Showing posts with label Berry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Berry. Show all posts

Monday, 4 October 2021

Fawcett's Disappointment With Halliday's Reply to Matthews (1966)

Fawcett (2010: 310):
The only 'debate' is in fact Matthews' short article in the Journal of Linguistics (1966) and Halliday's fairly brief 'reply' in the same issue. … Judging by later references to this 'debate' in the literature of SFL (e.g., in Berry 1975 and Butler 1985), some systemic linguists found Halliday's 'reply' more persuasive than others. I myself was somewhat disappointed with it because I wanted to know how he would handle the various problems raised by Matthews, on the grounds that theoretical concepts depend ultimately on their value as a framework for making detailed descriptions. But Halliday did not indicate how he would resolve these problems.


Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because in the course of identifying misunderstandings and fallacious argumentation on the part of Matthews, Halliday (1966) did indeed address the various problems raised that Fawcett wanted resolved. See the following two posts.

Tuesday, 6 July 2021

Not Recognising The 'Word' As A Syntactic Unit In English

Fawcett (2010: 255, 255-6n):
h < mountain, h <+ s

In traditional grammar, the existing element mountain in such an example would be described as the 'base' and the element as a "suffix". Here, however, we shall not use these terms. The reason is that there is no need (in English but not necessarily in other languages) to recognise the 'word' as a syntactic unit — though this was done in Scale and Category Grammar and in early Systemic Functional Grammar (e.g., as described in Berry 1975:85). …
¹⁵ There is only place that I can think of where a systemic functional linguist actually shows what the implications of placing the categories of 'word' and 'morpheme' on the 'rank scale' are for the representation of text-sentences. This is in Berry (1975:9), a work that provides a very useful 'fleshing out' of the concepts in Halliday's "Categories". Morphology is simply ignored in most other introductions to SFL. Indeed, this lack of discussion can be taken as indirect evidence for the rather different view of the 'word' and the 'morpheme' taken here — at least with respect to English. See the discussion in Section 10.5.2 of Chapter 10 of the problems for the 'rank scale' concept of languages such as Japanese, Mohawk and Swahili.
 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading. Like Scale & Category Grammar, (current) SFL Theory models syntax and morphology as a rank scale that includes the word and morpheme as units.

[2] To be clear, placing the word and morpheme on the rank scale means that groups consist of words and words consist of morphemes. In SFL Theory, this has no implication for the representation of text sentences, mainly because 'text sentence' is not a rank in SFL Theory, and if it was, its structure would be represented at that rank, and not at the rank of word or morpheme.

[3] This is not misleading, because it is true. One reason for this is that the priority of SFL Theory is function, not form (and system, not structure). Another reason is the priority given to the clause in a functional theory that interprets grammar in terms of meaning. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 10):

The clause is the central processing unit in the lexicogrammar – in the specific sense that it is in the clause that meanings of different kinds are mapped into an integrated grammatical structure.

[4] To be clear, on the one hand, this is a non-sequitur, because a lack of discussion does not logically entail a different point of view. On the other hand, it is true that Fawcett takes a very different view to the word and morpheme in English.

[5] See the examination of that discussion here, where Fawcett makes the false assumption that the same systems operate at the same rank across different languages.

Friday, 11 December 2020

Misrepresenting Fawcett On Class Of Unit

Fawcett (2010: 197):
Halliday takes a very different approach to the criteria for recognising a 'class of unit'. While the criterion used here is the unit's internal structure (together with semantic criteria, as described in Section 10.2.1), for Halliday the criterion is the unit's ability to fill elements of units at the 'rank' next above it on the 'rank scale' (as we saw in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2). Thus Halliday's definition of 'class of unit' is dependent — like so much else in his theory — on the concept of the 'rank scale'.
It is interesting to note that Halliday later (1963/76) introduced to the theory a concept that he termed "type". It was introduced as a complement to 'class', in a sense that is exactly equivalent to the concept of 'class of unit' as it is used here. In other words, in Halliday (1963/76) a unit's 'type' is defined in terms of a unit's internal structure. Interestingly, while Berry's introduction to the theory gives a clear account of the difference between this concept and Halliday's "Categories" sense of 'class of unit' (1975:76-7, 124-6), Berry makes no further use of it, and the concept has not been used in most later accounts of the theory. Thus it is not mentioned by Halliday in either "Systemic theory" or IFG, nor by Matthiessen (1995). 
Moreover, in both IFG and Matthiessen (1995) units continue to be defined in the "Categories" manner. Halliday is clearly using this criterion when deciding to treat very lucky in You're very lucky as a nominal group (p. 194 of IFG), and Matthiessen emphasises the correlation between "grammatical units of different classes" and their "functional potential [in the unit above]" (Matthiessen 1995:22).


