Not Understanding Halliday (1993) On Rank

Fawcett (2010: 84):

We turn now to the concept of 'rank' — the 'scale' which, with 'unit', provides the major organising principle of the grammar in "Categories". The definition that Halliday gives of it in "Systemic theory" is one of the more puzzling sections of the paper. Here he defines 'rank' in a somewhat opaque manner, writing: 

'Rank' is constituency based on function, and hence 'flat', with minimal layering. (Halliday 1993:4505) 

The meaning of "and hence flat" can be clarified by expanding the last part of Halliday's definition to "and hence represented by diagrams that resemble 'flat trees' rather than 'trees with multiple branching'". And such trees naturally have "minimal layering".

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Fawcett provides no evidence that he understands Halliday here.  By 'constituency based on function, and hence 'flat', with minimal layering' Halliday means constituency based on minimal bracketing (ranked constituents) rather than maximal bracketing (immediate constituents).  Halliday (1985: 23):

 

 

Minimal bracketing at three ranks yields (Halliday 1985: 21):

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On Delicacy

Fawcett (2010: 84):

Let us begin with delicacy. I suggested in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2 that this concept belongs essentially with that of 'system' (and so with 'system network'), such that one system is more "delicate" than another if its entry condition is a feature in that other system — and so on, across a chain of such dependencies (as illustrated on a small scale in Figure 1 of Appendix A). It follows, then, that the elevation of the 'system' to model contrasts in 'meaning potential' rather than contrasts between forms brings with it a similar change in the meaning of 'delicacy' — so that 'delicacy' has similarly become a partly different concept. It is therefore not simply "retained", as Halliday says (p. 4505); it has been adapted, just as the concept of 'system' has been adapted. However, there is what we might term a "second order" manifestation of the concept, i.e., its use to describe the relationship between 'primary' and 'secondary structures'. (See Figure 7 in Section 7.2 of Chapter 7 for the presentation of MOOD as having both a 'primary' and a 'secondary' structure, and see Section 10.3.4 of Chapter 10 for a critical discussion of this concept.) With these substantial provisos, then, we may say that the term "delicacy" is used in "Systemic theory" in a roughly similar sense to that which it had in "Categories". 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, the theoretical meaning of systemic 'delicacy' is Halliday's formulation, not Fawcett's suggestion.

[2] This is misleading because it seriously misunderstands the notion of delicacy.  Because the scale of delicacy is a dimension of systems — semantic, lexicogrammatical, phonological — the stratal location of systems does not change the meaning of systemic delicacy.

[3] Here again Fawcett confuses language as system (meaning potential) with semantics as stratum (meaning).

[4] This is misleading.  To be clear, delicacy is a dimension of system, not structure.  To anticipate the examination of Chapter 7, compare Fawcett's Figure 7 with the delicacy of the MOOD system of Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

 

Using Halliday (1961) As The Benchmark Of Halliday (1993)

Fawcett (2010: 83-4):

Thus, only one of the four "fundamental" categories of "Categories" appears in the list of "basic concepts" in "Systemic theory" (i.e., 'system') — and even then it has a significantly modified sense. Two are either used informally or presupposed (i.e.,  'element' and 'class (of unit)'), but it is really surprising to find that they are not presented as "basic concepts". And one of the four original "fundamental concepts" ('unit') is completely missing.

How far, then, are the 'scales' of "Categories" still treated as "basic concepts" in "Systemic theory"? In the section headed "Other basic concepts" Halliday makes the claim that "systemic theory retains [from "Categories"] the concepts of 'rank', 'realisation' [his 1966 replacement for 'exponence'] and 'delicacy'" (Halliday 1993:4505-6). But are these the same concepts that we met in the summary of "Categories" in Chapter 2? 

Blogger Comments:

[1] See the preceding 6 posts for the validity of these claims.

[2] See the next 4 posts for the validity of these claims.

Misunderstanding Halliday (1993) On Class

Fawcett (2010: 83):

The fourth "fundamental category" in "Categories" is 'class' — and this concept too is missing from the list of "basic concepts" in "Systemic theory". This absence is equally surprising, because the concept of 'class of unit' is essential to any generative SF grammar. The reason is that the way in which such grammars work is that each pass through the system network builds the structure of a given class of unit. For example, the class of unit that the simple system network in Figure 1 of Appendix A generates is the nominal group, and it cannot generate any other class of unit. The class of unit that is generated in all of the illustrative generative grammars that Halliday presents is the clause (e.g., Halliday 1969/81). "Systemic theory" is oriented to the use of the theory in generation so that the concept of 'class (of unit)' is, in a sense, presupposed throughout, yet the fact is that it is not presented as a "basic concept".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the reason why 'class' is not presented as a "basic concept" in Halliday (1993) is because Systemic Theory is "basically" a functional theory, rather than a formal theory, and 'class' is the categorisation of form.

This, of course, does not mean that 'class' is not accounted for by the theory.  SFL models grammatical form as the rank scale, where it distinguishes classes, most explicitly at group and word rank; e.g. nominal vs verbal vs adverbial vs preposition vs conjunction group.

