Misrepresenting 'Filling Probabilities' As An Alternative To The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 337):

Interestingly, the concept of the 'rank scale' plays no role in a generative SF grammar. Its main practical value has always been as a model (if a problematical one) that makes predictions that guide the text analyst in how the units in a text-sentence relate to each other. And for this purpose we can now use the set of units supplemented by the concept of filling probabilities that is described in Section 11.2 of Chapter 11 and exemplified in Appendix B. From one viewpoint they are simply a drastic re-interpretation of the 'rank scale' concept, but in essence they are a replacement for it, as a guide for use in text analysis.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. It is only in Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar that the rank scale plays no acknowledged role.

[2] This is misleading, because the rank scale model of formal constituency is fundamental to SFL Theory since it is the means of modelling syntax and morphology. The rank scale provides the various entry conditions to grammatical systems and identifies the formal units that serve grammatical functions.

[3] This is misleading, because filling probabilities are concerned with form-function relations, not with form-form relations ("how units relate to each other"), they are neither a re-interpretation of the rank scale nor a replacement for it as a model of formal constituency.

Misrepresenting 'Filling' As An Alternative To The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 336-7, 337n):

Even if we set aside the case for abolishing the 'verbal group' set out in the last section, as well as the more general evidence of the value of a description of English such as that summarised in Appendix B, it is surprising that the evidence produced by Matthews, Huddleston and others summarised above has not persuaded Halliday to reconsider the status of the 'rank scale' concept.  

After all, it is clear that the strongest claim that can be made for it is that it characterises a tendency towards a pattern to which there are in fact a great many exceptions.  

One sometimes gets the impression that support for the 'rank scale' is maintained simply because of a general perception that 'there is no alternative'.²¹ 

But there now is an alternative: a simple unordered set of classes of unit, each of which is capable of filling several elements of one or more higher units, as presented in Section 10.2 of Chapter 10.

²¹ This is the 'TINA' attitude to change that is close to the heart of many a right-wing politician — and so not, one would assume, Halliday's.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the reason why the evidence produced by Matthews, Huddleston and others have not persuaded Halliday to reconsider the rank scale concept is that the evidence is no evidence at all, since it derives from theoretical misunderstandings, as demonstrated in previous posts.

[2] This is misleading. The rank scale is one of two ways of modelling formal constituency — the other being immediate constituent analysis (Halliday 1994: 20-8). In SFL Theory, it is the means of modelling morphology and syntax, which is why it leaves no room for Fawcett's 'functional syntax', which is why Fawcett is motivated to argue against its theoretical value. The theoretical value of the rank scale includes the fact that it identifies the entry conditions for networks at each rank, and, in doing so, identifies the formal units to which meanings are assigned.

[3] To be clear, this is a false impression, since the alternative to ranked constituent analysis (minimal bracketing) is immediate constituent analysis (maximal bracketing), as explained in Halliday (1994: 20-8).

[4] To be clear, as previously explained, Fawcett's notion of 'filling' is no alternative to the rank scale, because it is concerned with form-function relations, not with form-form relations (constituency). On the other hand, Fawcett's notion of 'higher' — and therefore 'lower' — units discloses the fact that his model ranks units on a scale from high to low.

[5] To be clear, Fawcett here invites the reader to associate the attitude he falsely attributes to Halliday, a lifelong communist, with the attitude of right-wing politicians. This is achieved textually by the punctuation, which places tonic prominence on the word 'assume', thereby making it the Focus of New information, and interpersonally through the most likely tone, tone 4, which expresses 'reservation' in declarative MOOD.

Misrepresenting An Argument Against Parataxis As An Argument Against Hypotaxis

Fawcett (2010: 331):

In the second part of their case, M&M suggest a second analysis of Huddleston's example, i.e., as two co-ordinated clauses with ellipsis in the second, thus: He left before the debate or (he left) (at least) before the vote was taken. But again, I am afraid, I have to point out a problem. While their analysis appears at first to be another possible one, we need to take account of the fact that one can insert either to the left of before the debate, so that it becomes He left either before the debate or (at least) before the vote was taken. And this fact demonstrates clearly that the grammar must allow for the possibility of generating the prepositional group and the clause as jointly filling an Adjunct.

Thus M&M suggest that two possible analyses should be allowed (the first being Huddleston's and mine). They therefore do not address the question of which of the two is systemically preferable, and why. Moreover, Huddleston's criticism of IFG stands. In other words, he is right that Halliday's decision to treat all clauses embedded directly in clauses as 'hypotaxis' means that the Sydney Grammar cannot handle examples such as Huddleston's.

Finally, to demonstrate that Huddleston's example is not a 'special case', consider the following example with a simple 'additive' Linker: On average, people died earlier in those days, both from diseases such as diphtheria and because they worked such dreadfully long hours. Notice that here (as in Huddleston's example) the item both prevents the M&M analysis in terms of two co-ordinated clauses with ellipsis. The conclusion, then, must be that we should treat all such 'beta' clauses as embedded clauses. … Withe respect to the areas of the grammar described here, then, M&M fail to rebut Huddleston's critical comments. 

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is an argument about parataxis, and as such, not relevant to the question of hypotaxis. Moreover, this being the case, it could be equally directed against Fawcett's model of co-ordination.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, Huddleston's criticism does not stand, with regard to hypotaxis, because it is an argument about parataxis. On the other hand, SFL Theory (IFG, Halliday) does not treat all such "embedded" clauses as hypotaxis. By distinguishing between embedding (rankshift) and hypotaxis, SFL Theory provides such explanatory advantages as distinguishing between

• defining relative clauses (embedded) and non-defining relative clauses (dependent), and
• pre-projected facts (embedded) and reported projections (dependent).