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not misleading, because it is true.

[2] To be clear, this is misleading, because it is untrue. As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's classifies his units differently according to the syntagmatic structure of each unit ('from below'), not on the basis of the meaning it realises ('from above'). For example, as previously discussed, he classifies the groups over sixty and very clever differently — as quantity vs quality group — despite the fact that both congruently realise the same meaning: Attribute.

[3] To be clear, this is slightly misleading. It is not so much that the 'definition' of class of unit is dependent on a rank scale, but that the rank scale provides a grammatical means of modelling the natural relation between meaning (e.g. thing) and grammatical form (e.g. noun). See, for example, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 15, 18ff).

[4] This is very misleading indeed. Halliday (1963) only outlines this alternative method in order to identify it as the approach he is not taking — which is why it is not taken up later by Berry, Halliday or Matthiessen. Halliday (2002 [1963]: 95-7):

I have assumed, for the purpose of the main points made in the paper, that this category of “class” is to be defined syntactically. By this I mean that the concept is introduced into the description of a language in order to bring together those sets of items that have the same potentiality of occurrence; in other words, sets of items which are alike in the way they pattern in the structure of items of higher rank. Thus, to take a typical instance from grammar, we may have morpheme classes defined by word structure, each such class being one set of morphemes having a given value in the structure of words: as, for example, the morphemes of inflexion in Latin nouns. Likewise we might have word–classes defined by group structure, or clause–classes by sentence structure.
This use of the term “class”, to name a category defined in some way by its relationship to a higher structure, is by no means universal in linguistics; but it would probably be granted that some such category is necessary to linguistic description whatever name we choose to adopt for it. Syntactic classification (sometimes referred to as “functional classification”, in what is perhaps a rather misleading opposition of “form” and “function”) is a central feature of linguistic method, and one which it seems appropriate to discuss in the present context.
The alternative to this use of the term “class” is to consider morphological classification. Here “class” would be the name given to a set of items which are alike in their own structure: that is, in the way that they themselves are made up of items of lower rank. A word–class would then be a set of words having a certain similarity in their own formation out of morphemes. In this usage there are no morpheme classes, since “morpheme” is the name given to the smallest unit in grammar, which by definition has no structure: its relation to items abstracted at other levels, such as phonemes, is not one of structure, but involves the interrelation of different dimensions of abstraction.
It is important to notice that this is in the first instance a terminological alternative, not necessarily implying a different theory. It is not the case that the linguist has to choose between two different kinds of classification, the syntactic and the morphological; he has in fact to recognise both kinds of likeness. Moreover, the sets of items identified on these two criteria often coincide: we may recognise a syntactic class “noun”, for example, defined as “that class of word which operates as head of a nominal group”, and find that the items grouped together on this criterion will be the same set as would be grouped together on a morphological criterion such as “that type of word which is made up of a stem morpheme followed by a morpheme of case and a morpheme of number”. Indeed other things being equal, it is usually accepted as desirable that the two should coincide: when the linguist is faced, as he often is, with a choice between two descriptions, both theoretically valid and both accounting for the facts, one in which the two assignments coincide and one in which they do not, he will normally, and “intuitively”, choose the former. For example, groups in English such as this morning operate in clause structure both as Adjunct, as in “I came this morning”, and as Subject (or Complement), as in “this morning promises to be fine” (or “I’ve set this morning aside for it”). The syntactic class defined by operation as Adjunct is the adverbial group; that defined by operation as Subject or Complement is the nominal group. Syntactically, therefore, this morning could be assigned to either or both of these classes. Morphologically, however, it clearly resembles other nominal groups (the morning, this man, etc.) rather than other adverbial groups (quickly, on the floor, etc.), and this can be allowed to determine its primary syntactic assignment.
There are, however, clear instances where syntactically defined sets do not coincide with morphologically defined sets; and it would probably be generally agreed that, whatever the status accorded to the latter, the former cannot be ignored. Syntactic likeness must be accounted for. Moreover, even where the two sets do coincide, the criteria on which they have been established, and therefore their theoretical status, is different; and it is desirable that they should not be called by the same name. It seems to me appropriate that the term “class” should be reserved for the syntactic set (the morphological set may then be referred to as a “type”), and I propose to adopt this usage here. It is also true, in my opinion, that the class thus defined, the syntactic set, is crucial to the whole of linguistic theory, since it is required to give meaning to the basic concepts of “structure” and “system”; whereas the type, or morphological set, is more a descriptive convenience whose theoretical implications are largely internal to itself.
In the remaining sections of this paper, therefore, I should like to discuss two aspects of the syntactically defined set, which I shall refer to henceforward simply as the “class”.