[2] To be clear, as already demonstrated, Fawcett's system network is inconsistent with SFL theory, not least because it construes lexical items as grammatical features of the nominal group.

[3] To be clear, here Fawcett mistakes a rank unit ('clause') for a class of rank unit (e.g. 'adverbial clause').

Deploying A Logical Fallacy In Discussing Halliday (1993) On Unit

 Fawcett (2010: 83):

How, then, have the two other "fundamental" categories from "Categories" fared, i.e., unit and class (of unit)? Amazingly, these two terms are also missing from "Systemic theory". One reason why it is surprising that the concept of 'unit' is not listed as a "basic concept" is that it is a vital part of the 'rank scale' concept — and it is this concept which provides the main organising principle in "Categories" (as we saw in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2). We shall discuss the curious treatment of the related concept of 'rank' shortly, when we ask what status is given in "Systemic theory" to the 'scales' that were introduced in "Categories".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Fawcett is amazed because two terms from an earlier theory, Scale and Category Grammar, are missing from a brief summary of a later theory, Systemic Functional Grammar. This is equivalent to being amazed because the term 'epicycle' from the earlier planetary model of Ptolemy is missing from the later planetary model of Copernicus. Clearly, Fawcett's presumption that the terms of an earlier theory should be included in a later theory is an instance of the 'red herring' logical fallacy. But see [2].

[2] This is very misleading indeed.  In this instance, Fawcett switches from 'term' to 'concept'. Contrary to Fawcett's claim, the concept of 'unit' is included in Systemic Theory, because the concept of 'rank', which is included (Halliday 1993: 273), entails the concept of 'unit', since a rank scale is a scale of units. Readers can judge for themselves whether Fawcett is deliberately trying to deceive his readers.

[3] Here again Fawcett uses the rhetorical strategy of implying a critique ("curious") while promising an argument elsewhere.  "We shall discuss" the misunderstandings that Fawcett deploys "shortly".

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On Element

Fawcett (2010: 83):

Perhaps, you might think, the concept of 'structure' in the "Categories" sense would still be reflected in "Systemic theory" through the presence of the term element, with which it is mutually defining? The term "element" does indeed appear in "Systemic theory", but once again it is used in a somewhat different sense (as I shall explain shortly). But the most surprising fact of all about the concept of 'element' in "Systemic theory" is that it is not presented as one of the "basic concepts". It is simply employed in defining other concepts — rather as if it was considered to be a non-theoretical concept whose meaning the reader is expected to interpret without guidance. In "Systemic theory", then, the concepts of both 'structure' and 'element' are used in different senses from those with which they were used in "Categories".

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  Halliday (1993: 272-3) uses 'element' in the same sense: as an element of structure, such as Subject, Finite, Theme, Process etc.

[2] This is misleading in two ways.  On the one hand, Halliday (1993: 272-3) presents 'element' in his discussion of the "basic concept" of Systemic Theory, systems, where it features in realisation statements.  On the other hand, it is not surprising that the concept should be presented this way, especially in a brief encyclopædia article, because what distinguishes Systemic Theory from Scale and Category Grammar (1961) is the 'shift to a paradigmatic orientation' (p273).  (Fawcett's orientation is to structure and form, rather than system and function.)

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue, as demonstrated above for 'element', and in the previous post for 'structure'.  That is, Fawcett has misrepresented Halliday (1993) on both matters.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On Structure

Fawcett (2010: 82-3):

However, Halliday also uses the term system in a more general sense. In this second sense it denotes 'paradigmatic relations' (or 'options in meaning potential'), and it is in contrast with the term structure, which is itself to be understood in a broad sense that embraces all aspects of syntagmatic organisation at the level of form. But we should notice this is not the sense in which the term "structure" was used in "Categories". There it was used in a quite specific sense, i.e., one in which it was mutually defining with the concept of 'element'. In other words, a second "fundamental category" is now being used in a different sense.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is the same construal of system.  In this case, system is being theoretically located in terms of the axial relation between paradigmatic system and syntagmatic structure, rather than in terms of the instantiation relation between system and instance.

[2] This is misleading, because 'form' is a level in Fawcett's model of syntax, not in Halliday's functional linguistics.  Halliday models form as a rank scale at the level (stratum) of lexicogrammar.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue.  In Categories, Halliday  (2002 [1961]: 46) writes

A structure is made up of elements which are graphically represented as being in linear progression; but the theoretical relation among them is one of order.

This is the same sense of 'structure' in Systemic Theory; e.g. the experiential structure of a clause is a configuration of elements, such as Senser ^ Process ^ Phenomenon.  What is true is that the notion of structure is backgrounded in Halliday (1993), since the priority of Systemic Functional Theory is system, not structure (and function, not form).

[4] This is misleading, because it misrepresents a fundamental category in a superseded theory (Scale & Category Grammar) as a fundamental category in the theory that replaced it (Systemic Linguistics).

