Misrepresenting 'Filling' As An Alternative To The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 336-7, 337n):

Even if we set aside the case for abolishing the 'verbal group' set out in the last section, as well as the more general evidence of the value of a description of English such as that summarised in Appendix B, it is surprising that the evidence produced by Matthews, Huddleston and others summarised above has not persuaded Halliday to reconsider the status of the 'rank scale' concept.  

After all, it is clear that the strongest claim that can be made for it is that it characterises a tendency towards a pattern to which there are in fact a great many exceptions.  

One sometimes gets the impression that support for the 'rank scale' is maintained simply because of a general perception that 'there is no alternative'.²¹ 

But there now is an alternative: a simple unordered set of classes of unit, each of which is capable of filling several elements of one or more higher units, as presented in Section 10.2 of Chapter 10.

²¹ This is the 'TINA' attitude to change that is close to the heart of many a right-wing politician — and so not, one would assume, Halliday's.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the reason why the evidence produced by Matthews, Huddleston and others have not persuaded Halliday to reconsider the rank scale concept is that the evidence is no evidence at all, since it derives from theoretical misunderstandings, as demonstrated in previous posts.

[2] This is misleading. The rank scale is one of two ways of modelling formal constituency — the other being immediate constituent analysis (Halliday 1994: 20-8). In SFL Theory, it is the means of modelling morphology and syntax, which is why it leaves no room for Fawcett's 'functional syntax', which is why Fawcett is motivated to argue against its theoretical value. The theoretical value of the rank scale includes the fact that it identifies the entry conditions for networks at each rank, and, in doing so, identifies the formal units to which meanings are assigned.

[3] To be clear, this is a false impression, since the alternative to ranked constituent analysis (minimal bracketing) is immediate constituent analysis (maximal bracketing), as explained in Halliday (1994: 20-8).

[4] To be clear, as previously explained, Fawcett's notion of 'filling' is no alternative to the rank scale, because it is concerned with form-function relations, not with form-form relations (constituency). On the other hand, Fawcett's notion of 'higher' — and therefore 'lower' — units discloses the fact that his model ranks units on a scale from high to low.

[5] To be clear, Fawcett here invites the reader to associate the attitude he falsely attributes to Halliday, a lifelong communist, with the attitude of right-wing politicians. This is achieved textually by the punctuation, which places tonic prominence on the word 'assume', thereby making it the Focus of New information, and interpersonally through the most likely tone, tone 4, which expresses 'reservation' in declarative MOOD.

Fawcett's Epistemology

Fawcett (2010: 329-30):

The main rhetorical thrust of M&M's "Response to Huddleston" is a forceful rejection of almost all of what he says. Yet often, as we shall see, they do not show why we should reject arguments such as these, even sometimes accepting Huddleston's analysis. 

Instead, their major point is (following Halliday in his 'reply' to Matthews in the first stage of the 'rank scale' debate) that it is a virtue of Halliday's model that it raises questions about grammatical structure, rather than to establish that the IFG approach is 'right' and that the more traditional analysis that Huddleston offers is 'wrong'. This approach is fully justifiable at the exploratory stage, but systemic functional linguists have now had well over a quarter of a century to explore English in the systemic functional framework.

Even though Halliday may be right that language is ultimately "ineffable" (Halliday 1984/88), it seems to me that, as SF linguists, it is our task to carry out the research programme outlined earlier, i.e., to assemble the available evidence; to decide which relationships between examples should be given systemic priority in the model of the lexicogrammar; and to explain our decisions.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here again Fawcett makes a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence, about an argument to presented later in order to prime the reader to prejudge the argument when it is finally presented.

[2] To be clear, this is a serious epistemological misunderstanding that pervades Fawcett's work. The notion that theories are right or wrong presumes that 

• there is one true model of phenomena, if only we could find it, and so that
• there are criteria for assessing theories that are themselves independent of theory.

Clearly, theories are contingent on the initial assumptions on which they are developed. Theories can be compared on the basis of explanatory potential, but this too is contingent on the assumptions on which each theory was developed, which include the functions the theory was designed to serve.

On the other hand, what can be assessed as "right" (consistent) or "wrong" (inconsistent) are interpretations of theory.

