A Rank Scale That Is Not A Rank Scale

 Fawcett (2010: 189-90):

One way in which a clause may be said to be a 'higher' unit than the others — as the 'rank scale' concept predicts it to be — is the fact that the unit that is shown as the 'highest' on the page in any tree diagram representation of a text-sentence is always the clause.¹ In a generative SF grammar, provision for this fact is built into the probabilities on the features in an early system in the overall network, so ensuring that a clause is always generated first. However, we may note that the informal summary of clause syntax for text analysis purposes shown in Appendix B shows that a clause is the only unit that can fill the "element" of "sentence", and this fact is given to the computer parser of texts as a relevant part of its knowledge of syntax. However, this is a fact about clauses in relation to all other units, and on its own it does not constitute evidence that there is a 'rank scale' of units in the "Categories" sense of the term.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the rank scale does not "predict" that the clause is a higher unit than the others. The rank scale is a way of modelling constituency, and what makes the clause the highest unit, in this model, is the fact it alone is not a constituent of some other unit. A tree diagram merely represents this fact. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 43):

The units of grammar form a hierarchy that is a taxonomy. To talk about any hierarchy, we need a conversational scale; the most appropriate here might seem that of size, going from “largest” to “smallest”; on the other hand size is difficult to represent in tables and diagrams, and may also trap one into thinking in substantial terms, and a vertical scale, from “highest” to “lowest”, has advantages here. For the moment we may use both, eventually preferring the latter. The relation among the units, then, is that, going from top (largest) to bottom (smallest), each consists of one, or of more than one, of the unit next below (next smaller). The scale on which the units are in fact ranged in the theory needs a name, and may be called rank.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett's set of procedures for clause generation is inconsistent with the theory he is claiming to be developing: Halliday's superseded theory of Scale & Category Grammar. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 42):

In this view of linguistics description is, as already emphasised, a body of method derived from theory, and not a set of procedures. This has one important consequence. If description is procedural, the only way of evaluating a given description is by reference to the procedures themselves: a good description is one that has carried out the right procedures in the right order, but for any more delicate evaluation external criteria have to be invoked. Moreover, every language has to be treated as if it was unknown, otherwise procedural rules will be violated; so the linguist has to throw away half his evidence and a good few of his tools.

A theory on the other hand provides a means for evaluating descriptions without reference to the order in which the facts are accounted for. The linguist makes use of all he knows and there is no priority of dependence among the various parts of the description. The best description is then that which, comprehensiveness presupposed, is maximally grammatical: that is, makes maximum use of the theory to account for a maximum amount of the data.

[3] As this clause demonstrates, Fawcett's model is concerned with text generation by computer, not with language as spoken or written by humans.

[4] This is misleading. As Appendix 2 (pp306-7) demonstrates, Fawcett's model includes the following units, all of which are, in effect, constituents of the clause:

• nominal group,
• prepositional group,
• quality group,
• quantity group, and
• genitive cluster.

That is, Fawcett's model has a 2-level rank scale, in the "Categories" sense (see [1]), in all but name.

Misrepresenting Halliday's Scale & Category Grammar As A Theory Of Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 189-90):

10.1.2 The remaining traces of the concept of a 'rank scale' of 'units'

It would be surprising if the concept that was the backbone of Halliday's original theory of syntax were to disappear without trace from the theory proposed here. After all, the phenomena in language that led Halliday to recognise the concept in the first place are still there. We should ask, therefore, whether the concepts of 'unit' and 'rank', in Halliday's original senses of the terms, have any correlates in the framework of concepts proposed here. Let us examine this question for a moment.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the validity of theorising is not a matter of whether or not it is 'surprising'. 

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The rank scale was not the 'backbone' of Halliday's superseded theory, Scale & Category Grammar. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 41):

The fundamental categories for the theory of grammar are four: unit, structure, class and system.

[3] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. Even Halliday's superseded Scale & Category Grammar was not a theory of syntax. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 39) modelled the levels of language as follows:

On syntax (and morphology), Halliday (2002 [1961]: 51) wrote:

Traditionally these terms have usually referred to “grammar above the word” (syntax) and “grammar below the word” (morphology); but this distinction has no theoretical status. … But it seems worthwhile making use of “syntax” and “morphology” in the theory, to refer to direction on the rank scale. “Syntax” is then the downward relation, “morphology” the upward one; and both go all the way.

[4] To be clear, the theoretical question is how to model such phenomena to the best advantage.

[5] In anticipation of Fawcett's misunderstandings of Halliday's original senses of 'unit' and 'rank', it may be useful to cite Halliday's own words, as a point of departure. Halliday (2002 [1961]: 43):

The category set up to account for the stretches that carry grammatical patterns is the unit. The units of grammar form a hierarchy that is a taxonomy. To talk about any hierarchy, we need a conversational scale; the most appropriate here might seem that of size, going from “largest” to “smallest”; on the other hand size is difficult to represent in tables and diagrams, and may also trap one into thinking in substantial terms, and a vertical scale, from “highest” to “lowest”, has advantages here. For the moment we may use both, eventually preferring the latter. The relation among the units, then, is that, going from top (largest) to bottom (smallest), each consists of one, or of more than one, of the unit next below (next smaller). The scale on which the units are in fact ranged in the theory needs a name, and may be called rank.

Misrepresenting The Theoretical Importance Of Unit And Rank In SFL Theory

  Fawcett (2010: 189):

Taken together, the above facts suggest (1) that those who work in the framework of the Sydney Grammar do not in fact find the concepts of 'unit' and 'rank' useful when they are engaged in the nitty gritty work of describing a language or of describing a text; (2) that they only find the concept of 'rank' useful when embedding occurs, and (3) that in any case the term "embedding" is to be preferred to "rank shift". However, this apparent down-grading of the theoretical importance of the 'rank scale' and 'rank shift' is accompanied by a far stronger claim about the limitations on when 'rank shift' can occur than the claim made in "Categories", as we shall see in Section 11.8.5 of Chapter 11.

Finally, I should perhaps point out that, while the term "unit" is used frequently in the writings of Cardiff grammarians, it is always with the meaning of 'class of unit' (this being the topic of Section 10.2).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As can be seen from the two preceding posts, 'the above facts' are a collection of misleading untruths.