Friday, 24 July 2020

Misrepresenting Scale and Category Grammar As A Model Of Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 160):
At the end of the 1960s and the start of the 1970s there was a spate of text books that functioned as introductions to Scale and Category syntax — rather as there was to be a second spate of introductory grammars in the theory in the 1990s, this time based on Halliday's IFG. Each of those early textbooks had its st[r]ong points, but two stood out because of their clear vision of a model of language in which one component was systemic and presented the system networks that constituted the 'meaning potential' of the language, and another component which provided for the structures — using the familiar Scale and Category concepts (minus 'system'). The first was Muir's two-part text book, with one part on structures and one on systems, and the other was the two-volume work that became the standard introduction to the theory (Berry 1975 and 1977). Berry (1977) is particularly noteworthy for providing, in a book that was essentially designed to enable its readers to analyse texts, a sketch of how a generative version of the model would operate.³ But the key point here is that in both Muir's and Berry's books the picture of syntax that was presented was that of "Categories".
³ This set of books also included Strang (1962/69), Leech (1966), Scott, Bowley et al 1968 (where Bowley was the principal contributor), Turner & Mohan (1970) and Sinclair (1972). One reason why Berry (1975 and 1977) quickly became established as the standard introduction to the theory was that she introduces more of the theory that underpins the description than Muir (1972), including an early picture of how 'realisation' works.

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading. To be clear, here Fawcett again strategically misrepresents Halliday's first theory, Scale and Category Grammar, as a model of syntax, despite the fact that Halliday explicitly regarded 'syntax' as merely one component of grammar, which he modelled as a rank scale. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 51):
The distinction does, however, need a name, and this seems the best use for the terms “syntax” and “morphology”. Traditionally these terms have usually referred to “grammar above the word” (syntax) and “grammar below the word” (morphology); but this distinction has no theoretical status. It has a place in the description of certain languages, “inflexional” languages which tend to display one kind of grammatical relation above the word (“free” items predominating) and another below the word (“bound” items predominating). But it seems worthwhile making use of “syntax” and “morphology” in the theory, to refer to direction on the rank scale. “Syntax” is then the downward relation, “morphology” the upward one; and both go all the way.

Friday, 10 July 2020

An Addendum To The Argument For A Theory Of Syntax For SFL

Fawcett (2010: 156-7):
As an addendum to the line of argument set out here, we should note that there are important theoretical differences between the Cardiff Grammar and the Sydney Grammar (within the general framework summarised in Figure 6 in Section 4.9 of Chapter 4). The most important difference is in way in which the various 'strands of meaning' are represented. While the Cardiff Grammar represents the meanings systemically — i.e., in terms of the features that have been chosen in the system networks that constitute the 'meaning potential' of the language — Halliday represents the meaning by 'functions'. His use of this concept for representing meanings can be traced back to the stage in the development of the theory in which it was believed that the realisation of the features in the system networks necessarily took place in two stages: in the first the grammar would use the 'selection expression' of features that were chosen on a traversal of the system network to create an unordered string of 'functions' (and of conflated functions), and in the second these 'functions' would be ordered in sequence.²⁶
²⁶ See Berry (1977:29-31) for an introductory account of this version of the model. The fullest implementation by far of the concept of realisation in two stages is that described in Hudson (1971), which had 76 such 'functions' (these being explicitly at the level of form, however). In a later work Hudson reduced them to just three (Hudson 1976), and this constitutes a little subsidiary evidence for the position taken here, i.e., that it is unnecessary for a systemic grammar first to generate 'functions' and then to order them.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is true, as the careful examination on this blog demonstrates. For example, the "Sydney Grammar" is the theory that Halliday painstakingly created, whereas the "Cardiff Grammar" is merely Fawcett's alteration of the theory that Halliday painstakingly created. More importantly, as demonstrated over and over again, Fawcett repeatedly misrepresents Halliday's model, while his own model, Figure 4, is invalidated by its own internal inconsistencies.

[2] This is very misleading indeed. The discussion in Section 4.9 is not concerned with Halliday's "Sydney Grammar", but with an earlier development (c1970) that was soon superseded, as previously explained. Figure 6, in which Fawcett has added the label 'COMBINED' to Halliday's diagram, otherwise displays the earlier model:
[3] To be clear, as this blog demonstrates, this is not the most important difference between the Cardiff Grammar and Halliday's version of his own theory, but it nicely illustrates the type of misunderstandings that invalidate Fawcett's version of Halliday's theory. As previously explained, Fawcett represents 'strands of meaning' — that is, structures — as systemic features.  As well as confusing the syntagmatic with the paradigmatic axis, this results in features of the clause being  represented as features of clause constituents.

Halliday's 'functions', on the other hand, are elements of function structure, with each structure of the clause being the relation between elements.