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On System

Fawcett (2010: 82):

Let us begin by looking for the four concepts from "Categories" of 'unit','class', 'structure' and 'system'. We shall find, as we would expect in a theory that has been re-named "systemic (functional) theory", that system is strongly fore-grounded, so let us begin with this concept. In Halliday's words (1993:4505): "the system takes priority," and he defines a system as a set of "options in meaning potential [my emphasis]". He then goes on to show how, because an option in one system can serve as an entry condition to another, large numbers of such systems combine to form a system network. … Thus the first two "basic concepts" of "Systemic Theory' are 'system' and 'system network', where they model the "meaning potential" of a language.

One might be tempted to say that the concept of 'system' has been expanded from what it was in "Categories" rather than changed — if it were not for the vital fact that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on now model choices between meanings, as Halliday's use of the term "meaning potential" indicates.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading in a way that serves Fawcett's argument.  Systemic Theory is not a renaming of another theory.  It is a different theory.

[2] Here Fawcett continues his confusion of language as meaning potential with meaning as the semantic stratum of language.  To be clear, systems on the stratum of phonology represent the meaning potential of language, but they do not represent "choices between meanings" (semantics).  That is, Fawcett confuses instantiation (potential–instance) with the stratification of content (meaning–wording).

[3] This is very misleading. By 1993, the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, and THEME modelled choices between wordings (lexicogrammar); see [2].

Examining Systemic Theory (Halliday 1993) By Comparing It With Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961)

Fawcett (2010: 81-2):

With these issues in mind, we shall turn now to an examination of the concepts presented in "Systemic theory". Then in Chapters 6 and 7 we shall examine those in IFG. …

Halliday begins "Systemic theory" by reminding us that "systemic theory" is short for "systemic-functional theory", and this establishes from the start that the "systemic" approach to explaining language is one that is inherently oriented to 'function' and 'meaning'. The fact that SFG is a different theory of language from S&C is underlined when Halliday describes it (1993:4505) as "a development of Scale and Category Grammar"; indeed, the encyclopaedia in which "Systemic theory" appears contains a separate article on S&C grammar (Butler 1993a).

The question that we need to ask is: "How far do the seven 'fundamental' concepts of "Categories" (as described in Chapter 2 of this book) coincide with the 'basic concepts' presented in "Systemic theory", thirty-two years later?" 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Fawcett intends to examine one theory, Systemic Theory (Halliday 1993), not in its own terms, but by comparing it with a different theory, Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961).  It will be seen that Fawcett frames the differences between the two theories as shortcomings of the later theory.

Promising A Critique Of An Imaginary Theoretical Inconsistency

Fawcett (2010: 81):

However, as we shall see in Chapter 7, it seems that two different positions on how a grammar works have been allowed to develop alongside each other in the Sydney version of SFL — and that in this case the two positions are not compatible with each other. This then raises the difficult question of which one is the 'correct' version of the theory — and, in relation to the other version, why it is different and what status it has in the theory.

Blogger Comments:

[1] It is worth mentioning, given how frequently Fawcett uses it as a rhetorical strategy, that Fawcett  primes the uncritical reader by repeatedly making substantial claims for which the evidence is said to lie elsewhere (in an upcoming chapter, in a past or forthcoming publication, etc.).

[2] To be clear, Fawcett's Chapter 7 is concerned with the 'box diagram' representations of metafunctional structures at the rank of clause in IFG. "As we shall see in the examination of Chapter 7", Fawcett's misunderstandings in this regard are multi-dimensional and, as such, very instructive.

Misrepresenting Halliday's Presentations Of Theory

Fawcett (2010: 80-1):

Thus, when Halliday was asked to write an account of 'systemic theory' for the Encyclopaedia of Languages and Linguistics, it was natural that he should draw primarily on the theoretical-generative strand of the theory. However, this leaves unanswered the question of why the aspects of the theory that are relevant to the 'text-descriptive' work that is presented in IFG are so different from the aspects presented in "Systemic theory".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, what Fawcett previously (p79) described as "most striking" is now described as 'natural'.

[2] This is misleading. On the one hand, all "aspects of the theory" are potentially "relevant to the 'text-descriptive' work", whether theory is being used to describe a language or to analyse text.

On the other hand, the reason for the different presentation of theory in Halliday (1993) and in IFG (1985, 1994) is that these texts are instances of different registers, each realising a different context.  For example, in terms of tenor, the addressee of Halliday (1993) is the general reader, whereas the addressee of IFG is an undergraduate linguistics student taking a course in Systemic Functional Grammar.

Misrepresenting Halliday's IFG

Fawcett (2010: 79-80):

The second strand of work in SFL is the one that is more widely known: this is the text-descriptive strand of work. Like the term 'theoretical-generative', the term 'text-descriptive' is intended to evoke two types of work in linguistics that do not necessarily occur together, but which in SFL tend to be mutually supportive. The first is the description of languages, where the goal is to achieve a functional description of a language with a broad coverage (rather than, for example, the identification of particular syntactic phenomena as part of a search for syntactic 'universals', as in some other theories). … Works such as Halliday's IFG and Fawcett (in press) are also in the text-descriptive tradition.

