement of the rank model. [...] "The problems we have been discussing [layering in 'paratactic' and 'hypotactic' structures] are created by the [rank scale] model". (Huddleston 1988:151)

The clear implication of this revealing statement is that the purpose of introducing the concepts of 'paratactic' and 'hypotactic' relations in structure to the theory was less their inherent insightfulness than to shore up the ailing concept of the 'rank scale'. This is therefore secondary evidence for the position taken here, i.e., that the concept of the 'rank scale' is ultimately not a useful one. Moreover we now have a replacement for it, i.e., the concept of a set of units, each of which is capable of filling several elements of one or more higher units in a tree representation, supplemented for text analysis by filling probabilities.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's exploration of the implications on the rank scale proceeds from misunderstandings of unit complexes with regard to the rank scale.

[2] Again, to cite a conclusion without the argument on which it is based is a fallacious use of the argument from authority (argumentum ad verecundiam).

[3] This is very misleading indeed. Huddleston's point is that if a rank scale is assumed, then total accountability at all ranks entails layered univariate structures in the model.  Fawcett misrepresents this as meaning univariate structures were devised primarily as an attempt "to shore up the ailing concept of the rank scale".

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Fawcett has merely misrepresented Huddleston — see [3] — in a way that agrees with his desires.

[5] To be clear, Fawcett ranks his units on a scale from higher to lower, but denies that his model includes a rank scale.

The Case Of The Missing Unit Complexes

Fawcett (2010: 320, 320n):

Is there any reason why Halliday should not include in his representations the 'unit-complexes' that the description implies? The reason why he does not address this question is, I would guess, that the additions to the 'rank scale' that such structures imply would threaten its viability because of the unacceptable quantity of 'singulary branching' that the maintenance of the principle of 'accountability at all ranks' would introduce. They are therefore unwelcome in Halliday's theory, both as 'units on the rank scale' and as the representation of such units on paper.¹⁰

¹⁰ A possible alternative answer might in principle be that, while this would suit 'hypotactic' structures quite well, it would not suit 'paratactic' structures, because co-ordination does not involve a 'modifier-head' relationship (as is recognised in all theories). However, given Halliday's view of the centrality of the 'rank scale' in the theory, it seems more likely that the reason suggested in the main text is the right one.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In all his representations Halliday does include the unit complexes that the description makes explicit ("implies"). For example, in the following representation (Halliday 1994: 216), the unit complex that is "included" is the clause complex:

[2] To be clear, one possible reason why Halliday does not address this question is that, because he writes at a level to be comprehensible to an intelligent 12-year-old, he would be justified in assuming that, for most readers, the question would not arise.

Misunderstanding The Place Of Unit Complexes On The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 319):

However, it makes little difference which way one decides on this matter, because my essential point stands in either case. This is that the effect on the concept of the 'rank scale' of introducing 'parataxis' and 'hypotaxis' is that it greatly increases the number of units on the 'rank scale'. Indeed, since in Halliday's model there can be unit complexes of both the 'paratactic' and the 'hypotactic' types above each basic unit, the number of units on the 'rank scale' is increased to at least twelve. Moreover, since either the 'paratactic' or the 'hypotactic' structure may come above the other (or indeed between two instances of the other) there may be even more layers still. The model with which Halliday's account of 'univariate' structures leaves us is therefore one which has, in principle, potentially very many layers of unit complexes (either 'paratactic' or 'hypotactic' or both) above each of the four basic 'units' of the 'rank scale'.