[2] To be clear, this is a non-sequitur. Even if what Fawcett wrote about the concepts of 'unit' and 'rank' in Halliday's current framework had been true, it would still say nothing whatsoever about what Systemic Functional grammarians find useful.

[3] To be clear, each rank is the entry condition to a set of functional systems; for example, the rank of 'clause' is the entry condition to the systems of THEME, MOOD, and TRANSITIVITY. That is its paradigmatic function. By the same token, each unit is the syntagmatic domain that is structured; for example, the unit 'clause' is usually structured as Theme^Rheme. Moreover, the elements of function structure at a higher rank are realised by units of a lower rank; for example, Subject, at the rank of clause, is realised by a nominal group.

[4] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue; see the previous post.

[5] This is misleading, because it is untrue. It is the rank scale that models syntax (and morphology) in SFL Theory. It is for this reason that Fawcett misrepresents its theoretical value in SFL Theory. Rank-shift, of course, is important in accounting systematically for instances in which a higher ranked unit realises a structural element of the same rank, or below, as, for example, when a clause realises the Subject of a clause: what you see is what you get.

[6] As we shall see in the examination of Section 11.8.5 of Chapter 11, Fawcett misrepresents Halliday (1994) on this matter, as well.

[7] As previously noted, the term 'class of unit' presupposes the notion of 'unit' (of which there are classes).

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On 'Embedding'

 Fawcett (2010: 189):

Furthermore, in the brief section in IFG on 'rank shift', Halliday quickly introduces the terms embedding and embedded as alternatives to "rank" and "rankshifted", and he then drops the original two terms completely. So it seems that Halliday himself appears to prefer the terms "embedding" and "embedded". (This is my preference too — but Halliday would not share the reason for my preference, which is that the term "embedding" expresses the key concept in the new theory that a unit frequently occurs within a unit of the same class without invoking the notion of the 'rank scale'. Again, see Section 11.1 of Chapter 11).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, what Halliday (1994: 188) actually writes is:

[2] To be clear, as can be seen in the quote above, Fawcett here confuses the notion of 'rank', a level in the rank scale of forms, with 'ranking', the status of a form that is not rankshifted.

[3] This is misleading. As can be seen from the quote above, Halliday does not "drop these terms completely". Instead, he explains that he uses the term 'embedded' only as an alternative to 'rank-shifted', excluding 'hypotaxis'. The reader is invited to predict whether or not Fawcett's use of 'embedded' includes the notion of 'hypotaxis'.

[4] This is misleading, because it flatly contradicts the Halliday quote, as can be seen above.

[5] To be clear, this proposition is not discussed in Section 11.1, as will be seen when Chapter 11 is examined.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On Rank And Halliday (1994) On Unit

Fawcett (2010: 188-9):

We should therefore ask how far the concepts of 'unit' and 'rank' are still actually used in Halliday's current framework. As we noted in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 of Chapter 5, the concept of a 'rank scale of units' is surprisingly absent from the list of "basic concepts" of Halliday's authoritative "Systemic theory" (1993), where the focus is mainly on the grammar as a generative device. However, we also noted that in IFG it continues to be used in virtually the same way as in "Categories". Thus Halliday writes, as part of the opening sentence of Chapter 1 of IFG (Halliday 1994:3), that "a passage of English [...] consists of larger units made up out of smaller units, [and] these smaller units, in their turn, are made up out of units that are smaller still." On the other hand, the index of IFG shows that the term "unit" is not used after the introductory chapters (as we saw in Section 6.2.2 of Chapter 6), and nor is "rank", except in the two brief discussions of 'rank shift'. Matthiessen (1995) goes even further, only mentioning the concept of 'unit' twice in his work of almost a thousand pages (though he has rather more to say about 'rank' and 'rank shift').

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. Halliday (1995[1993]: 272):

[2] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. As the title 'Systemic Theory' makes plain, Halliday (1993) is focussed on outlining Halliday's theory of language to a general readership — in an encyclopædia article.

[3] To be clear, this is explicitly stated in Halliday (1993); see [1] above.

[4] This is still misleading, because it is still untrue. Halliday (1994) is organised on the basis of rank. Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 7 are concerned with clause rank, and Chapters 6 and 7 Additional are concerned with group/phrase rank.

[5] To be clear, 'unit' refers to form, whereas Systemic Functional Linguistics is concerned with identifying the functions of forms.

∞

189 pages into this publication, Fawcett is repeating his previous misrepresentations of Halliday instead of getting on with outlining his own theory.

Fawcett's Claim That His Theory Does Not Use The Concept 'Unit'

Fawcett (2010: 188):

One reason for approaching the 'new' theory in the way that we now are is that it establishes from the start that there is a major change in this basic aspect of the theory. The precise nature of the concept that replaces the 'rank scale of units' will become clearer in the next section, and clearer still in Section 11.2 of Chapter 11. We shall find that the framework of syntax proposed here retains only a few incidental traces of the concept of 'rank'. There is consequently no role in the present theory for the concept of 'unit' in Halliday's original sense of 'unit on the rank scale'.

The major critical evaluation of the concept of the 'rank scale' will come in Section 11.1 of Chapter 11, under the more general heading of "constituency", and Appendix 4 provides some further notes on 'the rank scale debate'.

Even though the concept of 'unit' is not used here, a concept that was originally derived from it plays a central role in all modern SF grammars. This is class of unit, which we shall come to in Section 10.2. However, while all systemic functional grammars use the concept of 'class of unit', there is an important difference between Halliday's criteria for defining a class of unit and the criteria used by most other systemic functional grammarians who have written on the subject, as we shall see.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett's claim is that 'unit' plays no part in his theory, but that 'class of unit' does. Since 'class of unit' presupposes 'unit', just as 'class of bird' presupposes 'bird', this is nonsensical. The reason why Fawcett would jettison 'unit' as a theoretical concept is that he sees it as inextricably bound to the notion of a rank scale, and he rejects the notion of a rank scale because it is the grammatical rank scale that models syntax (and morphology) in SFL Theory, and which, therefore, makes his own model redundant.

[2] To be clear, as previously explained, a functional grammar relates the class of a unit to the function it generally realises; that is, classes are viewed 'from above'. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 76):

The class of an item indicates in a general way its potential range of grammatical functions. Hence words can be assigned to classes in a dictionary, as part of their decontextualised definition. But the class label does not show what part the item is playing in any actual structure. For that we have to indicate its function. The functional categories provide an interpretation of grammatical structure in terms of the overall meaning potential of the language. For example, see Figure 2.9.