It is a descriptive linguistics of this type that is needed by many researchers in many fields of 'applied linguistics' for use in the description of texts. … The term "text-descriptive" is therefore intended to cover both of these aspects of what is perceived here as one general strand of work: the text-based description of languages and the description of texts. …

The two editions of IFG (1985 and 1994) and the many spin-off publications are the main testimony to this strand of work in the Sydney framework.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, Fawcett's notion of a 'text-descriptive aspect of theory' conflates the focus on instances of language ('text') with the practice of describing particular languages ('descriptive').

	theory	description
linguist as grammarian	language as potential	a language as potential
linguist as discourse analyst	language as instance	a language as instance

The failure to distinguish these "strands" leads to misunderstanding and misrepresentation, as demonstrated below.

[2] This is misleading.  Halliday's IFG uses a theoretical description of one language, English, to demonstrate his theory of language, Systemic Functional Grammar.  That is, in terms of Fawcett's dichotomy of 'theoretical-generative' vs 'text-descriptive', it is both 'theoretical' and 'descriptive', but not 'text', since it is concerned with language-as potential, not with language-as-instance.

[3] To be clear, this confuses the theory–description dimension with the potential–instance dimension.  The description of language-as-instance (text) requires a description of language-as-potential.  This is why linguists working on an undescribed language need to describe the language in terms of theory in order to describe (analyse) texts of the language.

What Fawcett Finds Most Striking About Halliday (1993)

Fawcett (2010: 79):

From this viewpoint, what is most striking about "Systemic theory" is that the ideas that Halliday chooses to present as the "basic concepts" of the theory are precisely the ones that are central to the concerns of the theoretical-generative strand of work in SFL (as we shall see in the next section).

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, what Fawcett finds "most striking" here is the fact that, in an Encyclopædia article titled 'Systemic Theory', Halliday outlined the basic concepts that constitute the architecture of Systemic Theory (rather than, say, a description of a language or an analysis of text).

Fawcett's Distinction Of 'Theoretical-Generative' Vs 'Text-Descriptive' Aspects Of A SF Theory Of Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 78):

Interestingly, we shall find that, in what we shall term the 'theoretical-generative' aspect of a SF theory of syntax, there are fewer important differences between the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars than there are in the 'text-descriptive' aspect. By the end of this chapter we shall see how it is that there can be a fairly close similarity between the two models with respect to one aspect of the theory, while there is not in the other.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As will be seen, Fawcett's distinction between the 'theoretical-generative' aspect of theory and the 'text-descriptive' aspect of theory confuses two distinct dimensions:

• the distinction between theory and description, and
• the distinction between potential and instance.

	theory	description
linguist as grammarian	language as potential	a language as potential
linguist as discourse analyst	language as instance	a language as instance

That is, Fawcett's notion of a 'text-descriptive aspect of theory' conflates the focus on instances of language ('text') with the practice of describing particular languages ('descriptive').

On the distinction between theory and description, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 55) write:

While a description is an account of the system of a particular language, a theory is an account of language in general. So we have descriptions of various languages such as English, Akan and Nahuatl; but we have a theory of human language in general. This introduction to (systemic) functional grammar is both an introduction to the general theory of grammar and to the description of the grammar of a particular language, English. The theory includes the ‘architecture’ of grammar – the dimensions that define the overall semiotic space of lexicogrammar, the relationships that inhere in these dimensions – and its relationship to other sub-systems of language – to semantics and to phonology (or graphology). Thus, according to systemic functional theory, lexicogrammar is diversified into a metafunctional spectrum, extended in delicacy from grammar to lexis, and ordered into a series of ranked units.

On the different foci of the linguist as grammarian on potential and the linguist as discourse analyst on instance, Halliday (2008: 84-5, 126) writes:

I shall refer from time to time to "the grammarian" and "the discourse analyst", which makes it sound as though these have to be different people; but it is obvious, I hope, that the same person may take on both rôles, and probably most of us do, unless we adopt a rigidly formalist approach. … the power of the text resides in the system, because it is the system that determines the meaning and the significance of the ongoing choices made by writers and speakers. It is a mistake to restrict our angle of vision to just one perspective or the other, or to treat the discourse analyst and grammarian as if they inhabited two different realms of intellectual being.

[2] This is misleading.  Only Fawcett's model is a theory of syntax.  Halliday (1994: xiv) explains why he rejects the term:

[3] It will be seen, by the end of this chapter, that Fawcett actually uses his confused distinction to make comparisons between Halliday's pre-Systemic theory, Scale and Category Grammar (1961), and Halliday's exposition of Systemic theory (1993).

Misrepresenting The Relation Between Theory And The Work That Contributes To It

Fawcett (2010: 77-8):

We can take the view of language presented in "Systemic theory" as broadly representative of three closely related bodies of work: (1) the work in the mid-1960s by Halliday, Henrici, Huddleston and Hudson that was to develop into the set of concepts presented in "Systemic Theory"; (2) the formalisation and computer implementation of these concepts by Mann, Matthiessen and others, as first described informally in Mann & Matthiessen (1983/85) and later more fully in Matthiessen & Bateman (1991) and (less formally) in Matthiessen (1995); and (3) — with some differences — the set of concepts used in the Cardiff Grammar, as first described in Fawcett (1973/81 and 1980) and defined most clearly in Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993). It is the first two bodies of work that "Systemic theory" reflects most closely. 