[3] To be clear, this is a serious misunderstanding. Halliday argues that it is grammatical categories that are ineffable, and in a specific sense. Halliday (2002 [1984]: 303, 306-7):

The meaning of a typical grammatical category thus has no counterpart in our conscious representation of things. There can be no exact paraphrase of Subject or Actor or Theme – because there is no language-independent clustering of phenomena in our experience to which they correspond. If there was, we should not need the linguistic category to create one. If language was a purely passive partner, ‘expressing’ a ‘reality’ that was already there, its categories would be eminently glossable. But it is not. Language is an active participant in the semogenic process. Language creates reality – and therefore its categories of content cannot be defined, since we could define them only by relating them to some pre-existing model of experience, and there is no model of experience until the linguistic categories are there to model it. The only meaning of Subject is the meaning that has evolved along with the category itself. … 

But a language is an evolved system; and evolved systems rest on principles that are ineffable – because they do not correspond to any consciously accessible categorisation of our experience. Only the relatively trivial meanings of a natural language are likely to be reducible to (meta-)words. Fundamental semantic concepts, like those underlying Subject, or Theme, Actor, New, definite, present, finite, mass, habitual, locative, are, in an entirely positive way, ineffable. 

Fawcett's Reasons For The Lack Of Discussion Of Solutions To Problems In SFL

Fawcett (2010: 312-3, 313n):

We need to ask why there has been so little discussion of alternative systemic functional solutions to problems in SFL. The reason is partly the example that is set by Halliday himself. He, like many others, has a strong dislike for the type of supposedly 'hard-nosed' combative argumentation that was so popular in the heyday of Chomskyan linguistics. This may be at least part of the reason why Halliday has only rarely responded to criticisms, and why he hardly ever comments adversely on alternative proposals from within SFL — and so why there is so little 'debate' in SFL. 

On the rare occasions when he does reply to a criticism, his typical response is to concede courteously that the point needs consideration (as he did with respect to Matthews' idea of treating Linkers such as and as "markers"), while at the same time continuing to assert the value of the original concept. The problem is that, with the passage of time and the repeated re-presentation of the original concept (both his own works and, often, in the various introductions to his ideas by others) the criticism gets forgotten and the original concept, despite its weaknesses, survives.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the reason there has been so little discussion of the problem of the rank scale is that the only people who think it a problem are those who cannot understand it. On the other hand, alternative solutions to non-problems have been proposed, not only by Fawcett, but also by others, most notably Martin.

[2] This speculation confuses debate, in general, with one particular type of debate — the type exemplified by Matthews (1966) and Fawcett (2010: 238n, 256n):

… its existence is therefore an embarrassment for the 'rank scale' concept …

We might note that the data that we are about to consider are yet another serious source of embarrassment for the concept of the 'rank scale'.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. When Halliday later formulated Systemic Functional Grammar, he did indeed treat these as structure markers. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 611):

The logico-semantic relation is marked by a conjunction – either by a non-structural one that is used only in this way, i.e. only cohesively, such as for example, furthermore, consequently; or by a structural one whose prototypical function is to mark the continuing clause in a paratactic clause nexus. … the latter are simply analysed as structure markers and are obligatorily thematic as structural Theme.

[4] To be clear, as this blog has demonstrated, this is not true in the case of either the rank scale or structure markers.

∞

It might be mentioned that Fawcett and his fellows are not so keen to have Fawcett's "solutions" discussed. See, for example, here.

Misrepresenting IFG On Conjunction Groups

Fawcett (2010: 311-2):

We have seen that, in his response to Matthews' comments, Halliday (1966) allows that Matthews may have a valid point with respect to Linkers such as and. In IFG, however, he makes an alternative proposal (p. 211). He introduces a new class of group, the 'conjunction group', which is to fill a Linker or Binder. He is right that this is needed (at least for Linkers), but one wonders whether the proposal has the additional attraction of enabling him to handle Linkers within the 'rank scale' rather than as 'markers', and so to defend the original 'rank scale' concept. However, while Binders occasionally require an internal structure (as Appendix B shows), Linkers do not. (I assume here that Halliday would treat and so, etc. as a single item, as I would). Halliday's new class of group does not help here, nor does it help with Adjuncts that express logical relations such as therefore and however. Moreover, the structure that he suggests for the 'conjunction group' is simply "β α". The problem here is that this makes it a 'hypotactic' relationship, so that an example such as immediately after is treated as a 'word complex' rather than a group. In other words, such a structure does not constitutes a group in Halliday's theory, but a 'unit complex' that occurs between a simple word and a simple group.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue, since this is not an alternative proposal. Linkers and binders are classes of conjunctions, which serve as the Head of conjunction groups, which can function as structure markers in continuing clauses of a clause complex.