As Fawcett has previously demonstrated, he defines 'class of unit' 'from below' — that is: not in terms of the function it realises — and it will therefore be interesting to examine the validity of the views of "most other systemic functional grammarians who have written on the subject" when Fawcett eventually relates them. Of course, any claim that a proposition is valid because a majority of people support it is an instance of the logical fallacy known as argumentum ad populum.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993 and 1994) On The Rank Scale

Fawcett (2010: 187-8): 

Thus, while the concept of the 'rank scale' has survived into the reincarnation of S&C as Systemic Functional Grammar in the Sydney version, it has not in the Cardiff version. Its centrality in the Sydney version is given a visual manifestation in the well-known summary diagram of the lexicogrammar in which the two dimensions of organisation are (1) the 'rank scale' of units and (2) the four major 'metafunctions' (e.g., Halliday (1971/73b:141), Halliday (1977/78:132) and Martin (1992:18). A similar diagram with eight 'strands of meaning' can be found in Fawcett (1980:95). However, the crucial requirement of the 'units' dimension in such diagrams is not that the units should be arranged on a 'rank scale', but that the set of units should be complete. This may sound a small difference, but it is not, as we shall see.

However, while the "Categories" concept of the 'rank scale' is clearly still present in the Sydney Grammar, we have noted (in Section 5.3 of Chapter 5) that in "Systemic theory" Halliday defines 'rank' in a curious way that avoids mentioning the concept of a 'rank scale of units'. And we have also noted (in Section 6.2 of Chapter 6) that 'rank' has an apparently diminished role in IFG.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The arrangement of units on a rank scale is the theoretical point of such diagrams.

[2] To be clear, the question of whether the set of units is 'complete' or not depends on the criteria on which they are defined. Note that Fawcett's claim is that the concept of 'unit' plays no part in his Cardiff Grammar.

[3] To be clear, this does not sound like a small difference. The organisation of units in a compositional rank scale is distinct from the 'completeness' of a set of units.

[4] This is misleading, because it is still untrue; see the earlier post Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On Rank. What Halliday (1993: 273) actually says is:

Systemic theory retains the concepts of 'rank,' 'realisation,' and 'delicacy' from scale and category grammar. 'Rank' is constituency based on function, and hence 'flat,' with minimal layering;

That is, Fawcett does not understand that a compositional hierarchy of units (constituency) is a scale from the highest rank (clause) to the lowest rank (morpheme).

[5] This is misleading, because it is still untrue, and indeed, it flatly contradicts Fawcett's previous claim (p85):

the concept of the 'rank scale' is still reflected quite strongly in IFG

To be clear, each unit on the rank scale provides the entry condition to the systems of that rank. For example, the unit 'clause' is the entry condition for the systems of THEME, MOOD and TRANSITIVITY. Moreover, the following tables from IFG (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 20-1) put the lie to Fawcett's claim:

Fawcett's Tribute To Halliday (1961)

Fawcett (2010: 187):

The concept of 'unit', in the sense defined in Halliday's "Categories", is inextricably bound up with the concept of 'rank' (as we saw in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2). In other words, there can be no concept of 'unit', in the "Categories" sense of the term, without the concept of a 'scale' of units that relates such units to each other in terms of their 'rank' on that scale — together with the accompanying set of 'rank shift' restrictions as to what 'rank' of unit may occur as an element of what other 'rank' of unit. Thus the concepts of 'unit' and 'rank' are inextricably intertwined in Halliday's theory of language, and together they make up the composite notion of the 'rank scale' that provides the backbone of Scale and Category (S&C) Grammar.

It is a tribute to the continuing influence of Halliday's founding paper "Categories of the theory of grammar" (1961/76) that the most helpful first step in explaining the new theory of syntax to be set out here to state the two basic Hallidayan concepts that it does not have. These are the precisely two concepts of 'unit' and 'rank'.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in both of Halliday's theories, Scale & Category Grammar and Systemic Functional Grammar, the term 'unit' refers to a unit of form — on the grammatical stratum: the clause, phrase, group, word and morpheme — and these are organised in terms of composition, such that a clause consists of one or more groups and phrases, which consist of one or more words, which consist of one or more morphemes. It is this compositional arrangement that constitutes the rank scale. Thus it is the rank scale that models what other theories model as syntax and morphology, and which, therefore, makes Fawcett's "Systemic Functional" syntax redundant.

[2] To be clear, here Fawcett claims that his rejection of Halliday's 'unit' and 'rank' is a tribute to the continuing influence of Halliday's theory. The question as to whether 'unit' and 'rank' are genuinely absent from Fawcett's theory will be explored in future posts.

Fawcett's Modern Systemic Functional Theory Of Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 186):

There are two parts to a theory of instances of syntax: the categories and the relationships by which these are related. We shall begin in Chapter 10 with the more 'object-like' concepts of the theory, i.e., the categories. Then in Chapter 11 we shall examine the relationships. There is a fairly close parallel between this pair of concepts and the "categories" and "scales" of Halliday (1961/76). But it is important to emphasise that my term "relationships" includes a wider range of concepts than Halliday's term "scales".

The structure of what follows therefore broadly reflects that of both Halliday (1961/76) and Fawcett (1974-6/81). …

By the beginning of Chapter 12, therefore, we shall be in a position to summarise the concepts that are required for a modern systemic functional theory of syntax, and also to evaluate how far the seven "fundamental concepts" established in "Categories" are still valid today.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Fawcett's "modern systemic functional theory of syntax" is a development of Scale and Category Grammar (Halliday 1961). This theory, which has long since been superseded by Systemic Functional Grammar, did not include system networks or metafunctions. On this basis, Fawcett's theory can hardly be called 'modern', and might be better termed a Scale and Category theory of syntax, were it not for the fact that even Halliday's first theory modelled syntax (and morphology) as a rank scale.

"Using The Cardiff Grammar As The Baseline For Constructing A Modern Theory Of SF Syntax"

Fawcett (2010: 185-6, 186n):

In Chapters 10 and 11 we turn to the concepts that are required for the specification of 'instances of syntax'. As we have seen, these concepts are drawn on in a computer model of parsing such as that described in Weerasinghe & Fawcett (1993), Weerasinghe (1994) and Souter (1996). However, these concepts are also referred to in the realisation rules, and are in that sense presupposed by them.