Blogger Comments:

As previously explained, this is misleading because it is untrue. Parataxis and hypotaxis are relations that obtain between units in unit complexes at one of the four ranks of the rank scale. Here Fawcett explicitly demonstrates the extent to which he does not understand either the rank scale or taxis.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Hypotactic Structures

Fawcett (2010: 319):

I should add, however, that Halliday would probably not agree that every additional element in a 'hypotactic' unit complex (after the first two) adds a new layer of structure — even though diagrams such as those referred to above clearly imply that they do. In Halliday (1965/81:34) he says that "a hypotactic structure is better thought of as a chain of dependencies". Indeed, 'box diagrams' such as those in the lower halves of Figures 7-2 and 7-3 on p. 217 of IFG show the elements "α β γ" as a set of adjacent symbols — so implying that they are all elements of the same unit. This in turn raises the question of whether it is possible to have a recursive 'modifier-head' relationship between three elements α, β and γ, because the β element has to function as both a head (to γ) and a modifier (to α), which is arguably illogical. Halliday certainly intends this interpretation (1965/81:36), but I find his reasons for its desirability unpersuasive, and I would analyse all of his examples in terms of embedding.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true that the diagrams — in Halliday (1994: 216-9) — imply that a complex with more than two units necessarily entails what Fawcett calls 'an additional layer of structure'. Clause complexes may be simply linear — e.g. α β γ — but they may involve the nesting of sub-complexes with the complex. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 442):

Many clause complexes are linear sequences … But we also often find internal bracketing, or nesting. This is where what is being linked by a logico-semantic relation is not a single clause but rather a ‘subcomplex’ – a clause nexus in its own right.

We can show nesting in either of two ways. (i) The nesting can be represented explicitly as internal bracketing – e.g. 1 ^ 2(α ^ β); (ii) or it can be represented as a simple string – e.g. 1 ^ 2α ^ 2β.

[2] To be clear, Figures 7-2 and 7-3 both represent instances of nesting:

[3] To be clear, there is no "implication" here. The α β γ symbols in Figures 7-2 and 7-3 symbolise the hypotactic structure of a subcomplex within each clause complex. Each symbol categorises a clause (unit) in the clause (unit) complex. This demonstrates again that Fawcett does not understand hypotactic structures or their diagrammatic representations.

[4] To be clear, the structure α β γ is a "recursive modifier-head relationship". In a linear α β γ clause complex, the dominant α is Head and the dependent units are Modifier. Halliday (1994: 216):

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue that Halliday intends Fawcett's misinterpretation. In a linear structure, there is no Head-Modifier relation within the Modifier. This only occurs when the Modifier itself is a nested subcomplex, as illustrated in Figures 7-2 and 7-3. It is clear from this that Fawcett does understand the notion of nesting in complexes.

[6] Clearly, Fawcett is unpersuaded by Halliday's argument because he does not understand his model of hypotactic structures, as demonstrated above. This incomprehension explains why Fawcett would analyse all of Halliday's examples in terms of embedding.

Seriously Misrepresenting Halliday On Unit Complexes

Fawcett (2010: 318, 318n):

However, so far as the two 'rank scale' concepts of (1) 'accountability at all ranks' and (2) 'rank shift' are concerned, Halliday treats the 'unit complexes' as if they were not part of the 'rank scale'. He does not consider, therefore, that every clause should be analysed as serving a function in a clause complex, that every group should be seen as filling an element in a group complex, and so on. (And yet, as we shall shortly see, this is precisely what he does say, at some points.) Although he does not state in IFG why it is undesirable to treat 'unit complexes' as 'units' on the 'rank scale', we can infer that the reason is the additional layers of 'singulary branching' that would occur — because one of his reasons for introducing 'hypotaxis' in 1965 was to avoid the "somewhat artificial increase in 'depth' in number of layers [introduced by embedding]." ⁸

⁸ A defender of Halliday's position might be tempted to offer a modified model of the standard column of units on the 'rank scale', in which each type of unit complex was placed beside its equivalent basic unit rather than above it. But this would not resolve the problem, because it would leave the relationship between a 'unit' and its equivalent 'unit complex' undefined. There is in fact no alternative, in Halliday's framework, to accepting unit complexes as additional units on the 'rank scale'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is the opposite of what is true. In SFL Theory, a clause complex is a complex of clauses, and 'clause' is a unit on the rank scale; a group complex is a complex of groups, and 'group' is a unit on the rank scale; etc.