[4] To be clear, this "concept for representing meanings" is the syntagmatic dimension of the theory. As previously explained, Fawcett's model (Figure 4) misrepresents the relation between system and structure as a (stratified) relation between potential and instance:
[5] To be clear, other people's interpretations of earlier versions of Halliday's theory do not represent the "Sydney Grammar". That is, the inclusion of this in Fawcett's argument constitutes the logical fallacy known as a red herring.

[6] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Halliday's theory. To be clear, the grammar does not first generate "functions" — i.e. elements of function structure — and then order them. In SFL Theory, the grammar is modelled as a system of choices, with different choices specifying the different structures that realise them.

Sunday, 6 May 2018

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On System Networks

Fawcett (2010: 49-50):
Today, very many systemic functional linguists would take it as axiomatic that system networks such as those for TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. model choices between meanings, i.e., semantic features. These linguists include those who work in the framework of the Cardiff Grammar (including those in China and Japan), those working with the Nottingham Grammar (as described in Berry (1975, 1977 and 1996:8-9), those who are applying systemic functional grammar to other semiotic systems (e.g., Kress & van Leeuwen 1997, van Leeuwen 1999 and probably O'Toole 1994). Moreover, Halliday himself continues to write in a similar manner at times, e.g., in IFG:

In a functional grammar, [...] a language is interpreted as a system of meanings [my emphasis], accompanied by forms through which the meanings can be expressed (Halliday 1994:xix).
In this view of the basic architecture of language, then, the meaning potential constitutes the level of semantics.  More precisely, it is the task of the system networks to model those 'meanings' that are expressible through realisation rules at the level of form (Figure 4 in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3).

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here again Fawcett argues for his misunderstanding of Halliday by means of the logical fallacy known as 'Argumentum ad populum':
Argumentum ad populum (appeal to widespread belief, bandwagon argument, appeal to the majority, appeal to the people) – a proposition is claimed to be true or good solely because majority or many people believe it to be so.
[2] Again, see any of the previous posts on the distinctions
  • between meaning potential (language as system) and meaning as stratum (semantics), and
  • between functional grammar (wording viewed from semantics) and semantics (meaning).
See also Halliday & Matthiessen (1999) for Halliday's semantic systems of the ideational metafunction.

[3] Here again Fawcett misunderstands Halliday in a way the favours his own (unsupported) position; see [2].

[4] Here Fawcett misleads by omission: failing to tell the reader that this (incorrectly sourced) quote from Halliday (1994: xiv) is part of an argument in which Halliday gives reasons for the inappropriateness of the term 'syntax' in a functional approach to grammar:

[5] This clarification (more precisely) of Fawcett's own misunderstanding (see [2]) is merely a restatement of his own model (Figure 4) — itself riddled with internal inconsistencies due to his misunderstandings of the dimensions of realisation and instantiation, as previously demonstrated here and elsewhere.

Sunday, 29 April 2018

Employing Two Logical Fallacies: 'Argumentum Ad Populum' And 'Appeal To Authority'

Fawcett (2010: 49):
It was passages such as the two cited immediately above that led many systemic functional linguists — including myself — to interpret Halliday as suggesting that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on should be regarded as the semantics of a language. We accepted this as a major insight, and used it as the basic assumption for a re-interpretation of the earlier system networks. I myself first expressed this position publicly in Fawcett (1973/81), writing that 
'Meaning' is concerned with the intra-linguistic level of semantics. [...] A network may therefore be regarded as a summary of a complex area of meaning potential [my emphasis] (Fawcett 1973/81:157). 
And Berry, in her classic introduction to systemic linguistics, writes that 
the terms in a system [...] are distinct meanings within a common area of meaning [my emphasis] (Berry 1975:144). 
In a similar vein Kress, in his insightful account of the development of Halliday's ideas, states that 
the freeing of system from surface structure has a consequence that systems are now made up of terms which are semantic features [my emphasis] (Kress 1976:35).

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here Fawcett supports his misunderstanding* of Halliday by means of the logical fallacy known as 'Argumentum ad populum':
Argumentum ad populum (appeal to widespread belief, bandwagon argument, appeal to the majority, appeal to the people) – a proposition is claimed to be true or good solely because majority or many people believe it to be so.

[2] In giving authoritative weight (classic, insightful) to the opinions of these linguists, Fawcett also supports his misunderstanding* of Halliday by means of the logical fallacy known as 'Appeal to authority':
An appeal to authority is an argument from the fact that a person judged to be an authority affirms a proposition to the claim that the proposition is true. Appeals to authority are always deductively fallacious; even a legitimate authority speaking on his area of expertise may affirm a falsehood, so no testimony of any authority is guaranteed to be true.

* See any of the previous posts on the distinctions
  • between meaning potential (language as system) and meaning as stratum (semantics), and
  • between functional grammar (wording viewed from semantics) and semantics (meaning).