As will by now clear, we shall be using the Cardiff Grammar rather than the Sydney Grammar as the baseline for constructing a modern theory of SF syntax.⁵ 

⁵ Apart from the reasons that follow from our findings in Chapter 7, there are two more reasons for this. Firstly, the Cardiff Grammar has taken the revolutionary proposals for changes to the theory made by Halliday in the 1960s (as summarised in Chapter 4) significantly further than the Sydney Grammar has. It has full implementations of (1) explicitly semantic system networks, (2) the concept of lexis as "most delicate grammar", (3) the integration into the system networks of the meanings realised in intonation and (4) the integration of meanings realised in punctuation. Secondly, the Cardiff Grammar provides a much fuller specification than the Sydney Grammar does of the syntactic concepts that are required, both for language in general and for the description of English in particular — especially in its recognition of classes of group and cluster that are not provided for in the Sydney Grammar.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, Fawcett's 'instances of syntax' are actually structures, not instances. Fawcett's model (Figure 4) confuses the realisation relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes with the instantiation relation between potential and instance.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar is his model of syntax. Halliday's "Sydney Grammar" — SFL Theory — models syntax (and morphology) as a rank scale, but Halliday (1985: xiv) explains why the term 'syntax' is inappropriate for a functional grammar:

[3] To be clear, Halliday's work in the 1960s was concerned with Scale and Category Grammar, not with Systemic Functional Grammar. That is, Fawcett's claim is actually that his Cardiff Grammar takes the proposals of Halliday's superseded theory further than Halliday's current theory does.

[4] To be clear, Fawcett does not present any of his 'explicitly system semantic networks' in this entire publication. In SFL terms, such networks are actually the grammatical networks, and can be found in Halliday & Matthiessen (2004, 2014). For genuinely semantic networks, see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999).

[5] To be clear, Fawcett has nowhere demonstrated, in this publication, how he models 'lexis as most delicate grammar', and it does not figure in his theoretical architecture (Figure 4). Moreover, since Fawcett locates grammatical systems at his level of meaning, his model is committed to lexis as most delicate semantics, not grammar.

[6] To be clear, Fawcett does not present any of the system networks of the meanings realised in intonation in this entire publication. For an SFL approach to intonation, see Halliday & Greaves (2008).

[7] To be clear, Fawcett does not present any of the 'integration of meanings' realised in punctuation in this entire publication.

[8] This misleading. The 'Sydney Grammar' (SFL Theory) does not provide any specifications 'of the syntactic concepts that are required, both for language in general and for the description of English in particular', largely because SFL Theory is not a theory of syntax; see [2] above.

Fawcett's Summary Of His Comparison Of His Operations With SFL's Realisation Statements

Fawcett (2010: 185):

Let me summarise. Leaving aside the "Split" and "Expand" operations of the Sydney Grammar, which are either unworkable or unnecessary, the Sydney Grammar has an equivalent for every realisation operation in the Cardiff Grammar except the first (though these are not always in a one-to-one relationship, as we have seen). These realisation operations are important concepts in the theory, as their treatment in both Halliday (1993) and Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993) clearly demonstrates. 

However, these 'operation' concepts are a part of the grammar itself, so that they are relevant only indirectly to the outputs from the grammar — i.e., to a description of the structure of the text-sentences that are the instances of the potential specified in the grammar. Essentially, their function is to generate the relationships between the categories that we shall establish in Chapter 10. It is in Chapter 11 that we shall meet the relationships again. And it is perhaps significant that the first concept to be discussed there — that of 'rank' — has no equivalent among the realisation operations and will be rejected, while all of those to be considered in Sections 11.2 to 11.8 do have such a relationship.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue, as previously demonstrated.

[2] This is misleading, because it falsely presents Halliday's original model ("the Sydney Grammar") as if it were the derivative model (Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar).

[3] To be clear, this is both a non-sequitur and untrue. It is a non-sequitur because their being part of the grammar does not logically entail that realisation 'operations' are only indirectly relevant to the structures they specify; for example, the PROCESS TYPE system is also part of the grammar, and yet it is "directly relevant" to the experiential structure of the clause. And it is untrue because 'operations' (realisation statements) "directly" specify how system selections (paradigmatic axis) are realised structurally (syntagmatic axis).

[4] To be clear, here again Fawcett misunderstands the realisation relation between system and structure as the instantiation relation between system and instance — and he does so despite the fact that his term 'realisation operations' explicitly identifies the relation as realisation, not instantiation.

[5] To be clear, the claim that Fawcett's realisation operations (listed below) generate relationships between categories will be tested in the examination of Chapters 10 and 11.

1. Insert a unit (to fill an element). 

2. Locate an element at a place in a unit.

3. Conflate an element or Participant Role with an existing element. 

4. Expound an element by an item.

4a. Fetch a name to expound an element. 

5. Prefer certain features on re-entry to the system network , including preselection. 

6. For an element, re-enter the system network.

[6] To be clear, in SFL Theory, rank is not an "equivalent" of realisation statements. The rank scale provides the entry conditions to the systems of each rank, and realisation statements accompany features in those networks. Moreover, the rank scale is the means by which SFL Theory models form — i.e. syntax and morphology — and so is the theoretical dimension that makes Fawcett's model of syntax redundant. So it is hardly surprising that Fawcett rejects the 'concept' of rank. 

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On The Realisation Statement 'Conflate'

Fawcett (2010: 184-5):

Matthiessen & Bateman (1991) and Matthiessen (1995) call Halliday's "Split" operation "Expand", but otherwise there is, in principle, no difference between them and Halliday. In practice, however, they do not fully implement Halliday's concept that the MOOD structure consists primarily of "Mood + Residue" and only secondarily of "Subject + Finite + Complement" (or whatever it happens to be). See the examination of their account of generation in Section 7.4.2 of Chapter 7, which showed that their model is not a 'structure conflation' model, as the IFG model is, but an 'element conflation' model. As I argued there, this fact demonstrates that in the theoretical-generative strand of work in the Sydney Grammar the concept of 'structure conflation' is unnecessary, undesirable, and ultimately unworkable.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, Halliday (1995 [1993]: 272) specifies an 'Expand' realisation statement, not a "Split" operation:

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. It is only Fawcett, not Halliday, who regards these structures as 'primary' and 'secondary'.