[2] This is misleading. On the one hand, in SFL Theory, clauses in a clause complex do not function as elements of a clause complex because a clause complex is not a higher rank than the clause. Likewise, groups do not function as ("fill") elements of a group complex because a group complex is not a higher rank than the group.

On the other hand, in SFL Theory, a secondary clause in a clause complex functions either as an expansion of the primary clause in terms of elaboration, extension or enhancement or as a projection of it. Likewise, a secondary group in a group complex functions either as an expansion of the primary group in terms of elaboration, extension or enhancement or as a projection of it.

[3] This is misleading, because here Fawcett falsely implies an inconsistency in IFG where there is none.

[4] To be clear, Halliday frequently advised his students to write at a level that could be understood by an intelligent 12-year-old. We can infer from this that he assumed that an intelligent 12-year-old would understand that a unit complex is a complex of rank scale units.

[5] This is not only irrelevant, given the above, but also misleading. In this pre-Systemic paper, there can be no singulary branching in hypotactic structures. Halliday (2002 [1965]: 235):

In constituent terms, all hypotactic structures can in fact be represented as binary; that is, as having no more than two constituents at a single layer.

[6] This is very misleading indeed, because the quote from Halliday (1965) is not concerned either with Halliday's reason for introducing hypotaxis or with embedding. The "somewhat artificial increase in 'depth' in number of layers" is a disadvantage that results from treating hypotactic structures 'as having no more than two constituents in a single layer' (see [5]). And it is for this reason that Halliday (2002 [1965]: 235) instead proposes:

In the present analysis, hypotactic structures are not being treated as exclusively binary, but are considered as capable of extension on one layer as well as by layering one within another.

[7] As previously explained, unit complexes are complexes of units located on the rank scale. A clause complex is a univariate structure at the rank of clause.

[8] To be clear, in SFL Theory, there is no "relationship" between a unit and its equivalent unit complex, except in the tautological sense that one is a complex of the other. On the other hand, units in a unit complex are related in terms of interdependency and logico-semantic types.

[9] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The alternative "to accepting unit complexes as additional units on the 'rank scale' " is simply understanding that unit complexes are complexes of rank scale units.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Unit Complexes

 Fawcett (2010: 318):

Firstly, then, we need to note that in Halliday's current model any such "unit complex" is located above the equivalent "basic unit" on the 'rank scale'. (These terms were introduced by Huddleston himself, in his important contribution in Huddleston 1965/81:46.) In other words, Halliday's model states 

(1) that above the clause there is the 'clause complex' (the term "sentence" being permitted as an equivalent when referring to written rather than spoken text); 

(2) that between the clause and the group/phrase there is the 'group/phrase complex'; 

(3) that between the group/phrase and the word there is the 'word complex'; and 

(4) that between the word and the morpheme there is the 'morpheme complex'. 

In principle, then, the introduction of 'unit complexes' to the theory doubles the number of 'units' on the 'rank scale'. Moreover, there is no doubt that a unit complex is a type of 'unit' in Halliday's theory, because he refers to it as a 'unit' — writing, for example, that "the clause complex is the only grammatical unit that we shall recognise above the clause" (IFG p. 216).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true. A unit complex is the structural relation of units at the rank of the unit:

• a clause complex is the structural relation of units at clause rank;
• a group/phrase complex is the structural relation of units at group/phrase rank;
• a word complex is the structural relation of units at word rank; and
• a morpheme complex is the structural relation of units at morpheme rank.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, sentence is a unit on the stratum of graphology, not lexicogrammar. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 436):

… the clause complex is realised graphologically as a ‘sentence’, in the way that this has evolved, over the centuries, as a unit in the written language. The sentence is the highest unit of punctuation on the graphological rank scale and has evolved in the writing system to represent the clause complex as the most extensive domain of grammatical structure. We will use the term sentence to refer only to this highest-ranking graphological unit of punctuation.

[3] This is misleading, because it is not true. As explained above, unit complexes are located at the rank of the units in the complex.

