"A Theory Of The Type Described Here"

Fawcett (2010: 293):

All in all, we can say that a theory of the type described here — together with the theory of system networks and their realisation as illustrated in Appendix A and in Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993) — provides a principled analysis of English syntax that is at every point explicitly functional. It therefore continues the line of development that extends from "Categories" through "Language as choice in social contexts" and, in some measure "Systemic theory". And since the theory of system networks and of the realisation component are clearly quite close in the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars — at least, so long as Halliday continues to regard the networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. as modelling the 'meaning potential' — it is in the theory of syntax that one of the major differences between the two is to be found.

The other great difference, of course, is the answer to the question "What further components does each model have above the system networks for TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc? But that must await another book!

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence. Moreover, there is much evidence that this is not the case, as demonstrated by Fawcett's focus on syntax and form, and his rejection of the three function structures of the clause as proposed in SFL Theory.

[2] To be clear, "the theory of system networks and their realisation as illustrated in Appendix A" will be examined in future posts. But as a foretaste, the only system network that Fawcett provides in this entire publication (p298) construes every noun in English not only as a feature in the network , but also as a feature of either 'mass' or 'count':

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The Cardiff Grammar diverges from this line of development at its very beginning, Scale & Category Grammar (1961). By 1977 (Text as Semantic Choice in Social Contexts), Halliday had already devised the SFL model of stratification that Fawcett does not use, and the metafunctional clause structures that Fawcett rejects.

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue, as the system network above, and the previous examinations of Fawcett's realisation operations demonstrate.

[5] This is misleading, because, although it is true that these systems model 'meaning potential' in Halliday's understanding of the term, language as system, they have never modelled it in Fawcett's misunderstanding of the term, as the semantic stratum.

[6] This is not misleading, because it is not untrue.

[7] To be clear, the "component" that SFL Theory "has above" the system of MOOD is the system of SPEECH FUNCTION; e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 136):

By the same token, the "component" that SFL Theory "has above" the system of TRANSITIVITY is the model of the figure; e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 53):

For the the "component" that SFL Theory "has above" the system of THEME, see the discussion of the text base in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398-413).

[8] To be clear, this book is still awaited, 21 years after the first edition of this publication.

"What Is Certain"

Fawcett (2010: 292-3):

What is certain is that, if the framework for grammar set out in "Categories" had not existed, there would not have been a 'base framework' from which to explore the alternative approaches to the problems of modelling language that have been developed in the years since then within the framework of SFL. And if these explorations had not occurred, the theory of syntax presented here would not have evolved as it has. From this viewpoint, the impressive thing about "Categories" is that it provided a framework of concepts, each of which could be adapted, tested and either adapted further or discarded as a significant part of the developing theory.

The changes in the theoretical apparatus for expressing the categories and relationships of functional syntax that are described in this book reflect, I believe, our growing understanding of what a systemic functional model of language should be like. But these categories no longer constitute the full theoretical apparatus of the grammar, as they did in 1961. They are just the theoretical apparatus that is required at the level of form. But they are the type of theory that is required for a syntax that realises the meaning potential of a language, i.e., the meanings of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is not misleading, because it is true. If Halliday had not devised his original theory, Scale & Category Grammar, 60 years ago in 1961, Fawcett would have had no template on which to build a theory he could call his own.

[2] To be clear, what Fawcett views as impressive is the fact that he was able to use Halliday's original theory to create his own.

[3] To be clear, as the evidence on the blog demonstrates, this belief is not justified. For example, 

• the architecture of the Cardiff Grammar is internally inconsistent, as well as inconsistent with SFL Theory; 
• the approach that Fawcett takes, the view 'from below' is not only inconsistent with SFL Theory, but inconsistent with a functional approach to theorising; and, 
• as Halliday (1985) explained, the 'syntax' approach to grammar is inconsistent with the approach taken in SFL Theory. 

Moreover, the Cardiff Grammar is based on Halliday's superseded Scale & Category Grammar, not Systemic Functional Grammar, and Fawcett has spent his entire book continually misrepresenting SFL Theory in ways that suit his own purposes.

[4] To be clear, here Fawcett repeats his misunderstanding of 'meaning potential' as the stratum of meaning. In SFL Theory, 'meaning potential' refers to language as system, as opposed to language as instance. The stratum of meaning, on the other hand, refers to the semantics that is realised in lexicogrammar. Moreover, in SFL Theory, the lexicogrammatical systems that realise the semantics are not just those of the clause — TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME — but those of all ranks.