Blogger Comments:

Here Fawcett confuses theory ('the view of language') with work carried out in the developmental history of the theory.  Halliday (1993) sets out the theory itself in Sections 2-4, and lists works involved in the development of Systemic theory in Section 5.

More importantly, Fawcett misrepresents the relation between Systemic theory and such work, in as much as his identification construes the theory as decoded by reference to these works, including his own. This can be demonstrated by the following agnate clauses:

systemic theory	broadly	represents	three closely related bodies of work
Identified Token	Manner: degree	Process: relational	Identifier Value

systemic theory	most closely	reflects	the first two bodies of work
Identified Token	Manner: degree	Process: relational	Identifier Value

On the one hand, this is invalid, since it construes the theory as less abstract than the work that expresses it; and on the other hand, it is misleading, because it identifies the theory in terms of work, like Fawcett's, which may or may not be consistent with the theory.

In terms of the theoretical architecture of SFL linguistics, theory (context) is realised by the language that expresses it, with each instance of such language (individual text) realising an instance of theory.

systemic theory	is realised	by language
instances of systemic theory	are realised	by instances of language
Identified Value	Process: relational	Identifier Token

(That is, Systemic theory is encoded by reference to the language that expresses it.)

Moreover, it can be seen that, if different texts realise different instances of theory, the question arises as to whether such instances of theory are valid or not.  And that is the question that this blog asks with regard to the instance of Systemic theory realised in Fawcett (2000, 2010).

∞

It will be seen, in later posts, that this misrepresentation is a strategic necessity for Fawcett's argument in this chapter.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993)

Fawcett (2010: 77):

The picture of the nature of language that one gets from "Systemic theory" [Halliday 1993] is fascinatingly different from that given in "Categories" — and indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter, from the picture of language given in IFG. It is of course to be expected that it should be different from "Categories", since that paper appeared over thirty years earlier, but it is at first sight surprising that "Systemic theory" is so different from IFG (whose second edition was published just a year after it, in 1994). 

Blogger Comments:

Unsurprisingly, given the foregoing, as will be seen in the examination of Fawcett's Chapter 5, the theoretical differences here are not between Halliday's IFG and Halliday (1993), but between Fawcett's understanding of Halliday's IFG and  Fawcett's understanding of Halliday (1993).

On Halliday's 1972-6 Model

Fawcett (2010: 75):

Finally, I showed that there was one temporary phase in the development of Halliday's theory in which he showed the Scale and Category elements of the clause as serving the function of integrating the various strands of meanings that are always shown in any IFG-style analysis — very much as the Cardiff Grammar does, in general terms, and as this book argues that all systemic functional grammars should. Yet it is a model which Halliday quickly abandoned for reasons that are far from clear, inserting the 'integrating' elements in the 'interpersonal' strand of meaning instead, as we shall see in Chapter 7. And, as we shall also see in Chapter 7, this leaves the considerable problem of how these semi-semantic 'multiple structures' are to be integrated into a single structure.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, this hangover from Halliday's pre-Systemic theory, Scale and Category Grammar, had already been re-theorised by the time of the second edition (Halliday 1978) of the paper that Fawcett used (Halliday 1977 — written 1972-6) to exemplify the "temporary phase in the development of Halliday's theory".

[2] To be clear, this "abandonment" was a direct consequence, in Halliday (1978), of identifying units of the rank scale — clause, group, word, morpheme — as the locus onto which the structures of metafunctional systems are mapped.

[3] As will be demonstrated in the examination of Chapter 7, the "problem" here, as elsewhere, is with Fawcett's difficulty in understanding Halliday's theory.

Fawcett's Argument Against Realisation Rules In System Networks

Fawcett (2010: 75): 

Next, I showed why diagrams consisting of system networks in which the realisation rules are shown as 'footnotes' on the features are not only inadequate for a large-scale grammar but that they also give a misleading picture of language. In other words, the existence of such diagrams should not be taken as evidence that the full set of components and outputs shown in Figure 4 is unnecessary.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because, as previously demonstrated, Fawcett did not show why the location of realisation rules (statements) in system networks is inadequate for a large-scale grammar, not least because the network he used in his argument was a small-scale network of his own devising which, for example, confuses lexical items with grammatical features.

[2] This is misleading, because, as previously demonstrated, Fawcett did not show that the location of realisation rules in system networks gives a misleading picture of language.  Moreover, Fawcett's own alternative model (Figure 4) is invalidated by the fact that it locates categories of the same level of symbolic abstraction, grammatical features, at different levels of symbolic abstraction, meaning and form, depending on whether they are located in networks or in rules.

[3] To be clear, this provides Fawcett's motivation for arguing against the location of realisation rules (statements) in system networks: the fear that it invalidates his own model, whereas, in truth, what invalidates Fawcett's model is its own internal inconsistency — including its misconstrual of the relation between realisation rules and the structures that realise them as instantiation.