The conclusion, then, is the distinction between rankshifted and dependent clauses has explanatory advantages over the lack of distinction.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Rankshift

Fawcett (2010: 330-1):

Here we shall consider M&M's response to Huddleston's "co-ordination" argument. This begins, perhaps surprisingly, with M&M's agreement that his analysis is indeed a possible one (i.e., the analysis in which before the vote was taken is treated as a clause embedded as an Adjunct). However, they move quickly on from this apparent olive branch to a robust defence of what they take to be the IFG position on this matter — claiming that Huddleston is wrong to criticise IFG for ruling out his analysis, because "there is nothing in Halliday's system to block this analysis" (p. 27). 

But on this matter Huddleston is right and M&M are wrong, as is shown by Halliday's own specification of the types of rankshift that his model permits. Thus he states (IFG p. 242) that "the relationship of an embedded clause to the 'outer' clause is an indirect one" — i.e., the embedded clause must fill an element of a group, not a clause. (See Section 11.8.5 of Chapter 11 for a summary of Halliday 's statement on this matter.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, if a clause is shifted to the rank of group, then it functions as a group and so serves as ("fills") an element of a clause. For example:

On the other hand, it is when a clause is shifted to the rank of word, that it serves as ("fills") an element of a group. For example:

[2] See the post on Section 11.8.5: Seriously Misrepresenting Halliday On Embedding.

Fawcett's Argument On Hypotaxis vs Embedding [6]

 Fawcett (2010: 328-9):

If we put this evidence together with that of my alternative analyses of the examples of Halliday's ten major categories for 'paratactic' and 'hypotactic' relations between clauses (as set out in Section 11.9 of Chapter 11), we have two separate pieces of evidence that the grammar should not in fact foreground the contrast between 'parataxis' vs. 'hypotaxis' as a system that is to be entered simultaneously with one for 'expansion' vs. 'projection', etc. 

The alternative is that each type of 'co-ordination' and each type of 'dependence' should be modelled in terms of the systemic choices that are available to it, so avoiding the ever present temptation to the grammarian, i.e., that of modifying the description to conform to the theory.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, neither of these constitute evidence about the system of TAXIS (parataxis vs hypotaxis). The argument Fawcett has just made relies on misrepresenting expressions of systemic features as systemic features (see the preceding five posts), and his alternative analyses in Section 11.9 are merely presented rather than supported by argument; see:

• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic And Paratactic Projection
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic Extension And Enhancement
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotactic "Elaboration"
• How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Paratactic Expansion
• Summary Of How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotaxis And Parataxis

[2] To be clear, this is precisely how the two types of interdependency — parataxis ("co-ordination") and hypotaxis ("dependence") — are modelled in SFL Theory, in conjunction with the systems of LOGICO-SEMANTIC TYPE and RECURSION. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 438):

[3] To be clear, it is not the description that is at risk of being modified so as to conform to theory, but the data that is described in terms of a theory. More importantly, Fawcett's insinuation here is that Halliday has succumbed to the temptation of intellectual dishonesty.

Misrepresenting Halliday As Theoretically Inconsistent And Intellectually Dishonest

Fawcett (2010: 323n):

¹⁶ As with many other concepts, the idea that all groups can be handled as word complexes is one for which at least some support can be gleaned from Halliday's writings (e.g., "a group is in some respects equivalent to a word complex (IFG pp. 179-80), and "a group is the expansion of a word" (p. 180). Indeed, Halliday sometimes gives the concept of a group as a word complex more weight than the concept of a group as the expression of a semantic unit with its own set of functional elements. One clear case is his treatment of quality groups when they fill the modifier in a nominal group, as in the case of very small in some very small ones (IFG pp. 192 and 194). Thus very small is said to be a 'complex' of two words that are 'hypotactically related' rather than a group of words. Yet the same words would be a group for Halliday if they filled a Complement, as in The egg was very small. We can guess that the reason why he adopts this somewhat inconsistent position is that it at least has the virtue (from his viewpoint but not mine) that it avoids having to recognise such examples as yet another cased of the unwanted phenomenon of 'rank shift' — which, if acknowledged, would be further evidence against the concept of the 'rank scale'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading in a trivial way. The idea that all groups can be handled as word complexes does not find "at least some support" in Halliday's writings; it is Halliday's model.

[2] To be clear, with the nominal group, which is Fawcett's chief concern, Halliday gives equal weight to the logical ("word complex") and experiential ("its own set of functional elements") structures. With the verbal group, which is lacking from Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar, the logical structure is of greater value, because it 'embodies the single most important semantic feature of the English verb, its recursive tense system' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 398). It is the groups that are of no concern to Fawcett — adverbial, conjunction, preposition — that are structured only logically.

[3] To be clear, the (ideational) semantic unit that is realised by the group is the element: participant, process, circumstance, relator; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 177-226).

[4] To be clear, quality groups do not feature in Halliday's model.

[5] This is misleading. In such instances, very small  is a subcomplex within the logical structure of the nominal group, corresponding to the Epithet in the experiential structure. Halliday (1994: 194):

To be clear, very small is a "group of words", but in this instance, it does not constitute an entire nominal group (of words).