Misrepresenting Halliday On 'Element Of Structure'

Fawcett (2010: 292):

However one concept, that of element of structure, has survived virtually unchanged from its initial appearance, in 1956, in Halliday's "Grammatical Categories in Modern Chinese" (1956/76). It has survived via its slight demotion in "Categories" — and its apparently even greater demotion in "Systemic theory" — to be used in essentially the same sense in IFG as it originally had, and to become one of the two principle categories in the present theory. Perhaps this is not surprising, since it is the 'element' that most clearly corresponds to the concept of 'function' in syntax — so much so that it is often used instead of it.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. For example, in the first paper (Halliday 2002 [1961]: 46ff), a structure is said to be made up of elements, and in the second, (Halliday 1995: 272-3), where the emphasis is on system, rather than structure, it is an element that is acted upon in all but one of the realisation statements.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, an element is an element of function structure, and it is the relation between elements that constitutes the structure. Each element of clause structure is the function being served by a clause constituent, group or phrase, in that clause. The function of grammatical forms, such as groups or phrases, is to realise meaning.

Fawcett's "New And More Comprehensive Theory"

Fawcett (2010: 292):

Was the theory described in "Categories", which had such an effect on so many linguists in the subsequent years, completely misguided? Of course not. The impressive thing about it is that it has proved sufficiently bendable (and mendable) for a new and more comprehensive theory to emerge from it. It is perhaps surprising that any of its concepts should have survived, given the fundamental nature of the change brought about by the elevation of the system networks to a higher level. Just as in language tout se tient (Meillet 1937), so it is also true that, in the models that we build to represent language, the function of every part depends upon the function of every other part. So it would be natural to expect that this major change would result in changes throughout the rest of the grammar. And this has happened — more clearly, however, in the present theory of syntax than in the Sydney Grammar.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett's claim here is that Halliday's superseded theory, Scale & Category Grammar (1961), was partially misguided, though Fawcett has been able to "mend" it.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett's claim here is that the impressive thing about Halliday's superseded theory is that he has been able to change it.

[3] To be clear, Fawcett's claim here is that his theory is more comprehensive than Halliday's superseded theory. This is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence.

[4] This is not misleading, because it is true.

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The template for Fawcett's theory, Scale & Category Grammar, did not feature any system networks. Because they did not exist, they could not be elevated to a higher level.

[6] Strictly speaking, un système oú tout se tient.

[7] On the one hand, this is misleading, because it gives the false impression that the architecture of the Cardiff Grammar (Figure 4) is internally consistent. On the other hand, the comparison made with SFL Theory ("the Sydney Grammar") is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence.

Fawcett's "Richly Deserved" Tribute To His Use Of Halliday's Original Theory

Fawcett (2010: 291):

Before we conclude, I would like to pay tribute to the role of Halliday's "Categories' in the development of the modern "theory of syntax for Systemic Functional Linguistics" that has been presented here. This tribute is richly deserved in spite of the fact that, as we have seen, only one of the seven original concepts of "Categories" has anything like its original meaning in the new theory of syntax. Indeed, even though Halliday still holds to his original 'rank scale' concept in IFG, in practice the concepts of 'rank' and 'unit' place [sic] little part in the description of English offered there.

However, such changes are surely no more than one should expect — given the influences on the theory in the intervening period. The first of these was directly theoretical, i.e., the revolutionary set of changes to the theory summarised in Chapter 4, of which the most fundamental was the elevation of the concept of 'system' to the semantics. The second was the widespread application of the theory to descriptions of a variety of languages, and then in turn the application of these descriptions to the task of describing large quantities of text (especially, however, texts in English) — all of which had the potential to stimulate modifications to the theory. And the third major influence on the theory was the demanding requirements of the large scale computer implementations of SFL, which have led to further advances.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett is paying "richly deserved" tribute to his own use of Halliday's first theory, Scale & Category Grammar (its role in his developing his own theory of syntax).

[2] To be clear, if Fawcett has redefined 6 of the 7 original concepts of Halliday (1961), his theory cannot be consistent with the original theory that he used as his template.

[3] On the one hand, this is misleading because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, the rank scale identifies the formal constituents that are interpreted in terms of function, and each unit on the rank scale is the entry point to the systems that specify the function structures of that unit.

On the other hand, this is disingenuous, because if Fawcett honestly believed that the rank scale played little part in IFG (SFL Theory), he would not have spent so much time in the body of this work, and in its Appendices, arguing against the validity of the rank scale.

[4] To be clear, this is only true of Fawcett's model, and Fawcett provides no such systems in this entire publication. In Systemic Functional Linguistic Theory, system is the fundamental theoretical formalism, and not only are all strata are modelled as system networks, but system is the model of the potential of which texts are instances.

[5] To be clear, the biographical recount, that these applications of "the" theory led to modifications and further advances, is a bare assertion, that can only be taken on trust.

