Deploying Two Logical Fallacies In Misrepresenting Halliday On Realisation

Fawcett (2010: 63):

The reason why the reinterpretations by Halliday of what "realisation" means cited above are so problematical is that it is not logically possible to hold at the same time the two views that

(1) there are two levels of instances (as Figure 4 suggests that there are), and
(2) the two levels of instances are at the same level of language (as Figure 5 suggests). 

It would only be possible to hold both views if one were to claim at the same time that the selection expression of features chosen from the 'meaning potential' and the structure that so clearly manifests it at a lower level are at the same level. Yet the system networks are patently more 'semantic' than the structures that are generated from them. Indeed, when Halliday first introduced the concept of 'realisation', it was in precisely the sense of the relationship between two levels, i.e., between (1) the system networks at the level of meaning potential and — after first generating a selection expression and then applying the realisation statements — (2) the output structures, which are necessarily at the level of form.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, Halliday is consistent on the meaning of realisation; what varies is the dimension along which the realisation relation obtains: strata vs axes. The "reinterpretations" are Fawcett's misunderstandings that arise from his viewing the architecture of SFL theory through his own flowchart (Figure 4).

[2] Here Fawcett continues his use of the Straw Man logical fallacy (identified in the previous post).  As previously demonstrated, Fawcett's flowchart (Figure 4) does not represent the architecture of SFL theory, and his revised flowchart (Figure 5) does not represent Halliday's view.  Fawcett is attempting to refute a position not held by Halliday.

[3] Here Fawcett argues by using the logical fallacy of circular reasoning known as begging the question (petitio principii).  In saying 'the structure that so clearly manifests it at a lower level', Fawcett is assuming the truth of the claim he is trying to prove by argument.

[4] This bare assertion (presented as reasoned argument) clearly demonstrates that Fawcett does not understand the theoretical meaning of 'realisation'.  It is not a matter of systems being more semantic than structures; it is a matter of systems being more symbolically abstract than structures.

[5] This is misleading.  Here Fawcett misrepresents Halliday by inserting two components of his own flowchart (Figure 4), which is temporally ordered, into the realisation relation between system and structure, which is not temporally ordered.  Realisation is an intensive identifying relation, not a circumstantial identifying relation.

[6] This is another bare assertion (presented as reasoned argument) and another use of the circular reasoning logical fallacy known as begging the question (petitio principii), since it assumes the point Fawcett is trying to prove, namely that structures are at the level of form.

To be clear, SFL theorises grammatical form as a rank scale of constituency: clause, group/phrase, word and morpheme.  However, being a functional theory, the structures at each of these ranks are functions, not forms.  For example, the clause structure Token^Process^Value is a structure of functions, not a structure of forms.  Each of these functions is realised by a form of the rank below, and the structures of these forms, such as Classifier^Thing, are likewise functions, not forms.