[6] To be clear, in this instance, very small  is once again a subcomplex within the logical structure of the nominal group, once again corresponding to the Epithet in the experiential structure. The difference in this case is that the Epithet conflates with the Head of a nominal group with no Modifier:

In a functional grammar, where the view is 'from above', it is the function of words that is criterial, not the words as forms ("the same words").

[7] This is misleading, because Halliday does not adopt an inconsistent position, as demonstrated above. Once again, as throughout this book, Fawcett has falsely assumed that he correctly understands Halliday's model.

[8] This is misleading on three counts. Firstly, both examples involve internal bracketing, not rankshift, and so the question of recognising rankshift does not arise. Secondly, rankshift is not an "unwanted phenomenon"; for example, it provides a systematic explanation of how the complexity of written language (lexical density) is brought about. Thirdly, rankshift is not "evidence against the concept of the rank scale" because it is consistent with the notion of a rank scale, with the rank scale providing the yardstick by which to identify the shift.

But it must be said, the really nasty thing here is that Fawcett has falsely accused Halliday of intellectual dishonesty: of trying to conceal what Fawcett wrongly claims to be a problem for the model. In this book of 12 chapters, only 3 were devoted to expounding Fawcett's model, but all 12 were devoted to misrepresenting Halliday's model in a way that favoured Fawcett's argument for his own model.

Misunderstanding Huddleston On Halliday's Group

Fawcett (2010: 322-3):

But Huddleston goes even further, apparently dismissing the concept of the 'group' (or 'phrase') altogether. So it is yet more surprising that he states:

Clause, word and morpheme are commonplace categories in syntactic theory; it is the group, among Halliday's basic ranks, that has no significantly close analogue in non-rank grammars, and it is difficult to see that this innovation has anything to recommend it" (Huddleston 1988:155).

Here Huddleston seems to be denying the value of the concept of the group (or 'phrase'). Presumably he would replace them with various types of 'word complex', each built up of simple 'modifier-head' relationships.¹⁵ Yet he himself uses the concept of 'phrase' throughout Huddleston & Pullum (forthcoming). It is therefore hard to understand what prompted him to make the statement cited above, unless he has moved from that position to a more conventional one in the period since 1988. But if the above remarks stand, he would not only do away with the 'rank scale', but also with any units other than the clause, the word and the morpheme. This would indeed be radical.

¹⁵ This passage reads as if Huddleston is suggesting that the concept of the 'group' (or 'phrase') is an "innovation" by Halliday, whereas it is in fact a commonplace of descriptive grammars — including Huddleston's own current grammar of English. Perhaps the "innovation" is intended to be the placing the group on the 'rank scale'? In any case, the syntax in Huddleston & Pullum (forthcoming) makes full use of familiar concepts such as 'noun phrase', 'adjectival phrase' and 'prepositional phrase' (Huddleston, personal communication 2000).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Huddleston uses the logical fallacy of relevance known as argumentum ad populum: a proposition is claimed to be false solely because a majority or many people believe it to be so.

And from another angle, the absence of a component from Newton's Universal Gravitation in Einstein's General Relativity is clearly no argument against Einstein's theory.

[2] To be clear, here Huddleston uses the logical fallacy of relevance known as the argument from incredulity: 'I cannot imagine how it could be true; therefore it must be false'.

[3] This is misleading. To be clear, it is only the group that Huddleston identifies as Halliday's innovation — not the phrase.

[4] To be clear, the innovation is simply Halliday's concept of the 'group'. As demonstrated above and previously, Fawcett does not understand the distinction between group and phrase.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1965) On Hypotaxis

Fawcett (2010: 321):

Finally, we should note that the position taken by Halliday himself on this issue is exploratory rather than dogmatic. He writes that "hypotaxis is in some ways intermediate between parataxis and [...] rankshift; in fact all hypotaxis could be regarded as rankshift" (1965/81:40). And over twenty years later (IFG p. 216) he introduces this aspect of his model with hedging expressions such as "the tendency is [...]", "we shall assume [...]", "we shall interpret [...]".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday takes a scientific approach by proposing hypotheses and then providing arguments to demonstrate why and how such hypotheses are valuable.

[2] This is deliberately misleading through selective omission — the logical fallacy known as contextonomy.  What Halliday (1981 [1965]) actually wrote in this pre-Systemic paper was the following: 

Hypotaxis is in some ways intermediate between parataxis and multivariate structure involving rankshift; in fact all hypotaxis could be regarded as rankshift, although this would result in very different bracketing of constituents and would obscure the important respects in which hypotaxis differs from rankshift and resembles parataxis. We may summarise the types of structure dealt with as follows:

Seriously Misrepresenting Huddleston On Univariate Structure

Fawcett (2010: 320-1):

The above argument goes rather further in exploring the implications for the concept of the 'rank scale' of Halliday's proposals than does Huddleston's review, perhaps in part because he concentrates on different matters (relations between words and groups, and issues of left and right branching). While I shall not attempt to summarise these here, I shall cite his interesting concluding words. These deserve attention because he was, as we noted in Section 5.1 of Chapter 5, one of the small team (with Halliday, Hudson and Henrici) who worked on these problems in the 1960s. Indeed, it was Huddleston who wrote one of the key S&C papers on this topic (Huddleston 1965/81). Since he was so closely involved, we should give due weight to his statement that

historically, the layered univariate structure was introduced in the context of an attempt to solve certain problems stemming from the total accountability requirement of the rank model. [...] "The problems we have been discussing [layering in 'paratactic' and 'hypotactic' structures] are created by the [rank scale] model". (Huddleston 1988:151)

The clear implication of this revealing statement is that the purpose of introducing the concepts of 'paratactic' and 'hypotactic' relations in structure to the theory was less their inherent insightfulness than to shore up the ailing concept of the 'rank scale'. This is therefore secondary evidence for the position taken here, i.e., that the concept of the 'rank scale' is ultimately not a useful one. Moreover we now have a replacement for it, i.e., the concept of a set of units, each of which is capable of filling several elements of one or more higher units in a tree representation, supplemented for text analysis by filling probabilities.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's exploration of the implications on the rank scale proceeds from misunderstandings of unit complexes with regard to the rank scale.