Misrepresenting Both The Cardiff Grammar And SFL Theory

Fawcett (2010: 287):

Finally, we should return to the IFG framework in order to note that it requires, as well as 'multiple structures' such as those found in IFG, a way of modelling the integration of these different structures in a final, integrated structure, i.e., one in which the five or more structures of an IFG-style representation must be integrated. It currently lacks this, so that it requires a theory of syntax such as that outlined here to model this integrated structure.

Thus, even though the two theories of syntax share a common origin in "Categories", they are now very different. The two theories are equally 'systemic' and 'functional', in that they both operate within the generalised model of level of language that was presented in Chapter 3 and summarised in Figure 4 in Section 3.2 of that chapter. However, as we saw in Section 7.4 of Chapter 7, the Sydney Grammar appears to need an additional component in order to integrate its multiple structures.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. To be clear, in SFL Theory, the clause has only three lines of structure — textual, interpersonal and experiential — and these are integrated in the syntagm of groups ± phrases that realise them. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 74, 212):

The clause, as we said, is the mainspring of grammatical energy; it is the unit where meanings of different kinds, experiential, interpersonal and textual, are integrated into a single syntagm.

[2] To be clear, here Fawcett finally reveals his motive for continually misrepresenting SFL Theory on the integration of structure: his desire for his model of structure to fill the integrating rôle. However, even ignoring the fact that this rôle, unknown to Fawcett, is already filled, it can be readily seen that Fawcett's proposal would result in theoretical inconsistencies. For example, consider Fawcett's example (p289):

That very experienced reporter had guessed that they had lost all of the money

and how Fawcett's theory of syntax would integrate 'the multiple structures found in IFG':

[3] This is misleading, because SFL is a theory of grammar, not a theory of syntax. SFL Theory models syntax and morphology as a rank scale, a notion that Fawcett rejects, but unwittingly uses.

[4] On the one hand, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence. On the other hand, it is misleading, because it is demonstrably untrue. Fawcett's theory is not "equally systemic" since, as Fawcett explicitly admits (p280), the concept of system 'has no rôle in the present model of syntax'. By the same token, Fawcett's theory is not "equally functional" since the perspective taken on the grammar is not 'from above', in terms of function, but 'from below', in terms of structure, as demonstrated, for example, by Fawcett's means of classifying groups.

[5] This is very misleading indeed, because it is a deliberate gross misrepresentation. SFL Theory does not "operate within the generalised model of level of language…summarised in Figure 4". Ignoring the demonstrated fact that Fawcett's theoretical architecture in internally inconsistent, the falseness of the claim can be demonstrated by comparing the models. Fawcett (p36):

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 26, 31):

Fawcett's Understanding Of "The Concepts Underlying IFG"

Fawcett (2010: 285-6):

The core of the IFG framework still appears to be the concept of units on the 'rank scale' — even though it is mentioned only occasionally in IFG and not at all in "Systemic theory". Moreover, the concept of class (which is always 'class of unit') is tied into the 'rank scale' too, in that it is defined in terms of its patterns of operation in the unit next above on the 'rank scale'. The concept of element of structure continues to serve a vital role in the theory, though it receives little overt recognition. The concept of delicacy seems to hover between being a theoretical category and a descriptive convenience. (Systemically the more important concept is dependence, and structurally, as I suggested in Section 10.3.4 of Chapter 10, showing structures with varying degrees of delicacy adds unnecessary complexity to the representation of texts.) And exponence in "Categories" was a concept waiting to be redefined as realisation, and then needing to be split up into specific realisation operations. The original concept of 'exponence' has no role in the theory of syntax that underlies IFG, though 'realisation' is used as the general term for the interstratal relationship. To these concepts from "Categories" Halliday has added three further ones: 'multiple structures' in the clause, and 'parataxis' and 'hypotaxis'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. On the one hand, the rank scale provides the organisation of Halliday (1994), and the entry conditions to grammatical systems. On the other hand, the rank scale is, of course, mentioned in "Systemic Theory". Halliday (1995 [1993]: 273):

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, units (e.g. groups) are classified (e.g. nominal) according to the elements of structure of the higher rank that they prototypically realise (e.g. participant).

[3] This is misleading, though comically so, because all editions of IFG pay far more attention to elements of structure — at clause rank: participants, processes and circumstances — than they do to the systems that specify them.

[4] This is misleading, also comically so, because delicacy is the ordering principle of the system network (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 20), which is the fundamental formalism of Systemic Functional Theory.

[5] This is misleading, because taxis (interdependency) is not more important than delicacy, if only because taxis is confined to the logical metafunction, whereas delicacy is a dimension of every system of all metafunctions.