[3] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Halliday's model. As previously demonstrated in the examination of Fawcett's Section 7.4.2, and shown above in Halliday's realisation statement (b), in SFL Theory, it is only elements that are conflated, not structures.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1994) On Maximally Extended Theme

Fawcett (2010: 184):

The other line of structure where Halliday frequently shows more than one line of structural analysis is in THEME, and this happens whenever there is a case of 'multiple theme'. For example, on page 55 of IFG there are three lines of structure for THEME in the analysis of Well but then Ann surely wouldn't the best idea be to join the group. On the pattern of the IFG approach to the structure of MOOD (as in Figure 7 of Chapter 7), Halliday's grammar would operate by first generating the 'multiple theme' of Well but then Ann surely wouldn't the best idea, since he analyses all of these items as different 'subcomponents' of the 'Theme', and it would then "split" it into its separate parts. It seems most unlikely that Halliday (or anyone else) would wish to treat all of these as parts of a single element, but that is the clear implication of the introduction of his "Split" operation. (See Section 10.3.4 of Chapter 10 for a discussion of 'primary' and 'secondary' structures.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the example in Halliday (1994: 55) is:

[2] As previously explained for Mood, the grammar does not first "generate" a multiple Theme and then expand it into textual and interpersonal sub-components. This is to mistake a system network of relations for an algorithmic procedure. The identity relation between system and structure is intensive (elaboration), not circumstantial (enhancement: temporal): thematic structure realises systemic features selected from simultaneous networks, including those that specify textual and interpersonal Themes; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 106):

[3] This is misleading, because it is the opposite of what is true. To be clear, all the sub-components do indeed constitute Theme as a single element of clause structure. The reason why this seems 'most unlikely' to Fawcett is that his 'systemic syntax' views grammar from below: giving priority to structure over system, and to form over function. In this case, because the structure has multiple forms, he assumes that there cannot be a single functional element realising the system of THEME.

[4] Again, it is only Fawcett who regards these structures as 'primary' and 'secondary'.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On The Realisation Statement 'Expand'

Fawcett (2010: 184):

The last realisation operation that requires a comment is Halliday's Operation (e) of "Split". This has no equivalent in the Cardiff Grammar. A "Split" operation is only needed in a grammar which represents both 'primary' and 'secondary' structures (as introduced in "Categories" and still used regularly for some aspects of structure in IFG). Halliday introduces it to enable the grammar first to generate what he would term a 'primary structure' (such as "Mood + Residue" in Figure 7 in Chapter 7), and then to 'split' the 'Mood' element into the two elements of its supposedly 'secondary' structure, i.e., into "Subject + Finite". Halliday does not explain why he thinks it desirable to generate the "Mood" element first and then to split it into two, but we can presume that the intention is to give expression to the idea that the "Mood + Residue" structure is 'primary' and the "Subject + Finite" structure is 'secondary'. Nor does Halliday explain what would actually happen in practice when a "Split" operation is carried out.

The reason why the Cardiff Grammar has no such realisation operation is, of course, that we recognise only one degree of 'delicacy' in the structures of the clause, so that there is no need for an operation whose function is to add another line of analysis to the representation. Instead, we treat the Subject and the Operator (Halliday's "Finite") as direct elements of the clause.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, Halliday (1995 [1993]: 272) does not propose an Operation of "Split", but a realisation statement of 'expand':

(e) 'Expand' an element into a further configuration (e.g., expand mood into subject+ finite);

[2] Non-trivially, the grammar does not first "generate" a Mood element and then expand it into Subject and Finite elements. This is to mistake a system network of relations for an algorithmic procedure. The identity relation between system and structure is intensive (elaboration), not circumstantial (enhancement: temporal).

[3] This is misleading. It is only Fawcett who regards these structures as 'primary' and 'secondary'.

[4] This is misleading. On the one hand, Halliday does explain why a Mood element is necessary. For example, the presence of the Mood element realises the feature 'indicative' (Halliday 1994: 74). On the other hand, the realisation statement 'expand' is not used in the system network of MOOD; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

[5] To be clear, Halliday's explains that this realisation statement expands an element into a further configuration. 

[6] To be clear, in SFL Theory, delicacy (hyponymy) is a sub-type of elaboration (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 145) and a dimension of systems, not structures. In contrast, the relation of Subject and Finite to the Mood element is composition (meronymy), a subtype of extension (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 146).

[7] This is misleading, since Subject and Finite are "direct" elements of the clause in SFL Theory also. Or more precisely, the notion of 'direct' is irrelevant here, deriving, as it does, from Fawcett's misunderstanding of a system network as a sequenced algorithm; see [2] above.

Fawcett's Difficulty In Understanding The Absence Of 'Insert Unit' In Halliday's Theory

 Fawcett (2010: 183):

It is hard to understand why the Sydney Grammar lists of realisation operations should not give Operation 1 at least the status of being a separate operation from 'preselection'. For a start, this operation will only generate units for the lower layers of a structure, so their realisation operations appear not to have any means of generating the initial unit of the clause. Moreover, even when we limit ourselves to lower units in the structure (such as how a nominal group comes to fill an element such as Subject, we should note that it is perfectly possible for the grammar to need to select a given feature on the next pass through the network without thereby also inserting a new unit, so that preselection must in any case be treated as a separate operation from the insertion of a new unit. 

It is therefore hard to understand why Halliday, Matthiessen and Bateman have no equivalent of Operation 1. The reason may possibly be connected with the fact that the emphasis in the Sydney Grammar is strongly on the generation of clauses. Perhaps this leads those working in that framework to take it for granted that all the choices being made in the system network are for the clause unless the rules state otherwise, so that the insertion of the initial clause does not get stated explicitly. Indeed, one surprising fact about the literature of the Sydney Grammar is that it contains no examples of generations of texts that involve a further layer of structure beyond that of a single clause — even in the fairly full description of the Penman Project given in Matthiessen & Bateman (1991). So there is no account of how the process of re-entry operates in the Sydney Grammar, whether for a clause or even for a simple nominal group. In practice, however, the computer implementation of the Penman model must have some equivalent operation to our Operation 1, or it would be unable to generate structures with more than a single layer (as it does when used in computer implementations). Indeed, the existing realisation operations refer to the generation of lower units (e.g., "Preselect nominal group" in Halliday (1993:4505) — though there are no worked examples.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously noted, Fawcett's Operation 1 is 'Insert unit (to fill an element)'. The reason why SFL Theory has no equivalent is simply because a unit is selected from the rank scale within the system.