[2] Again, to cite a conclusion without the argument on which it is based is a fallacious use of the argument from authority (argumentum ad verecundiam).

[3] This is very misleading indeed. Huddleston's point is that if a rank scale is assumed, then total accountability at all ranks entails layered univariate structures in the model.  Fawcett misrepresents this as meaning univariate structures were devised primarily as an attempt "to shore up the ailing concept of the rank scale".

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Fawcett has merely misrepresented Huddleston — see [3] — in a way that agrees with his desires.

[5] To be clear, Fawcett ranks his units on a scale from higher to lower, but denies that his model includes a rank scale.

"The Theoretical Core Of The Problem That 'Unit Complexes' Raise"

Fawcett (2010: 320):

We come now to the theoretical core of the problem that 'unit complexes' raise for the concept of the 'rank scale'. Halliday's descriptions of these additional layers of structure are always in terms of what he terms their "elements", e.g., the 'hypotactic' ones are said to be in a series of 'modifier-head' relationships to each other (IFG p. 217-8), represented by the symbols "α β γ" etc. But these elements are not treated as elements of a unit (as in the case of the modifier and head of a nominal group), but as elements that are somehow able to function in relation to each other without the use of the concept of 'unit'. Yet in SFL the concepts of 'unit' and 'element' are mutually defining. In other words, an element is by definition an element of the structure of something, and in SF theory that "something" is a unit. Yet in IFG we are presented with 'elements' that are shown in the diagrams as relating directly to each other, without any indication of the unit of which the element is a component — or indeed of the unit that fills the element. In other words, the concept of a 'unit' is in fact covertly present, even through it is not referred to at any point.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading. On the one hand, a hypotactic structure is not a series of "modifier-head" relationships. A hypotactic structure comprises one Head and one Modifier, either of which may nest a hypotactic or paratactic subcomplex. In a clause structured as α β γ, α constitutes the Head and β γ the Modifier, as demonstrated in Halliday (1994: 217). And, on the other hand, modification is only a first step in understanding hypotaxis. Halliday (1994: 218):

As a first step, therefore, we can interpret the relationship between these clauses as one of modification … . The concept of modification needs to be enriched by allowing for systematic alternatives along two separate dimensions: (i) type of INTERDEPENDENCY or TAXIS; (ii) the LOGICO-SEMANTIC RELATION.

[2] This misrepresentation is misleading. To be clear, on the one hand, the elements of a unit complex are the units that are complexed. For example, the elements of a clause complex are clauses. Taxis is a relation between forms (units on the rank scale). This is distinct from elements of a (multivariate) function structure of a unit, such as Predicator as a functional element of clause structure. And on the other hand, these units (elements) relate to each other in the unit complex. Viewed in terms of constituency, a clause complex is the "unit" of which the clauses are "components".

Misrepresenting Halliday On Hypotactic Structures

Fawcett (2010: 319):

I should add, however, that Halliday would probably not agree that every additional element in a 'hypotactic' unit complex (after the first two) adds a new layer of structure — even though diagrams such as those referred to above clearly imply that they do. In Halliday (1965/81:34) he says that "a hypotactic structure is better thought of as a chain of dependencies". Indeed, 'box diagrams' such as those in the lower halves of Figures 7-2 and 7-3 on p. 217 of IFG show the elements "α β γ" as a set of adjacent symbols — so implying that they are all elements of the same unit. This in turn raises the question of whether it is possible to have a recursive 'modifier-head' relationship between three elements α, β and γ, because the β element has to function as both a head (to γ) and a modifier (to α), which is arguably illogical. Halliday certainly intends this interpretation (1965/81:36), but I find his reasons for its desirability unpersuasive, and I would analyse all of his examples in terms of embedding.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true that the diagrams — in Halliday (1994: 216-9) — imply that a complex with more than two units necessarily entails what Fawcett calls 'an additional layer of structure'. Clause complexes may be simply linear — e.g. α β γ — but they may involve the nesting of sub-complexes with the complex. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 442):

Many clause complexes are linear sequences … But we also often find internal bracketing, or nesting. This is where what is being linked by a logico-semantic relation is not a single clause but rather a ‘subcomplex’ – a clause nexus in its own right.

We can show nesting in either of two ways. (i) The nesting can be represented explicitly as internal bracketing – e.g. 1 ^ 2(α ^ β); (ii) or it can be represented as a simple string – e.g. 1 ^ 2α ^ 2β.

[2] To be clear, Figures 7-2 and 7-3 both represent instances of nesting:

[3] To be clear, there is no "implication" here. The α β γ symbols in Figures 7-2 and 7-3 symbolise the hypotactic structure of a subcomplex within each clause complex. Each symbol categorises a clause (unit) in the clause (unit) complex. This demonstrates again that Fawcett does not understand hypotactic structures or their diagrammatic representations.