[2] This misunderstanding is misleading, because it is untrue. For Halliday, linkers and binders are word classes, classes of conjunction, whereas conjunction groups consist of conjunctions and serve as structural Themes or conjunctive Adjuncts at clause rank. In short, group rank units — conjunction groups — don't realise ("fill") word rank units — linkers and binders — except where rankshift is possible.

[3] This is misleading because it misrepresents theorising with the rank scale as defending the rank scale.

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, binders and linkers are classes of words, which therefore consist of morphemes. Any internal structure of a word is a configuration of functional elements served by morphemes.

[5] To be clear, this non-sequitur is a bare assertion unsupported by argument. Moreover, it is demonstrably untrue, if only because conjunction groups are proposed as the formal units that serve the clause function of conjunctive Adjunct.

[6] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday (1994: 211):

Conjunctions also form word groups by modification, for example even if, just as, not until, if only. These can be represented in the same way, as β ^ α structures (or α ^ β in the case of if only). Note however that many conjunctive expressions have evolved from more complex structures, e.g. as soon as, in case, by the time, nevertheless, in so far as. These can be treated as single elements without further analysis. They are themselves, of course, subject to modification, e.g. just in case, almost as soon as.

To be clear, in SFL Theory, the 'Head Modifier 'structure is the logical structure of all groups: nominal, verbal, adverbial, conjunction and preposition. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451):

Parataxis and hypotaxis are general relationships that are the same throughout the grammar: they define complexes at any rank (clause complex, group or phrase complex, word complex; in addition hypotaxis defines the logical organisation of groups.

The logical structure models the group along the lines of a word complex (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 362), which is why they are called groups (of words), not phrases. By the same token, it is because prepositional phrases cannot be modelled as logical structures that they are called phrases, not groups.

Misrepresenting IFG On Structure Markers

Fawcett (2010: 311, 311n):

In his reply to Matthews' paper, Halliday (1966:110-8) accepts that it is at least worth considering one idea floated by Matthews, i.e., that items such as and and or might be treated as "markers" (as he suggest punctuation might be) rather than as "constituents".¹ 

¹ In his 1988 review of IFG, Huddleston suggests (ironically, presenting the idea as a possible source of support for the 'rank scale' concept) that, Halliday may have taken up Matthews' suggestion, and that he would analyse the genitive element 's in my father's as a "structural signal rather than a constituent" (Huddleston 1988:141), and that "the same probably holds for co-ordinators such as and and or." But there is no indication in Halliday's analyses in IFG that this would be his solution to any of the four types of problem mentioned above. There he classifies both 'linkers' and 'binders' (together with 'continuatives') as types of 'adverbial', and so as 'constituents' rather than as 'structural signals' (p. 214). The problem of how best to handle these four cases in a 'rank scale' grammar therefore remains unresolved.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading. What Halliday (2002 [1966]: 125) actually wrote was:

Given an adequate representation of the underlying grammar, there is no need to insist that every element should be assigned constituent status at all; it is quite usual not to recognise intonation features as constituents, and the same considerations could apply, as Matthews points out, provided limitations were stated, to markers such as and and or. I do not know how to specify in a general formation the conditions under which accountability in constituent terms would not be required. But this problem is no more difficult for a rank grammar, which has at least the concept of total accountability to refer to as a point of departure, than for a rank-free grammar, which has not.

[2] To be clear, in Systemic Functional Grammar, these are analysed as constituents of their respective rank units that function as structure markers. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 425, 611):

The exception is prepositional phrases with of, which normally occur only as Postmodifier; the reason is that they are not typical prepositional phrases, because in most of its contexts of use of is functioning not as minor Process/Predicator but rather as a structure marker in the nominal group (cf. to as a structure marker in the verbal group). …

The logico-semantic relation is marked by a conjunction – either by a non-structural one that is used only in this way, i.e. only cohesively, such as for example, furthermore, consequently; or by a structural one whose prototypical function is to mark the continuing clause in a paratactic clause nexus. The former serve as conjunctive Adjuncts and are very commonly thematic; the latter are simply analysed as structure markers and are obligatorily thematic as structural Theme.

[3] See the preceding two posts.