[6] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue, no matter how many times Fawcett repeats it (the logical fallacy known as the argument from repetition). On the one hand, the organising principle of such structures is composition (extension), not delicacy (elaboration). On the other hand, the bare assertion that they add unnecessary complexity to the description is invalidated by the additional explanatory potential that they provide.

[7] This is misleading. On the one hand, the term 'exponence' (Halliday 1961) was not redefined as realisation. Instead, SFL Theory distinguishes two different types of relation that were conflated in Firth's use of the term: realisation and instantiation. On the other hand, the concept of realisation is not "split up into specific realisation operations". That is, realisation operations are not subtypes of the concept of realisation, but statements that identify circumstances in which the relation obtains. 

[8] This is misleading. On the one hand, the two relations inherent in the original concept of 'exponence', realisation and instantiation, both play very important rôles in SFL Theory. On the other hand, realisation is not merely the relation between strata. Realisation obtains wherever there is a relation of symbolic abstraction, as, for example, between:

• function and form,
• system and structure,
• selection expression and lexical item.

And importantly, SFL Theory reduces syntax (and morphology) to a rank scale of formal units, which is not what Fawcett means by "the theory of syntax that underlies IFG".

[9] This is seriously misleading, because it misrepresents SFL Theory as simply the addition of metafunction structures and taxis to Scale & Category Grammar; see the following post for evidence that invalidates the claim.

Misrepresenting SFL Theory On The Location Of Grammatical Systems

Fawcett (2010: 285):

Clearly, Halliday sees the concepts of "Categories" as also being the concepts that underlie IFG — but with certain additions such as the concepts of 'multiple structures' and the two relationships between units of 'parataxis' and 'hypotaxis'. Let us now compare the two frameworks — i.e., the one that is derived from "Categories" and exemplified most fully in IFG (which we shall call "the IFG framework") and the one proposed here.

First, in both theories the original "Categories" concept of 'system' has been removed from the theory of syntax, as a result of its elevation to the role of modelling meaning potential. However, even though both theories are derived from the remaining concepts of "Categories", the conceptual core of each is quite different.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, if Halliday saw Systemic Functional Grammar as basically Scale & Category Grammar "with certain additions", he would not have been motivated to come up with a new name for his new theory.

[2] This is misleading on two fronts. Less importantly, Systemic Functional Grammar is not a theory of syntax, as Halliday (1985: xiv) makes clear. More importantly, because, as previously demonstrated, Fawcett misunderstands 'meaning potential' to mean semantics, he is here making the knowingly false claim that the grammatical systems of THEME, MOOD and TRANSITIVITY have been elevated to the stratum of semantics in SFL Theory. Semantics is where Fawcett desperately wishes to locate them, but not where Halliday actually locates them.

[3] This is not misleading, because it is true.

Seriously Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Structural Discontinuity

Fawcett (2010: 284-5):

However, the present theory introduces several concepts that are not found explicitly in any of "Categories", "Systemic theory" or IFG. These include the central roles given to the three key relationships of 'componence', 'filling' and 'exponence'; the recognition that classes of unit are determined by their internal structure; the fact that many units fill many elements of many other units (so that 'embedding' is seen as a valuable resource for constructing meanings). 

In addition the theory incorporates a number of well-recognised concepts that are not mentioned in those works, such as 'discontinuity' in units. The familiar concept of 'co-ordination' occurs in both theories, but in IFG it is included in 'parataxis' (which is contrasted systemically with "hypotaxis").

Blogger Comments:

[1] For the theoretical problems with these key relationships, see the relevant posts:

• here for componence
• here for filling, and
• here for exponence.

[2] To be clear, as previously explained, this "recognition" is inconsistent with SFL Theory, though consistent with Formal theories, since it takes the view 'from below' (structural realisation) instead of the view 'from above' (the functions being realised).

[3] This is misleading, because it presents what is recognised by both theories as something that is solely recognised by Fawcett's model. The difference between the theories lies in the units recognised, and what constitutes genuine embedding.

[4] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The extent to which it is untrue can be demonstrated by the following figures from Halliday (1994) which illustrate cases of discontinuity in the structure of units.

p81:

p86:

p97:

p98:

p113:

p118:

p140:

p208:

p209:

p268:

p286:

p288:

p290:

p350:

p367:

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the traditional notion of 'co-ordination' corresponds to paratactic extension, whereas in Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar, the term 'co-ordination' is applied to what in SFL Theory is:

• paratactic elaboration
• hypotactic elaboration
• paratactic extension
• paratactic enhancement.

See the earlier post Summary Of How The Cardiff Grammar Handles Hypotaxis And Parataxis.