[4] To be clear, the structure α β γ is a "recursive modifier-head relationship". In a linear α β γ clause complex, the dominant α is Head and the dependent units are Modifier. Halliday (1994: 216):

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue that Halliday intends Fawcett's misinterpretation. In a linear structure, there is no Head-Modifier relation within the Modifier. This only occurs when the Modifier itself is a nested subcomplex, as illustrated in Figures 7-2 and 7-3. It is clear from this that Fawcett does understand the notion of nesting in complexes.

[6] Clearly, Fawcett is unpersuaded by Halliday's argument because he does not understand his model of hypotactic structures, as demonstrated above. This incomprehension explains why Fawcett would analyse all of Halliday's examples in terms of embedding.

Seriously Misrepresenting Halliday On Unit Complexes

Fawcett (2010: 318, 318n):

However, so far as the two 'rank scale' concepts of (1) 'accountability at all ranks' and (2) 'rank shift' are concerned, Halliday treats the 'unit complexes' as if they were not part of the 'rank scale'. He does not consider, therefore, that every clause should be analysed as serving a function in a clause complex, that every group should be seen as filling an element in a group complex, and so on. (And yet, as we shall shortly see, this is precisely what he does say, at some points.) Although he does not state in IFG why it is undesirable to treat 'unit complexes' as 'units' on the 'rank scale', we can infer that the reason is the additional layers of 'singulary branching' that would occur — because one of his reasons for introducing 'hypotaxis' in 1965 was to avoid the "somewhat artificial increase in 'depth' in number of layers [introduced by embedding]." ⁸

⁸ A defender of Halliday's position might be tempted to offer a modified model of the standard column of units on the 'rank scale', in which each type of unit complex was placed beside its equivalent basic unit rather than above it. But this would not resolve the problem, because it would leave the relationship between a 'unit' and its equivalent 'unit complex' undefined. There is in fact no alternative, in Halliday's framework, to accepting unit complexes as additional units on the 'rank scale'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is the opposite of what is true. In SFL Theory, a clause complex is a complex of clauses, and 'clause' is a unit on the rank scale; a group complex is a complex of groups, and 'group' is a unit on the rank scale; etc.

[2] This is misleading. On the one hand, in SFL Theory, clauses in a clause complex do not function as elements of a clause complex because a clause complex is not a higher rank than the clause. Likewise, groups do not function as ("fill") elements of a group complex because a group complex is not a higher rank than the group.

On the other hand, in SFL Theory, a secondary clause in a clause complex functions either as an expansion of the primary clause in terms of elaboration, extension or enhancement or as a projection of it. Likewise, a secondary group in a group complex functions either as an expansion of the primary group in terms of elaboration, extension or enhancement or as a projection of it.

[3] This is misleading, because here Fawcett falsely implies an inconsistency in IFG where there is none.

[4] To be clear, Halliday frequently advised his students to write at a level that could be understood by an intelligent 12-year-old. We can infer from this that he assumed that an intelligent 12-year-old would understand that a unit complex is a complex of rank scale units.

[5] This is not only irrelevant, given the above, but also misleading. In this pre-Systemic paper, there can be no singulary branching in hypotactic structures. Halliday (2002 [1965]: 235):

In constituent terms, all hypotactic structures can in fact be represented as binary; that is, as having no more than two constituents at a single layer.

[6] This is very misleading indeed, because the quote from Halliday (1965) is not concerned either with Halliday's reason for introducing hypotaxis or with embedding. The "somewhat artificial increase in 'depth' in number of layers" is a disadvantage that results from treating hypotactic structures 'as having no more than two constituents in a single layer' (see [5]). And it is for this reason that Halliday (2002 [1965]: 235) instead proposes:

In the present analysis, hypotactic structures are not being treated as exclusively binary, but are considered as capable of extension on one layer as well as by layering one within another.

[7] As previously explained, unit complexes are complexes of units located on the rank scale. A clause complex is a univariate structure at the rank of clause.

[8] To be clear, in SFL Theory, there is no "relationship" between a unit and its equivalent unit complex, except in the tautological sense that one is a complex of the other. On the other hand, units in a unit complex are related in terms of interdependency and logico-semantic types.

[9] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The alternative "to accepting unit complexes as additional units on the 'rank scale' " is simply understanding that unit complexes are complexes of rank scale units.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Unit Complexes

 Fawcett (2010: 318):

Firstly, then, we need to note that in Halliday's current model any such "unit complex" is located above the equivalent "basic unit" on the 'rank scale'. (These terms were introduced by Huddleston himself, in his important contribution in Huddleston 1965/81:46.) In other words, Halliday's model states 

(1) that above the clause there is the 'clause complex' (the term "sentence" being permitted as an equivalent when referring to written rather than spoken text); 

(2) that between the clause and the group/phrase there is the 'group/phrase complex'; 

(3) that between the group/phrase and the word there is the 'word complex'; and 

(4) that between the word and the morpheme there is the 'morpheme complex'. 