[4] To be clear, 'adverbial' is the class of these words as formal constituents, whereas 'structure marker' is the function of these forms.

[5] This is misleading, because it is the opposite of what is true, as demonstrated above and in the preceding two posts.

Matthews' Fifth Specific Problem For Halliday's Proposals On 'Rank'

 Fawcett (2010: 310):

Fifthly, Matthews points out that the unit that is here called the genitive cluster (e.g., my father's) is a serious embarrassment for the concept of the 'rank scale'. The reason (though this is not how Matthews presents it) is as follows. While any such expression is clearly a unit that consists of more than one word, the 'rank scale' principle denies it 'group' status because it cannot function as a direct element of the clause. In fact it always fills an element of a group (usually the deictic determiner in a nominal group), and this suggests that it must be 'lower' on the 'rank scale' than the group. However, while one of its main elements is expounded by a morpheme (almost always 's), its other principal element is always filled by one or more nominal groups (and occasionally by a clause, as in whoever ate it's mistake). The existence of the genitive cluster is therefore a serious problem for the concept of the 'rank scale'. (See Section 10.2.11 of Chapter 10 and Appendix B for the straightforward approach to this unit that is taken here.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because what Fawcett terms a 'genitive cluster' is neither an embarrassment nor a problem for the concept of a rank scale. In SFL Theory, this is simply an embedded nominal group: one that has been shifted to word rank to serve as Deictic of a nominal group. For example:

[2] This is misleading, because it is not true. In terms of the rank scale, what Fawcett terms a 'genitive cluster' is indeed a nominal group, but one that has undergone rankshift to serve a function in nominal group structure.

[3] This is misleading, because it is not true. Such expressions also occur as ranking nominal groups that serve functions in clause structure. For example:

[4] This misleading, because it is not true. Even if it were true that such expressions are always rankshifted — in terms of the rank scale — the fact they are rankshifted demonstrates that they are of the same rank as, or higher than, the unit in which they function.

[5] To be clear, a nominal group like my father's consists of two words, my and father's, the first of which is realised by the morpheme my and second by two morphemes father and 's.

[6] To be clear, in this bizarre construction — which is found nowhere else on the internet — the clause whoever ate it is shifted to morpheme rank, as shown by its fellow constituent, the morpheme 's, and so serves as the Head element of a noun:

[7] For problems with Fawcett's straightforward approach to his genitive cluster, in Section 10.2.11, see:

• The Genitive Cluster
• Problems With The Structural Elements Of A Genitive Cluster
• Mistaking A Structure Marker For A Functional Element
• Problems With Fawcett's Argument For The Genitive Cluster

Four Of Matthews' Five Specific Problems For Halliday's Proposals On 'Rank'

Fawcett (2010: 310):

When Matthews' pejorative evaluations and misunderstandings are stripped away, five specific problems for Halliday's proposals on 'rank' remain. The first concerns Yes and No, but I see these as functioning outside the main grammar, so I shall set them aside.  

The second problem is that a Binder such as after in after we left Henry's clearly invites analysis as a word rather than a group. Yet according to the 'accountability at all ranks' principle it should be a group, since it is an element of the clause. And the same is true of those types of Adjunct that cannot be 'expanded' such as therefore. Fourthly, a Linker such as and and or is similarly a direct element of the clause (for me but not for Matthews). For Matthews (p. 107) it "cannot reasonably be said to go with" either the preceding or the following clause.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the source of Fawcett's misunderstanding here is his assumption that a constitute requires more than one constituent.  Halliday (2002 [1966]: 123-4) explains the theoretical advantage of his approach as follows:

Multiple rank assignment, in fact, is merely a formulation in rank-grammatical terms of the notion that a constitute may have only one constituent; if systems and structures are stated for each rank, constituents being assigned on this basis to the rank appropriate to them, the multiple assignment of constituents is not only simpler than the restatement of relations but also avoids making the relatively surface notion of constituency as the basis of grammatical organisation.

On the other hand, the view that Fawcett espouses is critiqued by Halliday (2002 [1966]: 124) as follows:

There is an analogy in the orthographic hierarchy. In the orthographic sentence I, it does not seem strange to say that this is a sentence consisting of one orthographic word and that this word consists of one letter. … If we say that the sentence consists of one letter, complications arise: we have to restate the structure of the orthographic sentence in terms of letters as well as in terms of orthographic words, thus requiring among other things a second and much more complex statement of the distribution of punctuation marks; the form I will not appear at all in the set of orthographic words, but only in that of letters, of which we must then define a subset consisting of those that can operate in the structure of the sentence; and so on.

