Fawcett (2010: 58-9):
In the work done over the last fifteen years by my colleagues and myself at Cardiff, one of our main goals has been to develop a new model of a SF grammar that tests the hypothesis that the system networks of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, THEME and so on are capable of being developed into a fully adequate model of semantics. Indeed, the very large computer implementation of a grammar (including lexis, intonation and punctuation) that we have built at Cardiff operates on precisely these principles. The first stage of this work was described in Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993) and related papers, and many aspects of the later stages have been reported in the many other papers listed in Fawcett (1998). As a result of all this work by the many members of the team, I am convinced that, in Halliday's own words (1994:xix), the "choices in the grammar [i.e., the system networks] can be essentially choices in meaning without the grammar thereby losing contact with the ground".
Blogger Comments:
[1] To be clear, the theoretical motivation for distinguishing semantic systems (e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen 1999) from lexicogrammatical systems (e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen 2014) is the resultant ability to systematically account for grammatical metaphor as an incongruence between the two levels of symbolic abstraction. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237) explain:
Of course, what we are recognising here as two distinct constructions, the semantic and the grammatical, never had or could have had any existence the one prior to the other; they are our analytic representation of the overall semioticising of experience — how experience is construed into meaning. If the congruent form had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.
[2] The citing of work carried out in Fawcett's framework is here presented as an argument in its favour. In terms of logical fallacies, this is the fallacy of relevance known as an appeal to popularity:
Appeals to popularity suggest that an idea must be true simply because it is widely held. This is a fallacy because popular opinion can be, and quite often is, mistaken.
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