In principle, then, the introduction of 'unit complexes' to the theory doubles the number of 'units' on the 'rank scale'. Moreover, there is no doubt that a unit complex is a type of 'unit' in Halliday's theory, because he refers to it as a 'unit' — writing, for example, that "the clause complex is the only grammatical unit that we shall recognise above the clause" (IFG p. 216).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true. A unit complex is the structural relation of units at the rank of the unit:

• a clause complex is the structural relation of units at clause rank;
• a group/phrase complex is the structural relation of units at group/phrase rank;
• a word complex is the structural relation of units at word rank; and
• a morpheme complex is the structural relation of units at morpheme rank.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, sentence is a unit on the stratum of graphology, not lexicogrammar. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 436):

… the clause complex is realised graphologically as a ‘sentence’, in the way that this has evolved, over the centuries, as a unit in the written language. The sentence is the highest unit of punctuation on the graphological rank scale and has evolved in the writing system to represent the clause complex as the most extensive domain of grammatical structure. We will use the term sentence to refer only to this highest-ranking graphological unit of punctuation.

[3] This is misleading, because it is not true. As explained above, unit complexes are located at the rank of the units in the complex.

[4] To be clear, a unit complex is a unit in the sense of unit with univariate structure.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a clause complex is not 'above' the clause in terms of the rank scale, as demonstrated, for example, by the location of the clause complexing system at clause rank; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 438):

Misrepresenting Halliday On Layers Of Structure

Fawcett (2010: 317, 317n):

Secondly, Huddleston discusses in considerable detail certain problems that result from the concept of 'layered univariate structures' within 'parataxis' and 'hypotaxis'. We first met these concepts in Section 2.6.1 of Chapter 2. Figure 2 in that section (which is taken directly from Halliday 1965/81) illustrates in a simplified form the concept that 'hypotactic' structures add new layers to the overall structure. Moreover, the top halves of the diagrams in Figures 7-2 and 7-3 on p.217 of IFG similarly suggest that each 'hypotactic' relationship adds a further layer of structure. And the 'paratactic' structures of Halliday's model, with their elements of "1 2 3", necessarily also add more layers to the overall structure.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett does not identify any of the"problems" resulting from layered univariate structures that Huddleston raises. He does, however, provide his own arguments, but as will be seen, these do not withstand close scrutiny.

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, Figure 2 only displays one level of structure: α β γ. Fawcett here simply misinterprets clauses displayed on three different lines as three levels of structure.

[3] This is misleading. To be clear, Fawcett here simply misinterprets clauses displayed on different lines in the top halves of Figures 7-2 and 7-3 as multiple levels of structure. On the other hand, the layers of structure are explicitly represented — not suggested — in the bottom halves of Figures 7-2 and 7-3.

[4] This is misleading. Clearly, the paratactic structure 1 2 3 construes only one level of structure.

Misrepresenting IFG On Conjunction Groups

Fawcett (2010: 311-2):

We have seen that, in his response to Matthews' comments, Halliday (1966) allows that Matthews may have a valid point with respect to Linkers such as and. In IFG, however, he makes an alternative proposal (p. 211). He introduces a new class of group, the 'conjunction group', which is to fill a Linker or Binder. He is right that this is needed (at least for Linkers), but one wonders whether the proposal has the additional attraction of enabling him to handle Linkers within the 'rank scale' rather than as 'markers', and so to defend the original 'rank scale' concept. However, while Binders occasionally require an internal structure (as Appendix B shows), Linkers do not. (I assume here that Halliday would treat and so, etc. as a single item, as I would). Halliday's new class of group does not help here, nor does it help with Adjuncts that express logical relations such as therefore and however. Moreover, the structure that he suggests for the 'conjunction group' is simply "β α". The problem here is that this makes it a 'hypotactic' relationship, so that an example such as immediately after is treated as a 'word complex' rather than a group. In other words, such a structure does not constitutes a group in Halliday's theory, but a 'unit complex' that occurs between a simple word and a simple group.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue, since this is not an alternative proposal. Linkers and binders are classes of conjunctions, which serve as the Head of conjunction groups, which can function as structure markers in continuing clauses of a clause complex.

[2] This misunderstanding is misleading, because it is untrue. For Halliday, linkers and binders are word classes, classes of conjunction, whereas conjunction groups consist of conjunctions and serve as structural Themes or conjunctive Adjuncts at clause rank. In short, group rank units — conjunction groups — don't realise ("fill") word rank units — linkers and binders — except where rankshift is possible.

[3] This is misleading because it misrepresents theorising with the rank scale as defending the rank scale.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, binders and linkers are classes of words, which therefore consist of morphemes. Any internal structure of a word is a configuration of functional elements served by morphemes.

[5] To be clear, this non-sequitur is a bare assertion unsupported by argument. Moreover, it is demonstrably untrue, if only because conjunction groups are proposed as the formal units that serve the clause function of conjunctive Adjunct.

[6] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday (1994: 211):

Conjunctions also form word groups by modification, for example even if, just as, not until, if only. These can be represented in the same way, as β ^ α structures (or α ^ β in the case of if only). Note however that many conjunctive expressions have evolved from more complex structures, e.g. as soon as, in case, by the time, nevertheless, in so far as. These can be treated as single elements without further analysis. They are themselves, of course, subject to modification, e.g. just in case, almost as soon as.

To be clear, in SFL Theory, the 'Head Modifier 'structure is the logical structure of all groups: nominal, verbal, adverbial, conjunction and preposition. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451):

Parataxis and hypotaxis are general relationships that are the same throughout the grammar: they define complexes at any rank (clause complex, group or phrase complex, word complex; in addition hypotaxis defines the logical organisation of groups.