Probabilistic Filling Relationships

Fawcett (2010: 283-4):

Appendix B summarises the main facts of what filling relationships are possible. In other words, statements about where a unit can and cannot occur have to be made for each unit and for each element that it may fill. This approach to the relations between units seems to correspond more closely to the patternings that we find in naturally-occurring texts than the picture that emerges when one tries to apply the 'rank scale' hypothesis that is embodied in "Categories" and IFG. In Appendix B, the differences in the probability that a unit will fill one element or another are indicated for conversation, and we must expect that some adjustments will be needed for other registers, such as academic writing.

However, the ultimate source of these probabilities is in the generative grammar. Here the probabilities are shown as percentages on features in systems, so that the theoretical-generative version of the model is capable of great refinement. Indeed, the probabilities can be changed in the light of specific contextual or systemic contexts. (See Fawcett, Tucker & Lin 1993 for a fuller picture.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. On the one hand, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence. On the other hand, it is nonsensical, because Fawcett has the relation between data and theory backwards. The "patternings that we find in naturally-occurring texts" depend on which theory is used to construe the data as patternings.

[2] To be clear, the ultimate source of these probabilities is the data.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1961) And (1994) On The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 282):

Let us now turn to Halliday's concept of the 'rank scale', as presented in "Categories". This predicts that every element of the clause will be filled by a group or by a 'rankshifted' clause, and that every element of a group will be expounded by a word (unless filled by a 'rankshifted' group or clause). Thus what Halliday terms "upward rank shift" is permitted, but "downward rank shift" is not. However, we saw in Chapter 7 that the picture changes in IFG, so that Halliday now only permits embedded clauses to function within groups (at least, in English).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As previously explained, the rank scale is a model of formal constituency, not function structures. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 43):

The units of grammar form a hierarchy that is a taxonomy. … The relation among the units, then, is that, going from top (largest) to bottom (smallest), each consists of one, or of more than one, of the unit next below (next smaller). The scale on which the units are in fact ranged in the theory needs a name, and may be called rank.

In SFL Theory, the rank scale is the theoretical dimension wherein clauses consist of groups and phrases which consist of words which consist of morphemes. Each unit on this rank scale is the entry condition for systems that specify the functions (e.g. mental Process) of the constituents (e.g. verbal group) of each unit (e.g. clause).

[2] This is misleading because it is the direct opposite of what is true, as even Fawcett knows.

[3] This is misleading, because it misrepresents rankshift. Clauses can be shifted from clause rank to 

• group rank, where they realise elements of clause structure, such as the Token and Value elements of [[what you see]] is [[what you get]] and
• word rank, where they realise the Postmodifier element of group structure.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1961) On Exponence

Fawcett (2010: 282):

Thus, the highly general concept of 'exponence' from "Categories" was first re-interpreted by Halliday as the second highly general concept of interstratal 'realisation'. Then the researchers at London who were developing generative SF grammars specified the particular types of operation required in realisation. These have been refined over the years, and those set out above can be seen to specify, in their turn, the relationships between categories that are found in the syntax. It is somewhat ironic that the term "exponence" is reintroduced here with roughly the sense that it was originally given by Firth (1957/68:183), before Halliday borrowed it and stretched — indeed overstretched — its meaning in "Categories".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, in Halliday (1961), 'exponence' covered what Halliday later recognised as two distinct theoretical dimensions: realisation (an identifying relation between levels of symbolic abstraction) and instantiation (an ascriptive relation between potential and instance).

[2] To be clear, 'ironic' means happening in a way contrary to what is expected, and typically causing wry amusement because of this. Fawcett's claim, then, is that it is counter-expectant and wryly amusing that he uses the term 'exponence' in a way that he deems consistent with Firth's usage.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Firstly, Halliday (1961) uses 'exponence' in the same sense as Firth, with no "stretching", and thus no "overstretching". Secondly, Halliday's later replacement of the term 'exponence' with the terms 'realisation' and  'instantiation' is not a stretching of the original term, but the more delicate distinction of two theoretical concepts conflated in the term 'exponence'.

[4] To be clear, here Fawcett trivially implies unethical behaviour on the part of Halliday by construing him as having borrowed something of Firth's and stretched it.

The Problem With 'Exponence' In Its "Categories" Sense

Fawcett (2010: 280-1):

Since this is a comparison as well as a summary, we shall take as our starting point one of the 'scales' of "Categories": the highly generalised concept of 'exponence'. The problem with 'exponence' in its "Categories" sense is that it covers a very larger [sic] number of different concepts — i.e., every relationship between "the categories of the highest degree of abstraction" (by which Halliday means the features in the system networks) and "the data" (Halliday 1961/76:71). 