On The Topological Equivalence Of SFL Architecture And Fawcett's Flowchart

Fawcett (2010: 74-5):

I then gave some of the reasons why I think he is wrong to dismiss his earlier insight that the system networks constitute the level of semantics, and I argued that the topological relationships between the different parts of the model of language summarised in Figure 4 remain intact — even when the diagram is redrawn in order to make them appear to occupy a single stratum of language, as in Figure 5. The key point is that, since the relationships remain the same, it is still possible to make a direct comparison between the output structures of the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, a principal reason why the system networks are located on the stratum of lexicogrammar, rather than semantics, is that distinguishing semantic and grammatical systems improves the explanatory power of the theory by providing the means of systematically accounting for grammatical metaphor.  But this is not the only reason. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 428-9):

Within systemic-functional linguistics, Fawcett (e.g. 1980) has pioneered a "cognitive model of an interactive mind". There are many fundamental similarities with the approach we are taking here, e.g. in construing an experiential system of process configuration within the content plane. However, there are two related differences of particular interest in the context of our present discussion:

(i) in Fawcett's model, there is only one system-structure cycle within the content plane: systems are interpreted as the semantics, linked through a "realisation component" to [content] form, which includes items and syntax, the latter being modelled structurally but not systemically; 

(ii) in Fawcett's model, the semantics is separate from the "knowledge of the universe", with the latter as a "component" outside the linguistic system including "long term memory" and "short term sort of knowledge". 

With respect to (i), in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones. As we saw in Chapter 6 in particular, grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures. Since we allow for a stratification of content systems into semantics and lexicogrammar, we are in a stronger position to construe knowledge in terms of meaning. That is, the semantics can become more powerful and extensive if the lexicogrammar includes systems. It follows then with respect to (ii) that for us "knowledge of the universe" is construed as meaning rather than as knowledge. This meaning is in the first instance created in language; but we have noted that meaning is created in other semiotic systems as well, both other social-semiotic systems and other semiotic systems such as perception. Our account gives language more of a central integrative role in the overall system. It is the one semiotic system which is able to construe meanings from semiotic systems in general.

[2] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, Fawcett's model summarised in Figure 4 is invalidated by its own internal inconsistencies, including its misconstrual of axial realisation of form as instantiation.

[3] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, Figure 5 is not topologically equivalent to Figure 4, since the one cannot be formed from the other without tearing. Moreover, in terms of Fawcett's argument, it is a 'straw man' of Fawcett's own invention.  See the earlier post Attacking A Straw Man.

Realisation Between Strata And Realisation Between Axes

Fawcett (2010: 74):

Then, in the second half of the chapter, we surveyed the effect of Halliday's adoption of the concept that there is a higher set of system networks than those of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD and THEME. First we noted that this has led him to express increasingly strongly the view that the relationship between these system networks and the structures that are generated from them is only one of realisation by "extension" or by "analogy".

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the 'higher set of system networks' than the grammatical systems of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD and THEME are the systems of the semantic stratum, such as the interpersonal system of SPEECH FUNCTION and the ideational systems set out in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

[2] This is misleading. To be clear, the reason why the relation of realisation also applies to the relation between system and structure is because it is the very same relation: the fundamental semiotic relation of symbolic abstraction between a higher level Value (system) an a lower level Token (structure).

See also what Halliday actually said, in this regard, in the earlier clarifying critique: (Accusing Halliday Of) Confusing Axial Realisation With Instantiation.

Misunderstanding Realisation And Instantiation

Fawcett (2010: 74):

The new general concept that was needed to provide for these 'interstratal' relationships was realisation… . A second new basic concept was instantiation — and it is the fact that we find both a 'potential' and an 'instance' at each of the two levels within the lexicogrammar that demonstrates the presence, within the grammar, of the two levels of 'meaning' and 'form'. 

Blogger Comments:

There are several misunderstandings here.

1. In terms of theoretical architecture, the relation between potential and instance, instantiation, does not "demonstrate the presence of" meaning and form, since the relation between the levels of meaning and form is realisation (symbolic abstraction).
2. In terms of epistemology, it is not the "presence" of meaning and form that can be demonstrated, but the explanatory power of proposing such a distinction in the model.
3. In terms of theoretical consistency, by construing realisation rules as potential, and structure as instance, Fawcett's level of form confuses instantiation with the realisation relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes.

The Relation Of The Cardiff Grammar To Halliday's Evolving Theory

Fawcett (2010: 73):

One reason why Halliday's "Language as choice in social context" is important, then, is that it is to this apparently aberrant stage of his developing model that the Cardiff Grammar is most closely related. … here my purpose is simply to note the fact of this phase in Halliday's frequently changing model.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Fawcett here positions his theorising in 2010 as most closely related to Halliday's theorising in 1972-6 (published in 1977 and 1978).  That is, while Halliday kept learning and improving his model on the basis of that learning, Fawcett staid put, with the result that few, if any, of the theoretical insights built into Halliday's model in the last half-century are likely to be found in Fawcett's interpretation of Halliday's model.

Seriously Misrepresenting Halliday's Early Theorising

Fawcett (2010:71-3):

The example analysed in Halliday (1977) as an illustration of these principles is fairly complex, i.e., "I would as soon live with a pair of unoiled garden shears, " said her inamorata. Halliday's analysis of this text-sentence raises a number of interesting questions that would distract us from the main point, so we shall look instead at the simpler example from the second of Halliday's two papers that exemplify the type of analysis that reflects the above description, i.e, that in Halliday (1970/76b). This is shown in Figure 6. 