The logical structure models the group along the lines of a word complex (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 362), which is why they are called groups (of words), not phrases. By the same token, it is because prepositional phrases cannot be modelled as logical structures that they are called phrases, not groups.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1966) On Reasons For The Value Of The Rank Scale

 Fawcett (2010: 311):

However, the main thrust of his defence of the 'rank scale' is to make a set of claims for the general insightfulness of working with the concept of the 'rank scale' — as a means of relating units and their associated system networks to each other, as a hypothesis that raises interesting questions about language, and as a tool that may be useful in fields of applied linguistics such as translation and others that involve text analysis. 

In other words, the defence is an empirical one: if the concept proves to be useful in advancing our understanding of how language works, it is a hypothesis that is worth making. And it has to be said that, whatever one's view of the 'rank scale' today, there is little doubt that, for those doing descriptive work in the theory and those using it in various fields of application in the 1960s and 1970s, the 'rank scale' did indeed provide a framework for describing languages that was an advance over unrestricted constituency relations. And, despite the drawbacks of its excessively strong claim, it has for several decades provided one dimension of the 'matrix' model of Systemic Functional Grammar (the other dimension being Halliday's four 'metafunctions', i.e., the 'experiential', the 'logical', the 'interpersonal' and the 'textual'). 

From this viewpoint, it may seem to some that it is 'politically' important to defend the 'rank scale' concept.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading. To be clear, what Halliday (2002 [1966]: 120) argued was as follows:

We must then ask whether it is worth making in the first place, and basically there are two grounds for thinking that it is: its descriptive advantages, and the questions that follow from it. Among these, I suggest, are the following.

It defines a point of origin for structures and systems, so that the assignment of any item to a given rank, as also the assignment of the structures and systems themselves, becomes an important step in generalisation. To show that a system operates at a given rank is the first step in stating its relationship to other systems; likewise to assign an item to a given rank is the first step in stating the systemic and structural relations into which it may enter and those which it may embody within itself. On the structure axis, rank is a form of generalisation about bracketing, and makes it easier to avoid the imposition of unnecessary structure. It also serves frequently to distinguish between similar structures, for example between defining and non-defining relative clauses in English. It may contribute towards a significant measure of depth (Huddleston 1965). It provides a point of reference for the description at other levels, such as phonology. These and other considerations suggest to me that the rank hypothesis, if valid, leads to a gain in descriptive power.

Among the further questions that would follow from it are these. If some such form of hierarchical organisation is universal, is the number of units also a universal, or is it a typological variable (in either case it is of interest)? Are certain paradigmatic or syntagmatic relations universally associated with specific ranks? Is there any statistical association among the relative frequencies of items of different rank? Is there any type of aphasia characterised by progressive, rank-by-rank loss of grammatical structures? Is there any reason why different languages have institutionalised different grammatical units in their orthographies or the same unit in different ways?

[2] This is misleading, because it is not true that "the defence is an empirical one" since empirical means 'based on what is experienced or seen rather than on theory'.

[3] To be clear, 'excessively strong' is an interpersonal Epithet, merely an enactment of Fawcett's attitude, instead of reasoned argument, supported by evidence.

[4] This is misleading, because it falsely reduces the architecture of SFL Theory to just two dimensions: rank and metafunction. The four dimensions unknown to Fawcett — stratification, instantiation, axis and delicacy — are included with these two by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 32):

[5] This is very misleading indeed, not least because the word 'political' can mean 'done or acting in the interests of status or power within an organisation rather than as a matter of principle'. 

To be clear, Halliday (1966) provides reasons why grammars with a rank scale have an explanatory advantage over rank-free grammars.

"What Is Certain"

Fawcett (2010: 292-3):

What is certain is that, if the framework for grammar set out in "Categories" had not existed, there would not have been a 'base framework' from which to explore the alternative approaches to the problems of modelling language that have been developed in the years since then within the framework of SFL. And if these explorations had not occurred, the theory of syntax presented here would not have evolved as it has. From this viewpoint, the impressive thing about "Categories" is that it provided a framework of concepts, each of which could be adapted, tested and either adapted further or discarded as a significant part of the developing theory.

The changes in the theoretical apparatus for expressing the categories and relationships of functional syntax that are described in this book reflect, I believe, our growing understanding of what a systemic functional model of language should be like. But these categories no longer constitute the full theoretical apparatus of the grammar, as they did in 1961. They are just the theoretical apparatus that is required at the level of form. But they are the type of theory that is required for a syntax that realises the meaning potential of a language, i.e., the meanings of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is not misleading, because it is true. If Halliday had not devised his original theory, Scale & Category Grammar, 60 years ago in 1961, Fawcett would have had no template on which to build a theory he could call his own.

[2] To be clear, what Fawcett views as impressive is the fact that he was able to use Halliday's original theory to create his own.

[3] To be clear, as the evidence on the blog demonstrates, this belief is not justified. For example, 

• the architecture of the Cardiff Grammar is internally inconsistent, as well as inconsistent with SFL Theory; 
• the approach that Fawcett takes, the view 'from below' is not only inconsistent with SFL Theory, but inconsistent with a functional approach to theorising; and, 
• as Halliday (1985) explained, the 'syntax' approach to grammar is inconsistent with the approach taken in SFL Theory. 

Moreover, the Cardiff Grammar is based on Halliday's superseded Scale & Category Grammar, not Systemic Functional Grammar, and Fawcett has spent his entire book continually misrepresenting SFL Theory in ways that suit his own purposes.

