The Argument For A Single Integrated Representation Of Structure

Fawcett (2010: xxii):

To express matters in this way seems at first sight to provide a neat way to reconcile the two models of structure. To my considerable regret, however, I have to point out that this is not what I am proposing. This is because, once one recognises the need for this final type of representation, it leads on to further questions. If this final integrated representation is required — as it undoubtedly is — we have to ask questions such as:

1 What is the status in the theory of the intermediate 'multiple structure' representations of clauses in IFG?

2 Do they represent some sort of 'intermediate' structure between the representation in terms of systemic features and the final integrated representation? 

3 If so, are the 'multiple structures' needed at all? 

If the answer to the third question is "Yes", so that 'multiple structures' of the type shown in IFG are indeed to be treated as an integral part of the model of language, this entails the addition to the model of a new component. Its function would be to convert the 'multiple structure' type of representation into a single representation. But this leads in turn to further questions, such as:

4 Is such component used in the computer implementations of Halliday's theory, e.g., is it described in Matthiessen & Bateman (1991)? 

5 Is there any indication anywhere else in the literature of SFL as to what this component would be like? Indeed, we must also ask: 

6 Is there, in fact, any way in which it is possible to 'integrate' several different structures (as opposed to integrating their elements, which is already standard practice in the theory)?

Chapter 7 asks these questions, provides the answers, and then discusses the implications of these answers for the theory. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] Still no argument has been provided as to why the three complementary function structures need to be integrated into a single syntactic structure.  It has merely been asserted to be true.  This is a version of the logical fallacy known as proof by assertion.

[2] This unsupported claim is presented as both:

• a motivation for these series of questions (see previous critique), and 
• one of the questions that logically follow from itself.

This is a version of the logical fallacy known as circular reasoning (circulus in probando) or begging the question (petitio principii).

[3] Here Fawcett criticises his colleagues for not having done what he has not demonstrated needs to be done.