Notice first that there is a line of structure for each of the 'ideational' and the 'interpersonal' strands of meaning: with the usual two for the 'textual' meaning — i.e., one showing the 'thematic' structure, and one the 'information' structure. But the key feature of the diagram is the single line of structure which comes below these four lines, and which uses the names of the elements of the clause which were established as part of Scale and Category Grammar — i.e, at the time when the assumption was that the whole grammar was at the level of form. Some of the labels for the 'functions' are different from those found in later representations such as those in IFG, e.g., "Modal" and "Propositional" are later replaced by "Mood" and "Residue", but we shall find in Chapter 7 that the first four lines of Figure 6 correspond closely to the type of analysis found in all of Halliday's work since that time.

Figure 6 is exactly as it occurs in Halliday (1970/76b), with the exception of the word "COMBINED", which I have added (borrowing it from the equivalent diagram in Halliday (1977). It is clear that, even though there are few explanatory comments on the diagram in either Halliday (1970/76b) or Halliday (1977), Halliday's intention is precisely that of showing that the structures represented in the four 'strands of meaning' above are "combined" in the single integrated structure shown below them. In Halliday's words (1970/76b:24): "any element [e.g., the Subject] may have more than one structural role, like a chord in a fugue which participates simultaneously in more than one melodic line." 

Blogger Comments:

This is very misleading indeed, since it misrepresents Halliday's theorising at the time. Specifically, here Fawcett chooses to ignore the analysis in the 1978 edition of the Halliday paper — which puts a lie to the claims he makes about this stage of Halliday's theorising — and instead, returns to an earlier stage (1970) of Halliday's model.  Halliday (1978: 130):

As can be seen above, even at this stage, Halliday had recognised the categories of Scale and Category Grammar (Subject etc.) as interpersonal functions of the clause. 

As Halliday (1978: 129) makes very plain, it is the clause itself that combines the metafunctional structures:

Fifth, we shall assume that the lexicogrammatical system is organised by rank (as opposed to by immediate constituent structure); each rank is the locus of structural configurations, the place where structures from the different components are mapped on to each other. …

It follows from the above that each type of unit — clause, verbal group, nominal group etc. — is in itself a structural composite, a combination of structures each of which derives from one or other component of the semantics. A clause, for example, has a structure formed out of elements such as agent, process, extent; this structure derives from the system of transitivity, which is part of the experiential component. Simultaneously it has a structure formed out of the elements modal and propositional: this derives from the system of mood, which is part of the interpersonal component. It also has a third structure composed of the elements theme and rheme, deriving from the theme system, which is part of the textual component.

Misrepresenting Halliday In A Footnote

Fawcett (2010: 71n):

However, it must be said that one of the five introductory 'assumptions' in Halliday (1977/78) seems to reflect the second of the two positions on meaning identified in Section 4.6. This is when he writes: "Let us assume that each stratum [...] is described as a network of options." This view is clearly incompatible with that modelled in Figure 4 of Chapter 3, because there the component that specifies the 'potential' at the level of form is the realisation rules — and so not a system network. Since the other assumptions are fully compatible with the model described in Figure 4 of Chapter 3, and since this one therefore appears to be at odds with those others, we shall take it that its inclusion in the paper is evidence that even as he wrote it Halliday was toying with the possibility of the second of his two models of meaning.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously explained, Halliday has had only one position on meaning.  As previously explained, the difference between the early model of more than 40 years ago (Halliday 1977/78) and the current model is that the former proposed that semantic structures were mapped onto grammatical structures, an interstratal relation, whereas the latter proposes that it is grammatical systems that are realised by grammatical structures, an axial relation.  In both models, the content strata are semantics (meaning) and lexicogrammar (wording).

[2] To be clear, as previously explained, Fawcett's model, described in Figure 4, is inconsistent with all of Halliday's models, past and present, not least because it confuses axial realisation with instantiation, and distributes phenomena of the same level of symbolic abstraction, features, across different levels, meaning and form, according to whether they are positioned in networks or rules.

[3] To be clear, Halliday's third assumption, that each stratum is described as a network of options, is not theoretically inconsistent with his other four assumptions.  In this early paper, Halliday provides no systems for either semantics or grammar, but describes the organisation of the lexicogrammatical system in his fifth assumption; Halliday (1978: 129):

Fifth, we shall assume that the lexicogrammatical system is organised by rank (as opposed to by immediate constituent structure); each rank is the locus of structural configurations, the place where structures from the different components are mapped on to each other. The ‘rank scale, for the lexicogrammar of English is:

Fawcett On The Rôle Of Lexicogrammar In Halliday (1977/8)

Fawcett (2010: 71):

Halliday then makes the point that "these are strata in Lamb's sense", and the terms in brackets are intended to show the parallels with Lamb's multi-stratal model (Lamb 1966). Of the three levels distinguished here, it is the first two in which we are interested. Let us take the "semantic" level first. Halliday writes:

Let us assume that the semantic system has four components: experiential, logical, interpersonal and textual (1977:176). 