That is, if Fawcett's view were consistently applied, the instance Go! would be have to be analysed as a clause realised directly by a morpheme.

In SFL Theory, Fawcett's examples of after, therefore, and, or are each conjunctions that serve as the Head of a conjunction group.

[2] To be clear, as presented, this is a bare assertion unsupported by evidence. Moreover it is untrue, since the constituency relations of conjunctions like and and or is shown by

• their initiation of primary clauses, such as And I said to her…, and
• their conjoint absence with a secondary clause, as in She went home or so I thought.

Fawcett's Disappointment With Halliday's Reply to Matthews (1966)

Fawcett (2010: 310):

The only 'debate' is in fact Matthews' short article in the Journal of Linguistics (1966) and Halliday's fairly brief 'reply' in the same issue. … Judging by later references to this 'debate' in the literature of SFL (e.g., in Berry 1975 and Butler 1985), some systemic linguists found Halliday's 'reply' more persuasive than others. I myself was somewhat disappointed with it because I wanted to know how he would handle the various problems raised by Matthews, on the grounds that theoretical concepts depend ultimately on their value as a framework for making detailed descriptions. But Halliday did not indicate how he would resolve these problems.

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because in the course of identifying misunderstandings and fallacious argumentation on the part of Matthews, Halliday (1966) did indeed address the various problems raised that Fawcett wanted resolved. See the following two posts.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Conjunction Groups

Fawcett (2010: 234):

Let us be clear from the start of this discussion that the general concept of 'rank' and the specific concept of 'total accountability at all ranks' are interdependent. In other words, the concept of a 'rank scale of units' makes no theoretical claim if it does not imply 'total accountability at all ranks' — or at the very least 'accountability at all ranks, with only a few justifiable exceptions'.

However, the strict application of the 'total accountability' principle leads to problems with certain classes of word. This has led to what might loosely be termed 'the rank scale debate', and I provide an account of this debate in Appendix C. Here I shall restrict the discussion to just those points that are central to establishing why I myself have abandoned the concept of the 'rank scale' in favour of a different concept.

As Matthews (1966) and others have pointed out, Halliday's principle of 'accountability at all ranks' requires that, in a clause such as after we left Henry's, the word after must be treated as a group, since it is an element of the clause. And the same would be true of the word and in ... and we left Henry's and therefore in we therefore left Henry's. In IFG Halliday introduces the concept of a 'conjunction group' to model structure within a Linker or a Binder, but see Section 1 of Appendix C for a dismissal of this concept as a possible solution to the problem of satisfying the principle of 'accountability at all ranks'. (For a start, it is highly unlikely that Halliday would wish to analyse every one-word Binder as a group with one element.) See Section 10.2.8 of Chapter 10 for how the Cardiff Grammar handles Binders with an internal structure (when they occur), and see Section 11.6.2 for the relevant concept of "variation in depth of exponence".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the principle of exhaustiveness holds that everything in the wording has some function at every rank. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 84):

The general principle of exhaustiveness means that everything in the wording has some function at every rank (cf. Halliday, 1961, 1966c). But not everything has a function in every dimension of structure; for example, some parts of the clause (e.g. interpersonal Adjuncts such as perhaps and textual Adjuncts such as however, play no role in the clause as representation.

[2] For context, Matthews is on record as describing the Chomskyan revolution as "the best thing that has happened to linguistics in the past 2500 years". Matthews' misunderstandings will be identified in the examination of Appendix C. In the meantime, see The Concept Of Rank: A Reply (Halliday 1966).

[3] This is not misleading, because it is true. In SFL Theory, the word after in this instance serves as the Head element of a conjunction group.

[4] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Halliday's model. The conjunction group does not "model structure within a Linker or Binder". Instead, linker and binder are subtypes of conjunction, and a conjunction serves as the Head of a conjunction group.

[5] See the forthcoming examination of Fawcett's Section 1 of Appendix C for the validity of Fawcett's dismissal. In the meantime, consider the serious misunderstandings identified in this post.

[6] To be clear, this is misleading, because it is the direct opposite of what is true. For Halliday, every "one-word binder" serves as the Head element of a conjunction group.