However, when in the 1960s Halliday introduced the concept that systems are choices between meanings, he also introduced the term realisation as a replacement for "exponence", and it quickly came to be used as the standard general term for referring to the relationship between different levels (or strata) of language. In the context of the present discussion it refers to the relationship between meaning and form (as described in Chapter 3 and as summarised in Figure 4 in Section 3.2 of that chapter).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true that, in Scale & Category Grammar, 'exponence' covered "a very larger number of different concepts". What is true is that it covered both realisation and instantiation, the latter being what Fawcett glosses as "a very larger number of different concepts". By this, Fawcett again demonstrates — as he does in Figure 4 — that he does not understand the SFL notion of instantiation. Halliday (1995: 273):

… 'realisation' (formerly 'exponence') is the relation between the 'strata,' or levels, of a multistratal semiotic system-and, by analogy, between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic phases of representation within one stratum. But in systemic theory, realisation is held distinct from 'instantiation,' which is the relation between the semiotic system (the 'meaning potential') and the observable events, or 'acts of meaning,' by which the system is constituted.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, 'exponence' is replaced by both 'realisation' and 'instantiation'.

[3] This is not misleading, because it is true. However, Fawcett's model (Figure 4) violates this relation between meaning and form by falsely positing that:

• system networks are realised by realisation rules, and
• selection expressions are realised by structures.

The Concept Of 'Unit' Has No Rôle In Systemic Functional Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 280):

The first "fundamental category" in "Categories" was that of a 'unit', but this concept, as will by now be abundantly clear, has no role to play in the theory of syntax proposed here, because it is inherently bound up with the concept of 'rank'. The word "unit" is used here, however, as a short form for the concept of 'class of unit'. Surprisingly, the concepts of 'unit' and its partner 'rank' occur only rarely in the recent writings of Halliday and Matthiessen. Yet it is clear that this pair of concepts still provides the general framework for the description of English set out in IFG — just as they underpinned the theory of syntax presented in "Categories".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is nonsensical, because the concept 'class of unit' includes the concept 'unit', just as the concept 'breed of dog' includes the concept 'dog'. Moreover, Fawcett's fear of acknowledging the concept is entirely unnecessary, because 'unit' is only "bound up with" the concept of 'constituency', which can be modelled in ways other than rank (e.g immediate constituent analysis).

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. SFL Theory models grammatical form as a rank scale of units and assigns functions (e.g. Token) to the constituents (e.g. nominal group) of each unit (e.g. clause). However, grammatical form is backgrounded in SFL Theory, because, as a functional grammar, rather than a formal grammar, it gives priority to function over form.

The Concept Of 'System' Has No Rôle In Systemic Functional Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 279-80, 280n):

The fourth "fundamental category" in "Categories" was, of course, the concept of system. It was Halliday's re-interpretation of this term in 1966 as 'choice between meanings' that made it the fundamental concept of a new model of language, and so of a new theory of 'meaning' (as we saw in Chapters 3 and 4). It therefore has no role in the present model of syntax.²

² It would be possible to envisage a model with a set of system networks that represented choices at the level of 'pure' form such that these were 'predetermined' by choices made at a higher level of 'semantics'. Hudson's work (e.g., Hudson 1971) is presented as a systemic model of syntax of just this type (with no ambition to model choices between meanings), but this is not the direction in which Halliday has led Systemic Functional Linguistics. I would claim that the fact that the Cardiff Grammar can indeed operate with system networks that are explicitly intended to model choices in meaning and that can be directly realised in syntax at the level of form vindicates Halliday's original hunch in the 1960s that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. should be regarded as modelling choices between meanings.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the concept of system has no rôle in Fawcett's Theory of Systemic Functional Syntax.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett has provided no evidence of this "fact". He has provided no system networks of meaning, and no realisation rules that specify how choices in systems are realised as his structures. Because his structures are not those of SFL Theory, he cannot claim that they realise the SFL systems of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD and THEME.

[3] To be clear, even if this "fact" were demonstrated, it would not vindicate something that is not true (see [4] below). More importantly, such a "fact" would not distinguish a model in which the system-structure relation is modelled axially — paradigm to syntagm — as in SFL Theory, from a model in which it is modelled stratally — meaning to form —  as in the Cardiff Grammar, because, in both models the relation between system and structure is the same: realisation (symbolic abstraction). 

However, this is undermined by the fact that the Cardiff Grammar (Figure 4) misunderstands the axial distinction between paradigm and syntagm as the distinction between potential and instance, as previously explained.