Each of these units serves as the entry condition to the systems of that unit. It is the rank scale that anchors the systems of the clause — theme, mood and transitivity — on the stratum of lexicogrammar, rather than semantics. Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar locates these grammatical systems at the level of semantics, and does not include a rank scale.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a nominal group realises the element Subject.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, a unit such as a clause or group is instantiated in a single 'pass' through the simultaneous systems of that unit, so there is no need for re-entry in the instantiation of a single unit. In cases where units form complexes, the network is re-entered through a system of RECURSION, as illustrated for the highest unit, clause, by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 438):

On The Absence Of Fawcett's Operations 1 and 6 In The Realisation Statements Of Halliday (1993)

Fawcett (2010: 182-3):

However, the most striking difference between the two sets of realisation operations is the omission from all three of the Sydney Grammar lists of our Operations 1 and 6. Operations 1 and 2 are in a sense the two fundamental operations, in that each adds one of the two major categories to the structure: Operation 1 adds a unit and Operation 2 an element. For example, the choice of the feature [situation] is realised by inserting the unit 'Cl' (for 'Clause'), and the choice of the feature [thing] is realised by inserting 'ngp' (for 'nominal group'). If there is no unit, there can logically be no elements, and so no structure. Thus the computer implementation of the Sydney Grammar must have such an operation, or it could not work. The odd thing is that it is not listed here. Operation 6 equally is crucial, because if the network is not re-entered only one layer of structure can be generated. 

The clue to the answer comes in Matthiessen and Bateman's description of what is covered by their term "preselection". For them, "preselections are instructions to re-enter the grammar to develop the function constituents of the clause as nominal groups, [...] and so on" (1991:108), so that their "Preselect" operation includes all three of (1) 'preselection' (in the strict sense of the term). (2) 're-entry' and (3) the insertion of a new unit. No doubt we can infer from this that Halliday's "preselect" operation includes the same three steps. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett's Operation 1 is 'Insert a unit (to fill an element)' (p180). In SFL Theory, a unit (clause, group, word, morpheme) is selected from the rank scale in a system network. SFL Theory models the phenomena of syntax as a rank scale. Fawcett's model of syntax (allegedly) does not include a rank scale.

[2] To be clear, Fawcett's Operation 6 is 'For an element, re-enter the system network' (p180). In SFL Theory, the selection of a given unit entails the selection of the features and the activation of realisation statements that specify all the elements of that unit. This includes structures that Fawcett regards as involving more than one "layer", such as clauses with textual and/or interpersonal Themes, where each is modelled as a simultaneous system within the network. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162):

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue; see [1] above. Halliday's (1995 [1993]: 273) realisation statement is not concerned with inserting a unit, but with preselecting a feature at a lower rank:

• 'Preselect' some feature at a lower rank (e.g., preselect actor : human collective);

[4] To be clear, Matthiessen & Bateman (1991) involves the adaptation of SFL Theory to the limitations of computers for the purposes of text generation. As such, it is not equivalent to the SFL model of the human use of language.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On The Realisation Statements 'Preselect' And 'Classify'

Fawcett (2010: 182):

Halliday's Operation (f) is roughly equivalent to our Operation 5, with the important difference that ours is expressed in terms of preferences — and preferences can set the probability of a feature being selected on re-entering the system network to any point on a scale from 0% to 100%. In contrast, the more limited concept of preselection implies an absolute probability (i.e., 100%) that the specified feature will be selected. Interestingly, it appears from Halliday's examples that his "Classify" operation is essentially the same as his "Preselect" operation, and both Matthiessen & Bateman (1991) and Matthiessen (1995) simply omit "Classify" from their lists. The two are therefore treated as equivalent in Figure 11.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday's realisation statement (f) is

• 'Preselect' some feature at a lower rank (e.g., preselect actor : human collective),

whereas Fawcett's Operation 5 is

• Prefer certain features on re-entry to the system network , including preselection (= 100% preference). 

These are not 'roughly equivalent', because Halliday's statement does not involve re-entry, and because Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar does not include a rank scale.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Halliday's realisation statement (d) is

• 'Classify' an element (e.g., classify process as mental : cognition);

As can be seen, 'classify' affects features of a given rank, whereas 'preselect' affects features of the rank below.

[3] It is therefore misleading to treat the two realisation statements as equivalent. In downplaying these differences between Halliday's realisation statements and Fawcett's realisation operations, Fawcett is downplaying the disadvantages of not including a rank scale in his model.

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On The Realisation Statement 'Lexify' In A Footnote

Fawcett (2010: 181-2, 182n):

The "Conflate" operation is clearly the same in both models, and Halliday's "Lexify" is equivalent to our "Expound". However, it is important to note that the example of 'lexification' is the exponence of the Subject by the item it (presumably for cases of 'empty Subjects' such as It's raining). In other words, it seems that the "Lexify" operation is not limited, as one might at first suppose, to lexical items, in the usual sense of that term, and that it can also introduce grammatical items to the structure. It therefore covers all types of  'item' — just as the operation "Expound" does in the Cardiff Grammar.⁴

⁴ It is surprising to find Halliday using this example, because it goes against the principle of 'total accountability at all ranks'. This requires, of course, that the Subject should be filled by a nominal group (or some other unit of that 'rank' or above). In the Cardiff Grammar the item it functions as the direct exponent of the Subject only in cases with an "empty Subject", such as It's raining and It's nice to see you, so perhaps this is the case in Halliday's example? But, if this is so, it breeches his 'rank scale' principle.

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because it is untrue. There is no 'breeching' of 'total accountability at all ranks' or the 'rank scale' principle because, in all such examples, the Subject of the clause is realised by nominal group whose Thing/Head is realised by a word:

Misrepresenting Halliday (1993) On The Realisation Statement 'Order'

Fawcett (2010: 181):

Interestingly, Halliday's original version of his Operation (c) specifies that the task of locating elements in the appropriate sequence in a unit should be achieved by 'ordering' elements in relation to each other — but in "Systemic theory" he adds, after the words "order an element with respect to another", the further words "or to some defined location". This wording seems to suggest that Halliday may wish to extend his original approach to 'ordering' to include the Cardiff Grammar concept of a '(numbered) place in a unit' — and perhaps even to embrace the concept of a 'potential structure' (i.e., an 'ordered list of elements at places in a unit') — as introduced in Fawcett (1973/81). Since this concept has actually been used in the Penman implementation of the Sydney Grammar (as noted in Section 10.4.2 of Chapter 10), it is possible that Halliday's wording here may be intended to reflect the adoption in the Penman implementation of my concept of 'places'.

 Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, since 'operation' is Fawcett's term only, not Halliday's. Where Fawcett's term demonstrates that his model is limited to text generation by computers, Halliday's model is concerned with the system-&-process of human language, whose material substrate is biological, rather than technological.

[2] This is misleading, because it is untrue. The concept of a '(numbered) place in a unit' only arises from giving priority to the view 'from below' — structure over system, form over function — in a model that is concerned with adapting theory to the limitations of computers.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. In SFL Theory, potential is modelled as system, not structure. Halliday explicitly rejected the Chomskyan notion of language as an inventory of structures.

However, the notion of semantic 'structure potential', varying for genre (text type) appears in the work of Hasan (1985: 64ff), though Halliday himself did not adopt his wife's model. It can also be noted here that Martin (1992) misunderstands Hasan's 'Generic Structure Potential' as modelling genre, rather than semantics varying according to genre.

[4] To be clear, the Penman 'implementation of the Sydney Grammar' was an adaptation of SFL Theory to the limitations of computers.

The Cardiff Grammar's Rules For The 'Insertion' Of An Element

Fawcett (2010: 181):

Since this is so, the Cardiff Grammar's rules for the 'insertion' of an element tend to be attached to more delicate features in the system network than in the published versions of the Sydney Grammar. In other words, the realisation rule that inserts an element in a unit is attached to a feature that occurs at the point in the system network by which we know not only that the element will be present in the unit but also the precise place at which it will occur.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Fawcett's realisation rules are not located in system networks (meaning), but at a lower level of symbolic abstraction (form), despite the fact that they apply to network features at the higher level of symbolic abstraction (meaning). This contradiction alone invalidates the theoretical architecture of the Cardiff Grammar (Figure 4).

Fawcett's 'Fetch' Operation

Fawcett (2010: 177-8):

In the Cardiff Grammar, there is a variant of Operation 4, which we shall call Operation 4a. This is the Fetch operation, and it is used to expound items when the item is not an ordinary word in the language that has a 'meaning', but a 'name'. Thus the 'meaning' of Mr White is nothing to do with the colour quality of 'white'. Rather it is something like 'formal', in contrast with Peter, which may be informal'. In order to expound such meanings, e.g., in a computer model of generation, the generation system must consult its 'knowledge' (or, to use a preferable term, its 'beliefs') in order to discover the specific title (realised as Mr, Mrs, Ms, Dr, etc) and family name of the referent, and then 'fetch' the relevant forms for use in the sentence generator. Hence the need to use a different type of operation in the generation of names.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, all wordings realise ("have") meanings.

[2] To be clear, this gives priority to the view 'from below', the expression 'white', rather than the view from 'above', the meaning realised by 'white' (surname vs colour). In SFL Theory, priority is given to to the view 'from above'.

[3] To be clear, 'formal' vs 'informal' does not distinguish the meanings of White vs Peter, but rather the different tenor variables of the situation type (cultural context), enacted by the choice of surname vs forename.

[4] To be clear, this only applies to a computer model of generation, not to the logogenesis of spoken, signed or written texts by flesh-&-blood human beings. Moreover, in SFL Theory, 'knowledge' and 'beliefs' are meanings (the semantic stratum of language).

Fawcett's 'Sentence' Element

 Fawcett (2010: 176-7):

While the system network models choices between meanings, the early choices are between the generalised meanings such as 'situation', 'thing' and 'quality', which are realised as the major syntactic units of the language. …

In generation, the first unit to be generated is always a clause. The 'element' that it fills is an element of an unusual sort, because it is not an element in a unit that is recognised in the model of syntax presented here. The element is the 'Sentence', and this term is interpreted as a placeholder for the 'element' of discourse structure (whichever it is) for which the text-sentence is being generated.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett does not present these system networks in this publication.

[2] To be clear, these 'generalised meanings' are experiential meanings only. Logical, interpersonal and textual meanings do not feature as 'generalised meanings' in Fawcett's unseen system network.

[3] As this wording demonstrates, this is a model of text generation, not of language itself.

[4] To be clear, in Fawcett's model of syntax, the clause fills an element in a unit that is not recognised in Fawcett's model of syntax.

[5] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the sentence is a unit of graphology, the expression plane system of written mode.

[6] To be clear, in Fawcett's model, a sentence is an element that is a placeholder for an element of discourse structure, though no such discourse structures are identified, and 'discourse structure' does not feature in his model (Figure 4).

Misunderstanding Axial Realisation As Instantiation

Fawcett (2010: 174):

Thus most of this chapter will be wholly oriented to the theoretical-generative strand of work in SFL. It might at first appear that Chapters 10 and 11 are oriented to the text-descriptive strand. However, they are only 'text-descriptive' in the sense that the emphasis is on the text-sentences that are the output from the operation of the grammar, and it is these that constitute the texts that are analysed in 'text-descriptive' work. These two chapters are also in fact primarily theoretical, in that the concepts covered there are the theoretical concepts that are required in the description of the structure of English that is needed by a computer for parsing a text — and, indeed, by a human text analyst. The concepts that characterise instances are therefore as much a part of the overall theory as the concepts required in the grammar itself to generate those outputs.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Fawcett's theory of language is actually concerned with what computers and linguists require for parsing a text.

[2] As previously explained, Fawcett equates 'instance' with 'output', and consequently misunderstands structures (syntagmatic axis) as instances of realisation rules (paradigmatic axis).

Fawcett's Theories Of Syntax Potential & Instances Of Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 174):

In the rest of the present chapter I shall specify the theory of syntax potential that is required in a modern, large-scale systemic functional grammar — i.e., the concepts that are required in the grammar itself. Then Chapters 10 and 11 will provide an account of the theory of instances of syntax — i.e., the part of the theory that underlies the description of text-sentences. Finally, Chapter 12 will summarise the current theory in relation to its antecedents, including "Categories", offering an evaluation of its importance today.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, for Halliday (1985 & 1994: xiv), the term 'syntax' suggests an approach to theorising that is inconsistent with the approach to SFL Theory, 'such that a language is interpreted as a system of forms, to which meanings are then attached'. In SFL Theory, 'syntax' is modelled as a rank scale. Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar does not include a rank scale.

