Fawcett (2010: 140):
In practical terms, however, the simple fact that Halliday always represents the structure of clauses as a set of parallel structures sends a powerful message to his readers that the structure of language combines several 'strands of meaning'.
It is just possible, of course, that Halliday simply regards the 'multiple structure' model of structure as [a] convenient reification of 'how language really is', and that he considers it worth sacrificing the purity of the theory to provide a strong visual image of the clause as the realisation of the several different 'strands' of meaning.
Blogger Comments:
[1] To be clear, the reason why Halliday represents the syntagmatic dimension of clauses as three metafunctional structures is that this is how his theory models clause structure.
[2] On the one hand, there is a sense in which the representation of structure is a reification, since SFL conceives of structure as the relation between elements, but represents it on the page as a thing (box diagram). However, this is not Fawcett's meaning here, since he only understands structure in terms of its representation, a box diagram, a thing, rather than as a relation between elements.
On the other hand, the wording 'how language really is' makes the common epistemological error of assuming that language "really" is something, as if reality were not itself a conscious construal of experience as meaning. Models of reality, including models of language, are models of meanings construed of experience, and are (interpersonally) assessed, for example, according to how reliably, self-consistently and extensively they account for the meanings they model.
[3] The implication here is that Halliday's 'three-strand' model of clause structure contaminates an otherwise pure theory, and that a single-strand model, such as Fawcett's, lacking the contaminant, remains pure.
[2] On the one hand, there is a sense in which the representation of structure is a reification, since SFL conceives of structure as the relation between elements, but represents it on the page as a thing (box diagram). However, this is not Fawcett's meaning here, since he only understands structure in terms of its representation, a box diagram, a thing, rather than as a relation between elements.
On the other hand, the wording 'how language really is' makes the common epistemological error of assuming that language "really" is something, as if reality were not itself a conscious construal of experience as meaning. Models of reality, including models of language, are models of meanings construed of experience, and are (interpersonally) assessed, for example, according to how reliably, self-consistently and extensively they account for the meanings they model.
[3] The implication here is that Halliday's 'three-strand' model of clause structure contaminates an otherwise pure theory, and that a single-strand model, such as Fawcett's, lacking the contaminant, remains pure.
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