[4] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Halliday's "original hunch" on the theoretical location of these systems. From the first formulation of these systems, they have been located on the stratum of lexicogrammar. However, because SFL Theory models lexicogrammar in terms of the meanings they realise, these systems are interpretations of lexicogrammatical form (the rank scale of constituents) as meaning. As Halliday (1985: xix, xx) explains:

The Fourth Fundamental Category Of The Cardiff Grammar: Place

Fawcett (2010: 279):

A fourth category that is required in the present theory is that of place, in the sense of the numbered position (or 'slot') in a unit at which an element is positioned. Interestingly, Halliday refers in passing to 'place' in "Categories", but it is not presented as a significant category, and nor is it given any role in his later work. Yet this concept has come to play an essential role in the generative versions of SF grammar — especially in providing the conceptual framework, with 'class of unit' and 'element of structure', for explaining the phenomenon known as 'raising' (as noted in Section 11.7 of Chapter 11). The first appearance of the concept of 'place' in the sense defined here was in Fawcett (1973/81) and it was later described formally in Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993). However, the concept was also used, it appears, in Mann and Matthiessen's computer implementation of Halliday's grammar (as explained in Section 10.4.2 of Chapter 10).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading, because Halliday (1961) and Fawcett do not mean the same thing by 'place'. For Fawcett (p279) 'place' refers to

…the numbered position (or 'slot') in a unit at which an element is positioned.

For Halliday (2002 [1961]: 46):

A structure is thus an arrangement of elements ordered in places. Places are distinguished by order alone: a structure XXX consists of three places. Different elements, on the other hand, are distinguished by some relation other than that of order: a structure XYZ consists of three elements which are (and must be, to form a structure) place-ordered, though they can be listed (X, Y, Z) as an inventory of elements making up the particular structure.

[2] This is misleading. The only "generative versions of SF Grammar" that feature Fawcett's concept of 'place' are those of Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar.

[3] See the previous post The Key Rôle Of 'Place' In Handling 'Raising' Phenomena.

[4] To be clear, Fawcett has produced no evidence that Mann & Matthiessen used his concept of 'place' in the Penman Project. But, in any case, the functionality of an adaptation of a theory to the limitations of computers is not an argument for its incorporation into a theory of human language.

The Third Fundamental Category Of The Cardiff Grammar: Item

Fawcett (2010: 279):

The third major concept in the present theory of syntax is that of the item. This replaces the concepts of 'word' and 'morpheme' on the "Categories" 'rank scale' of units, these two now being simply types of item. The reasons for this major change are given in Section 10.5 of Chapter 10.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, on the one hand, as previously observed, Fawcett's 'item' confuses two distinct notions of word:

1. word as grammatical constituent (composed of morphemes), and
2. word as lexical item (a synthetic realisation the most delicate lexicogrammatical features).

On the other hand, in treating words and morphemes as types of item, Fawcett misconstrues a meronymic relation as a co-hyponymic relation.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Recognising Elements Of Structure

 Fawcett (2010: 278):

A modern theory of SF syntax is — or should be — an explicitly functional theory of language, so that the criteria for recognising an element of structure are — or should be — functional and semantic rather than formal and positional. 

Thus the elements of a unit are those that are required to realise the meanings that have been selected in the system networks for realisation in this unit — ultimately, of course, as items (see below).

Halliday has surprisingly little to say in "Categories" (or indeed in any later writings) about the criteria for recognising elements of structure (especially the elements of groups).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, given that this is Fawcett's belief, it is surprising that he has, nowhere in this publication, provided "functional and semantic" criteria for recognising his elements of structure, and has, instead, foregrounded form (classes of unit) and position (place).

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, functional elements of grammatical structure (syntagmatic axis) are specified by realisation rules (such as 'insert Subject') in the grammatical system networks (paradigmatic axis) that the grammatical structures realise. In the absence of grammatical metaphor, grammar (wording) and semantics (meaning) are in agreement (congruent).

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday ± Matthiessen (1985, 1994, 2004, 2014) devote three chapters to providing criteria for recognising elements of clause structure, one chapter for each metafunction, and one chapter to providing criteria for recognising elements of group and phrase structure. For example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 240, 249) provide the recognition criteria for Scope and Senser as follows:

…the Scope of a ‘material’ clause is not in any way affected by the performance of the process. Rather it either (i) construes the domain over which the process takes place … or (ii) construes the process itself, either in general or specific terms…

In a clause of ‘mental’ process, there is always one participant who is human; this is the Senser: the one that ‘senses’ – feels, thinks, wants or perceives… . More accurately, we should say human-like; the significant feature of the Senser is that of being ‘endowed with consciousness’. Expressed in grammatical terms, the participant that is engaged in the mental process is one that is referred to pronominally as he or she, not as it.

It is the fact that, in a functional theory, such criteria are 'from above' — rather than 'from below' — that may explain why Fawcett is unable to recognise them as criteria.