[2] As previously explained, Fawcett's 'instances of syntax' are not instances of potential, but syntagmatic structures that realise realisation rules. That is, Fawcett's model (Figure 4) confuses the realisation relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes with the instantiation relation between potential and instance.

[3] To be clear, the term 'text sentences', like the architecture of Fawcett's model (Figure 4), confuses instance (text) with structure (sentence). In SFL Theory, 'sentence' is theorised as a rank unit of graphology.

[4] Fawcett's evaluation of the importance of his own model will be evaluated in the examination of his final chapter.

Fawcett's "Surprising Discoveries"

Fawcett (2010: 174):

In Part 1 we considered a number of different approaches to syntax in SFL, and we made some surprising discoveries about the status of the 'multiple structure' representations in IFG. That prolegomenon to the new theory will, I hope, have changed your perspective on the two original questions that were asked in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1. Most importantly, we are now aware that the theory of syntax must contain both a theory of 'syntax potential' and a theory of 'instances of syntax'. The main question was:

(1) What theoretical concepts are required for the description of syntax in a modern, large-scale systemic functional grammar? 

And, as a supplementary question of historical interest, we asked:

(2) How far are the founding concepts introduced by Halliday in "Categories" (1961/76) still valid in such a model?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL the approach to syntax is to model it as a rank scale. Fawcett's model has no rank scale.

[2] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, the "surprising discoveries" with regard to 'multiple structure' representations in IFG were Fawcett's misrepresentations of them, deriving from his misunderstandings, most notably his confusion of formal constituency with function structure.

[3] This is misleading, because it falsely presents a statement of Fawcett's model (Figure 4) as if it had been supported by reasoned argument in Part 1. More importantly, the relation between syntax potential (realisation rules) and instances of syntax (structure) is not instantiation, but realisation: the relation between the paradigmatic (realisation rules) and syntagmatic (structure) axes. This confusion alone invalidates Fawcett's model.

[4] It will be seen when Fawcett eventually comes to presenting his own theory, that his "modern" theory of syntax has more in common with Halliday's first theory, Scale & Category Grammar (1961), than the theory that replaced it, Systemic Functional Grammar.

Fawcett's Relevant Sources For A Modern Theory Of Systemic Functional Syntax

Fawcett (2010: 173):

Clearly, Halliday's important summary of current SFL in "Systemic theory" must be given due weight — especially because so many of the concepts that are new since "Categories" are present in the equivalent Cardiff Grammar work of Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993), as we noted in Section 5.5 of Chapter 5. Yet we must also take into account the evidence from Halliday's actual descriptive practice in IFG, even though it is harder to establish what the concepts are in this work. As we have noted, the concepts behind the representations of structure in IFG have more in common with the concepts of "Categories" than they have with "Systemic theory" — despite the great differences between the 'single structure' representation used in "Categories"-style analyses (as exemplified in Figure 1 in Chapter 2) and in the IFG-style analyses (as in Figure 7 in Chapter 7).

In addition, we must also draw on the evidence from work in the framework of the Cardiff Grammar, both from the 'text-descriptive' work that is roughly equivalent to IFG from Fawcett (in press) and from the 'theoretical-generative' work such as that in Fawcett, Tucker & Lin (1993) that is the equivalent to Halliday's "Systemic theory".

Finally, we have noted at various points that work on the formalisation of systemic functional grammars in computers has had an important influence on the theory, and in both the Sydney and the Cardiff Grammars this has led to the further refinement of the categories and relationships that need to be recognised in the theory.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As previously explained, "Systemic theory" (Halliday 1993) and IFG (Halliday 1994) outline the same theory, but to different readerships, whereas "Categories" (Halliday 1961) outlines a different theory, Scale & Category Grammar, that was superseded by Systemic Functional Grammar. To be clear, Fawcett is here preparing the reader to view positively the fact that his modern theory of syntax has more in common with Scale & Category Grammar (Halliday 1961) than Systemic Functional Grammar.

[2] The strategic use of the term 'equivalent' here — for 'analogous' — is misleading, because it gives the false impression that work in Fawcett's Cardiff Grammar is, in some sense, equivalent in terms of its theoretical assumptions and architecture to Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar.

[3] To be clear, adapting a theory of human language to the limitations of computers is not the same as modelling the language of humans. As demonstrated previously, Fawcett's model (Figure 4) has more in common with algorithms for text generation, than with models of human language.

Misrepresenting The Accounts Of Theories In Fawcett's Part 1

Fawcett (2010: 173):

In Part 1, we have examined four accounts of syntax in SFL. In Chapter 2 we looked at Halliday's "Categories of the theory of grammar" (1961/76), and in Chapters 5 and 6 we noted the considerable changes between the set of concepts presented in "Categories" and the concepts found in his "Systemic theory" (1993) and his An Introduction to Functional Grammar (1994). Then in Chapter 8 of Part 1 I described the framework of concepts set out in my "Some proposals for systemic syntax" (Fawcett 1974-7/81) — this being a revision of the concepts of "Categories" that was made as an explicit response to two factors: the exciting changes which Halliday made to the theory in the 1960s (described in Chapter 4), and very large quantities of work in text analysis. 

We therefore have three 'post-Categories' accounts of SFL syntax. The question now arises as to which of the three should be drawn upon — and to what extent — in the task of establishing a modern theory of SF syntax.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue, not least because, as previously explained, (a) neither of Halliday's theories, Scale and Category Grammar or Systemic Functional Grammar is a theory of syntax and (b) Scale and Category Grammar is not Systemic Functional Linguistics. Moreover, the accounts in Halliday (1993) and (1994) are accounts of the same theory, written for different audiences, as previously explained. That is, the only account of "systemic syntax" that has been introduced — not examined — is Fawcett (1974-7/81).

[2] To be clear, Fawcett's "Some proposals" was addressed to Halliday's first theory, Scale and Category Grammar, after Halliday had devised his second theory, Systemic Functional Grammar.

[3] To be clear, if it were consistent with SFL Theory to establish a "modern theory of SF syntax", then the modern version of SFL (e.g. Halliday 1993, 1994) "should be drawn upon". The reader is invited to guess whether this will be the case.