[4] To be clear, a unit complex is a unit in the sense of unit with univariate structure.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a clause complex is not 'above' the clause in terms of the rank scale, as demonstrated, for example, by the location of the clause complexing system at clause rank; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 438):

Misrepresenting Halliday On Layers Of Structure

Fawcett (2010: 317, 317n):

Secondly, Huddleston discusses in considerable detail certain problems that result from the concept of 'layered univariate structures' within 'parataxis' and 'hypotaxis'. We first met these concepts in Section 2.6.1 of Chapter 2. Figure 2 in that section (which is taken directly from Halliday 1965/81) illustrates in a simplified form the concept that 'hypotactic' structures add new layers to the overall structure. Moreover, the top halves of the diagrams in Figures 7-2 and 7-3 on p.217 of IFG similarly suggest that each 'hypotactic' relationship adds a further layer of structure. And the 'paratactic' structures of Halliday's model, with their elements of "1 2 3", necessarily also add more layers to the overall structure.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett does not identify any of the"problems" resulting from layered univariate structures that Huddleston raises. He does, however, provide his own arguments, but as will be seen, these do not withstand close scrutiny.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, Figure 2 only displays one level of structure: α β γ. Fawcett here simply misinterprets clauses displayed on three different lines as three levels of structure.

[3] This is misleading. To be clear, Fawcett here simply misinterprets clauses displayed on different lines in the top halves of Figures 7-2 and 7-3 as multiple levels of structure. On the other hand, the layers of structure are explicitly represented — not suggested — in the bottom halves of Figures 7-2 and 7-3.

[4] This is misleading. Clearly, the paratactic structure 1 2 3 construes only one level of structure.

Huddleston's Suggestion That Halliday Should Treat Hypotactic Clauses As Embedded

Fawcett (2010: 317):

Firstly, Huddleston suggests that in He assumed that she was guilty, the clause that she was guilty functions as a Complement, just as too much is a Complement in He assumed too much. Similarly, he suggests that in He left before the vote was taken, the clause before the vote was taken functions as an Adjunct, just as before the debate does in He left before the debate. Huddleston's point is that Halliday should treat the dependent clause in such examples as functioning as an element of the matrix clause (i.e., as embedded) and not as a clause that is 'hypotactically' related to the rest of the main clause in a 'modifier-head' relationship. The relevance of this for the 'rank scale' is that, if his position is accepted, the amount of 'rank shift' in the grammar is thereby increased enormously, and the predictions made by the 'rank scale' concept are consequently weakened. We shall shortly consider more closely both Huddleston's reasons for taking the position that he does on this matter, and Matthiessen and Martin's reply. As you may have noticed, Huddleston's position is essentially the same as my own, as described in Section 11.9 of Chapter 11.

Blogger Comments:

 [1] To be clear, merely reporting Huddleston's suggestions, without the reasoning on which they are based, is not argument.

But note that the above clause that she was guilty can interpreted as a Complement in SFL Theory, if it is construed as a pre-projected fact: He assumed (the fact) that she was guilty. Importantly, the distinction between embedding and hypotaxis provides the means of distinguishing between pre-projected facts and projected ideas, whereas the approach advocated by Huddleston and Fawcett does not.

[2] This is misleading. The rank scale derives from taking a functional approach to formal constituency: the minimal bracketing of ranked constituent analysis (Halliday 1994: 20-8). Its "predictions" are not weakened by any increase in the amount of rankshift. On the contrary, the rank scale provides the principled means of accounting for rankshift in functional terms.

[3] This is misleading, because it is not possible to look more closely at reasons which have not yet been provided. That is, Fawcett falsely implies that the bare assertions he provides here, from Huddleston, are reasoned arguments.

[4] To be clear, Fawcett's Section 11.9 is titled 'How embedding and co-ordination can replace hypotaxis and parataxis'. Clarifications and critiques of the section can be viewed here:

• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic And Paratactic Projection
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic Extension And Enhancement
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic "Elaboration"
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Paratactic Expansion
• Summary Of How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotaxis And Parataxis