[4] To be clear, here Fawcett repeats his misunderstanding of 'meaning potential' as the stratum of meaning. In SFL Theory, 'meaning potential' refers to language as system, as opposed to language as instance. The stratum of meaning, on the other hand, refers to the semantics that is realised in lexicogrammar. Moreover, in SFL Theory, the lexicogrammatical systems that realise the semantics are not just those of the clause — TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME — but those of all ranks.

Misrepresenting Halliday On 'Element Of Structure'

Fawcett (2010: 292):

However one concept, that of element of structure, has survived virtually unchanged from its initial appearance, in 1956, in Halliday's "Grammatical Categories in Modern Chinese" (1956/76). It has survived via its slight demotion in "Categories" — and its apparently even greater demotion in "Systemic theory" — to be used in essentially the same sense in IFG as it originally had, and to become one of the two principle categories in the present theory. Perhaps this is not surprising, since it is the 'element' that most clearly corresponds to the concept of 'function' in syntax — so much so that it is often used instead of it.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. For example, in the first paper (Halliday 2002 [1961]: 46ff), a structure is said to be made up of elements, and in the second, (Halliday 1995: 272-3), where the emphasis is on system, rather than structure, it is an element that is acted upon in all but one of the realisation statements.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, an element is an element of function structure, and it is the relation between elements that constitutes the structure. Each element of clause structure is the function being served by a clause constituent, group or phrase, in that clause. The function of grammatical forms, such as groups or phrases, is to realise meaning.

Misrepresenting IFG On Nominal Groups Embedded In Nominal Groups

Fawcett (2010: 289, 290):

The second part of Figure 25 that I shall comment on is the quality group very experienced. Here one group, a quality group, functions to fill an element of another group, a nominal group. Texts in English are in fact full of nominal groups that have within them other groups — and not just as qualifiers, which is all that IFG states is permitted. See Tucker (1998) for the fullest treatment in any theory of language of adjectives and the structures into which they enter. He demonstrates conclusively the value of the approach taken here to this major and hitherto understudied area of syntax — an area for which he has now provided the definitive description in SFL terms.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, Fawcett's quality group is an Epithet, which from a logical perspective, involves submodification:

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. On the one hand, less importantly, rankshifted nominal groups serving as Qualifier are relatively rare; it is rankshifted prepositional phrases and clauses that most frequently serve as Qualifier. On the other hand, more importantly, IFG (Halliday 1994: 195, 196) provides the following examples of rankshifted nominal groups serving as elements other than Qualifier:

[3] To be clear, no matter how valuable the work of Tucker, it cannot represent "the definitive description in SFL terms", because it is framed within the approach of the Cardiff Grammar, which has been demonstrated to be inconsistent with SFL Theory.

Misrepresenting Both The Cardiff Grammar And SFL Theory

Fawcett (2010: 287):

Finally, we should return to the IFG framework in order to note that it requires, as well as 'multiple structures' such as those found in IFG, a way of modelling the integration of these different structures in a final, integrated structure, i.e., one in which the five or more structures of an IFG-style representation must be integrated. It currently lacks this, so that it requires a theory of syntax such as that outlined here to model this integrated structure.

Thus, even though the two theories of syntax share a common origin in "Categories", they are now very different. The two theories are equally 'systemic' and 'functional', in that they both operate within the generalised model of level of language that was presented in Chapter 3 and summarised in Figure 4 in Section 3.2 of that chapter. However, as we saw in Section 7.4 of Chapter 7, the Sydney Grammar appears to need an additional component in order to integrate its multiple structures.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. To be clear, in SFL Theory, the clause has only three lines of structure — textual, interpersonal and experiential — and these are integrated in the syntagm of groups ± phrases that realise them. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 74, 212):

The clause, as we said, is the mainspring of grammatical energy; it is the unit where meanings of different kinds, experiential, interpersonal and textual, are integrated into a single syntagm.

[2] To be clear, here Fawcett finally reveals his motive for continually misrepresenting SFL Theory on the integration of structure: his desire for his model of structure to fill the integrating rôle. However, even ignoring the fact that this rôle, unknown to Fawcett, is already filled, it can be readily seen that Fawcett's proposal would result in theoretical inconsistencies. For example, consider Fawcett's example (p289):

That very experienced reporter had guessed that they had lost all of the money

and how Fawcett's theory of syntax would integrate 'the multiple structures found in IFG':

[3] This is misleading, because SFL is a theory of grammar, not a theory of syntax. SFL Theory models syntax and morphology as a rank scale, a notion that Fawcett rejects, but unwittingly uses.

[4] On the one hand, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence. On the other hand, it is misleading, because it is demonstrably untrue. Fawcett's theory is not "equally systemic" since, as Fawcett explicitly admits (p280), the concept of system 'has no rôle in the present model of syntax'. By the same token, Fawcett's theory is not "equally functional" since the perspective taken on the grammar is not 'from above', in terms of function, but 'from below', in terms of structure, as demonstrated, for example, by Fawcett's means of classifying groups.

[5] This is very misleading indeed, because it is a deliberate gross misrepresentation. SFL Theory does not "operate within the generalised model of level of language…summarised in Figure 4". Ignoring the demonstrated fact that Fawcett's theoretical architecture in internally inconsistent, the falseness of the claim can be demonstrated by comparing the models. Fawcett (p36):

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 26, 31):