The Second Fundamental Category Of The Cardiff Grammar: Element Of Structure

Fawcett (2010: 278):

We turn now from 'class of unit' to 'element of structure'. In "Categories" the "fundamental category" was said to be the concept of the 'structure' of a unit, but in the present theory it is recognised that the more specific and so more useful notion is the concept of element of structure. In Halliday (1956/76) element had been one of the key concepts, but in "Categories" it was curiously sidelined in favour of the less specific concept of the structure of a unit. The concept of 'element of structure' is nonetheless present throughout IFG, and it is impossible to envisage a SF grammar that did not give it a central role. This, then, is the second major category in the present theory of syntax.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true that 'element' was "sidelined in favour the less specific structure of a unit" in Halliday (1961). To be clear, Halliday (2002 [1961]: 41) identifies the fundamental categories of Scale-&-Category grammar as unit, structure, class and system, and then discusses structure in terms of elements (Halliday (2002 [1961]: 46-9). It is this that Fawcett misrepresents as a "sidelining" of 'element' in favour of 'structure'.

[2] To be clear, on the one hand, this is nonsensical, because, since 'element' and 'structure' are mutually defining, one cannot be more useful than the other. On the other hand, it is misleading, because it gives the false impression that Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar has some advantage over its source, Halliday's Scale-&-Category Grammar, despite the fact that both theories (necessarily) use both concepts.

[3] This is not misleading, because it is true. In SFL Theory, it is the relation between functional elements that constitutes the structure. Moreover, elements are the syntagmatic functions (e.g. Phenomenon) assigned to forms (e.g. nominal group), and as functional theory, SFL is concerned with the functions of forms.

The First Fundamental Category Of The Cardiff Grammar: Class Of Unit

Fawcett (2010: 277-8):

The first fundamental category in the present theory is the concept of class of unit. However, the criteria used for recognising examples of classes of unit (and at the development stage of the grammar for setting up new units) are significantly different from those used in "Categories" and still used in IFG, so that it is effect a different concept from Halliday's 'class of unit'. In "Categories", the class of a unit is said to be determined by its potential for operation at given elements of the unit next above on the 'rank scale' — and in IFG classes of unit still appear to be assigned on the same principle (even though this leads to various anomalies, as pointed out in Section 10.2 of Chapter 10). 

Halliday has stuck by this criterion in spite of the fact that most of his grammatically-minded colleagues of the 1960s and 1970s (Huddleston, Hudson and Sinclair) seem to have given increasing weight to internal structure and semantics, as we saw in Section 10.2.2 of Chapter 10 — so effectively rejecting Halliday's criterion. 

In the present framework, as in Fawcett (1974-6/81), the class of a unit is identified solely by its internal structure, i.e., by its potential array of elements of structure. (But see below for their close relationship with the meanings that they realise.) For English five major classes of unit are recognised here: clause, nominal group, prepositional group, quality group and quantity group, together with the genitive cluster and a number of other classes of cluster that handle the internal structure of various types of 'name'.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar recognises 'class of unit', but does recognise 'unit'. That is, it recognises the Classifier, but not the Thing classified. This is like recognising breeds of dogs without recognising dogs. The motivation for this oxymoron is Fawcett's association of 'unit' with the rank scale, which Fawcett vociferously rejects, because he knows the rank scale makes his theory redundant. In truth, 'unit' only implies constituency, not the rank scale approach to constituency.

[2] To be clear, this is not misleading, because it is true.

[3] To be clear, this is misleading, because it is not true, as demonstrated in the examination of Section 10.2. The "various anomalies" were shown to be (motivated) misunderstandings on Fawcett's part.

[4] To be clear, this criterion is fundamental to a functional theory of grammar, and distinguishes it from formal (syntactic) theories. A functional theory gives priority to the view 'from above': the function (e.g. Process) that is expressed by a form (e.g. verbal group). Fawcett's approach, on the other hand, is contrary to this fundamental principle, in that it gives priority to the view 'from below': how forms are expressed structurally.

[5] To be clear, on the one hand, Huddleston, Hudson and Sinclair do not use SFL Theory, and so take a different approach to language, founded on different assumptions. On the other hand, what matters intellectually is not the rejecting of a criterion, but the validity of the reasons for rejecting a criterion. Here Fawcett has once again indulged in the logical fallacies known as the appeal to popularity, since he suggests that his view must be preferred simply because it is held by others, and the argument from authority, since he presents Huddleston, Hudson and Sinclair as authorities whose opinions matter simply on that basis.

[6] To be clear, as explained above, and previously, Fawcett's approach, the view 'from below', is contrary to a functional approach to language.

[7] See, for example, the earlier post Limiting All Classes Of Semantic Unit To Experiential Meaning.

[8] To be clear, 'clause' is a unit, not a class of unit. An adverbial clause is a class of unit; a clause is the unit of which it is a class.