And two paragraphs later he suggests a third basic assumption:

Let us assume that each component of the semantic system specifies its own structures, as the Output' of the options in the network (each act of choice contributing to the formation of the structure). (1977:176) 

Since Halliday never shows any structures that can be de[s]cribed as "semantic" other than the multiple structures of functional elements found in IFG (which we shall be examining in the next chapter), it is clearly these to which he is referring. In other words, choices in the system network in the experiential component result in 'structures' such as 'Agent + Process + Affected'.

What, then, is the role of the level labelled "lexicogrammar" in this approach? It is a role that is very different from that which it is assigned in Halliday's 'two levels of meaning' approach to language, in which the "lexicogrammar" includes everything from the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME etc. to as their final realisation in form. Interestingly, Halliday writes in "Language as choice in social context" that

it is the function of the lexiogrammatical stratum to map the structures onto each other so as to form a single integrated structure [my emphasis] that represents all components [of the semantics] simultaneously. (Halliday 1877:176)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday (1978: 129) explicitly states this to be the case:

It follows from the above that each type of unit — clause, verbal group, nominal group etc. — is in itself a structural composite, a combination of structures each of which derives from one or other component of the semantics.

A clause, for example, has a structure formed out of elements such as agent, process, extent; this structure derives from the system of transitivity, which is part of the experiential component. Simultaneously it has a structure formed out of the elements modal and propositional: this derives from the system of mood, which is part of the interpersonal component. It also has a third structure composed of the elements theme and rheme, deriving from the theme system, which is part of the textual component.

[2] To be clear, the approach in this early paper, written between 1972 and 1976, is different from Halliday's later revised model.  In this paper, structures produced by semantic systems are mapped onto units of the grammatical rank scale.  In the current model, these semantic systems are reconstrued as lexicogrammatical systems, chiefly in order to systematically account for grammatical metaphor.  Semantic systems were later set out in Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

[3] As previously explained, this is a (motivated) misunderstanding of Halliday by Fawcett.  Halliday has never proposed a "two levels of meaning" approach to language.  His approach has consistently been to propose two levels of content: meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar).

Fawcett's Claim That His Model Is 'Fully Compatible' With Halliday (1977/8)

Fawcett (2010: 70):

The general picture that it [Halliday (1977/78)] gives of the nature of language and of how the grammar works is fully compatible with the picture given in Chapter 3. That is, the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on are presented as being at the level of semantics, and their realisations are integrated in a single structure at the level of form. (However, Halliday there terms it the 'lexicogrammatical level'; this is a little confusing, since Halliday later uses the term "lexicogrammar" in a sense that includes the system networks.) Thus the paper begins with the words:

Let us assume that the semantic system is one of three levels, or strata, that constitute the linguistic system: 

Semantic (semology)
Lexicogrammatical (lexology: syntax, morphology and lexis)
Phonological (phonology and phonetics). 

(Halliday 1977:176) 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is demonstrably false, as shown in dozens of previous posts.  The picture given in Chapter 3, as represented in Figure 4, is inconsistent in its own terms (e.g. confusing axial realisation with instantiation) and inconsistent with Halliday's model — even with the embryonic model presented in 1977.

[2] For once, this is actually true.  At this early stage of theorising, when Halliday was encoding the semantics (Value) by reference to the lexicogrammar (Token), he located the systems from which 'grammatical structures derive' — TRANSITIVITY, MOOD and THEME — at the level of semantics.  That is, at this early stage, Halliday (virtually) conflated the axial relation of realisation between system and structure with the stratal relation of realisation between semantics and lexicogrammar.  This situation was rectified within the next decade, largely motivated by the need to account systematically for grammatical metaphor.  Later still, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 429) explain:

… in our model there are two system-structure cycles, one in the semantics and one in the lexicogrammar. Terms in semantic systems are realised in semantic structures; and semantic systems and structures are in turn realised in lexicogrammatical ones. As we saw in Chapter 6 in particular, grammatical metaphor is a central reason in our account for treating axis and stratification as independent dimensions, so that we have both semantic systems and structures and lexicogrammatical systems and structures. Since we allow for a stratification of content systems into semantics and lexicogrammar, we are in a stronger position to construe knowledge in terms of meaning. That is, the semantics can become more powerful and extensive if the lexicogrammar includes systems.

[3] This is misleading in a way that supports Fawcett's own model.  Unlike Fawcett, Halliday does not propose a level of form.  As the quote that Fawcett himself provides makes clear, Halliday proposes the three strata of semantics, lexicogrammar and phonology.

[4] To be clear, Halliday (1978: 128-9) proposes systems for both semantics and lexicogrammar:

Third, we will assume that each stratum, and each component [metafunction], is described as a network of options, sets of interrelated choices having the form 'if a, then either b or c'.

with the lexicogrammatical stratum system organised by rank:

Fifth, we shall assume that the lexicogrammatical system is organised by rank (as opposed to immediate constituent structure); each rank is the locus of structural configurations, the place where structures from the different [metafunctional] components are mapped onto each other.