Seriously Misrepresenting Halliday On Groups

Fawcett (2010: 194-5):

Once we recognise that each element of a syntactic unit makes a unique contribution to realising the meaning of that unit, we can dispense with the traditional, over-narrow characterisation of the internal structure of groups as a series of 'modification' relationships. In its extreme form, this model presents groups as simply the 'hypotactic expansion' of the word class that functions as the 'head', in a series of 'modifier-head' relationships. This concept is central to 'sister dependency' grammars such as that of Hudson (1976), and it is reflected in Halliday's suggestion that there should be a 'logical' as well as an 'experiential' structure in the nominal group and the supposed 'verbal group'. (For a critique of the concept of a 'logical structure' in the 'verbal group' see Fawcett 2000.) However, to see groups as little more than the 'hypotactic expansion' of a word is to lose the important insights that come from approaching each group on its own terms, as a unit whose elements function to express meanings. Yet this is what Halliday is at times inclined to do. (See IFG pp. 180-1 and 196, and for a specific case where he treats the group very small as a 'word complex', see IFG p. 184.) 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this non-sequitur is misleading. On the one hand, SFL Theory already recognises that each element of the structure of a unit realises meaning. On the other hand, SFL Theory models the structure of groups according to two principles: univariate and multivariate. The former is the iteration of the one relation, modification, which is why it is termed 'univariate'. The latter involves multiple relations, which is why it is termed 'multivariate'; see further below.

[2] This is misleading. This is not "extreme"; it is merely the application of the univariate model to group structure.

[3] To be clear, strictly speaking, there is no series of modifier-head relationships. The logical structure of a nominal group involves one Head, and potentially, a series of Modifiers.

[4] This misunderstands the epistemological basis of theorising. It is not the case that there should be a logical structure, but that modelling the group as a logical structure provides an explanatory advantage over not doing so.

[5] To be clear, the logical structure of the verbal group provides a systematic explanation of English tense.

[6] This is very misleading indeed. Halliday is not inclined to "see groups as little more than the hypotactic expansion of a word". Halliday complements this univariate structure of the group with the multivariate, and it the multivariate structure that Fawcett describes as "approaching each group in its own terms, as a unit whose elements function to express meanings". The deception here is Fawcett's implication that his derivative model provides what Halliday's original model does not.

[7] This is misleading. Halliday (1994: 181-2) describes the experiential structure of the nominal group, not the logical structure.

[8] To be clear, Halliday (1994: 196) not only presents both the logical and experiential structure of a nominal group, but also demonstrates the value of logical structure as a distinct analysis, since it illustrates a type of instance where the logical Head and experiential Thing are not conflated:

[9] To be clear, this "specific case" appears on p194, not p184:

As can be seen from the analysis, very small is not a group, but the Epithet of a nominal group. Fawcett's interpretation of the structural representation demonstrates a serious inability to understand Halliday's model.

Again, this instance demonstrates the explanatory value of complementing the experiential model of structure with the logical model, since it is only through logical submodification that the function of every word is accounted for at group rank.